Toe original AF447 thread is closed so...

[LH-B744]

Another question from someone not experienced in the 'Bus'. With normal flight controls if you are holding the nose up you would get buffeting in the control wheel. Does that apply in the 'Bus' as well???

Back on topic? Yes, if you like.

not experienced in the Bus. Well that seems to be a fact which the two of us share. More than only once or twice I thought, what if the Lufthansa CEO now could hear or read us.
Chief Flight Captain (and LH CEO) Spohr on his A320 is the one who I would ask these questions.

I am rather 737, 757, 767 and, obviously 747.

But I can see what you're lookin for. In case of this A330 student pilot with only 22 months of experience with an ATPL license, he as the PF almost pulled the yoke out of his cockpit,
until a stall lead to the death of all 228 souls on board.

If you ask me (not experienced in A330 and not experienced in A320), with such a strong misbehaviour, he must have ignored all physical and all visual and all acoustic warning signals
which for an Airbus A330 is capable.

And all this has happened, with the only four stripes Flight Captain on board performing his regular break (he came back to the cockpit only when it was too late),

and... you must correct me when I'm wrong, at FL370 . From the German AF447 wikipedia "befand sich weitherhin im Steigflug und war schon um 2000 auf FL370 gestiegen".

That must've been the moment when that A330 student pilot already had his hands on the yoke to almost pull the stick out of that Airbus.

My opinion, today, 13 years after the catastrophe?

Well. Today I am 44 years old, and equipped with more than 14 years of experience concerning air accident investigations, which by clearly more than 75% has been published here in this forum.

Greg Feith (ex NTSB) is one of my heroes.

And, probably together with Mr Feith, today I still don't know if I had been so keen to pull the yoke really until death, when already at FL350.

We all lose speed when we pull the yoke for let's say more than 15 seconds, don't we. That's true in an A320, in a B737, in a Beech B200, in a Cessna, in a Rockwell Commander 114,
in a B747, and in an Airbus A330.

Tragic misbehaviour and, probably too young for the long haul with occasionally very bad weather high above the Atlantic Ocean.

[Gabriel]

Another question from someone not experienced in the 'Bus'. With normal flight controls if you are holding the nose up you would get buffeting in the control wheel. Does that apply in the 'Bus' as well???

Do you mean a stick-shaker or natural buffeting?

[LH-B744]

Gabe, what do you think. F/O Bonin was 32 years old when he tried to pull the stick out of his A330.

Too young to avoid the stall without supervision of his Captain Dubois?

[3WE]

At 02:11:41 they were nowhere near coffin corner

Is 02:11:41 a good place for a 20-degree pull up? I can’t think of a compelling reason.

And define “near coffin corner” because at FL upper 30s, the barber pole is a good bit closer to the stall speed versus FL 20 whatever. It’s kind of a gray area, but still, aggressive pull ups or push overs up there aren’t the best course of action…

[TeeVee]

lots of graphs in the final report gabe

https://bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090...p090601.en.pdf

[LH-B744]

I mean, and now you can probably give me two or three seconds to translate,
Um eigenverantwortlich einen 60 meter langen Übersee Passagier Jet (A330-200) durch vorstellbar absolut sehr sehr schlechtes Wetter auf der Langstrecke durch die Nacht auf dem Interkontinental Flug von Südamerika nach Europa zu fliegen, da benötigt es meiner Meinung nach entweder zwei erfahrene
A330 Flugkapitäne, die abwechselnd zu jeder Sekunde des Fluges (auch und gerade nachts um 0300 oder 0400 zulu)
in der Lage sind die absolute Kontrolle über so einen Langstrecken Flug zu behalten
- oder auch zurück zu gewinnen.
Oder Bonin hätte zumindest Kapitäns Anwärter sein müssen. Beides ist nicht der Fall gewesen, mit bekanntem tragischem tödlichen Ausgang.

