If this is your first visit, be sure to
check out the FAQ by clicking the
link above. You may have to register
before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages,
select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below.
OH MY GOD 8 degrees roll and 300 ft, we are going to die!
I didn't say PERFECTLY stable. You knw very well that if all the pilots did was wind the watch and light a cigarette, they would be all alive.
And if you call fighting to keeping roll in control while wildly pulling back "bad flying", then I am going to call hitting the X in the keyboard repeatedly "bad Shakespeare", or using the gas to keep try to adjust the speed, while turning the steering wheel to the stop for no reason, "bad driving".
I never argued the value of following the procedures and using proper CRM.
According to you, if a single-pilot (say in a business jet approved for single pilot) has an unreliable speed event, he is doomed.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
According to you, if a single-pilot (say in a business jet approved for single pilot) has an unreliable speed event, he is doomed.
Here's what you're not getting:
I DO REALIZE that if a number of A330 flights experience this same scenario and fail to do anything but improvise with sound airmanship, leaving the FD's on and the thrust locked, they will almost certainly all get through it just fine. Almost certainly. I also realize that eventually one will not because the perfect storm of loss of autoflight, misleading instrumentation, unpracticed flying skills, bad judgment and human error are going to converge at some point like they did here.
Guess what? I'm not the only one who realized that. And so procedures were written to minimize that possibility by removing the stealth factors and the improvisation that this eventuality depends on. Performed faithfully by every crew, that eventuality is no longer an eventuality.
That is how aviation safety works. Train pilots to be at their best. Then assume them at their worst and provide defenses against this. Multiple layers of defense. And, by all means, remove anything that can confuse situational awareness or lead to upset.
Here's how it doesn't work: Pilots not doing their part in this. Pilots with excessive self-confidence rather than a dreadful awareness of the fine line between proficiency and the pitfalls of human error. Pilots lacking in humility. Pilots disrespecting and disregarding procedures. Most will get away with it and retire one day. But some won't and they will take everybody down with them.
That's not acceptable. And all pilots have to do to prevent this is to put the hubris back in their pants and follow their training and the rules of the job that is entrusted to them.
That is, if they've even been properly trained in the first place...
I 100% agree with ALL of that. Yet, I am talking about something totally different.
You and I are in disjoint universes with independent existence in different dimensions and without a hope of making contact.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
I 100% agree with ALL of that. Yet, I am talking about something totally different.
You and I are in disjoint universes with independent existence in different dimensions and without a hope of making contact.
What is your position here? That the pilot was simply an idiot who didn't know the relationship between AoA and stall and the limitations of climb performance near cruise ceiling? That he intentionally reacted to the loss of autoflight at cruise level by zoom climbing at 7000fpm because he thought that was the thing to do? That doesn't align with a ATPL pilot flying for a major flag carrier airline with 8 years and 3000 hours under his belt. Certainly, he had been trained on basic airmanship. There had to be something else going on (which I have exhaustively tried to argue here--along with ample supporting evidence).
So your turn. What caused him to do that?
(I don't know isn't a useful answer if the idea is to prevent this from recurring).
The pilots (and especially Bonin) were not pilot material. Let alone airline pilot material.
For me the question (not INSTEAD the things you are talking about but IN ADDITION to them and BEFORE them) is how to avoid non-pilot material to be at the controls of a plane.
Of course you need to have solid procedures, train the pilots very well in their execution and in CRM and risk management, and have a strong safety culture that promotes discipline, compliance, horizontal cockpit gradient (everybody feels free and safe to speak in the cockpit, and everybody takes what is said openly and constructively), and a super strong confidential and realiation-proof speak-up policy to report every deviation from mistakes done by oneself to intentional non-complicate by the chief pilot (PIA rings a bell, that other dude that flew on one engine across Europe too).
Is that enough? No. You need pilots to practice and stay current. That means you need pilots hand-flying a minimum amount in different conditions and phases of flight. You need pilots that have an profound initiate understanding and intuition of how planes flight (beyond their experience, because there are things that they will never experience except perhaps once in a long while in a sim, which is not super realistic especially regarding physical sensations).
And the most difficult part, you need pilots that will not panic and start acting irrationally in a real emergency. How do you screen for that? I don't know.
So how do you protect against a Bonin? How do you protect against a Renslow? How do you protect against that student pilot that filtered himself out when he reacted to a practice stall by pushing all the way down and locking in that position, killing himself and the instructor? (or the other one that did more or less the same in a go around but locked himself in a pull-back)
I know you don't like the I don't know. But I don't know.
What I know is this: A pilot that reacts to a very minor event that involves the unexpected disconnection of the AP, by pulling up like crazy, and keeping pulling up like crazy, and when the pane finally stalls, pull up like crazy again and keep pulling up all the way don (oh the irony) is not in condition to identify what is the issue and what is the right procedure to apply. This applies to AF, Colgan and others.
