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  • Another stall spin crash burn die accident (almost)

    More precisely, a stall, wing drop, nose over, crash, breakup, burn, injured (but alive).

    The pilot of a multi-million-dollar turboprop making the same mistakes in the pattern that 2-seat-110-HP pilots do.

    This accident reminded me of the discussions we had with professional pilots about the convenience of reducing the AoA in a stall situation at very low altitude.

    In this accident, the pilot stalled the plane and the pilot tried to kill himself by pulling more up but he was saved y the plane who decided to push down instead and against the pilot's will.

    The accident did happen in a very stressful and probably very high workload context of severe engine problems.
    While I am more fascinated with the stall situation, we can also talk about the pilot decision making of not landing at the closest airport after the engine issue developed first as a partial loss of engine problem, then decided instead to divert to DFW 30 NM away, then the engine condition worsened so he re-diverted to the closest airport, then deciding to do a 360 on base (which had him pointing away from the field for most of the turn) to loose altitude.

    We can also talk about the appropriateness of the PHO making the distinction between "landing as soon as possible" and "as soon as practical" and then calling for landing "as soon as practical" in the event of partial power loss on the only engine installed in the plane.

    We have raw footage of the last part of the 360, stall, wing drop, and stick-pusher recovery; the VASAviation ATC with radar plot, and blancolirio's analysis:.
    In that order:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RioXwtR4Cig

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zyqbIIz_dg8

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ja7gRL15CKg

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

  • #2
    QUOTE=Gabriel RED = 3BS More precisely, a stall, wing drop, nose over, crash, breakup, burn, injured (but alive).

    The pilot of a multi-million-dollar turboprop making the same mistakes in the pattern that 2-seat-110-HP pilots do. The basic mistake of not being always 100% practiced up to NAIL a forced landing...everyone should have a glider certificate, or we should ban all airplanes.

    This accident reminded me of the discussions we had with professional pilots about the convenience of reducing the AoA in a stall situation at very low altitude. I'm not sure I'm with you? I am more concerned with the Three six oh, Four one oh and 2100 ft stalls when there's some buffer for recovery and some evidence of relentlessness....this strikes me as a not_relentless pull up as much as gingerly trying to get the last little bit of altitude...and then doing a halfway correct, halfway prompt corrective maneuver upon stalling.

    In this accident, the pilot stalled the plane and the pilot tried to kill himself by pulling more up but he was saved y the plane who decided to push down instead and against the pilot's will.I do not 100% concur that the dude was TRYING to kill himself...there is a distinct possibility he simply ran out of airspeed, altitude and ideas...It sucks to START the stall as the recover takes some altitude.

    The accident did happen in a very stressful and probably very high workload context of severe engine problems.
    While I am more fascinated with the stall situation, we can also talk about the pilot decision making of not landing at the closest airport after the engine issue developed first as a partial loss of engine problem, then decided instead to divert to DFW 30 NM away, then the engine condition worsened so he re-diverted to the closest airport, then deciding to do a 360 on base (which had him pointing away from the field for most of the turn) to loose altitude. He was probably a little high...

    If you want to discuss something, how about the fact that "good pilots" will spend the vast vast majority of their time doing a 3-degree approach, which I believe is generally not possible when the engine is out.


    We can also talk about the appropriateness of the PHO making the distinction between "landing as soon as possible" and "as soon as practical" and then calling for landing "as soon as practical" in the event of partial power loss on the only engine installed in the plane.

    My lazy side does not want to listen to the ATC recording and ponder what the guy was doing/thinking...sad to realize he was at 6000? feet which ought to make a LOT of airports available...Seems kind of unwise to fly over the suburbs of the giant-ass DFW area just to get to your favorite mechanic..

    We have raw footage of the last part of the 360, stall, wing drop, and stick-pusher recovery; the VASAviation ATC with radar plot, and blancolirio's analysis:.
    In that order:

    I'm glad he didn't died...and I'm glad he "found" something of an open field to do a semi-controlled, mediocre landing...you are going to have to sell me before I listen to a youtube expert tell the guy what he shouldn't have done...(why do we need that when we have this forum)
    Last edited by 3WE; 2020-04-29, 17:00. Reason: To put quote marks on found, to improve clarity to Gabriel.
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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    • #3
      Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
      The accident did happen in a very stressful and probably very high workload context of severe engine problems.
      While I am more fascinated with the stall situation, we can also talk about the pilot decision making of not landing at the closest airport after the engine issue developed first as a partial loss of engine problem, then decided instead to divert to DFW 30 NM away, then the engine condition worsened so he re-diverted to the closest airport, then deciding to do a 360 on base (which had him pointing away from the field for most of the turn) to loose altitude.

