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Couple more incidents of pilots forgetting how to fly a plane...

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  • Couple more incidents of pilots forgetting how to fly a plane...

    https://avherald.com/h?article=4d3baf19&opt=0

    Seems like this crew got disoriented in the dark and nearly crashed the plane on go-around (i.e. thoughts of Kobe's pilot).

    https://avherald.com/h?article=4d3bc19c&opt=0

    In this one, we have technology problems, faulty manual calculations, and then a pilot who reduces thrust to reduce airspeed? Sigh.

    Couple more airlines for your blacklist Evan.

    PS: You can probably add Laudamotion as well since they keep flying a lemon that keeps breaking: https://avherald.com/h?article=4d3bb507&opt=0


  • #2
    Originally posted by Schwartz View Post
    https://avherald.com/h?article=4d3baf19&opt=0

    Seems like this crew got disoriented in the dark and nearly crashed the plane on go-around (i.e. thoughts of Kobe's pilot).

    https://avherald.com/h?article=4d3bc19c&opt=0

    In this one, we have technology problems, faulty manual calculations, and then a pilot who reduces thrust to reduce airspeed? Sigh.

    Couple more airlines for your blacklist Evan.

    PS: You can probably add Laudamotion as well since they keep flying a lemon that keeps breaking: https://avherald.com/h?article=4d3bb507&opt=0
    A while back I pointed out that administrative software weaknesses (house of cards) are a hazard to aviation safety and, of course, everyone waved that off. Now what have we here? A problem with the EFB updated system. What did it lead to? The wrong reference speeds, an overspeed situation, a workload situation leading to pilot errors and potential for disaster. All because of a ground-based software issue. But do the CAA's regulate these things? If not, they will continue to be a jittery patchwork of third party ephemera.

    Comment


    • #3
      Originally posted by Evan View Post

      A while back I pointed out that administrative software weaknesses (house of cards) are a hazard to aviation safety and, of course, everyone waved that off. Now what have we here? A problem with the EFB updated system. What did it lead to? The wrong reference speeds, an overspeed situation, a workload situation leading to pilot errors and potential for disaster. All because of a ground-based software issue. But do the CAA's regulate these things? If not, they will continue to be a jittery patchwork of third party ephemera.
      Hard to argue with you on this one. When the software on the portable computer becomes essential to the operation of the aircraft, then I would say it becomes pretty important to get it right.

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by Schwartz View Post

        Hard to argue with you on this one. When the software on the portable computer becomes essential to the operation of the aircraft, then I would say it becomes pretty important to get it right.
        And pretty important to regulate it, right? Is there anything in the FAR's sbout this modern component of aviation safety?

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by Evan View Post

          And pretty important to regulate it, right? Is there anything in the FAR's sbout this modern component of aviation safety?
          The FARs (14 CFR) will not contain any specific requirement for software or the technical performance of electronic devices. You will find provisions saying that the pilot has to plan the flight using current information (doesn't matter if it comes from a paper manual or an iPad). And then you have TSOs that define the requirements of specific pieces of equipment (from radios to EGPWS). Probably there should be a TSO for EFB, I have no idea if there is one.

          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by Schwartz View Post
            [...]

            Seems like this crew got disoriented in the dark and nearly crashed the plane on go-around (i.e. thoughts of Kobe's pilot).

            [...]
            I just have 'telephoned' with another jetphotos senior member who also loves the year 1978. So, Kobe Bryant is only one of three men who I know (from TV or/and the internet) and who have been mentioned here in this forum, who love the year 1978. If you meet the right decisions, you normally do not die at the age of 41. In my humble opinion. And that was the only reason why in another section of this forum I used a word which I do not use every day.

            I wondered if in the Calabasas case only one man on board met the completely wrong and fatal decision to fly into the fog. I used a rather hard four letter word (which btw really has.. five letters), but today I'm ready to delete it. I only have to find again that forum post of mine.
            [Done.]

            As far as I know, it was not dark at night, when Kobe Bryant died. It was a Sunday morning, approx 0900 a.m. local at Orange County Airport 'John Wayne'.

            Nevertheless, what you wrote somehow reminded me of JFK junior. That case was under investigation until the former chief NTSB investigator Greg Feith wrote
            'spatial disorientation by night'
            on the death certificate of JFK junior. Who by the way died at the age of only 38. But that's not really an achievement, in my eyes.

            Incidents of pilots who forgot how to fly a passenger aircraft, not important if that's a helicopter or.. a Piper PA-32R Saratoga (JFK junior again), which indeed is a 300 hp strong single piston engine propeller, and not a turbopropeller. I soon get as old as a cow but still I'm learning things..

