The good, the bad and the ugly of human factors

[Gabriel]

By the time a pilot gets to that many hours, I have to believe rudder is as instinctual as yoke. Left wing dips. Turn yoke to right. Nose goes left. Push right rudder pedal. Engraved muscle memory requiring no critical thinking.

Some of us over there might not fully agree with that.

[3WE]

[Blah, blah, blah x a big number]

So I'm not really understanding why we aren't doing this. This seems like a wake-up call if ever I saw one.

https://youtu.be/xt0V0_1MS0Q

[Evan]

I half ass skimmed all the discussion as to whether this is a mental illness, or pure brain fart…I’m thinking that is mostly after the fact things, that are probably not_of PRACTICAL value for prevention (other than we already subject pilots to a decent medical exam.)

I’m more interested in the prevention side of things.

I have an unfounded ass-umption that this happens a lot, but that it’s recognized extremely quickly and corrected.

So how is it that the pilot and the FO let this go the two extra seconds whatever?

While I want to be the classic ass hat complainer that we need to fix this safety loop hole, the counter argument is that maybe there is no fix* or maybe it’s not a significant problem? I dunno.

*Footnote: Evan’s computer-operated airplanes are an option.

By the time a pilot gets to that many hours, I have to believe rudder is as instinctual as yoke. Left wing dips. Turn yoke to right. Nose goes left. Push right rudder pedal. Engraved muscle memory requiring no critical thinking.

This isn't an error of judgment. It's a human-factors phenomena. Stress, frustration, fatigue, whatever caused it, it just can't be happening a lot. Something has to go wrong in the reason-to-motor skill pathway.

Automation in yaw and steering during rollout is already a proven, commonly used technology.

Automation in yaw and steering during the takeoff roll seems like a no-brainer: like a set of digital rails on the runway. Runways are in all cases straight-ahead courses. Once the airplane is lined up, all the automation needs to know is the (exact) runway heading.

Certainly, problems could occur. If the automation is following the LOC (as RWY does on the Airbus), that signal can become distorted. Adding alternate or secondary references (GPS, internal guidance, map data, lateral acceleration) would allow it to be fail-safe. It could have safe deviation limits and allow pilot inputs (with breakout force) to take priority. As with every takeoff, the crew would have to be closely monitoring and prepared to step in at any moment.

Take-off TL position could activate it. Air/ground mode (and slow ground speed in these case of rejected takeoff) could inactivate it. All large modern transport aircraft have the means to control rudder and nose-wheel steering digitally.

So I'm not really understanding why we aren't doing this. This seems like a wake-up call if ever I saw one.

[3WE]

I half ass skimmed all the discussion as to whether this is a mental illness, or pure brain fart…I’m thinking that is mostly after the fact things, that are probably not_of PRACTICAL value for prevention (other than we already subject pilots to a decent medical exam.)

I’m more interested in the prevention side of things.

I have an unfounded ass-umption that this happens a lot, but that it’s recognized extremely quickly and corrected.

So how is it that the pilot and the FO let this go the two extra seconds whatever?

While I want to be the classic ass hat complainer that we need to fix this safety loop hole, the counter argument is that maybe there is no fix* or maybe it’s not a significant problem? I dunno.

*Footnote: Evan’s computer-operated airplanes are an option.

[TeeVee]

There are conditions caused by brain lesions that can result in this kind of 'unthinkable' mistake of proprioception. I think, at least, this pilot needs to be closely examined and tested for reflex actions.



So, one hundredth of one time. I'm cool with that.

and there are things called cerebral vascular accidents (strokes), aneurysms, myocardial infarctions, pulmonary emboli etc, etc. so are you advocating that all airline pilots go for total body CAT scans on, say a quarterly basis? can't be too safe ya know! a stroke could easily cause failed perception which could lead to wrong control inputs. aneurysms as well. shoot, any number of things could and do happen. pilots even die in the cockpit.

this was a case of pilot error. thankfully it resulted in nothing more severe than a broke airplane.

[Gabriel]

There are conditions caused by brain lesions that can result in this kind of 'unthinkable' mistake of proprioception. I think, at least, this pilot needs to be closely examined and tested for reflex actions.

I would not disagree with that. But you thrown him under the bus no questions asked.

So, one hundredth of one time. I'm cool with that.

Yes, but when you have 2 million pilots worldwide, that means that 20,000 of them will make such and error once in their lifetime. That would still count as several occurrences per year globally, most of them inconsequential and unnoticed.

[Evan]

I disagree. While it might be the case that this particular pilot has some kind or condition that predisposes this error...

