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Airbus copies Boeing and installs dangerously flawed software in its planes

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  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post

    Without an indication or a take-off config warning (because the thrust was so low that the plane didn't think they were attempting to take-off)
    But come on, speed is increasing, 60 knots, 80 knots, 100 knots... Extrapolations are dangerous but it should be obvious that the intention is not to slow down and keep the plane on the ground.
    I'm with you, and it needs to be fixed, pronto.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    Spoilers that automatically deploy on takeoff when takeoff power is set at 65.3% and then not monitored is not outrageous, and crew interfering.
    (Repaired).

    Setting takeoff power at 65.3% N1 and then removing one's hand from the thrust levers, assuming the plane is going to do your job, is outrageous. Especially on take-off, the crew must always be ready to interfere.

    Leave a comment:


  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    Spoilers that automatically deploy on takeoff is not outrageous, and crew interfering?
    Without an indication or a take-off config warning (because the thrust was so low that the plane didn't think they were attempting to take-off)
    But come on, speed is increasing, 60 knots, 80 knots, 100 knots... Extrapolations are dangerous but it should be obvious that the intention is not to slow down and keep the plane on the ground.

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Spoilers that automatically deploy on takeoff is not outrageous, and crew interfering?

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    All, I am fully aware that the A220 is in fact the Bombardier C-series. I am also fully aware that this situation is not similar to the MCAS (except that the software seems to be less than perfect).
    The thread title was somehow sarcastic.

    That said, when Airbus bought the business, put its name on it, and sells and supports the product, now it is Airbus. The revenue, the earnings, the costs, the liabilities.
    Well, the other difference is that it doesn't interfere with a competent flight crew, flying the plane as opposed to riding in it.

    It's a rock turned over, and a clear danger that needs to be addressed but it's nowhere near as outrageous as MCAS.

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  • Gabriel
    replied
    All, I am fully aware that the A220 is in fact the Bombardier C-series. I am also fully aware that this situation is not similar to the MCAS (except that the software seems to be less than perfect).
    The thread title was somehow sarcastic.

    That said, when Airbus bought the business, put its name on it, and sells and supports the product, now it is Airbus. The revenue, the earnings, the costs, the liabilities.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post

    absurd lack of vision on system interactions and potential stealth scenarios
    It makes me wonder if they overlay these systems when they are developing them of it they are designed in isolation to similar threshold requirements. Take the autothrust activation threshold (23%TLA / 60%N1). Why so low? Are you ever going to set takeoff power at 60% N1? Then look at the HOLD activation threshold (above 60kts). Now look at the spoiler activation. Same thresholds (less than 23%TLA above 60kts).

    I doubt this is a coincidence but I fail to see how it all comes together for any benefit.

    And, as you know, the A220 is a Bombardier design. Airbus-developed planes require thrust levers to be in the FLX or TOGA detents for take-off. There is no take-off autothrottle mode. Autothrottle is armed but not active until the pilot retracts the thrust to CL once in the air.

    Why would we need AT between brake-release and 400ft? Is positioning the thrust levers to set (rather than modulate) power so much workload?

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post

    absurd lack of vision on system interactions and potential stealth scenarios
    That is gray logic.

    Leave a comment:


  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post

    ???

    How is that "copies Boeing"?

    I agree this reveals an absurd lack of vision on system interactions and potential steath scenarios. But not for lack of redundancy.
    absurd lack of vision on system interactions and potential stealth scenarios

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by aegirN View Post
    ***However, a large part of this incident was pilot error and the multiple things they forgot to check during their takeoff roll.***
    True, but given a long history of old fashioned human error, an airplane that will automatically extends spoilers on takeoff is computer help we[no italics since we ride the things] do not need.

    Leave a comment:


  • aegirN
    replied
    Rather misleading title, the aircraft was produced and delivered before Airbus purchased the program. Meaning the Software error is caused by Bombardier. However, a large part of this incident was pilot error and the multiple things they forgot to check during their takeoff roll.

    However I do wish they update the software on the aircraft in case an incident like this happens again

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Gabriel: Why didn't you use an Acronym and a rhyme?

    And Evan: Are you aware of the subtle 1940's and 1950's 'trend' of suspicion between pilots and aeroengineers. I wonder if that feeling exists in Bobby?

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    http://avherald.com/h?article=4bbdb51e&opt=0

    If I was in a window seat near the wing, I would even be shouting "ABORT THE TAKE OFF!!!" or I would be shitting in my pants. And I don't know which of the two.
    ???

    How is that "copies Boeing"?

    I agree this reveals an absurd lack of vision on system interactions and potential steath scenarios. But not for lack of redundancy.

    Conversely, if the TLA of both throttle levers is less than 23 degrees during aircraft acceleration, the spoilers will deploy automatically if the wheel speed is above 60 kt.
    WTF!! This should never happen unless the thrust levers at at flight IDLE! I don't understand that logic at all.

    On the other hand (the one that should be resting on the thrust levers), the levers are servo-driven and this is a situation that any competent pilot should have recognized, at least at the 80kt call, when an abort was still reasonably safe.

    This is gross pilot error.

    But this is a perfect example of that blended area between manual piloting an automation where stealth factors are most dangerous, and these systems need to be modified asap, as in Emergency AD asap.

    Leave a comment:


  • Airbus copies Boeing and installs dangerously flawed software in its planes

    http://avherald.com/h?article=4bbdb51e&opt=0

    If I was in a window seat near the wing, I would even be shouting "ABORT THE TAKE OFF!!!" or I would be shitting in my pants. And I don't know which of the two.
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