So this is my question to you: How do you ensure that a pilot will first of all not actively destabilize the plane, then keep the flight stable, then identify the issue, then identify the procedure to follow, before following such procedure? And for all I care this could be a single pilot in a Pilatus PC-24 business jet with 11 pax on board, and the abnormal situation can be anything.
Because let me tell you one thing: "Follow the corresponding procedure for the condition" will not make it.
And if you disagree, I surrender. You win. I have nothing else to say.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
Forget it. You don't have to answer that. We will never know for certain anyway. This is good enough for me:
I 100% agree with ALL of that.
The issue I have concerning AF447 is with people insisting--especially after this debacle--that procedure isn't necessary and that basic universal airmanship and improvisation are good enough. That's what got all these people killed and will get more people killed in the future. That's what I found so appalling when the flight recorders were read out. No CRM. No regard for procedure. No memory procedure given to these pilots by an airline with the legitimacy of Air France.
The issue I have concerning AF447 is with people insisting--especially after this debacle--that procedure isn't necessary and that basic universal airmanship and improvisation are good enough. That's what got all these people killed and will get more people killed in the future. That's what I found so appalling when the flight recorders were read out. No CRM. No regard for procedure. No memory procedure given to these pilots by an airline with the legitimacy of Air France.
I'm glad you agree that that is unacceptable.
Well, I am not sure I agree with 100% of that.
I hope you can answer the question at the end of my previous post.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
So how do you protect against a Bonin? How do you protect against a Renslow? How do you protect against that student pilot that filtered himself out when he reacted to a practice stall by pushing all the way down and locking in that position, killing himself and the instructor? (or the other one that did more or less the same in a go around but locked himself in a pull-back)
You can't. A few will always get through that door. Because the person they are when they are certified is not the person they are when the startle comes about
What I know is this: A pilot that reacts to a very minor event that involves the unexpected disconnection of the AP, by pulling up like crazy, and keeping pulling up like crazy, and when the pane finally stalls, pull up like crazy again and keep pulling up all the way don (oh the irony) is not in condition to identify what is the issue and what is the right procedure to apply.
OK, but that never happened. Again I ask you to look at the FDR plots.
So this is my question to you: How do you ensure that a pilot will first of all not actively destabilize the plane, then keep the flight stable, then identify the issue, then identify the procedure to follow, before following such procedure?
You can't ensure that. But you can do everything to minimize that possibility. And that is the idea behind practiced CRM. The PM identified the problem in 12 seconds but did not call for any procedure. At that point the vertical speed was 3000fpm, the altitude was about 35,000ft, the AoA was between 5 and 6deg. If the pitch and power targets were called out at that point and set (and monitored) they would not have stalled. And there would be no FD to add misleading confusion. Even an idiot could have stabilized at that point, because he is no longer thinking independently, and that is the point.
OK, but that never happened. Again I ask you to look at the FDR plots.
I have...
The PM identified the problem in 12 seconds...
And by then the PF had already pitched up from 0 to 10 deg ANU, increased the vertical speed from 0 to 3500 fpm, triggered the stall warning twice, and been pulling 1.5 Gs.
Recoverable? Sure. With Bonin at the controls? Probably not. The PM told him a few times to stop climbing and to descend. Sure, that was not "the procedure", but the PF didn't execute on that. What makes you confident that he would have executed on "5 degrees nose up, climb thrust" instruction? I mean, maybe, ok. But not more than a timid maybe.
At what point should the PM have said "I have controls" and punched the PF in the face at the first "dual input" call? That is CRM too. And there is a procedure for that. it is called "pilot incapacitation".
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
And by then the PF had already pitched up from 0 to 10 deg ANU, increased the vertical speed from 0 to 3500 fpm, triggered the stall warning twice, and been pulling 1.5 Gs.
Right, that's the damage done. But the plane is still in the envelope (approach to stall regime) and things are still recoverable IF the PF can be assigned targets and is no longer thinking independently. Certainly Bonin had the skills to achieve those targets.
The TAM flight of 2003 cited in the final report (that did recover) started out badly as well:
Originally posted by BEA Final Report
When the AP disengaged, both [TAM] pilots made pitch-up inputs (one went to the stop) that resulted in an increase in pitch of 8°. On several occasions, the stall warning was triggered due to the nose-up inputs, and the crew reacted with strong pitch-down inputs. During the 4 minutes that the sequence lasted, the load factor varied between 1.96 g and -0.26 g, the pitch attitude reached 13° nose-up and the angle of attack reached 10°.
In the case of AF447, by 2:10:40 the plane was safely back in the envelope, steady at 6deg pitch and less than 5deg recorded AoA at 1400fpm. Relatively stable except that the thrust had been pulled back to 33%. But it could have ended favorably at that point with specific targets. The fatal inputs come a moment later, improvised pitch inputs that launch the plane back into the stall regime.
