Toe original AF447 thread is closed so...

[Evan]

Maybe while they're reprogramming the thing, they could also add a little code so the flight director doesn't call for a sustained nose-up pitch in situations where it's guaranteed to stall the aircraft?

Like autopilot, it should be inop when the air data is unreliable and remain that way until switched back on. Maybe they’ve changed it since then.

[3WE]

Ha! Good one.
Side comment: Bolded/underlined part was not the case in the times of AF447. It is much better now, take a look:
/https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/app/themes/mh_newsdesk/documents/archives/what-is-stall-how-a-pilot-should-react-in-front-of-a-stall-situation.pdf

Again, Evan misses the point.

Based on ATLs comments, he’s a decent pilot AND the Airbus is a fine plane.

But MORE THAN ONE PERSON has fouled up the pull up. My proposal wasn’t to change their plane, but instead their training: HEY, EVER HEARD ABOUT STALLS AND CONTROL STICKS BENT BACKWARDS?

And yeah Boeing dudes do it too.

Since Evan sees nothing wrong, has he offered an economical way to identify and defer Bonins (and avoid lawsuits) when Bonin was able to get the relevant ratings?

[elaw]

Exactly. And that is why Bonin was not a pilot. I rest my case.
(And neither was Renslow)

Just some clarification on my position (things that I already said in this thread but, you know, it is not always well understood).

I think that AIrbus-style envelope protections are GOOD.

While of course nobody wants to lose envelope protections when the control law is degraded (to avoid the inconsistencies that you mentioned), that may be unavoidable (there is a reason why the control law was degraded to begin with). That doesn't mean the way that happens cannot be improved (especially in the hinsight of AF447). For example. alpha max depends on Mach number. If Mach is lost, you could set a degraded alpha max at the highest value (which corresponds to the lowest Mach). You may still enforce that degraded alpha max protection. Of course the plane may (and more likely will) stall earlier than that, if the pilot disregards other signs of an impending stall, but it will limit how much you can go into the stall. You would not find yourself in a situation where you are with 45 degrees of AoA and the stabilizer fully trimmed nose up to the stop, and the plane still honoring your "but I have been pulling up all the time" stick inputs.

The part that I don't like is that in Alternate Law you lose all low speed and AoA hard and soft protections (except the stall warning) but the pitch response to stick input remains in direct law which lacks AoA feedback. Note that that doesn't happen even in direct law. In direct law, when you enter the slow speed regime (alpha prot) the stick response changes from load factor / pitch rate demand to AOA demand.

Maybe while they're reprogramming the thing, they could also add a little code so the flight director doesn't call for a sustained nose-up pitch in situations where it's guaranteed to stall the aircraft?

[Gabriel]

Dear Mr. 3WE,

Thank you for your kind letter. Rest assured that we at Airbus have always built upon the assumption that all licensed airline pilots have had adequate training in the basic stall characteristics that you describe both in their introductory pilot training and in their Airbus type ratings. We do not at present offer an idiot-proof airplane for non-pilots. The procedure in our FCOM's calls for pitch (AoA) reduction as the first instant recall procedural item following a stall warning. To make the stall warning instantly identifiable, we have it call out "STALL STALL STALL" rather insistently. We hope this answers your inquiry.

Respectfully,

Airbus Media Relations
Troll Division

Ha! Good one.
Side comment: Bolded/underlined part was not the case in the times of AF447. It is much better now, take a look:
/https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/app/themes/mh_newsdesk/documents/archives/what-is-stall-how-a-pilot-should-react-in-front-of-a-stall-situation.pdf

[Gabriel]

We all know the old saw about Airbus being dangerous because the protections are inconsistent between control laws. What that misses is that knowing the reversion laws on an Airbus is as fundamental as knowing the stickshaker on a Boeing. When a Boeing pilot feels shaker, if that pilot does not instinctively think 'stall warning, watch the pitch and power', that pilot is not a pilot. When an Airbus pilot gets the indications of alternate law (which include a master caution) and that pilot does not instinctively think 'hard stall protection lost, watch the pitch and power', that pilot is not a pilot.

Exactly. And that is why Bonin was not a pilot. I rest my case.
(And neither was Renslow)

Just some clarification on my position (things that I already said in this thread but, you know, it is not always well understood).

I think that AIrbus-style envelope protections are GOOD.

While of course nobody wants to lose envelope protections when the control law is degraded (to avoid the inconsistencies that you mentioned), that may be unavoidable (there is a reason why the control law was degraded to begin with). That doesn't mean the way that happens cannot be improved (especially in the hinsight of AF447). For example. alpha max depends on Mach number. If Mach is lost, you could set a degraded alpha max at the highest value (which corresponds to the lowest Mach). You may still enforce that degraded alpha max protection. Of course the plane may (and more likely will) stall earlier than that, if the pilot disregards other signs of an impending stall, but it will limit how much you can go into the stall. You would not find yourself in a situation where you are with 45 degrees of AoA and the stabilizer fully trimmed nose up to the stop, and the plane still honoring your "but I have been pulling up all the time" stick inputs.

