Jeju Air737-800 Crash at MWX (Muan International Airport, South Korea)

[Gabriel]

With gear and flaps up (very low parasitic drag) and in ground effect (very low induced drag), deceleration would be painfully slow.

From my own experience with in the 767 sim, that's not the case.
We tried various various scenarios and with the recommended full flap config, drag is so high that you can't even flare due to the rapid deceleration.

I am sorry Bernt, but I don't understand exactly with what you are disagreeing. Let me know when you tried with gear and flaps retracted.

[Evan]

Evan does get a “pilot error” in; however.

Evan:

I see two possibilities: An equipment failure or a human error. The alternate gear extension failed to work on LOT 16 (a 767) due to an open CB for the uplock circuit, so there is precedent on a different Boeing model. But that's highly unlikely here. More likely is a skipped configuration and missed warnings by an overwhelmed crew dealing with a time-compressed situation.

So you disagree with that. Explain how?

[bstolle]

I am sorry Bernt, but I don't understand exactly with what you are disagreeing. Let me know when you tried with gear and flaps retracted.

As I wrote: We tried various scenerios.
That was many years ago after the Cactus crash. Deceleration was pretty fast, even in clean config and with full flaps so fast that you couldn't even flare.
All scenarios were with the gear retracted (water landing)
Btw. neither is a clean config a GA setting, nor do the flaps seem to be fully retracted in the various videos IMO.

[orangehuggy]

If you lose a motor on finals, and it causes an unstable approach, does the training recommend a ga? Thanks

[bstolle]

Loosing an engine on final requires a GA in any case, regardless if the approach was stable or unstable.

[B_C]

Evan:

I see two possibilities: An equipment failure or a human error. The alternate gear extension failed to work on LOT 16 (a 767) due to an open CB for the uplock circuit, so there is precedent on a different Boeing model. But that's highly unlikely here. More likely is a skipped configuration and missed warnings by an overwhelmed crew dealing with a time-compressed situation.

So you disagree with that. Explain how?

On a news platform, an official report came out stating that partial pilot error was involved. As Airbus planes have a function that activates all flaps whereas the Boeing need to activate two flickers/buttons. The pilot panicked, thought this was an Airbus case and activated only one control.

[NYspotter]

With my experience with a lot of Korean pilots in my school (CFIs and Students) i believe it was most likely a result of pilot error and improper CRM.

background:
the plane started a go-around around 2359Z, and local news reports all said 0907L (0007Z) was when the accident happened... 8-9 minutes here
initial approach was to RWY01 but landed gear up on RWY19.
overran the runway and hit the localizer antenna for RWY19 in the video.
possible bird strike on the first approach. or compressor stall, or some event causing the fire coming out of the No. 2 engine


based on the videos i was able to find the locations where 2 videos were taken. 3 locations noticed:
the video of the fire coming out of the No2, the camera location is the pin at the bottom, close to water
the video showing the landing and impact, the camera location is the pin to the west of the departure end pf runway 19
the third pin on the top by the approach end of runway 19 is a hanger, and its the hanger directly behind the 737 when it first touched down on the runway in the crash video

did a quick calculation
the airplane touched down roughly about 4300ft past the threshold, which is about halfway down
the plane touched down at about a ground speed of 190kts, departed the departure end of runway 19 at a speed slightly above 150kts, and hit the localizer antenna at around 142kts.
winds were almost crosswind but only 2 kts, sea level airport, so their indicated airspeed is about the same as the ground speed
obviously they are not the actual speeds but i do not think they are off that much


here is what i think...
planned runway was runway 01, fire coming out of the right engine due to a bird strike or compressor stall or such (as you see in the video), and they probably lost the engine. first officer wanted to go-around but the captain just wanted to put it down.
they had to go-around possibly because the go-around procedure has been started so that is the time gear and flaps got brought back in.
8-9 minutes in the air after a go-around is definitely not enough to run the checklist. and with some south korean culture where they place significant emphasis on seniority, the FO just accepted the fact that they would just go straight to the runway instead of any checklist. with the warning inside the flight deck and such, the crew did not put the flaps and gear down, and missed the "too low, gear" warning or such.
then they touched down halfway down on runway 19 with their gear up
there were no system failures, they could still deploy the gear/flaps normally


