Tenerif... AUSTIN!

[Gabriel]

(my 500 ft estimation is a minimum, based on a smooth 1000 fpm go-around)

[Evan]

It would be absolutely possible. The landing plane would be going around from a point just shy of the threshold. The other plane would lift off some 3500 ft down the runway. The going-around plane would be easily 500 ft AGL by then, and still climbing. So even if one was exactly on top of each other they would not crash immediately and it would give time to take other evasive maneuvers (tell the taking-off plane not to exceed 1000 fpm, turn the going-aorund plane away) before the taking-off plane reaches the going-around one in the assumption that the former has a greater climb speed.

Yes, possible in the general sense. What I meant was, under certain circumstances, it might not be possible. For example, if the departing flight is still at or near the threshold and the arriving plane goes around at 100 AGL (about 750ft short of the threshold) or at 50 AGL (basically crossing the threshold). Especially if there is any delay in getting positive climb. The worst case scenario must be the one that guides us.

I think this 'in-advance' clearance procedure in limited RVR is insanely dangerous.

[Gabriel]

It was a beautiful VFR night. The plane that just landed had a double engine shutdown / a collapsed landing gear / burst several tires / hit a cow that crossed the runway / got stuck in the mud with one landing gear off the paved surface.

The trailing plane that was already cleared to land ________ .

[Not_Karl]

It was a beautiful VFR night. The plane that just landed had a double engine shutdown / a collapsed landing gear / burst several tires / hit a cow that crossed the runway / got stuck in the mud with one landing gear off the paved surface/got hit by a meteorite.

Fixed.

[Gabriel]

Fixed.

That would be a good fit for the blank too.

[Evan]

It was a beautiful VFR night. The plane that just landed had a double engine shutdown / a collapsed landing gear / burst several tires / hit a cow that crossed the runway / got stuck in the mud with one landing gear off the paved surface.

The trailing plane that was already cleared to land observed this and went around .

At least that is a reasonable expectation. But in low RVR there’s no provision for error. And if the conflict is with a plane taking off and still on the threshold end, even a go-around could result in a collision.

[Gabriel]

At least that is a reasonable expectation.

WTF? Your consistency is incredible.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGQlQFn0euI

But you are right. It did go around. Nothing to see here, let's make it SOP.

[Evan]

WTF? Your consistency is incredible.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGQlQFn0euI

But you are right. It did go around. Nothing to see here, let's make it SOP.

I consistently don’t like it in any visibility, but IF it must be a thing at all, it is more reasonable in VFR. And if we have pilots who neglect to do a visual scan of the runway at DH in VFR, that is an even bigger problem.

[3WE]

What if [1]? What if [2]?

Gabiee:

Here's the deal. Your nice "expect late clearance" works great in a perfect world. But in an imperfect world, it's going to cause more problems than it solves. I'm not answering your questions (although you will see answers below if you connect the dots).

Have you ever spent time at a busy airport with limited runways (not_the mega fields that have their takeoff runways AND their landing runways, but one where departures and arrivals share the same runway)?

It is pretty cool to see a dude flaring as another dude lifts off.

I do not want THAT pilot to be WAITING for landing clearance, or ASKING himself if he's gotten landing clearance during that phase of flight.

I want him to have two thoughts: Should I land? (screw ATC if I don't) and fly the GD plane to a landing (and watch the airspeed)...

I do not_want a third thought: Will I be cleared to land? (Or what was that last radio trasmission?)

You are flaring and YOU decide things are OK but the tower (with a bad view and 1-mile away) says no? That's not_a great "situation".

...and throw in a one second delay for the tower and a one second delay for him to interpret, or maybe he's already deciding to go around, but the FO is one second behind, rodger, who?, tower cancel clearance oveur...(Oh don't forget, Evan's CRM requires both pilots to verbalize "Landing, any questions" Valuable seconds and brain power used when it's needed elsewhere.)

With the way it is now: ITS, cleared to land, Southwest departing prior to your arrival...ITS says, ok that's tight, let's be prepared to go around...TO HELL WITH EVAN AND GABRIEL MAKING US ASK IF WE HAVE LANDING CLEARANCE AT THE MIDDLE MARKER...PHUGOID THAT, let the pilots operate the airplane.