      We can also talk about the appropriateness of the PHO making the distinction between "landing as soon as possible" and "as soon as practical" and then calling for landing "as soon as practical" in the event of partial power loss on the only engine installed in the plane.
      Seriously, on a single engine aircraft, you land at the nearest 'suitable' airstrip, lest you end up on a less suitable highway or in a far less suitable smoking hole. It's fortunate nobody on the ground was killed. This is what rules and procedure are best for: don't think about it, don't enlist your powers of reason, don't calculate the odds, just get it on the ground asap. (that little dot is a smoking hole seen from a safe distance)

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by Evan View Post
        (that little dot is a smoking hole seen from a safe distance)
        Good one.
        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by Evan View Post

          Seriously, on a single engine aircraft, you land at the nearest 'suitable' airstrip, lest you end up on a less suitable highway or in a far less suitable smoking hole. It's fortunate nobody on the ground was killed. This is what rules and procedure are best for: don't think about it, don't enlist your powers of reason, don't calculate the odds, just get it on the ground asap. (that little dot is a smoking hole seen from a safe distance)
          Well, in this case the guy arguably did follow the procedures. Because as I said and you quoted me saying:

          We can also talk about the appropriateness of the PHO making the distinction between "landing as soon as possible" and "as soon as practical" and then [the POH] calling for landing "as soon as practical" in the event of partial power loss on the only engine installed in the plane.

          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by 3WE View Post
            The basic mistake of not being always 100% practiced up to NAIL a forced landing...everyone should have a glider certificate, or we should ban all airplanes.
            I disagree. Miss the runway all you like, but keep flying the plane all the way to the ground. Stalling and flying are kinda opposite.

            I'm not sure I'm with you? I am more concerned with the Three six oh, Four one oh and 2100 ft stalls when there's some buffer for recovery and some evidence of relentlessness....this strikes me as a not_relentless pull up as much as gingerly trying to get the last little bit of altitude...and then doing a halfway correct, halfway prompt corrective maneuver upon stalling.
            I was talking about certain discussion that we had with certain professional ATPs where they were claiming that at low altitude it is not a good idea to reduce the AoA in a stall situation because of the risk of ground contact, and we said that not reducing AoA will not be any better to prevent ground contact, rather the opposite, it risks hitting the ground harder and out of control (perhaps nose-first and/or inverted). This accident is a neat example of that because the pilot stalled the plane and, left alone, he would have almost certainly killed himself, but the airplane lowered the nose (stick pusher) and that saved his life. Sort of proof that it is good to lower the AOA in a stall situation even in a low altitude situation.

            I do not 100% concur that the dude was TRYING to kill himself...there is a distinct possibility he simply ran out of airspeed, altitude and ideas...It sucks to START the stall as the recover takes some altitude.
            Ok, let me clarify. I absolutely do not believe that the pilot was intentionally trying to terminate with his life. It was an euphemism, or a rhetorical statement, like when you ask "are you trying to kill yourself?" to someone who is doing something risky or reckless. And yes, it sucks to start the stall, so don;t stall, and if you still do, your best option is still recover even if that means lowering the nose. Better lower it yourself a bit and not have the plane drop a wing and nose over regardless of your will.

            I'm glad he didn't died...and I'm glad he found something of an open field to do a semi-controlled, mediocre landing...you are going to have to sell me before I listen to a youtube expert tell the guy what he shouldn't have done...(why do we need that when we have this forum)
            You don't get it, do you? The pilot didn't find the field, the field found the pilot. He stalled, dropped a wing, the stick pusher activated lowering the nose, he pulled up again, stalled again, the stick pushed kicked in again (and perhaps a 3rd time) and he ended up with the attitude that the plane (stick pusher) and the laws of physics decided in the field that the fate decided.

            Did you see the footage? And in blancolitrio's review you have footage of the test pilot stalling the Pilatus with the stick pusher on and off.

            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
              You don't get it, do you? The pilot didn't find the field, the field found the pilot.
              Chill...a few rows up you had to back pedal when I said I didn’t think he was trying to kill himself.

              The foot is on the other hand and pretend I put quotes around him “finding” an open field...the plane stalled and turned and then he “found” a field in front of him...I didn’t say he found AND USED EXPERT SKILL TO STEER TO THE FIELD...

              Yes, he was extremely lucky that there was open space RIGHT THERE for him to sort of flare and not_did died.
              Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by Gabriel View Post

                Well, in this case the guy arguably did follow the procedures. Because as I said and you quoted me saying:
                We can also talk about the appropriateness of the PHO making the distinction between "landing as soon as possible" and "as soon as practical" and then [the POH] calling for landing "as soon as practical" in the event of partial power loss on the only engine installed in the plane.
                That needs to be revised. There is no such thing as a practical decision to continue to an alternate when your only engine has become unreliable.

                Comment


                • #9
                  A superior pilot uses his superior judgment to avoid situations which require the use of his superior skill.
                  As soon as the pilot decided to reject the first landing option and "try his luck" at getting to FDW 30 nmiles away, this lamentable misjudgement revealed his lack of any superior skill.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                    I was talking about certain discussion that we had with certain professional ATPs where they were claiming that at low altitude it is not a good idea to reduce the AoA in a stall situation because of the risk of ground contact, and we said that not reducing AoA will not be any better to prevent ground contact,
                    Noted...