about the korean culture i just mentioned: i have no idea how they really do things in korea and how this affects normal daily flight operations, but it was mentioned in a Mayday Air Disaster video where they were talking about the Asiana 777 in SFO and that is where i first learned this culture. and in my experience with some korean pilots in my school, i can feel this from a lot of korean instructors, not all of them tho. there are some very nice instructors, just good human beings. But for the rest, they are always right and you can't really disagree the stuff they do. those flight instructors follow our FOM and SOPs on the record so they dont get in trouble, but they do cut corners in the training and do things in the air from time to time. We had a runway incursion earlier this month and a 121 jet was forced to abort, and stuff like they fall asleep during long cross-country flights with students. flew with a korean instructor a long time ago for once, he managed to almost overspeed the engine twice while demo a maneuver. with a different korean instructor, i got yelled at in the debrief for questioning something the instructor did during a flight. I do not question their certifications but i do question some of them's ability to be a professional and safe pilot, and to create a good CRM environment after all.



for some reason i am not able to upload any attachments of those 3 pins and the calculations i did for the speeds.

[Evan]

As I wrote: We tried various scenerios.
That was many years ago after the Cactus crash. Deceleration was pretty fast, even in clean config and with full flaps so fast that you couldn't even flare.
All scenarios were with the gear retracted (water landing)
Btw. neither is a clean config a GA setting, nor do the flaps seem to be fully retracted in the various videos IMO.

You practiced ditching in a 767?! What was the point of that? Has anyone ever successfully ditched a widebody aircraft? Is it physically possible? I find the ditching switch on the Airbus widebodies to be a bit of wishful thinking.

[Evan]

about the korean culture i just mentioned: i have no idea how they really do things in korea and how this affects normal daily flight operations, but it was mentioned in a Mayday Air Disaster video where they were talking about the Asiana 777 in SFO and that is where i first learned this culture.

The Asiana final report highlighted cockpit gradient as a causative factor. Korean pilots with gung-ho military backgrounds were shown favoritism and deference. Hopefully this led to reforms but I won’t be too surprised to find it playing a role here. Culture is a huge risk factor. Maybe the greatest one of all.

[Observer]

According to local media, crew had 3 minutes from emergency to landing.

1) 8:54 AM - Flight 2216 received landing clearance for Runway 1 at Muan International Airport and began its approach.

2) 8:57 AM - 3 minutes later, the control tower issued a bird strike advisory, warning the crew of potential wildlife hazards.

3) 8:59 AM - The pilot declared an emergency, reporting a bird strike and proceed to go-around

4) 9:00 AM - Flight 2216 opted to land runway 19.

5) 9:01 AM -Flight 2216 received ATC clearance to land runway 19.

6) 9:02 AM -Flight 2216 touched down at one-third of the 2,800m runway. It skidded for approx 1,600m before crashing into the localizer and an outer wall

[Gabriel]

for some reason i am not able to upload any attachments of those 3 pins and the calculations i did for the speeds.

Just paste the google maps “share” links.

[orangehuggy]

Loosing an engine on final requires a GA in any case, regardless if the approach was stable or unstable.

well I don't think its that black and white, if you just lost that engine because there is no more gas on board, i'd imagine you continue...

[Evan]

3) 8:59 AM - The pilot declared an emergency, reporting a bird strike and proceed to go-around

There must be something missing here. 2216 declared emergency: reporting just bird strike?

I'm wondering about the possibility that the PF wanted the gear left extended in the go-around because of the potential for damage and loss of systems and thus did not request it but the PNF raised it out of habit without calling it out, leaving the PF unaware of the gear-up configuration. I could see this going unnoticed in a high-stress, high workload situation with multiple failure warnings going off.

[Evan]

well I don't think its that black and white, if you just lost that engine because there is no more gas on board, i'd imagine you continue...

Or if you lose your last remaining engine...

[bstolle]

well I don't think its that black and white, if you just lost that engine because there is no more gas on board, i'd imagine you continue...

Very black and white. If there's no gas on board and you didn't notice, you will find out pretty quick.
It doesn't influence the GA decision because you initiate the GA as soon as the engine failes. Troubleshooting is the next step.