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  • #46
    Originally posted by Evan View Post

    To begin with, ironically, shareholders. These hugely-compensated men damaged the company's valuation and the brand value by adopting reckless policies and procedures. I also think survivors of those who died should be able to sue them against that huge compensation. If not, where is the deterrent? The reason hit and run capitalism is currently running amuck and ruining societies is because the punishments fail to exceed the crimes. There's money to be made in what Boeing execs did here. That's currently the bottom line.
    I read today, Boeing is till under criminal investigation, and there is new news that they and the FAA broke protocol when evaluating how pilots would react by reminding the pilots before the test to do something.

    Anyways, if the criminal investigation is still ongoing, that means that the lawsuits will wait. I think you are right, the shareholders will sue.

    https://www.theglobeandmail.com/busi...g-report-says/

    Comment


    • #47
      In case anyone believes the top-down culture has changed over there:

      https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55372499

      Comment


      • #48
        Originally posted by Evan View Post
        In case anyone believes the top-down culture has changed over there:

        https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55372499
        BFD! That is what SIM training is for!

        Comment


        • #49
          Originally posted by Evan View Post
          In case anyone believes the top-down culture has changed over there:

          https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55372499
          In the video the woman says "If ___________, my father would still be here, but he is not".

          She fills the blank with "the 737 MAX had been grounded after the first crash". And it is true.
          But it is not the only thing that you can put in the blank and still make the sentence true:
          • Boeing had not horribly screwed up the design of the MCAS
          • the had not screwed up the certification process
          • Ethiopian had better trained their pilots after the LionAir crash.
          • The pilots had been more proactive studying the LionAir (even if they had participated in the thread here, they would have known better).
          • The pilots had managed the situation better (how about not overspeed, trim the plane before cutting the electric trim off, using the manual trim wheel to trim the plane soon after they disconnected the electric trim, slowed down when they were already overspeeding and starting to lose the battle for the yoke, used the thumb switch after they reconnected the electric trim which one can only assume they did exactly to be able to use the thumb switch).
          As always, an aivaition accidents in not caused by a single event but by a chain of events, and breaking just one link in the chain can break the full chain and prevent the accident.

          One thing that I would not put on the list is "Boing had told the pilots about the MCAS". While this might have made a difference for the LionAir crash, by the Ethiopian crash the world already knew pretty much everything that was there to know about the MCAS, its participation in the Lion Air crash, and how to deal with it if you had a similar crash, and if Boeings ESB and FAA's EAD on how the plane you fly crashed doesn't spark your curiosity as a pilot to go and learn everything about the matter (with or without official airline training), I don't know what will.

          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

          Comment


          • #50
            Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post

            BFD! That is what SIM training is for!
            This was not SIM training. This was a test of pilot reactions during an unexpected MCAS malfunction. This has never been about pilot capabilities under perfect situational awareness. Either of the fatal crash crews would have avoided upset if they had known what was happening and why. This has always been about a system failure that confuses and misleads pilot situational awareness. The Ethiopian Airlines crew left the thrust in take-off setting during the entire sequence, dooming any chance of recovery, not because they thought it was the right course of action but because they were too distracted with pitch trim to notice it. The test had to assure the FAA that this sort of scrambled situational awareness and task overload was no longer a threat. According to the accusations, Boeing coached the test crews, thus violating the test protocol and rendering the tests meaningless. There's a term for this, a term often used to define a winning strategy on Wall Street: gaming the system. It is deeply entrenched in capital investment culture. It doesn't play well in aerospace engineering. The problem at Boeing remains the same: the wrong culture at the top.

            So they cheated on the test and the FAA allowed that. What has changed there?

            Comment


            • #51
              Originally posted by Evan View Post

              This was not SIM training. This was a test of pilot reactions during an unexpected MCAS malfunction. This has never been about pilot capabilities under perfect situational awareness. Either of the fatal crash crews would have avoided upset if they had known what was happening and why. This has always been about a system failure that confuses and misleads pilot situational awareness. The Ethiopian Airlines crew left the thrust in take-off setting during the entire sequence, dooming any chance of recovery, not because they thought it was the right course of action but because they were too distracted with pitch trim to notice it. The test had to assure the FAA that this sort of scrambled situational awareness and task overload was no longer a threat. According to the accusations, Boeing coached the test crews, thus violating the test protocol and rendering the tests meaningless. There's a term for this, a term often used to define a winning strategy on Wall Street: gaming the system. It is deeply entrenched in capital investment culture. It doesn't play well in aerospace engineering. The problem at Boeing remains the same: the wrong culture at the top.

              So they cheated on the test and the FAA allowed that. What has changed there?
              Just keep your ass in the bus, then you don't have to worry about it. Nothing anyone says or does is going to please you. You are the consummate glass half empty guy. Had either of those crews flown the aircraft like an airplane instead of a computer, they all would have walked away. Maybe a little shaken up, but not dead.