The part that I don't like is that in Alternate Law you lose all low speed and AoA hard and soft protections (except the stall warning) but the pitch response to stick input remains in direct law which lacks AoA feedback. Note that that doesn't happen even in direct law. In direct law, when you enter the slow speed regime (alpha prot) the stick response changes from load factor / pitch rate demand to AOA demand.

[Gabriel]

I think you might be living in a universe parallel with yourself.

The first statement comes off to me as scarebus legend: ‘Airbus pilots learn to pull up relentlessly’. There are two situations I can think of where pulling up relentlessly would be taught (directly or indirectly). Both are in ground proximity and both are also taught for the 737.

Otherwise, Airbus pilots are taught to remain in the envelope with careful, measured sidestick inputs. A.k.a Airmanship.

So what is your point (or agenda) there?

Dude....

3we
Except, I almost never favor a relentless pull up…unless there’s a REALLY GOOD, PARTICULAR REASON…
Admittedly, if you WANT to stall, it’s a really good, particular reason.

Gabe
In an Airbus, there are a number of things that would qualify as a good reason to relentlessly pull up(1), which would not qualify as good reasons in a 737 or a Boeing.
(1) Small but binding print: As long as the plane is in Normal Law.

Evan
1) Wind shear
2) Obstacle or terrain clearance
What else?

Gabe
You just mentioned 2 things that are NOT "you WANT to stall" which are good reasons to relentlessly pull up.
2 is a number.
Point is that pilots get to know and trust the plane's ability to to handle a relentless pull up without fear fo stalling (fine print still applies but may get lost under startle and panic).

Do you understand the difference between teach and learn? Do you think there are ways of learning other than being directly taught something? Do you think that there are things that can be learned from teaching even when that thing was not what was directly taught? Do you think that Airbus pilots practice relentless pull-ups in the sim and see that the the plane cannot stall regardless of how much they pull? (fine print applies but may be overlooked under high stress, overload, panic and confusion). Do you think that Airbus pilot study that the plane will not go more than 30 deg ANU, 15 deg AND, 67 deg bank, overspeed, over-G, or stall, regardless of what they do with the stick? (again, fine print applies). Do you think that experiencing these envelope protections is something that may be practiced in the sim perhaps during type rating, to demonstrate how the protections work? Do you understand that I am NOT saying that anybody ever told any Airbus pilot "if you experience a stall warning, just pull up relentlessly"?

And...

There are two situations I can think of where pulling up relentlessly would be taught (directly or indirectly). Both are in ground proximity and both are also taught for the 737.

Really, Evan? Are you ok? Do you think that Boeing may train on a limit on how much the pilot can pull back while Airbus may train that it is ok to pull the stick all the way back and hold it there if needed?

[Evan]

Evan:

May I write Airbus a letter, suggesting that training be updated to remind pilots that relentless pull ups can cause a lot of airplanes to stall, including alternate-law A-330s, AND that it’s not a good reaction to A RASH of warnings, unless you are dangerously near terrain?

Thanks in advance.

Dear Mr. 3WE,

Thank you for your kind letter. Rest assured that we at Airbus have always built upon the assumption that all licensed airline pilots have had adequate training in the basic stall characteristics that you describe both in their introductory pilot training and in their Airbus type ratings. We do not at present offer an idiot-proof airplane for non-pilots. The procedure in our FCOM's calls for pitch (AoA) reduction as the first instant recall procedural item following a stall warning. To make the stall warning instantly identifiable, we have it call out "STALL STALL STALL" rather insistently. We hope this answers your inquiry.

Respectfully,

Airbus Media Relations
Troll Division

[3WE]

Evan:

May I write Airbus a letter, suggesting that training be updated to remind pilots that relentless pull ups can cause a lot of airplanes to stall, including alternate-law A-330s, AND that it’s not a good reaction to A RASH of warnings, unless you are dangerously near terrain?

Thanks in advance.

[Evan]

We all know the old saw about Airbus being dangerous because the protections are inconsistent between control laws. What that misses is that knowing the reversion laws on an Airbus is as fundamental as knowing the stickshaker on a Boeing. When a Boeing pilot feels shaker, if that pilot does not instinctively think 'stall warning, watch the pitch and power', that pilot is not a pilot. When an Airbus pilot gets the indications of alternate law (which include a master caution) and that pilot does not instinctively think 'hard stall protection lost, watch the pitch and power', that pilot is not a pilot.