You ask what would have happened if this situation if ITS wasn't cleared to land...Well, protocol would be that you continue the approach until it's unsafe to continue it. So, what the phugoid is the protocol WITH landing clearance....Ummm, continue the approach until it's unsafe to continue it.

And again, I spent some time fence-perving at flyover. I have heard cleared for immediate takeoff, traffic 2.5 mile final. (The aeroplanie was in position). In this instance: Southwest, cleared for takeoff, ITS 3 mile final (sure, I think maybe should have said no. I also remember geeking out with my scanner (hiding it from FAs) and hearing us cleared into position with a plane with nice big landing lights 3.5 miles out...we held for a moment for the prior landing to clear. I didn't did died.

I do agree that this incident seems very off (public punishment for the controller)...I can IMAGINE ITS THINKING that SW was much further down the runway- but conversely he asked as though he didn't like what he saw. I am not_sure what SWA was thinking...I SUSPECT the cancel came just after V-1 and with the slight risk of ice..."ummm, no, we are going".

I would like to hear what someone with credentials (or even better EXPERIENCE) has to say...do they fault thier pilot buddies for anything or is it ALL ATC?

[Gabriel]

I would like to hear what someone with credentials (or even better EXPERIENCE) has to say...

Ok, but let it be someone whose experience includes NOT_USA (a place not visible from your Flyover Amerita vantage point) where "my" idea has been SOP since before I was born.

[3WE]

[A plane runs off in to the ditch in VMC and the landing plane goes around.]

At least that is a reasonable expectation. But in low RVR there’s no provision for error. And if the conflict is with a plane taking off and still on the threshold end, even a go-around could result in a collision.

WTF? Your consistency is incredible.

But you are right. It did go around. Nothing to see here, let's make it SOP.

Evan's comments made sense to me...

"It's kind of reasonable to expect the pilots to initiate their own go-around in severe VMC, but pretty problematic in low visibility".

He had to throw in an acronym, but I get what he's saying. Also, nighttime is challenging at 3:00AM Universal Circadian Time when the runway IS clear...your example is not_relevant.

ReReReRepeating: Whatever style of "Cleared to land" is being used- the pilots and the tower need to monitor everything and be prepared to go around. That's the backup system Evan asks for...that and adherence to separation standards to give takeoff clearance while a plane is on a CAT I or a CAT MCMXVIII approach. Even with late clearance, excrement can still transpire.

[Evan]

As I've already pointed out, just being in the ILS protected area during CAT III operations when an arrival is inside the FAF ist verboten. On top of that, issuing 'in-advance' clearance defeats the purpose of runway clearance. In these circumstances, 'clear to land' must mean 'runway is clear', not 'runway is expected to be clear'.

The only way this would make sense is if the tower instructed to expect late clearance and the pilots were committed to go-around if that clearance (when the runway is actually clear) didn't arrive by DH (or better yet, by 100' no matter what the DH is).

But even that makes me squirm. The crew of this incident went around at 150' and it was too damned close.

So I don't get it. We have some wild west behavior here. Flagrant disregard for CAT III operations criteria and fundamental safeguards. Gabriel, are you telling us that this is SOP?

[Gabriel]

So I don't get it. We have some wild west behavior here. Flagrant disregard for CAT III operations criteria and fundamental safeguards. Gabriel, are you telling us that this is SOP?

Nope. I am saying that ATC royally screwed up (which is the opposite of SOP) and the layer of Swiss Cheese that saved the day was a pilot that went above and beyond by having extremely good situational awareness and deciding to disregard SOP of being fixated on the instruments during a CAT III approach with Autoland (where you may have a split second to react to an autopilot anomaly), and (apparently) decided instead to look outside, what let them see the Southwest plane and go around. This pilot would have done everything correctly if they had remained fixated on the instruments monitoring the autopilot land the plane on top of the 737.

With the policy used in most of the world outside the US, there would have been an additional quite thick layer of Swiss Cheese because the 767 would have not been cleared to land and they would have had to go around even if they remined fixated on the instruments. By SOP.