              Comment


              • #52
                Originally posted by Evan View Post

                This was not SIM training. This was a test of pilot reactions during an unexpected MCAS malfunction. This has never been about pilot capabilities under perfect situational awareness. Either of the fatal crash crews would have avoided upset if they had known what was happening and why. This has always been about a system failure that confuses and misleads pilot situational awareness. The Ethiopian Airlines crew left the thrust in take-off setting during the entire sequence, dooming any chance of recovery, not because they thought it was the right course of action but because they were too distracted with pitch trim to notice it. The test had to assure the FAA that this sort of scrambled situational awareness and task overload was no longer a threat. According to the accusations, Boeing coached the test crews, thus violating the test protocol and rendering the tests meaningless. There's a term for this, a term often used to define a winning strategy on Wall Street: gaming the system. It is deeply entrenched in capital investment culture. It doesn't play well in aerospace engineering. The problem at Boeing remains the same: the wrong culture at the top.

                So they cheated on the test and the FAA allowed that. What has changed there?
                What wasn't clear to me is when this occurred?

                Comment


                • #53
                  Ok I'm going to wave my own flag and probably stick with Boeing Bobby.

                  One of my 74 crews was going to Anchorage at night out of Chicago. Fl 330 under a higher overcast, dark. The autopilot roll stuck with just a tiny bit of deflection. The flight engineer first noticed the attitude indicator in a bank. When all three noticed what was going on they were in a 100 deg bank. The captain did what he was taught. Power to idle, roll the wings level on the attitude indicator first and then pull. They pulled 3 G's and max speed was M1.18. They recovered in Fargo ND. Aircraft was inspected and repaired by Boeing and went back to work.

                  B-747-100 takeoff out of Anchorage to the east. At about 1500ft they experienced extreme turbulence that exceeded the certification standards for the aircraft, including a yaw moment that caused the number 2 engine pylon to fail. The engine flew over the wing and crashed into the ground. The leading edge of the wing ripped off from the fuselage to the number 1 pylon and back to the main spar, which is nearly 6 feet tall. The aircraft tried to roll over and all the hydraulics systems tripped off, the flight controls are operated by the hydraulics. But the captain did what he was trained to do. While the flight engineer was franticly trying to get the hydraulics back the captain pulled the power back on the number 4 engine to stop the roll. Once the FE had the hydraulics back they were able work their way around and made a safe landing back at ANC.

                  We asked all our crews to hand fly the aircraft to FL 180 and then on the descent to turn off the autopilot and hand fly it back to landing from FL 180.

                  Comment


                  • #54
                    Originally posted by kent olsen View Post
                    Ok I'm going to wave my own flag and probably stick with Boeing Bobby.

                    B-747-100 takeoff out of Anchorage to the east. At about 1500ft they experienced extreme turbulence that exceeded the certification standards for the aircraft, including a yaw moment that caused the number 2 engine pylon to fail. The engine flew over the wing and crashed into the ground. The leading edge of the wing ripped off from the fuselage to the number 1 pylon and back to the main spar, which is nearly 6 feet tall. The aircraft tried to roll over and all the hydraulics systems tripped off, the flight controls are operated by the hydraulics. But the captain did what he was trained to do. While the flight engineer was franticly trying to get the hydraulics back the captain pulled the power back on the number 4 engine to stop the roll. Once the FE had the hydraulics back they were able work their way around and made a safe landing back at ANC.
                    You do realize that we cannot expect all pilots to fly out of something like that. Or even most. Pylon failures have killed some very experienced (in hand flying) crews. If the slats are gone on one wing and you don't realize it, and then you extend them on the other, and whoa, why does it roll like that? Everything begins (and sometimes ends) with situational awareness. Boeing can't script that in ahead of time and call it a meaningful test.

                    Comment


                    • #55
                      Originally posted by Gabriel
                      If (Blah Blah Blah]
                      I guess there’s two things that bug me:

                      1. Let’s make NO mention of this system to pilots (it seems like a little knowledge would have gone a long way)

                      2. Yeah, a little more redundancy before Hal 9000 starts it’s relentless dive...
                      Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                      Comment


                      • #56
                        Originally posted by Evan View Post

                        You do realize that we cannot expect all pilots to fly out of something like that. Or even most. Pylon failures have killed some very experienced (in hand flying) crews. If the slats are gone on one wing and you don't realize it, and then you extend them on the other, and whoa, why does it roll like that? Everything begins (and sometimes ends) with situational awareness. Boeing can't script that in ahead of time and call it a meaningful test.
                        Captain Olsen, it's a waste of time. You can't teach the new kid's anything, because they already know more about aviation than you do. Cheers B B.

                        Comment


                        • #57
                          Originally posted by Evan View Post
                          Either of the fatal crash crews would have avoided upset if they had known what was happening and why.
                          Seriously? You mean that the Ethiopian crew didn't know what was happening? If they didn't, shame on them! If they did(and still lost it), shame on them!
                          (And no, I am not defending Boeing, the above doesn't exonerarte Boeing at all for thier incredibly flawed design)

                          I guess there’s two things that bug me:
                          1. Let’s make NO mention of this system to pilots (it seems like a little knowledge would have gone a long way)
                          2. Yeah, a little more redundancy before Hal 9000 starts it’s relentless dive...
                          1. See above.
                          2. I don't understand what you mean (or your connection to what I said).

