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  • #46
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post

    By the way, I don’t like to compare this to Teterboro. Teterboro was gross airmanship, high speed, during the day in wide open terrain…
    Teterboro was a late transition from the ILS approach to the circle-to-land maneuver caused by being way behind to begin with and leading to steeper maneuvers at low speed and altitude rather than a proper go-around. It fits into the sudden transition from normal CVR to panic CVR scenario, which is all I’m saying. That and the Lear factor.

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    • #47
      Originally posted by Evan View Post
      sudden transition from not falling out of he sky to falling out of the sky, which is all I’m saying. That and the Lear factor.
      Fixed. There was plenty of not normal things on the Teterboro CVR.

      Now, this crash may have had prior gross sloppiness OR could have had high levels of precision and safety right up through the final minute.

      Acknowledged. The sudden loss and “Lear Factor” are comparable. Shall we throw in several short final/flare PIO control loss crashes…the sleek little aeroplanie has been known to bite.
      Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

      Comment


      • #48
        Originally posted by 3WE View Post
        By the way…wait for the final report is not a literal statement on an ass-hat parlour talk discussion forum. It’s really only valid when there’s more than one likely theory but the data needed to distinguish between the theiries probably won’t be available till then.

        There are data pointing to speed decay and the need for tight maneuvering.

        By the way, I don’t like to compare this to Teterboro. Teterboro was gross airmanship, high speed, during the day in wide open terrain…

        This seems much more precise, carefully controlled, challenging and tight with one final, small misjudgement/insidious neglect.
        I agree. This may be a risk management issue. There is a known "fallacy" in risk management (don't know its name, but it falls under the bigger category of overconfidence) where one evaluates previous successful outcomes (and just the successful outcomes) favorably. For example: "I did it 9 times and all worked ok, so I feel very confident that it is safe". Well, guess what, if the next one goes wrong it is a 10% fail rate, which in risk management is AWFUL.

        Apparently this plane and crew where based in this airport. Maybe they did this 270-turn visual approach to 27R several times times, threading the hills and all. Maybe they did it at night sometimes. Maybe they did it in less than perfect visibility some times. Maybe a few times with both circumstances combined. And they thought "we got this".

        But the real question is.... if you did this 10 million times, in how many of them you would die? And of course that cannot be answered factually because nobody ever did 10 million times one thing ever. There is variation in all things involved. Visibility, wind, aircraft weight, and pilot performance (even if the pilot is the same). It is hard to judge those variations and their influence, but that is what risk management tries to do. Because one day you may find yourself at night, with visibility a little worse, with the runway and the hills coming in and out of sight, with the pilots maybe not in their sharpest day, with their performance and CRM a bit under their own average, and you may die. And if this combination may happen a few times per million, then it is too much risk even if you managed to pull it off 100 times successfully.

        It is not how many times you did it successfully, it is not just the outcome, but what was the safety margin left in those times to absorb any reasonable variation of circumstances in the future, and any reasonable combination of variation of the circumstances that may conspire against you. And also not just variations of the previous circumstances, but outlier conditions not experienced before in the previous successful attempts. What if there is a windshare, what if there is an engine failure, etc...

        It is not easy stuff.

        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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        • #49
          Originally posted by Evan View Post
          Teterboro was a late transition from the ILS approach to the circle-to-land maneuver caused by being way behind to begin with and leading to steeper maneuvers at low speed and altitude rather than a proper go-around. It fits into the sudden transition from normal CVR to panic CVR scenario, which is all I’m saying. That and the Lear factor.
          Teterboro was, since the beginning, a cricle to land approach to a runway after following the ILS to a different runway. It is still an instrument approach (even the circle to land part) and it involved more or less side-stepping to a runway that had a heading that was not too different from the heading of the ILS. They didn't do the maneuver at the prescribed point and instead of going around they attempted some aerobatics to try to fix it when they were already way too close.

          In this case they were flying an ILS approach to RWY 17, and were cleared to land and they acknowledged the landing clearance for RWY 17. When they became in visual contact with the field they cancelled VFR and requested a left pattern for RWH 27, which was granted. The turns were wide, no aerobatics involved, they had ample room and time.

          Yes, both were Learjets and both lost control while on approach, but that's about where the similitudes seem to end. It is too early, but there is no evidence (yet) that the pilots of this latest accident were having the reckless attitude of the Teterboro captain, not to mention that he forced the copilot, who was not allowed to fly the plane, to fly the plane against his will and despite his objections to do it.

          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

          Comment


          • #50
            Originally posted by Gabriel View Post

            Teterboro was, since the beginning, a cricle to land approach to a runway after following the ILS to a different runway. It is still an instrument approach (even the circle to land part) and it involved more or less side-stepping to a runway that had a heading that was not too different from the heading of the ILS. They didn't do the maneuver at the prescribed point and instead of going around they attempted some aerobatics to try to fix it when they were already way too close.

            In this case they were flying an ILS approach to RWY 17, and were cleared to land and they acknowledged the landing clearance for RWY 17. When they became in visual contact with the field they cancelled VFR and requested a left pattern for RWH 27, which was granted. The turns were wide, no aerobatics involved, they had ample room and time.