The PM told him a few times to stop climbing and to descend.
Vague. Relative. No target values. He told him to "go back down". Bonin DID back off on pitch at that point and even made some ANU inputs (and he did 'go down' in pitch and vertical speed). But he needed a target to focus on. 5deg pitch. Or at that point initially a reduced pitch in keeping with the approach to stall recovery procedure to silence the warning, then the UAS stability values. But definitely no independent thinking on Bonin's part. Targets.
CRM was missing. The final report states the following:
Originally posted by BEA Final Report
At no time did the PF indicate his intentions or objectives with respect to the control and stabilisation of the flight path. Although the PF’s various roll inputs indicate his intention to keep the wings horizontal, it is not possible to determine what the PF’s target was in the longitudinal axis.
At what point should the PM have said "I have controls" and punched the PF in the face at the first "dual input" call? That is CRM too.
No. At the point that the PM did finally take over, it was too late. Bonin was in full panic mode. The PM should have called out the stabilization memory items "5deg pitch, climb power" as soon as the UAS was identified, and then, it Bonin failed to respond to that, have taken over control. At that point, I highly doubt a far less bewildered Bonin would have put up any resistance.
And by then the PF had already pitched up from 0 to 10 deg ANU, increased the vertical speed from 0 to 3500 fpm, triggered the stall warning twice, and been pulling 1.5 Gs.
Recoverable? Sure. With Bonin at the controls? Probably not.
I agree that, with Bonin at the controls and thinking independently, probably not. But with Bonin at the controls following CRM and a pitch and power target, I think they would have recovered.
A large part of the mythology surrounding AF447 is that Bonin pulled up into a stall after taking command and was pulling up to the full stop the entire time.
The truth is that he followed the initial freak-out 7000fpm climb by returning the aircraft to an almost stable state and that, while he did trigger the stall warning momentarily during that time, the airplane remained within the envelope and could have been recovered at any time up to 02:10:50. That left a full 33 seconds following the identification of UAS by the PM to implement procedural targets for pitch and power.
At 02:20:51, following a second increase in pitch command by the PF, the airplane departed the envelope and entered the stall. For me, the larger mystery is in understanding why he did that. There were two waves to this: an initial pitch command reaching 7000fpm and stall warning, a correction back to sustainable values (6deg pitch and 1400fpm), and then a second aggressive pitch command that initiated the stall.
The A320 and A330 share a common cockpit and the stall procedures are the same.
what's your point? my point was they did NOT have stall avoidance/recovery training at any point AFTER their type rating training. at least that is what mentour said, and he's usually pretty accurate.
what's your point? my point was they did NOT have stall avoidance/recovery training at any point AFTER their type rating training. at least that is what mentour said, and he's usually pretty accurate.
I don't think he ever had any stall recovery training on type. But I assume he needed it to get his PPL. But, like I said before, maybe in France you just need a mime class and a few hours in a Peugeot.
But he definitely had stall avoidance training on type (A320) and the procedure at that time prioritized TOGA thrust while holding pitch because it was ground-proximity stall training. Since the accident, the procedure has prioritized pitch reduction, trading altitude for airspeed, whenever altitude is not critical.
What he did, however, had nothing to with any stall avoidance procedure. That is why it is so difficult to understand.
The pilots (and especially Bonin) were not pilot material. Let alone airline pilot material.
Frustrated with Evan? What he doesn’t get is that these guys WERE pretty decent pilots.
PNF is dutifully reading 10 warnings. PF is riveted on flying.
But, PNF is brain locked on procedure. PNF is brain locked on flying AN AIRBUS, not an airplane.
As asshat outsiders, we try and try to visualize how we might screw up (given our lousy knowledge). But we keep concluding: Gee, I think I would have crashed that plane on the Airport in France as opposed to following the how-to-stall memory checklist while my PM wondered which of the 10 procedures was correct.
But somehow, we’ll never know why, they violated A NUMER OF SUPER BASIC THINGS. So while they didn’t belong in a cockpit, they also DID.
Light a cigarette…a VERY scary rule of thumb for this crash. As is trying to generally avoid relentless pull ups.
I do favor prompt, measured, nose-down inputs and speed checks and power adjustments in response to stall warnings.
Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
We process personal data about users of our site, through the use of cookies and other technologies, to deliver our services, personalize advertising, and to analyze site activity. We may share certain information about our users with our advertising and analytics partners. For additional details, refer to our Privacy Policy.
By clicking "I AGREE" below, you agree to our Privacy Policy and our personal data processing and cookie practices as described therein. You also acknowledge that this forum may be hosted outside your country and you consent to the collection, storage, and processing of your data in the country where this forum is hosted.
Tweet
Comment