                          You are the consummate glass half empty guy.
                          I would argue that that is the correct approach in aviation. You asume that systems will fail, that things will go wrong, that pilots will make mistakes, and work out a system that is as robust as possible around that.

                          That's why you decide in advance what the decision speed is, why you plan the take-off, climb and even cruise assuming that an engine will fail, why you put an alternate in your flight plan and fuel in the plane to reach it with margins reserve plus margins, why you have EGPWS, and why it is considered a good practice for private pilots to think of where they are going to put the plane down in case of an engine failure after take off and to be constantly looking for places to put it down during the flight, among many other things.

                          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                          Comment


                          • #58
                            Originally posted by Gabriel
                            ...I don’t understand what you mean (or your connection to what I said...
                            The connection is that I took your longer comprehensive list and pulled out what I think are the two highlights.

                            One can pile on Boeing, or take the counter argument that the big ass clicky wheel is obvious and Bobby would pull the CB...

                            Some truth to both, but keeping it secret and triggering it off of a single thingie is kind of bad.
                            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                            Comment


                            • #59
                              Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                              One can pile on Boeing, or take the counter argument that the big ass clicky wheel is obvious and Bobby would pull the CB...
                              Why does it have to be one or another? It is both.
                              Boing design was inexcusable horrible. Pilots performed horrible too.

                              Some truth to both, but keeping it secret and triggering it off of a single thingie is kind of bad.
                              I have my doubts about "keeping it secret". Do you think that the Airbus QRH, FCOM or FTM contains the code of the SELs, SEC, and ADC?
                              Airplanes are becoming very complex internally to become more simple operationally. I don't think that there is a single person (not even a Boeing or Airbus engineer or test pilot) that knows all the intricacies of the systems of a modern airliner.

                              That said, Boeing relied on the trim runaway procedure for the pilots to handle these MCAS malfunctions, but the trim runaway procedure didn't factor the distractions caused by a false stickshaker, airspeed disagree, altitude disagree, and NOT having an AoA disagree indication that would explain all that (all of which are NOT factors in the "traditional" trim runaway), plus it described the trim runaway condition as "uncommanded stabilizer trim movement occurs continuously", which is not what happens in this MCAS failure (was now updated to "... or in a manner not consistent with the flight condition). And also it had "downgraded" (in 1982) the FCOM in the explanation of how the trim wheel can become too hard to move by hand and how to resolve it, which the Ethiopian crew could have used to try to trim the plane when they finally (way too late) attempted to use the manual wheel but it was stuck:

                              Pre-1982 version:

                              Accelerate or decelerate the airplane to an in-trim airspeed. If a recovery must be initiated from an extreme nose-down out-of-trim requiring a high pull force, an increase in airspeed may relieve enough of the elevator load and control displacement to permit manual trimming. Do not exceed speed limitation.

                              If other methods fail to relieve the elevator load and control column force, use the "roller coaster" technique. If nose-up trim is required, raise the nose well above the horizon with elevator control. Then slowly relax the control column pressure and manually trim nose-up. Allow the nose to drop below the horizon while trimming. Repeat this sequence until the airplane is trim.
                              Post-1982 version:

                              Excessive airloads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct the mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the airloads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually.
                              All that said:
                              1. Despite the "secrecy" of the MCAS, the first LionAir crew was able to control the situation by following (sort of) the traditional trim runaway procedure.
                              2. The Ethiopian crew was NOT able to control, the situation despite the MCAS not being secret anymore and the procedure having been clarified and expanded for this situation by a Boeing SB that as made into an EAD by the FAA. The Ethiopian crew should have known everything that a pilot needed to know about the MCAS and how to handle the exact malfunction that made them crash. And that was still not enough.

                              So I don't know how much the secrecy itself was an issue.

                              --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                              --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                              Comment


                              • #60
                                Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                                ....I have my doubts about "keeping it secret". Do you think that the Airbus QRH, FCOM or FTM contains the code of the SELs, SEC, and ADC?.
                                Lay off the acronyms, Evan. Spewing obscure acronyms is similar to claiming credentials.

                                Boeing was known as “the plane where the pilot had ultimate authority”.

                                Pilots used to have to know the brake lining thickness...so maybe knowing that the new engines cause more pitch up and that there’s an automatic pitcher-downer system isn’t too much to ask...

                                You can’t compare that to knowing the computer code.

                                We have OFTEN seen pilots list nuances that are much more insidious than an automatic trimmer-downer...

                                DC-9 pilots had to learn that pulling a cabin pressure CB at the wrong time also popped the ground spoilers. That pilot was chastised for not knowing “how things work”.

                                Again, a system that applies nose-down trim when you get slow MIGHT be worth knowing about...Not the code, but that such a system exists.

                                That system was not mentioned in the manuals, nor the light-duty type-specific computer training module.

                                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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