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  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post

    Where the Select-O-Matic set to “Climb” equates to fully powered back...
    Where a trained A320 pilot understands that CL (climb) selects the maximum range of autothrust (with both engines operating), and delivers any power level from full climb thrust to flight idle.

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  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post

    Where the Select-O-Matic set to “Climb” equates to fully powered back...
    Where AutoThrust set to "ON" equates "AutoThrust will determine and command the thrust required to enforce the required performance and flight path according to the selected automation mode".

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  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post

    Exactly! What's it doing now? It's saving your ass!
    Where the Select-O-Matic set to “Climb” equates to fully powered back...

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  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post

    No, I think the pilot wasn't properly trained in moving the flaps lever with his eyes as well as his hand. And I think the PF wasn't properly trained in verifying that his requests were correctly carried out.


    This is what the two-pilot cockpit is supposed to overcome. Certainly any single pilot can make an egregious mistake like this, but both at the same time? That's a cry for help.
    Not necessarily. Assume only well trained and honestly responsible crews. Say that a mistake like that happens in 1 out of 1000 flights, and say that out of those times that it does happen, it is quickly detected by one of the pilots 999 times out of every 1000 times. You will still have an undetected error like that in one every 1 million flights. And if you know anything of human factors you will know that these 2 one-in-a-thousand screw-up scenarios are too optimistic, even in well trained and honestly responsible crews.

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  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by kent olsen View Post
    A response from my best friend, my previous DC-8 Asst Chief Pilot. He's a tail dragger, owns 2. Flew the 320 at Jet Blue.


    Ha! Any old-technology airplane would have killed them when the NFP selected flaps up, it wouldn’t stow the slats until a safe speed.
    Exactly! What's it doing now? It's saving your ass!

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  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    Really? Do you think that the pilot was not properly trained in moving the lever back when he wanted to increase the flaps setting? Or didn't have enough experience doing just that?
    No, I think the pilot wasn't properly trained in moving the flaps lever with his eyes as well as his hand. And I think the PF wasn't properly trained in verifying that his requests were correctly carried out.

    These are human mistakes of the most basic type and happen from time to time to everybody no matter how skillful or professional, and some times they are not immediately detected or recognized.
    This is what the two-pilot cockpit is supposed to overcome. Certainly any single pilot can make an egregious mistake like this, but both at the same time? That's a cry for help.

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  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by kent olsen View Post
    A response from my best friend, my previous DC-8 Asst Chief Pilot. He's a tail dragger, owns 2. Flew the 320 at Jet Blue.


    Ha! Any old-technology airplane would have killed them when the NFP selected flaps up, it wouldn’t stow the slats until a safe speed. Plus, if it was in normal law it wouldn’t have stalled even with the stick all the way aft. It won’t exceed the AOA pitch and if you reach that AOA it maintains the max pitch while automatically going to TOGA.
    You’re just prejudiced because you’re an old stick and rudder pilot !
    It also hand-flies really nicely! It’s as light on the controls as a C-150!
    I thought hand flying was going to be like CWS in a Boeing. It’s not.
    Interesting input to say the least.
    Does it change your opinion previous in any way?

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  • kent olsen
    replied
    A response from my best friend, my previous DC-8 Asst Chief Pilot. He's a tail dragger, owns 2. Flew the 320 at Jet Blue.


    Ha! Any old-technology airplane would have killed them when the NFP selected flaps up, it wouldn’t stow the slats until a safe speed. Plus, if it was in normal law it wouldn’t have stalled even with the stick all the way aft. It won’t exceed the AOA pitch and if you reach that AOA it maintains the max pitch while automatically going to TOGA.
    You’re just prejudiced because you’re an old stick and rudder pilot !
    It also hand-flies really nicely! It’s as light on the controls as a C-150!
    I thought hand flying was going to be like CWS in a Boeing. It’s not.

    Leave a comment:


  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    I would say the worst part is that one of the pilots carelessly moved the flaps into the 0 position without either pilot noticing. If you want to talk about airmanship, start there.
    I don't disagree but that is something that is going to happen every once and then. You are never going to get rid of that no matter how good the pilots.
    Selecting flaps up instad of down.
    Selecting the gear lever instead of the flaps lever (or vice versa).
    And even turning the rudder trim switch instead of the cockpit door switch.

    These are human mistakes of the most basic type and happen from time to time to everybody no matter how skillful or professional, and some times they are not immediately detected or recognized.

    But, from a training perspective, let's start with that flap lever....
    Really? Do you think that the pilot was not properly trained in moving the lever back when he wanted to increase the flaps setting? Or didn't have enough experience doing just that?

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  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabe
    ...I would say that the worst part is that they did no FULLY clicked clacked Otto out of the game. They stayed with the autothrust on even when the thrust was doing crazy things like idling the thrust when they were climbing and had "climb" selected (you know that the automation doesn't move the pilot controls like it does in the Boeing, neither the sidestick nor the thrust levers, so leaving the levers in "climb" with the AT on doesn't mean that the thrust is in climb, but Airbus pilots surely are absolutely aware of that and used o fly that way, because they do that in every single flight).
    Indeed.

