Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Jeju Air737-800 Crash at MWX (Muan International Airport, South Korea)

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Originally posted by thor View Post
    it would not be difficult to build a bird like drone to attack plane engines nowadays, just guessing.
    Birds do not attack engines. Engines attack birds. Nobody wins.

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Evan View Post

      Birds do not attack engines. Engines attack birds. Nobody wins.
      I mean a drone which disguise as a bird to attack engine.

      Comment


      • evan, you should actually read the source you cited. get back to me in a week or so and let me know how well you understood it.

        i have a degree in psychology, albeit, undergrad, and their article is not beginner level stuff. not even intermediary.

        having said that, their specialty (Tversky & Kahneman) was more related to economics than anything else. They also did not use individuals trained in the subject area they were assessing, e.g., participants questioned on medical procedures choices were not medically trained; participants questioned on money related issues/investments, were not professional investors or investment advisors.

        i think it's fair to say that while their research and theory may be valid in terms of the general population (i.e., ordinary humans), it more than likely has little value when it comes to the decision making processes of highly trained individuals.

        the skybrary link in your post does not provide access to the supposed paper by NASA.

        the full semi-original paper: https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfi...0Decisions.pdf

        Comment


        • Originally posted by TeeVee View Post
          evan, you should actually read the source you cited. get back to me in a week or so and let me know how well you understood it.

          i have a degree in psychology, albeit, undergrad, and their article is not beginner level stuff. not even intermediary.

          having said that, their specialty (Tversky & Kahneman) was more related to economics than anything else. They also did not use individuals trained in the subject area they were assessing, e.g., participants questioned on medical procedures choices were not medically trained; participants questioned on money related issues/investments, were not professional investors or investment advisors.

          i think it's fair to say that while their research and theory may be valid in terms of the general population (i.e., ordinary humans), it more than likely has little value when it comes to the decision making processes of highly trained individuals.

          the skybrary link in your post does not provide access to the supposed paper by NASA.

          the full semi-original paper: https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfi...0Decisions.pdf
          Teevee, I am referring to an observed and studied psychological phenomena with origins in the research done by Kahneman and Tversky but subsequently studied in the context of aviation by Nasa Ames Research Center and cited in official aviation reports (the processes of highly trained individuals). Again, if you take issue with this, take it up with them.

          If it makes it easier, you can also refer to 'Certainty Effect' or the more popular related term 'No Guts, No Glory'.

          In the context of this discussion, it refers to choosing between a course of action that will likely produce some undesirable outcome by no catastrophic one, and a course of action that may produce no undesirable outcome or a catastrophic one. It's high stakes gambling to achieve the best possible result. ​

          Comment


          • I want to let you know that I have been doing further analysis of photos and videos and the results I get are not consistent among them (that is, they give different results).

            So my analysis in comments number 74, 81 and 82 may be wrong.

            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Evan View Post

              I am referring to an observed and studied psychological phenomena with origins in the research done by Kahneman and Tversky but subsequently studied in the context of aviation by Nasa Ames Research Center and cited in official aviation reports (the processes of highly trained individuals). Again, if you take issue with this, take it up with them.

              If it makes it easier, you can also refer to 'Certainty Effect' or the more popular related term 'No Guts, No Glory'.
              As an aside, Kahneman's and Tversky's ideas exist in the world of trading and investing in a form that is today usually called "Prospect Theory". It's taught very early in any responsible retail investing course, essentially because it's so subliminal in the human mindset that it absolutely has to be called out early. It helps explain a number of _observed phenomena in financial markets, including why human trading patterns don't seem to align with expected utility theory (i.e. People Behave Oddly!). It was one of the very first successfully tested and proven experimental theories in economics, and Kahneman won a Nobel Prize for it.

              That said, it's not founded in economics at all, but in a series of ideas Kahneman and Tversky put forward about generalized human decision making. They just happened to test those theories in the world of economics. So it comes as no surprise to me that Prospect Theory would also apply in the context of aviation decision making, though I had no idea that NASA Ames had tested it before I read your posts about it. More generally it says people fail to correctly assess the probability of loss if there's a prospect (however remote) of a successful outcome. I can definitely see this playing a part in cockpit decision making when facing the prospect of "land badly or go around" after a (dual?) engine bird strike and there's no time to run checklists.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by flashcrash View Post

                As an aside, Kahneman's and Tversky's ideas exist in the world of trading and investing in a form that is today usually called "Prospect Theory". It's taught very early in any responsible retail investing course, essentially because it's so subliminal in the human mindset that it absolutely has to be called out early. It helps explain a number of _observed phenomena in financial markets, including why human trading patterns don't seem to align with expected utility theory (i.e. People Behave Oddly!). It was one of the very first successfully tested and proven experimental theories in economics, and Kahneman won a Nobel Prize for it.