            You damn have passengers with you, you're not alone, compared to a Cargo pilot. That's one of the reasons why I could never imagine to be a Cargo pilot. I need the thought, behind me in the cabin they all just order their first coffee. And I take care so that the coffee gets into the passenger, and not on the floor. Did I mention that I love the bank angle limiter in the B744 simulator?

            Passengers really like to survive. No difference to good passenger aircraft pilots!

            PS: Do men of my age write a 'sticky topic' warning on top of a whole quite big and quite traditional thread if there is a quite hard four letter word with indeed five letters in it?
            Last edited by LH-B744; 2020-02-26, 01:51. Reason: I just removed that word. Sorry. Minus an 's' which disturbed me.
            Jubilees do count. Type 747-100, inauguration flight: February 1969.
            And constantly advanced, 744 and 748 /w upper and lower EICAS.
            LH is member in the 747 club since April 1970.
            Aviation enthusiast, since more than 30 years with home airport EDDL.

            Comment


            • #7
              So they engaged the autopilot, which should have allowed them to look around and see what was going on, speed, abnormal pitch, flap and landing gear position, brother. Next time I'll take the train.

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by kent olsen View Post
                So they engaged the autopilot, which should have allowed them to look around and see what was going on, speed, abnormal pitch, flap and landing gear position, brother. Next time I'll take the train.
                Human factors often trumps 'should have'.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by Evan View Post

                  And pretty important to regulate it, right? Is there anything in the FAR's sbout this modern component of aviation safety?
                  I would not argue about regulating software that is considered critical to flying the airplane (like the software on the plane). I do object to regulating the systems that operate the airline.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Another example of incorrect values entered for takeoff. That was some tail strike. https://avherald.com/h?article=4d2bf0d1&opt=0

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by Schwartz View Post
                      Another example of incorrect values entered for takeoff. That was some tail strike. https://avherald.com/h?article=4d2bf0d1&opt=0
                      Wow. And that's a lot of debris to leave on the runway!

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        It is a matter of time until there is one where all what's left is debris.

                        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by Schwartz View Post

                          I would not argue about regulating software that is considered critical to flying the airplane (like the software on the plane). I do object to regulating the systems that operate the airline.
                          So define 'critical to flying the airplane". The EFB updating software is critical to avoiding mistakes in calculating references speeds that must be correct in order to avoid critical airborne situations. The flight booking software is critical to preventing groundings and delays that create backlogs that place pressure on flights to depart or land under questionable conditions and to continue and complete the mission rather than play it safe and incur additional delays. ANYTHING that introduces confusion or pressure to the cockpit is critical to flying the airplane. Many if not most accidents today are the result of pilot error and many of those are they result of implied pressures or calculated errors.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Evan View Post

                            So define 'critical to flying the airplane". The EFB updating software is critical to avoiding mistakes in calculating references speeds that must be correct in order to avoid critical airborne situations. The flight booking software is critical to preventing groundings and delays that create backlogs that place pressure on flights to depart or land under questionable conditions and to continue and complete the mission rather than play it safe and incur additional delays. ANYTHING that introduces confusion or pressure to the cockpit is critical to flying the airplane. Many if not most accidents today are the result of pilot error and many of those are they result of implied pressures or calculated errors.
                            I tend to agree that if the software on that tablet is relied upon to ensure a safe flight, then yes, it is deemed critical. Unless there is a reliable manual way to validate for potential mistakes, I would call it critical. If I can check in passengers with a piece of paper instead of a computer, it has no bearing on the process of flying the plane safely. Time pressure comes from all directions and would exist whether the computers were working or not. The systems that create smooth business operations are a business problem and they will allocate their investment as they deem appropriate to manage the risks of failure. Regulating business operations software would be a sure way to ensure all innovation dies and that no process improvements will ever be made.

                            There are many things that can introduce confusion in the flight deck and it is the the responsibility of the pilots to remember to fly the plane first.

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Evan View Post
                              So define 'critical to flying the airplane".
                              I think that's a great question to ask. A question that IMHO isn't asked often enough. In the context of BCP, there are some definitions of "critical" that may or may not be relevant here. There's also a subtle distinction between "critical" and "mission critical". If you'll forgive me playing with semantics for a moment, you may mean the latter. But just for fun, here are the working definitions in my world:

                              Critical: A function without which an operation cannot remain viable in the medium/long term. Its absence would result in financial, legal, or other penalties.
                              Mission Critical: A function essential to day-to-day operations. Its absence would cause "normal" operations to halt immediately.

                              I'm not sure how relevant those are for commercial aircraft, but I thought I'd at least put them on the table for debate.

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