                    As part of my personal effort to understand "what I will never understand", I go to the details...

                    They have powerful airplanes and can power out of incipient stalls in a very impressive manner (if the engines can spool up)...I kind of get the general technique.

                    Can you truly power out of a stall? I can in fact think of some circumstances where you can...but we now get into the area of "what's practical".

                    We also delve in to the nitpicky issue of "are you shoving over to make a ~10-degree AOA reduction", or doing more critical one or two degree shove over to maintain things without going full stall (clarification- not TARGETING a specific number of degrees...just trying for a slight AOA reduction or at the very least not increasing it much).

                    Now, does this have relevance to this crash?- not particularly, just acknowledging your comment.
                    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                      Can you truly power out of a stall?
                      You can power out of approach-to-stall. Gabriel did it in a 747. The key lies in not stalling. But it rarely works without power.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Evan View Post

                        In a simulated 747, Gabriel instinctively relaxed on his post-takeoff pull up to silence a stall warning (while really not getting all that close to an incipient stall), while lacking extensive, type-specific training. He may have even cited Tomahawk training for this inappropriate, cowboy-improvisational response.
                        Fixed.

                        AND it is a different scenario from what Gabriel was originally discussing.
                        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          I'd like to share with you an experience I had with my FAA Principal Operations Inspector. My point is that no everyone regardless of their title know everything about flying

                          So I was that Chief Pilot of a small commuter in the Seattle area back in the early 80's. We were purchased by another commuter and I was asked to remain as the Chief Pilot. Their POI asked me to train all the pilots from the buying company in our Cessna 402's because they had Britain Normand Islander's, fixed gear so he felt they were not complex. Well I trained them all and sent them over to him for a check ride. The second pilot failed the check ride. When I talked to the POI he said he had simulated a failed engine by pulling the power back but also simulated the engine wouldn't feather and left it at idle. Well on the ILS my pilot wasn't able to maintain airspeed because of the drag and as he continued down the ILS his speed kept reducing until he got to VMC at which point he held that speed but wasn't able to stay on the ILS , he sunk below by 1-2 dots at which point the POI gave him the power back but failed him!

                          When I sat down with the POI I asked him if he knew what happens when you have full power on one engine and your speed goes below VMC? He didn't answer. I told him you would have two choices. Keep pulling back, slowing down, until the airplane would do a snap roll and crash inverted or you could hold VMC and slide to the side a little and crash wings level next to the approach lights.

                          I told him if he worked for me and that was his answer to my question I would fire him. End of conversation. Just because you have a big title doesn't mean you know anything about flying.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                            We also delve in to the nitpicky issue of "are you shoving over to make a ~10-degree AOA reduction", or doing more critical one or two degree shove over to maintain things without going full stall (clarification- not TARGETING a specific number of degrees...just trying for a slight AOA reduction or at the very least not increasing it much).

                            Now, does this have relevance to this crash?- not particularly, just acknowledging your comment.
                            It does have relevance. You reduce the AoA at least just barely enough to silence the stall warning. If you have some altitude to spare, go ahead and be more liberal. But reducing the AoA any less than that will not help you preserve the altitude and most likely will do just the opposite with the added risk of losing lateral/directional control. Remember Detroit.

                            It is in some way (maybe remotely) related to what Kent wrote above: If you loose an engine and can't keep both the speed and the GS on the remaining one, it is a fallacy that you need to pick between keeping the GS or keeping Vmc. The GS is gone for good, it is out of reach. So the real question is if you want to preserve Vmc and crash under control short of the runway or go below Vmc, lose control and crash much harder and even shorter from the runway.

                            Now... May it happen to me that I see the runway just over there and I see the trees just between me and the runway and it looks to me that I will make the trees rather than the runway and I try to pull up a bit to squeeze the last drop of lift but I end I pulling up too much that I stall (or get a stall warning) but still instinctively resist to reduce the AoA? Yes, it can happen (I do think that I am more aware of AoA and stall management than many, but I am not immune to any screw-up mode, especially under high stress and workload and may be in panic). But I know that if I do that and I happen to survive (like this pilot) I would be insulting myself for failing at that and not asking for indulgence.

                            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Evan View Post

                              You can power out of approach-to-stall. Gabriel did it in a 747. The key lies in not stalling. But it rarely works without power.
                              Can we define what is "power out a stall or approach to stall" please? I don't think that I powered out of that one (I did a lot of AoA management, and in fact I did nothing but AoA management) and I don't think that any stall or approach to stall can be recovered without managing AoA, for which most of the times power only is of no use (and many times it may even be counter productive). You can have a short-term recovery (as the plane will gain speed and pitch up, and pitching up naturally lowers the AoA) but if you don't push down or relieve back pressure you will end up pitching way up and stalling again.

                              --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                              --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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