                That said, it's not founded in economics at all, but in a series of ideas Kahneman and Tversky put forward about generalized human decision making. They just happened to test those theories in the world of economics. So it comes as no surprise to me that Prospect Theory would also apply in the context of aviation decision making, though I had no idea that NASA Ames had tested it before I read your posts about it. More generally it says people fail to correctly assess the probability of loss if there's a prospect (however remote) of a successful outcome. I can definitely see this playing a part in cockpit decision making when facing the prospect of "land badly or go around" after a (dual?) engine bird strike and there's no time to run checklists.
                Exactly.

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Evan
                  [Psychobabble and a call that we need more procedural training and simulator time. (Including big words)]
                  Does this support the fundamental of lighting a cigarette and not touching anything?
                  Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by TeeVee View Post
                    evan, you should actually read the source you cited. get back to me in a week or so and let me know how well you understood it.

                    i have a degree in psychology, albeit, undergrad, and their article is not beginner level stuff. not even intermediary.

                    having said that, their specialty (Tversky & Kahneman) was more related to economics than anything else. They also did not use individuals trained in the subject area they were assessing, e.g., participants questioned on medical procedures choices were not medically trained; participants questioned on money related issues/investments, were not professional investors or investment advisors.

                    i think it's fair to say that while their research and theory may be valid in terms of the general population (i.e., ordinary humans), it more than likely has little value when it comes to the decision making processes of highly trained individuals.

                    [...]
                    Hm. That I may come to a point where I can quote you (again), ... not bad.

                    So, I don't have a degree in psychology. But is this fatal accident a psychological phenomenon?

                    I must confess, I haven't read all the 113 posts which happened before this one. But together with Gabriel, I wonder if this Cpt and his F/O was under extraordinary stress.

                    They were originally cleared to land on the RKJB rwy 01, and only after that, they must've perceived that all three landing gear doors (front and aft left and aft right) remain silent,

                    after the main gear lever has been set to 'down' .

                    But now, what would you do?

                    If you ask me, throw the 737 down on the 01, and if without gear.

                    Why go around and then again, have no gear.

                    And I even guess, that during go around from 01 then flying a U-turn and then coming in on the 19, they must've gained more speed than during the process that I marked blue here.

                    And how much speed, more than 260 kn ground speed (more than 480 km/h), or what do you need to completely destroy a 737 through a concrete wall?


                    PS: 'The FDR was heavily damaged on impact.', one of my sources says. Let's hope that it at least says something.

                    The German long haul is alive since 1955, 69 years and still kicking.
                    The Gold Member in the 747 club, 50 years since the first LH 747.
                    And constantly advanced, 744 and 748 /w upper and lower EICAS.
                    This is Lohausen International speaking (est.1927), echo delta delta lima.

                    Comment


                    • ... btw, since I am a jetphotos member, I know one quite famous belly landing, with even zero injuries, all 231 souls on board survive.



                      But somewhere there is a difference to the 738 which we talk about today:

                      Flight 16 was captained by a 57-year-old veteran pilot with twenty years of Boeing 767 experience.​
                      Or how old was the 738 Cpt here in this case?
                      The German long haul is alive since 1955, 69 years and still kicking.
                      The Gold Member in the 747 club, 50 years since the first LH 747.
                      And constantly advanced, 744 and 748 /w upper and lower EICAS.
                      This is Lohausen International speaking (est.1927), echo delta delta lima.

                      Comment


                      • they turned nicely to runway 19 and landed smoothly on the runway. looks like they still at least have some hydraulic powers generated from the engines. but why they didn't apply flaps, spoilers and lower the landing gears? I don't understand.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by LH-B744 View Post
                          I must confess, I haven't read all the 113 posts which happened before this one.
                          The confession is appreciated but the sin remains. Please read the thread. Then you will understand the sequence of events as best we know them. Apparently, the gear was lowered for the initial approach, raised after the go-around and not extended for the second approach and landing. The reason for this remains a mystery.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Evan View Post

                            Nasa Ames Research Center and cited in official aviation reports ​
                            and where is this source material?

                            you can't cite sources and not provide the sources. unless of course your name is McCarthy

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by TeeVee View Post

                              and where is this source material?

                              you can't cite sources and not provide the sources. unless of course your name is McCarthy
                              Look in the forest. It's hidden behind the trees.

                              Comment


                              • Behind the trees? But if your entering the forest from the opposite side, it would be in front of the trees.
                                Any chance for a more precise description?
                                Thank you.
                                bernt stolle aviation photos on JetPhotos
                                Bernt Stolle - Art for Sale | Fine Art America​​

                                Comment

                                Working...
                                X