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  • Evan
    replied
    What we have here is one of those 'blended automation' scenarios. This is where we have seen a lot of 'what's it doing now'.

    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    I am not sure that looking at the FMA and realizing that the vertical mode was not in GA mode would have helped them realize of the full situation and break the chain of events.
    No, but it would have made it perfectly clear that there was an automation problem and that a go-around wasn't happening. That should have led to a complete reversion to manual flight.

    I would say that the worst part is that they did no FULLY clicked clacked Otto out of the game. They stayed with the autothrust on even when the thrust was doing crazy things like idling the thrust when they were climbing and had "climb" selected (you know that the automation doesn't move the pilot controls like it does in the Boeing, neither the sidestick nor the thrust levers, so leaving the levers in "climb" with the AT on doesn't mean that the thrust is in climb, but Airbus pilots surely are absolutely aware of that and used o fly that way, because they do that in every single flight).
    I would say the worst part is that one of the pilots carelessly moved the flaps into the 0 position without either pilot noticing. If you want to talk about airmanship, start there.

    When you move the thrust levers beyond CL you are no longer in active autothrust. You are in manual thrust. The pilot also disconnected the autopilot. This is what I mean by blended automation. The pilot has full manual authority, but, since he left the autothrust armed and the FD's on, he was heading for a 'what's it doing now' moment when he returned the thrust levers to CL and unintentionally reactivated the autothrust in GS mode. That is why there is procedure for autoflight shutdown that includes things the crew might overlook, things that might leave the automation armed and set to confuse them. That is why there is recurrent training.

    But, from a training perspective, let's start with that flap lever....

    Leave a comment:


  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post

    I’m sure Evan is tingling...

    I dunno- I kind of like the 6 basic instruments, and power levers that directly control power...if you want to put automatic crap ON TOP of that, fine...

    I find it disturbing that the pilots never really took
    control of the airplane, but conversely, it SEEMS that El Capitan was aware of a lot of stuff...just a bit short on how the acronyms weave together with flaps up.

    [Footnote- not calling for a return to steam gauges- the flat screen reports similar data in similar relative positions]

    Click clack paddy whack give a pilot a plane, this ole pilot used airmanship to get us home...
    It seems that they never realized of the flaps mistake that set the crap in motion until after the plane was fully stabilized after the incident. That possibly triggered the "what is it doing now".
    Even if they looked at the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator) and realized that the GA (Go Around) mode had not engaged, they probably would have not understood why not (i.e. they would have still been in the "what is it doing now mode"). I am not sure that looking at the FMA and realizing that the vertical mode was not in GA mode would have helped them realize of the full situation and break the chain of events.

    I would say that the worst part is that they did no FULLY clicked clacked Otto out of the game. They stayed with the autothrust on even when the thrust was doing crazy things like idling the thrust when they were climbing and had "climb" selected (you know that the automation doesn't move the pilot controls like it does in the Boeing, neither the sidestick nor the thrust levers, so leaving the levers in "climb" with the AT on doesn't mean that the thrust is in climb, but Airbus pilots surely are absolutely aware of that and used o fly that way, because they do that in every single flight).

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  • 3WE
    replied
    Acronyms galore (and crazy woven automatic systems)
    I’m sure Evan is tingling...

    I dunno- I kind of like the 6 basic instruments, and power levers that directly control power...if you want to put automatic crap ON TOP of that, fine...

    I find it disturbing that the pilots never really took
    control of the airplane, but conversely, it SEEMS that El Capitan was aware of a lot of stuff...just a bit short on how the acronyms weave together with flaps up.

    [Footnote- not calling for a return to steam gauges- the flat screen reports similar data in similar relative positions]

    Click clack paddy whack give a pilot a plane, this ole pilot used airmanship to get us home...

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post

    I didn't say that it makes or doesn't make sense. I said that bringing RVSM is irrelevant.
    I didn't bring up RVSM because of the altitude. I brought it up as an example of something all airlines pilots have accepted about human error. Autoflight does it (a lot) more reliably up there.

    I could ask you why does it make sense now but not before when RVSM was not a thing.
    Because RVSM wasn't a thing until autoflight became ultra reliable in the digital age. It would not have been safe enough.

    But here we are, in the digital GPS age. No human pilot can fly a flight path more reliably than automation. I recognize the need to do it at least occasionally for the purpose of retaining skills that might be needed if the automation fails. But it comes with added workload and stress for the PM because human performance is inconsistent and prone to errors, distractions and illusions.

    I think Capt Olsen is lucky to have flown in a more exciting age of flight and to have retired before it becomes entirely automated. But I also think the rest of us are lucky to fly in a far safer age.

    (Recklessly designed automation and reckless cowboy improvisation excepted, of course).

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  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post

    Exactly. If it makes sense above 18,000ft, why doesn't it make sense below 18,000ft?
    I didn't say that it makes or doesn't make sense. I said that bringing RVSM is irrelevant.

    I could ask you why does it make sense now but not before when RVSM was not a thing.

    (And RVSM starts at 29,000 ft and ends at 41,000 ft, not 18,000 ft. I mentioned 18,000 ft only because that's the altitude where Kent said he disconnected the AP, and they were descending not climbing, so RVSM was not a thing there).

    Leave a comment:

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