And now in English. As I said, give me a second. Three requirements which I see today have not been fulfilled back then in 2009:
1. A 60 meter long overseas passenger jet like the A332 shouldn't be flown without supervision by an experienced Flight Captain.
Never and not, and not during one second of the flight.
2. The long haul, e.g. across the pond, has its very very own requirements. As I know it from the Lufthansa schedule,
LH #510
begins with a night flight at Rhein/Main, and
LH #511
on the way home again is a night flight.
a/c type: B748.

3. After 14 years here at jetphotos, I am not sure if I am old enough to fly a LH-B748
a) through the night
b) in extremely bad weather
c) alone without supervision of my Captain, from South America to Europe.

I'd say, "without supervision" always and automatically must mean, I am the second Flight Captain on board. Which also was not the case, back then at AF#447.

With the known tragical result.

[Gabriel]

Gabe, what do you think. F/O Bonin was 32 years old when he tried to pull the stick out of his A330.

Too young to avoid the stall without supervision of his Captain Dubois?

There is no reason at all to believe that his age was a factor. In fact, I can hardly magine a case where age could be a factor in any accident of any passenger jet.

And he was being monitored by the other first officer who in fact had more experience flying the A330 than the captain.

[Gabriel]

Is 02:11:41 a good place for a 20-degree pull up? I can’t think of a compelling reason.

And define “near coffin corner” because at FL upper 30s, the barber pole is a good bit closer to the stall speed versus FL 20 whatever. It’s kind of a gray area, but still, aggressive pull ups or push overs up there aren’t the best course of action…

I side with Evan on this one. If it takes pulling up like crazy during 30 seconds or more before actually stalling the pane, you were nowhere near the coffin corner. They were close to the ceiling because of engine power limitations, not because the max Mach number was close to the min IAS.

[Evan]

Is 02:11:41 a good place for a 20-degree pull up? I can’t think of a compelling reason.

You're not getting it. At that point the plane was outside the envelope in a fully-developed stall. That's not a good place to remain at level pitch either. That's not a good place, period.

That's also not a place where you should expect to find compelling reason. I'm pretty convinced the F/O was bereft of reason at the point and only looking for a sign to act upon. And there it was, in the form of God, the flight director, which basic airmanship neglected to switch off...

Get it yet?

[3WE]

Get it yet?

I see that you are grasping at SOME way to figure out what Bonin was thinking (or not_thinking).

Maybe he was not an airman, but a damn good flight director follower?

You trash him for not following Airbus procedures, I trash him for not following basic procedures that apply to almost every expletive airplane ever built…they lead to the same question: What in the hell was he thinking?

That being said, you run for cryptic crap that is more about big words than substance.

I just can’t explain his actions, other than somehow he didn’t belong in a cockpit.

Just fly the plane.

Definitely do not_do a relentless pull up regardless if you are at FL 370 nor FL37 nor halfway between.

The only other thing I wonder is if he FEARED the Airbus FBW logic would pull a HAL-9000 and try to kill him…he saw a glimpse of that and panicked…and I’ve been pulling up the whole time.

[Evan]

I see that you are grasping at SOME way to figure out what Bonin was thinking (or not_thinking).

And do you see that Mentour Pilot and the final BEA report also grasp for that?

There are reasons behind procedures that might not be evident to pilots but are nonetheless vitally important.

And this often has to do with human factors.

One particularly dangerous human factor is confirmation bias.

So this pilot may have placed confirmation bias on the flight director (it's called a flight director for a reason) and disregarded all the other instruments (we have no good instruments!). In his mind, the flight director may have been the only instrument that was still functioning. And, ironically, it was the one instrument that should not have been functioning.

Engineers foresaw this potential for confusion when they wrote the procedure: FD's OFF

THUS, THE ESSENTIAL LESSON FROM THIS TRAGEDY:

Learn, respect, follow and complete the CRM procedures (that little nodding emoji is a period. It is also a pilot arriving safely home at the end of a day.)

