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  • Air India

    http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4ac18ec7&opt=0

    so, i'm curious, aside from the glaringly obvious 3 green lights and the position of that giant lever, isn't there some other way these two idiots could've known that they forgot to retract the gear?

  • #2
    Noise and vibration?

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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    • #3
      apparently also ecam messages. not that these idiots were looking.....

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      • #4
        I recall that some years ago a Captain was dismissed because his ATPL was one of the type that comes from a cereal box....I.e. He never actually trained as a pilot.
        Could it be I wonder that....... ?
        If it 'ain't broken........ Don't try to mend it !

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        • #5
          Originally posted by TeeVee View Post
          http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4ac18ec7&opt=0

          so, i'm curious, aside from the glaringly obvious 3 green lights and the position of that giant lever, isn't there some other way these two idiots could've known that they forgot to retract the gear?
          This is what happens with pure procedural mentality. Positive rate...switch to departure...no other observation or thought needed.

          By the way, I think there's a non PC comment that could be made.
          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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          • #6
            Originally posted by 3WE View Post
            This is what happens with pure procedural mentality. Positive rate...switch to departure...no other observation or thought needed.

            By the way, I think there's a non PC comment that could be made.
            except that the procedure is: V1. V2. rotate. positive rate. gear up. so in this case, evan's purely procedural methodology would have worked and likely would have saved these two pilots' arses.

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            • #7
              Originally posted by TeeVee View Post
              except that the procedure is: V1. V2. rotate. positive rate. gear up....evan's purely procedural methodology...
              We give Gabriel grief for long posts...but he's thorough and explains the nuances.

              The issue is the human brain...we forget stuff and that's a major reason why I razz Evan on his purely procedural mindset.

              So...the procedure that is referenced in this thread, was positive rate, contact departure...(which yes, violates the post-takeoff memory checklist)

              But, the pure-procedure, memorize-regurgitate mind never ever pauses again to think about the gear, or peek at the three green lights...The mind just moves on to the next item in the checklist!

              Thinking that maybe I'll keep a known, robust power and attitude for a minute while I sort out my crazy computer...that bugs the heck out of Evan...he will remind us, "That's NOT the procedure for UAS!" (Cleary we need more training...memorize...regurgitate...sooo many checklists...no thought to go back and check the gear).

              But as you & others said towards the start of this thread...how in the hell is it that they never glanced down at the gear lights, noted the rumble...noted that the plane was 'slower'...???

              I think that their minds were simply full of the procedure with no ability to stop, think or reflect...(and yes, they did brain fart and skip a checklist item)...

              (Which I suppose would require cowboy improvisation to detect that the gear was down...cowboy improvisation like pausing and thinking and looking!)
              Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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              • #8
                sorry bro, i'm gonna disagree with you a bit here. having sat in the cockpit of a modern aircraft (challenger 300) during all phases of flight several times, with two COMPETENT, experienced, old school pilots, i've seen and heard first hand (though didn't participate) how it is supposed to be done. PF makes the callout for "gear up" after PM announces "positive rate." PF then repeats "gear up" and actually stows the gear.

                this has to be not just a mindless memorization, but the product of executing the necessary steps and announcements which serve to assure that the required actions are actually taken. but, even if it is mindlessly called out, THAT mindlessness serves a purpose.

                now i will of course sand corrected by real pilots if i'm wrong, but this has been my experience first hand and has been confirmed by a 737 pilot friend. Bobby, feel free to ump in here and call me out if i'm wrong.

                i wonder if the report will ever be released on what occurred in that cockpit during takeoff. i'd love to read the transcript.

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                • #9
                  PM: 80
                  PF: Checked
                  PM: V1, Rotate, V2
                  PM: Positive climb
                  PF: [Crosschecks positive climb and sometimes repeats "positive climb", then commands] Gear up
                  PM: Gear up [and moves the gear lever to the UP position]
                  PM: [monitors the stowing of the landing gear and then calls] Gear up, lights out [indicating that the green lights indicating that the gear is down, and then red lights indicating that the gear is unsafe / in transit, have extinguished]

                  Then there are other activities that need to be done, if the PAC was set to off for higher take-off thrust, it must be turned on to provide AC and pressurization, at 100 or 1500 ft the plane will level-of or reduce it's rate of climb to let the plane accelerate, flaps will be gradually retracted as speed increases, thrust will be set from TO to Climb, then the plane reaches 250 kts the pilots will pitch up again to stop accelerating and keep climbing at 250kts, then...

