CRJ crash

[3WE]

I suspect the pilot flying (PIC) may have been totally focused on correcting roll with limited authority and not paying enough attention to pitch attitude and in no mood to reduce pitch in a steep bank below 100’. I’m guessing the airspeed indicator doesn’t get much attention at all in those moments.

This has to be prevented on the ground.

I sort of have a problem with the digital, absolute thinking that a bank would preclude management of pitch and airspeed…

I know it’s kind of cowboyish, but it’s all linked and pulling up in a steep turn is broadly considered a bad thing. But I better check the CRJ-200 FCOM to learn if that does not apply the specific type.

[Evan]

I sort of have a problem with the human factors time-compressed and often panicked thinking that uncommanded roll excursions at lawn mowing altitude would preclude management of pitch and airspeed…

I do too. It should never happen. Which is why there are protocols to checking and entering weights and balances and v-speeds that shouldn't ever be taken lightly. Once the above happens, it's rodeo time, and you know how most rodeo rides end.

[3WE]

uncommanded roll excursions at lawn mowing altitude

Somehow, Gabriel, with incredibly few 747 hours and shit for training, survived (sort of) a rather similar V-speed error, using Tomahawk mentality…I guess he just happened to read the right paragraph in the FCOM & Acronym handbook.

[Evan]

Somehow, Gabriel, with incredibly few 747 hours and shit for training, survived (sort of) a rather similar V-speed error, using Tomahawk mentality…I guess he just happened to read the right paragraph in the FCOM & Acronym handbook.

I don't remember him telling us about steep roll excursions in both directions.

But, as I've said before, we can't all be Gabriel. The fact is, there is a gradient of quality amongst pilots. Some of them succumb to human factors more readily than others.

Often, they are the ones who consider themselves to have impeccable airmanship.

Due to this fact, aviation safety focuses on preventing these scenarios from ever happening.

[Gabriel]

Somehow, Gabriel, with incredibly few 747 hours and shit for training, survived (sort of) a rather similar V-speed error, using Tomahawk mentality…I guess he just happened to read the right paragraph in the FCOM & Acronym handbook.

Unfortunately, not really. I mean, I did survive but I used more than "basic Tomahawk mentality". I didn't apply the stall recovery procedure of lowering the nose liberally adding full power. I used more of a ground proximity escape or windshear escape procedure. Power was already full so I lowered the nose barely enough to make the stall warning stop and then pulled up at bit again until it started again and kept modulating the elevator into and out of the stall warning. This is something that I knew from self-interest in aviation safety in general and , as you know, a LOT of study, reflection and discussion about stalls and their recovery but was never taught in training and that I never practiced in a Tomahawk or Cessna (I might have tried it in MSFS, but I don't remember one way or another). This history / knowledge (to the point of making intuitive, even instinctive, without even haven practiced it) is not the common pilot story. If you asked me, it should, but it is not.

And then, even the "basic Tomahawk mentality" (let's say basic GA airmanship) is not reliably found across the board in GA either. Stall-spin accidents is a major killer in GA, much much muuuuuch more than in air transport. And remember the Tomahawk's nickname? It didn't earn it due to pilots not_stall-spin-crash-burn-dieding. (Actually, while the Tomahawk has a better fatal accident rate than the C-152 overall, it has like thrice the fatal stall-spin fatal accidents rate than the C-152, which the C-152 pilots make up for by dying in other dumb ways not related to stall/spins).

At the end of the day, I agree with both you and Evan.

Superior pilots use superior judgement to avoid needing to use their superior skills.
We need both, because shit can happen even shit can happen even with superior judgement (say a windshear) and because seven superior judgement is not perfect judgement and even superior pilots make mistakes of which then need to be able to fly away safely.

It seems that these pilots (or the Latam tailstrike pilots) didn't use superior judgement, and the CRJ PF didn't have superior skills either.

[Gabriel]

I don't remember him telling us about steep roll excursions in both directions.

I kept the AoA low enough (maybe barely low enough) to avoid any such roll excursions to even start, by relieving back pressure a tad immediately when the stickshaker started shaking and then modulating the elevator around the stickshaker onset AoA. And, if roll excursions started to develop, I want to think that I have the knowledge for how to control them as ingrained as the stall, but I didn't have the chance to test it. It is one of these thing that is not normally taught nor practiced: How to control PIO by opposing rate not position, and eliminate the source of the lack of natural damping (which is the part that I did before the roll even started).

[3WE]

Blah, Blah, Blah (Gabriel unable cite a rather simple bottom line in spite of aero engineering being complex.)

I was never taught this in 172 school, but you can prevent wing wallows by preventing a thing or two that generally precedes it.

Although, I forget what those preventative things are…

It might involve some measured attitude management to prevent things that happen before the roll excursions.

[Evan]

I was never taught this in 172 school, but you can prevent wing wallows by preventing a thing or two that generally precedes it.

Although, I forget what those preventative things are…

Taking off with sufficient airspeed?

[3WE]

Taking off with sufficient airspeed?

No, two other things…