And in La Guardia, the 2 layers of Swiss Cheese were pure luck: 1) An airport vehicle just happened to be close to the accident and was able to see what the tower could not see, and 2) The Delta MD-80 had gone far enough off the side of the runway that had the trailing plane landed they would have not collided. Using the policy used in that remote part of the world called NOT_US there would have been an additional thick layer of Swiss Cheese: The trailing plane could have not been cleared to land until the Delta MD-80 reported being clear of the runway. So trailing plane would have had to go around even if the tower never instructed them to do so because they never learned what had just happened with the Delta plane. And, again, this layer is by SOP, not by luck or above and beyond performance.

(Note: in the Austin incident, there was room for more layers above-and-beyond performance: Southwest could have declined the take-off clearance until after the FedEx landed, and the FedEx could have initiated a go around immediately when Southwest was clear for take off, exactly for the reasons you mention. 2 layers of above-and-beyond Swiss Cheese failed. Fortunately a 3rd one didn't fail and saved the day. It took a pilot to deviate from SOP to save the day against shitty SOP)

But hey, cheer up. No harm no foul. We can wait until 2 planes with 400 pax each actually, not nearly, land on top of each other. It would be a disaster, but look at the half-full glass. We would break a word record that remained unbeatable for 45 years and counting!!!!

[Evan]

Nope. I am saying that ATC royally screwed up (which is the opposite of SOP) and the layer of Swiss Cheese that saved the day was a pilot that went above and beyond by having extremely good situational awareness and deciding to disregard SOP of being fixated on the instruments during a CAT III approach with Autoland (where you may have a split second to react to an autopilot anomaly), and (apparently) decided instead to look outside, what let them see the Southwest plane and go around. This pilot would have done everything correctly if they had remained fixated on the instruments monitoring the autopilot land the plane on top of the 737.

With the policy used in most of the world outside the US, there would have been an additional quite thick layer of Swiss Cheese because the 767 would have not been cleared to land and they would have had to go around even if they remined fixated on the instruments. By SOP.

And in La Guardia, the 2 layers of Swiss Cheese were pure luck: 1) An airport vehicle just happened to be close to the accident and was able to see what the tower could not see, and 2) The Delta MD-80 had gone far enough off the side of the runway that had the trailing plane landed they would have not collided. Using the policy used in that remote part of the world called NOT_US there would have been an additional thick layer of Swiss Cheese: The trailing plane could have not been cleared to land until the Delta MD-80 reported being clear of the runway. So trailing plane would have had to go around even if the tower never instructed them to do so because they never learned what had just happened with the Delta plane. And, again, this layer is by SOP, not by luck or above and beyond performance.

(Note: in the Austin incident, there was room for more layers above-and-beyond performance: Southwest could have declined the take-off clearance until after the FedEx landed, and the FedEx could have initiated a go around immediately when Southwest was clear for take off, exactly for the reasons you mention. 2 layers of above-and-beyond Swiss Cheese failed. Fortunately a 3rd one didn't fail and saved the day. It took a pilot to deviate from SOP to save the day against shitty SOP)

But hey, cheer up. No harm no foul. We can wait until 2 planes with 400 pax each actually, not nearly, land on top of each other. It would be a disaster, but look at the half-full glass. We would break a word record that remained unbeatable for 45 years and counting!!!!

Wait a sec...

Gabriel, are you telling us that this is SOP?

Nope. I am saying that... It took a pilot to deviate from SOP

So you are saying that it is SOP? Issuing runway clearance 'in-advance' and then meanwhile taxiing another plane onto takeoff position is SOP? In the US but not in the NOT_US where runway clearance is not given until the runway is clear?

[Gabriel]

So you are saying that it is SOP? Issuing runway clearance 'in-advance' and then meanwhile taxiing another plane onto takeoff position is SOP? In the US but not in the NOT_US where runway clearance is not given until the runway is clear and expected to remain clear?

(Fixed)

Yes. That is SOP in the US but not in most of the the NOT_US.
But you asked if "Flagrant disregard for CAT III operations criteria" was SOP. No, that is NOT SOP. That was total ATC screw-up.

I suspect that the 767 PF or PM deviating the attention outside of the instruments during a CAT-III autoland, to look for the Southwest 737 (if that's what happened, which I don't know) was probably against SOP too. But in the good way (to your horror). That may have saved many lives. Including the controller's.