[BoeingBobby]

https://images.app.goo.gl/Lui8FyubDubBrK7H6

[Gabriel]

And do you see that Mentour Pilot and the final BEA report also grasp for that?

There are reasons behind procedures that might not be evident to pilots but are nonetheless vitally important.

And this often has to do with human factors.

One particularly dangerous human factor is confirmation bias.

So this pilot may have placed confirmation bias on the flight director (it's called a flight director for a reason) and disregarded all the other instruments (we have no good instruments!). In his mind, the flight director may have been the only instrument that was still functioning. And, ironically, it was the one instrument that should not have been functioning.

Engineers foresaw this potential for confusion when they wrote the procedure: FD's OFF

THUS, THE ESSENTIAL LESSON FROM THIS TRAGEDY:

Learn, respect, follow and complete the CRM procedures (that little nodding emoji is a period. It is also a pilot arriving safely home at the end of a day.)

I am trying not to engage, but this is absurd.

Why do you expect that is in a mental state that, upon an unexpected AP disconnect at 35000 ft, grab the stick and push back an 1.5G, 15 degrees ANU, 7000 fpm, 2500 ft climb, before the unreliable speed condition was even identified, is however in a mental state that would let him think rationally, identify a condition, and follow a procedure?

In ANY emergency or abnormal situation, the 1st memory item and #1 priority ALWAYS is FLY THE PLANE. And I am going to go full black and white here and point out that PERIOD at the end of the sentence. THEN you can start working on the diagnosis and corresponding troubleshooting.

"Fly the plane" (aka "aviate") in this context and in this super early stage of the abnormal situation doesn't mean any specific procedure, just keep the plane stable and within the envelope (or recover if it departed the envelope, which was not the case here). This plane was stable and within the envelope so the first thing they MUST have done is NOTHING (or at most small control inputs to keep the plane stable). THEN you can analyze and troubleshoot. However the first action taken was make crazy control inputs that actively took the plane way outside its normal envelope.

And you are asking why they didn't follow a specific procedure?

The human factor was broken BEFORE there was any chance to react rationally, be it in a "keep the plane stable" common airmanship sense, or in a "we have UAS, UAS memory items" way.

[kent olsen]

Correct me if I"m wrong but I remember hearing that Air Bus didn't require stall training during initial training. That was subsquently changed after this accident.

A friend of mine, my assistant chief pilot in the DC-8, worked at an operator where he flew the 737 and later the 757. He then went to work, where he retired, flying the Air Bus 320. He did do stalls in the Bus but I don't remember what time frame. I sent him that video and he said it was very accurate.

[Evan]

I am trying not to engage, but this is absurd.

Why do you expect that is in a mental state that, upon an unexpected AP disconnect at 35000 ft, grab the stick and push back an 1.5G, 15 degrees ANU, 7000 fpm, 2500 ft climb, before the unreliable speed condition was even identified, is however in a mental state that would let him think rationally, identify a condition, and follow a procedure?

I don't. If both of these pilots had been trained in a safety culture that ingrained CRM and procedural discipline, he never would have done that or at least not for more than a few moments, never to anywhere near the point of stall. That sort of piloting comes from not having a plan in your head and being incapable of concentrating on your part of that plan.

In ANY emergency or abnormal situation, the 1st memory item and #1 priority ALWAYS is FLY THE PLANE. And I am going to go full black and white here and point out that PERIOD at the end of the sentence. THEN you can start working on the diagnosis and corresponding troubleshooting.

That is exactly what the procedure calls for. It's the THEN that the procedure is there for.

And you are asking why they didn't follow a specific procedure?

No. I know perfectly well why they didn't follow the procedure that they hadn't properly learned. Or any semblance of CRM.

The human factor was broken BEFORE there was any chance to react rationally, be it in a "keep the plane stable" common airmanship sense, or in a "we have UAS, UAS memory items" way.

Disagree. If they had the procedure installed in their heads, I think things would have gone very differently and we would not be discussing this anymore than we are discussing the many other times procedures were faithfully followed.