There are conditions caused by brain lesions that can result in this kind of 'unthinkable' mistake of proprioception. I think, at least, this pilot needs to be closely examined and tested for reflex actions.

I think that it is something that can happen to ANY of us say 0.01 times in our lifetime.

So, one hundredth of one time. I'm cool with that.

[Gabriel]

let's talk about the fact that this particular pilot had over 19,000 hours flying time and 3000 hours on type. under evan's rules, a guy with a likely major error free career deserves to get axed.

I agree. Now, if (and I said IF) this pilot had a condition (perhaps a newly acquired one) that makes him more likely to make this kind of honest errors, then yes, he would need to get axed. He would still not deserve it, but the flying public would.

[Gabriel]

This came too close to disaster to be brushed off. If the pilot did, indeed, confuse his left/right pedal inputs, I'm sorry but that person shouldn't be considered commercial pilot material.

I disagree. While it might be the case that this particular pilot has some kind or condition that predisposes this error, I think that it is something that can happen to ANY of us say 0.01 times in our lifetime. That means that it will just happen to 1 out of 100 persons once in their life, randomly, and they are never going to do it again. So excluding them from the pool after the fact would not benefit anybody. Most of the times the mistake will be identified and corrected quickly before causing any harm. Very seldom it will be also identified and corrected very quickly but still too late to avoid harm and you end with an airplane write-off or, in the case of my children's elementary school, one parent dead and 3 kids injured.

This is not too dissimilar to calling your dog's name when you intended to call your child.

[TeeVee]

But a different sort of error occurs under stress in those who drive with both feet (brake foot/accelerator foot), similar to left rudder/right rudder.

We just don't want such people flying us around. There must be a way the industry can vet for pilot candidates not prone to this kind of error.

Either that or advance to the final frontier of the protected airplane: FBW in yaw.

i guess that you would want to get rid of all the people that drive manual transmission vehicles as well. i mean, based on your "logic" and ass-umptions, i'd be nailing the clutch when i mean to hit the gas and nailing the gas when i mean to hit the brakes....

let's talk about the fact that this particular pilot had over 19,000 hours flying time and 3000 hours on type. under evan's rules, a guy with a likely major error free career deserves to get axed.

i am in no way defending his actions, but knowing exactly as much as you do evan, from watching mentour video, i'm certainly not gonna say i don't want him flying me around. in fact, there's a decent chance he has flown me around once...

[kent olsen]

I do remember at the end of my career, flying with some pilots who just used the rudder pedals as foot rests. Nose wheel steering on the ground and never move them in flight. I believe some a/c I flew had a connect between the ailerons and the yaw damper, so you got a little coordination when turning the wheel. You'd never get away with that in the "Cub".

[Evan]

This came too close to disaster to be brushed off. If the pilot did, indeed, confuse his left/right pedal inputs, I'm sorry but that person shouldn't be considered commercial pilot material.

I remember back on the late 1980's, my parents bought a new Audi 5000. The first time I drove it, I couldn't get it out of park until my father informed me that I must have the brake pedal depressed to do so. WTF? Well, this safeguard was the fallout from legal lawsuits brought against Audi by people who had made the error of mistaking the accelerator for the brake and then claiming that the car (which relied on electronics that were a bit ahead of it time) was at fault. The error is made and then the situation is exacerbated by confusion:

In reality, the foot is pressing on the accelerator by mistake. Our vestibular-ocular system (balance and sight) informs the brain that we are in fact getting faster and sends the instruction to press the pedal harder. The foot does so as it believes it is in the right place doing the right thing and there is no feedback to suggest otherwise. The incorrect sustained use of the accelerator can be catastrophic.

The error of having the brake/accelerator foot on the wrong pedal wouldn't apply to rudder error. But a different sort of error occurs under stress in those who drive with both feet (brake foot/accelerator foot), similar to left rudder/right rudder.

We just don't want such people flying us around. There must be a way the industry can vet for pilot candidates not prone to this kind of error.

Either that or advance to the final frontier of the protected airplane: FBW in yaw.

[ATLcrew]

ATL, I suppose that the bar transitions from being a yaw cue to a roll cue at the moment of lift off?

It disappears completely at liftoff. The flight director then transitions to RWY TRK mode, followed either by NAV or by HDG depending on what sort of departure we're on.

[Gabriel]

ATL, I suppose that the bar transitions from being a yaw cue to a roll cue at the moment of lift off?

[Gabriel]

I suppose it also helps to transition from just looking out of the window to flying the instruments when the PM calls "rotate". When the nose is high the forward view of the runway can be obscured, and also it is better to have the obelisk already moving and provide continuity with the RWY TRK mode than having it suddenly jump to a side when the airplane becomes airborne.