Final report of Air Force Global Express one year ago

[Gabriel]

We don't train dual engine failures. Never have.

Many years ago, with a friend that worked (and still works) for Aerolíneas Argentinas, I got into the cockpit of a B-747-200 that was parked outside of the AR hangars in Ezeiza.
I found one thick manual (don't remember which one, I guess it was the FCOM) which had an emergency section which started with an index where you would put your finger in the tab of the item in the index and that would take you directly to that section.
One item in the index caught my attention, it was the "all engines out" section (don't remember if that was the exact title).
So I went there and it had exactly 2 lines:
- Keep speed at or above XXX (don't remember the number).
- Start APU below XXXXX ft.

[Evan]

We don't train dual engine failures. Never have.

Not entirely sure why the discussion has gone to dual engine failure, which I realize is trained about as often as sharknado encounter.

What we're discussing should be single engine failure (castastrophic) followed by IFSD (pilot error).

When you train for single engine failure, what steps are taken to ensure the correct engine is shut down?

[kent olsen]

Back in my DC-8 days when my instructor asked if I wanted to see anything else, I asked for a 3 engine failure, so on downwind he failed 3. Not too big of a deal as long as you don't need to climb. Well being the smart a** I sometimes am I asked for a 4 engine failure. Energy management that's all. Over the years I did one on each of my PC checks. I did it as well after I got into the 747. Then I left the big airplanes and got typed in the Hawker 1000. Again I asked for the all engine failure during my PC checks.

Well I was tasked to do a test flight on the 1000. Climbing thru 10,000 I had a dual flame out. We turned back to the airport, declared and emergency and tried numerous times to start either engine with no luck, (turned out to be fuel contamination). I glided back to the airport like in the simulator and made an uneventful landing. Training???

[TeeVee]

Not entirely sure why the discussion has gone to dual engine failure, which I realize is trained about as often as sharknado encounter.

What we're discussing should be single engine failure (castastrophic) followed by IFSD (pilot error).

When you train for single engine failure, what steps are taken to ensure the correct engine is shut down?

maybe because their failure to 1) choose the right airport 2) successfully relight the good engine was a key part of why they died.

once both engines were down, there would've been zero vibrations, actually before that as the left engine would've spooled down considerably after it shut itself down. they then would've clearly seen the numerous messages about the left engine failure.

since there was no cvr (not sure why they wouldn't have that on a military jet), we will never know

[TeeVee]

I'm finding it hard to argue with that. Here what two seconds of effort on Google would have done for you:

https://armedservices.house.gov/2020...viation-safety

The actual statement:

The full report can be downloaded here:

https://www.militaryaviationsafety.g...nal_Report.pdf

oh right, the same reference you were using in the thread on EX-military pilots being so horrible.

funny thing is, the congressional report refers to pilots still in the military. so a single report on the junkers crash that used the word "seemed" has now become proof that EX-military pilots flying commercial are more prone to eff up because of all their years in a shit safety culture.

yeah. Logic 101. too bad i failed that subject....

i wont excuse all the losses of military aircraft but it's obvious even to a layman like me, that military aircraft are largely different than commercial aircraft. aside from this global 6000 event, your numbers include inherently unstable aircraft, which from what i gather, don't take much to eff up. there are also, i am sure of it, instances like the problems that plagued the f-16 for years, and that the air force denied/covered up until some dead pilot's wife sued the us government. the loss of certain aircraft can be tied to pilot error to be sure. but you are discounting all the other reasons set forth in that report, much of which comes down to $$$

and yeah i get it that the bean counters dont talk to safety people.

[Evan]

maybe because their failure to 1) choose the right airport 2) successfully relight the good engine was a key part of why they died.

once both engines were down, there would've been zero vibrations, actually before that as the left engine would've spooled down considerably after it shut itself down. they then would've clearly seen the numerous messages about the left engine failure.

since there was no cvr (not sure why they wouldn't have that on a military jet), we will never know

The failure to divert to an airport within glide range was due to over-confidence. That's bad culture.

The failure to airstart the good engine was due to the biased conviction that it was the bad one. That bias overwhelmed any cockpit indication. No attempt was made to airstart the good engine. Clearly, the assumption that the R engine was damaged was never properly cross-checked and verified.

That's bad culture.

[BoeingBobby]

Probably Boeing's fault, right Evan?

[Evan]

Probably Boeing's fault, right Evan?

I don't know... you flew Boeings. Why did this never happen to you?

[BoeingBobby]

I don't know... you flew Boeings. Why did this never happen to you?

"Engine failure number 3, CONFIRM number 3"! Engine number 3 thrust lever idle, CONFIRM number 3 thrust lever idle. Engine number 3 fuel cutoff off, CONFIRM number 3 engine fuel cutoff, engine number 3 fire handle pull, CONFIRM engine number 3, fire handle pull.

[BoeingBobby]

Basically you don't move anything until you have CONFIRMED that is what you intended to move. One of the best reasons to have kept flight engineers on board.

[Evan]

Basically you don't move anything until you have CONFIRMED that is what you intended to move.

I like the way you think. Do you think that sort of thinking might have been lacking here?

[BoeingBobby]

I like the way you think. Do you think that sort of thinking might have been lacking here?

Hard to imagine that they followed proper procedures and still managed to shut the wrong engine down. There are some things to consider here. Having flown in and out of Afghanistan many times, BIG mountains, gusty wind and turbulence, and having to worry about taking fire if you are low. We did almost all of our fights at night with no lights on below 18000' in the beginning. First time in the daytime really opened my eyes to how rugged it is.

[TeeVee]

The failure to divert to an airport within glide range was due to over-confidence. That's bad culture.

The failure to airstart the good engine was due to the biased conviction that it was the bad one. That bias overwhelmed any cockpit indication. No attempt was made to airstart the good engine. Clearly, the assumption that the R engine was damaged was never properly cross-checked and verified.

That's bad culture.

Did you read the report? How do you know "no attempt was made to airstart the good engine?"

[Evan]

Did you read the report? How do you know "no attempt was made to airstart the good engine?"

Because it would have started. There was nothing wrong with the right engine and the APU was running. Also, AFAIK, the switch was found in the off position.

[Evan]

Hard to imagine that they followed proper procedures and still managed to shut the wrong engine down. There are some things to consider here. Having flown in and out of Afghanistan many times, BIG mountains, gusty wind and turbulence, and having to worry about taking fire if you are low. We did almost all of our fights at night with no lights on below 18000' in the beginning. First time in the daytime really opened my eyes to how rugged it is.

This one happened above 42,000 ft. So nothing to consider there.