Each methodology has strengths and weaknesses. Boeing pilots get a more physical feedback than Airbus pilots (though buffet is still quite felt). But in downbursts or critical terrain conflicts you are much better off in an Airbus. Overall, in almost 100% of flights, a protected aircraft is the safer one.

But, it the pilot is not a pilot, then good luck.

[3WE]

So what is your point (or agenda) there?

QUITE A FEW crashes have come from relentless pull ups, and quite a lot of BASIC training says “dont”, and there’s an impressive list of reasons why it should USUALLY be avoided…

[Evan]

Do you see the disconnect between the parallel universes?

I think you might be living in a universe parallel with yourself.

In an Airbus, there are a number of things that would qualify as a good reason to relentlessly pull up⁽¹⁾, which would not qualify as good reasons in a 737 or a Boeing.

And then:

I mean that you can and should pull up relentlessly in an Airbus if you need to extract max escape performance.

The first statement comes off to me as scarebus legend: ‘Airbus pilots learn to pull up relentlessly’. There are two situations I can think of where pulling up relentlessly would be taught (directly or indirectly). Both are in ground proximity and both are also taught for the 737.

Otherwise, Airbus pilots are taught to remain in the envelope with careful, measured sidestick inputs. A.k.a Airmanship.

So what is your point (or agenda) there?

[Gabriel]

I mean that you can and should pull up relentlessly in an Airbus if you need to extract max escape performance. The plane itself will moderate your relentlessness and keep the AoA just shy of stall. You don't need this "if the stickshaker triggers, reduce the AoA just a bit and keep and modulate it around onset of the stickshaker". You just pull up with the peace of mind that the stall warning will never sound. HAL will not let Dave stall.

The old stall procedure prioritized thrust to maintain critical altitude. It did not instruct pilots to pull up relentlessly.

I never said that. What I said is that Airbus pilots learn that they can pull up with confidence and no concerns to stall

No no no. Airbus is never saying 'pull up with impunity' outside of escape maneuvers where that is actually called for.

Do you see the disconnect between the parallel universes?

[3WE]

The old stall procedure prioritized thrust to maintain critical altitude. It did not instruct pilots to pull up relentlessly.

I never said that it did.

IT DOESN’T MATTER WHO SAID WHAT…

The fact is that there’s a somewhat troubling NUMBER of crashes with relentless pull ups.

My total ass hat parlour talk opinion is that A FEW pilots forget their 172 training and rote repeat full power and nail a (normal) max-climb attitude…a great procedure for INCIPIENT stalls in powerful planes…maybe not so good for STALLED aeroplanies…

I always thought an occasional reminder might help versus memory regurgitation but conversely…I have no real business offering an opinion.

[Evan]

What I said is that Airbus pilots learn that they can pull up with confidence and no concerns to stall (with some fine print in effect).

I realize that this is not official Airbus pilot training, but this is the message that Airbus has been conveying, directly or indirectly.

No no no. Airbus is never saying 'pull up with impunity' outside of escape maneuvers where that is actually called for.

Airbus is saying pull up with caution and concern for airmanship and aerodynamics. The training in that respect is in alignment with any other type training.

They didn't design it for aerobatics or stunt flying. They designed it to have defenses against the dunderheads who might treat it that way.

That is the message they have always been conveying.

And you realize that Bruce Dickerson doing dickhead things is not official Airbus pilot training (although thank god it is Bruce Dickerson proof).

[Gabriel]

Look, you might be right. It has been speculated to have been a factor, as you know. The PF is the first to call out 'alternate law protections' so from that point on he knew (it took him 18 seconds to realize this - BAD CRM). Around that moment, he does relax the pitch inputs and even makes nose-down inputs. This is also the point at which things start to 'go back down' to sustainable levels. Again, the real mystery is why he pulled up again after that, now clearly aware that the plane was in Alternate Law.

The answer if of course I don't know. I suspect that the pilot under panic was not acting rationally or reasoning effectively. I am not convinced that the pilot reduced the nose-up inputs because he realized of the implications of the alternate law or if his call and subsequent action just happened to coexist for different independent reasons (for example, because the PNF was telling him to stop climbing and to go down).

But, aside from the escape procedures that I mentioned, Airbus pilots are not taught to pull up relentlessly. I don't know where you're getting that.

And I don't know where your are getting that I am getting that.

The old stall procedure prioritized thrust to maintain critical altitude. It did not instruct pilots to pull up relentlessly.

I never said that it did.

What I said is that Airbus pilots learn that they can pull up with confidence and no concerns to stall (with some fine print in effect).

I realize that this is not official Airbus pilot training, but this is the message that Airbus has been conveying, directly or indirectly:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ei_IY8VymbU

I think that Airbus changed the pitch (speach) after AF447 and the industry consensus for the new stall procedure.