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Boeing Lawyers Their Way Out of Punitive Damages for Ethiopian Crash

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  • #16
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    The following ones are not so obvious to me:



    I think that Boeing could have designed the MAX from the beginning with a sound MCAS (like the one it has now) and it would have been very safe, competitive against the NEO (especially for airlines already operating the NG) and same type and differences training would have been enough.

    Even taking greed into account, it is not understandable (to me) why the MCAS was designed and approved the way it was.
    so i dont know much, if anything, about how airplanes are designed and modified by manufacturers. i do know that in large companies there is a very common compartmentalization which very often leads to big problems. in short, the left hand doesn't know what the right is doing.

    perhaps (PERHAPS) the design people thought the training people would teach pilots about the new system. perhaps, a bean counter with rank told everyone "just make it frickin happen or you all lose your jobs.

    who knows.

    clearly though this was all driven by america's incessant and quite despicable enslavement to wall street. i've said this many times before on this forum. it simply boggles my mind that no american CEO has the balls or ovaries to tell wall street, "hey dickheads, we really dont give a shit about what you want. we are going to produce the best product we can at whatever it costs. we are going to treat our customers like mini-kings and queens so that we build a loyal base that will keep coming back over and over again instead of shopping for the bottom basement price."

    i'm an apple fan so maybe i'm biased. but apple seems to have a bit of that attitude. they make fantastic and really expensive stuff. they could cut corners and increase profit margins, but thankfully, that culture does not seem to exist within the apple universe. they build the best product they can.

    the 737max fiasco and tragedy is simply american greed.

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    • #17
      Originally posted by Evan View Post

      Obviously, if Boeing had properly developed the 737NG into the 737 MAX, a new SIM and new type certification would have been required.
      Even if that's true (and I'm not sure it is), a new type rating requirement (and corresponding training regimen) are not as huge a deal as some make it sound. When one realizes economies of scale, it ends up somewhere under $10,000 per pilot, which is really not a whole lot when we're talking about aircraft that sticker for around $100M a pop. At any rate, they could have developed an abbreviated course similar to what exists for A320 pilots transitioning to the A330 et al. In other words, I don't think it would have been such a huge obstacle. Manufacturers have subsidized training as part of package deals with aircraft purchases before and will again,

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      • #18
        Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post

        Even if that's true (and I'm not sure it is), a new type rating requirement (and corresponding training regimen) are not as huge a deal as some make it sound. When one realizes economies of scale, it ends up somewhere under $10,000 per pilot, which is really not a whole lot when we're talking about aircraft that sticker for around $100M a pop. At any rate, they could have developed an abbreviated course similar to what exists for A320 pilots transitioning to the A330 et al. In other words, I don't think it would have been such a huge obstacle. Manufacturers have subsidized training as part of package deals with aircraft purchases before and will again,
        The problem was that Boeing got caught on the back foot. They knew that the relatively antiquated 737-MAX was going to be a tough sell against the very modern A320NEO. So they sold it on ease-of-transition to operators with existing 737 fleets. They would market the MAX with the angle that a new type rating to the A320NEO was a big deal. Of course, for this to work, nothing in the 737-MAX design could trigger anything other than an easy (Powerpoint!) transition. Things like going back to the drawing board on main gear height apparently would have not allowed this. Boeing's other problem was time. There's had run out. The NEO was coming to market and could potentially replace Boeing fleets. An extended re-certification wasn't in the development time budget.

        If they had done things properly, building a airframe that could safely carry ultrafans without risky augmentation software, their strategy would never had worked. And now, two fatal crashes, an extensive grounding and redesign and $20B later, it no longer does.

        From the FAA Flight Standardization Board Report of the new training requirements needed to return the MAX to service:

        Training is required to be conducted in a 737 MAX Level C or D FFS.
        A new SIM is now required. Training for certain aspects of flight control can not be conducted in those existing NG FFS's. Maybe you see that as not a huge deal but back in 2011, when it would have trumped the only card Boeing had left (fleet commonality and effortless transition), it might have been game over.

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        • #19
          Originally posted by Evan View Post
          If they had done things properly, building a airframe that could safely carry ultrafans without risky augmentation software, their strategy would never had worked. And now, two fatal crashes, an extensive grounding and redesign and $20B later, it no longer does.
          Again, the problem is not augmentation software per se (the NEO has a shitload of augmentation software). Had they designed the MCAS as it is now, with built-in redundancy and limiting its input to ensure it is not catastrophic, they would have gotten away with it. The added sim training now required by the FAA may be justified, but it is based more on politics. I don't think there is anything that the FAA knows now that was not known before that would justify sim training now but not before. The MAX and the MCAS now is very similar to what the FAA thought it was back then.

          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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          • #20
            Originally posted by Gabriel View Post

            Again, the problem is not augmentation software per se (the NEO has a shitload of augmentation software). Had they designed the MCAS as it is now, with built-in redundancy and limiting its input to ensure it is not catastrophic, they would have gotten away with it. The added sim training now required by the FAA may be justified, but it is based more on politics. I don't think there is anything that the FAA knows now that was not known before that would justify sim training now but not before. The MAX and the MCAS now is very similar to what the FAA thought it was back then.
            I don’t think it’s political to require a SIM to reproduce actual flight characteristics. MCAS, even with sensor redundancy, can become inop, at which point the MAX has different aerodynamics and control responses than the NG. And those differences are particularly dangerous during an upset at low altitude. I'm not saying that these differences contributed to the fatal crashes. I’m saying that Boeing was never going to safely mount a LEAP turbofan on a 737 without requiring more costly and disruptive transition training, whether due to awkwardly placed engines and augmentation software or more appropriate changes to the airframe that would negate the need for these things.

            I’m saying that Boeing’s marketing strategy for the MAX was fatal.

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            • #21
              Originally posted by Evan View Post

              I don’t think it’s political to require a SIM to reproduce actual flight characteristics. MCAS, even with sensor redundancy, can become inop, at which point the MAX has different aerodynamics and control responses than the NG. And those differences are particularly dangerous during an upset at low altitude. I'm not saying that these differences contributed to the fatal crashes. I’m saying that Boeing was never going to safely mount a LEAP turbofan on a 737 without requiring more costly and disruptive transition training, whether due to awkwardly placed engines and augmentation software or more appropriate changes to the airframe that would negate the need for these things.

              I’m saying that Boeing’s marketing strategy for the MAX was fatal.
              And with your EXTENSIVE aviation background, and your many years as a commercial pilot, well you see where I am going..

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              • #22
                this horse has been beaten so much i doubt anyone here knows where to swing the bat!

                we all get it. boeing acted in the interest of wall street and not in the interest of the company's longitudinal success by failing to think about the 737's, the 757's and likely more models replacements back in the 90's. we get it. and now so do boeing execs and shareholders.

                american greed will cause the ultimate demise of the american economy. then all the rich, retired execs can try to fend off the masses of homeless people before being trampled to death.

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