            Yes, both were Learjets and both lost control while on approach, but that's about where the similitudes seem to end. It is too early, but there is no evidence (yet) that the pilots of this latest accident were having the reckless attitude of the Teterboro captain, not to mention that he forced the copilot, who was not allowed to fly the plane, to fly the plane against his will and despite his objections to do it.
            I haven't seen any data on this. The two coincidental elements, the runway change and the Learjet made me go there. I have read other accounts about the notorious stall characteristics of certain Learjets when performing low speed 'aerobatics'. Having the time and space to do this safely doesn't always prevent one from getting too slow and banking too steeply, but I assume you have the data to know that this wasn't the case.

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            • #51
              Originally posted by Evan View Post
              I haven't seen any data on this… but I assume you have the data to know that this wasn't the case.
              Data:

              -Day vs Night
              -VMC vs. Reduced visibility and ceiling
              -ATC advising Teterboro of deviations, hints that minimal advice was needed
              -Instrument approach seemingly performed well with good understanding of legalities vs. Approach performed crappy.

              Do we “know”, Mr. Black and White, or are you defaulting to Cowboy Monkey Improvisational Idiocy as you normally do?

              No, we don’t know, but we know there are many differences due to data.
              Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

              Comment


              • #52
                Originally posted by 3WE View Post

                Do we “know”, Mr. Black and White.
                You know what's black and white? Carbon copies. I never suggested that this was a carbon copy of the Teterboro accident, but there you go, black and whiting me as you normally do.

                Question: is there a link to what IS known about this?

                Comment


                • #53
                  http://www.internet.com
                  Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                  Comment


                  • #54
                    Originally posted by Evan View Post
                    Question: is there a link to what IS known about this?
                    VAS aviation:
                    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lIjMCPKULMM

                    Maximus (Note, this one includes the harrowing screams which you may find emotionally disturbing, as I did. Some may not want to listen to this version. Listen at your own risk).
                    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jpsvGPPQxyo

                    Kathryn's report (a collection of facts and sources, not a video)
                    http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2021/12/l ... ident.html

                    Blancolirio:
                    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lalLdpFAryI

                    Dan Gryder. In general don't like Dan at all but in this case he has good factual data, and in this instance I also generally agree with his analysis and opinion.
                    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8pS17RPgqfI&lc
                    EDIT: Dan's video was taken down, or rather made private which has the same effect of not being accessible. No idea why. It is a pity, it had good ASD-B data graphed in 3D over 3D google maps with terrain.
                    This is the new video (1/7/2022) that replaces the one he took down: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hX8V0WCWllM

                    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                    Comment


                    • #55
                      Wondering how much Lear time the bunch of you have? Monday morning quarterbacks the lot of you.

                      Comment


                      • #56
                        Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                        Wondering how much Lear time the bunch of you have? Monday morning quarterbacks the lot of you.
                        All of us have exactly zero Lear experience. But you already knew that. So what? What I have to say is on that is in my signature in every post.
                        Monday morning quarterbacks? Did you want us to comment on this accident before it happened?

                        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                        Comment


                        • #57
                          Originally posted by Gabriel View Post

                          All of us have exactly zero Lear experience. But you already knew that. So what? What I have to say is on that is in my signature in every post.
                          Monday morning quarterbacks? Did you want us to comment on this accident before it happened?
                          Your signature is boring at this point! 3000 hours in 25's and 35's and I'm still walking around.

                          Comment


                          • #58
                            Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post

                            Your signature is boring at this point! 3000 hours in 25's and 35's and I'm still walking around.
                            I don't know if you noticed that this is a discussion forum on aviation safety, open to the general public, within an airplane photos internet site.
                            If you want to hear from the pros, you are not in the right place.

                            In the meantime remind me please how may hours van Zanten had? Or the Colgan captain? Or the Air France guys? Or the AA that CFITed at Cali? Or the other AA guy that tore the tail off the A300 taking off from JFK? Or the Atlas / Amazon 767 crew at Houston?

                            As if TT or time-on-type was the only indicator both of skills and of entitlement to opine.

                            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                            Comment


                            • #59
                              Originally posted by Gabriel View Post


                              In the meantime remind me please how may hours van Zanten had?

                              No idea who you are talking about.

                              Or the Colgan captain?

                              Not the best training record for the Captain. F/O, had no business in the seat that day, she was sick and as such had the obligation to remove herself from the flight.

                              Or the Air France guys?

                              Damn Airbus! Old man was in the back if I remember.

                              Or the AA that CFITed at Cali?

                              I was called as an expert witness on this accident and I am not allowed to discuss it.

                              Or the other AA guy that tore the tail off the A300 taking off from JFK?

                              Guess it shouldn't have gotten so close to a whale!

                              Or the Atlas / Amazon 767 crew at Houston?

                              Can't talk about this one either. But I wish I could!

                              As if TT or time-on-type was the only indicator both of skills and of entitlement to opine.

                              Comment


                              • #60
                                now now boys, it's the holidays. let's play nice.

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