                  PF: After take-off checklist
                  PM: After take off check list
                  PM: Air cond and press?
                  PF: [Checks status and confirms] Set
                  PM: Start switches?
                  PF: [Checks status and confirms] Off
                  PM: Landing gear?
                  PF: [Checks status and confirms] Up, no lights.
                  PM: Flaps?
                  PF: [Checks status and confirms] Up, no lights.
                  PM: After take-off checklist complete.

                  --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                  --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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                  • #10
                    Originally posted by TeeVee View Post
                    ***sorry bro, i'm gonna disagree with you a bit here***
                    Don't think we're disagreeing as much as not understanding?

                    Two pilots (of questionable competence) APPARENTLY FORGOT to raise the gear, AND THEN NEVER NOTICED.

                    This leaves us with the age old question, 'How in the hell did that happen?'

                    I offered up a pure parlour-speculative theory that this modern crew maybe had a head full of procedures and no more room to detect and analyze the status of the aircraft...they seemingly, just proceeded with the next phase of the flight. (I don't know that any of this is fact, but it is a possible explanation).

                    (Also, we have several instances of modern pilots being trained predominately in procedures to the detriment of thinking and fundamentals) (In the Shade, where art thou?, or just ask Gabe about stall recovery techniques that were taught, ad-nauseum, of a few years ago.)

                    There is a giant shit-pot of procedures and memorizing and regurgitation...and that stuff is needed...I just think some people are sometimes overwhelmed with that and sort of forget to think. The repair isn't to throw procedures in the trash, but it's fun to sit at my keyboard and pretend that I know how to improve situational awareness. I agree with Evan that better screening would be nice...just not sure it's as simple as he thinks, though.

                    I wholeheartedly agree with you that the vast majority of plots are bad-ass procedure executers AND bad-ass fundamental/situationally aware/thinking professionals. This would include: VNav, Bobby, ATL, and your Challenger buds... I don't think "we" need to do anything to improve their situational awareness.
                    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                    • #11
                      Simple answer to this really...

                      1. Excessive cockpit workload for the particular flight deck crew concerned. Workload normally well handled by other competent pilots. (By definition that makes them incompetent)
                      2. Failure to perform the required checklists. (By definition that makes them incompetent)
                      3. Failure to attend to obvious poor cruise performance because of 1. and 2. above. (By definition that makes them incompetent.)

                      The word Incompetent is coming up rather a lot here, isn't it ?
                      If it 'ain't broken........ Don't try to mend it !

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                      • #12
                        Originally posted by brianw999 View Post
                        ***Excessive cockpit workload***
                        I agree with what you said, AND taking this snip out of the full comment does change it's context.

                        But, apologies as I laugh and cuss and roll my eyes, at the ironing that that an expletive super automated modern plane (with the I'll-handle-the-trim, game-console-like, side stick) gave these pilots an excessive workload.

                        I have WATCHED a Cape Air pilot Shoot an ILS to 400 feet with high maintenance, mixture-sensitive piston engines, with prop controls and cowl flaps and throttles and steam gauges, and cabin environment controls, AND NO AUTOPILOT NOR COPILOT nor a magenta line. (I guess they have it easy since there's no carburetor heat to worry about.)

                        There's just about no comparison in the workload!

                        As you say, "incompetent" seems to weigh heavy here.
                        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                        • #13
                          cape air, eh? i sat right seat from tortola to SJU a few years ago as i was the only passenger, and the pilot said, "it'll keep me balanced. just keep your hands away from the control and i wont have to hit you..."

                          the question then reverts to a theme that we've beaten to death here: does automation help or hinder? (and yeah, gear is not part of automation). we have thousands of pilots around the world flying old school planes that require hands-on 100% of the time with zero automation. and while they occasionally prang, for the most part, they are safe. then we have time after time after time, where pilots flying modern super-computers get into trouble. we here speculate that these instances arise from pilots (1) forgetting and ignoring stick and rudder; (2) lack of depth of hell knowledge of the ridiculously complex flight systems and engineer-in-a-lab created flight mode logic; (3) general incompetence. did i miss anything?

                          my challenger buddies at times lament not having auto-throttle. yet on the flights that i've taken with them, don't even use auto-pilot 100% of the time. most "old-timers" like BB will tell you that while the automation is a great AID, it is not a substitute for the ability to FLY in EVERY condition.

                          one problem as i see it, is that with the tremendous level of automation and sophistication in today's airliners, not only does a pilot have to be able to fly, he has to do so while simultaneously trying to figure out if it is the automation failed and how; how to fix it if possible; what to do if he/she can't; and if it isn't the automation, what the hell is it. we may be getting to the point where the flight engineer (a systems engineer with OUTSTANDING systems knowledge but not a pilot) is needed back in the cockpit.

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                          • #14
                            Ha! The ILS I watched was into SJU during a nice big juicy rainshower. ��
                            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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