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Emirates EK-231 Report Out - Slave to the Flight Director

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  • Emirates EK-231 Report Out - Slave to the Flight Director

    B777 - lifted off at over 215kts, in the overrun 90m from the localizer antenna - climbed out at 800fpm. The FD’s were in ALT mode due to the MCP altitude being at 0000. Cockpit gradient kept the F/O from pestering the Captain with his concerns. There may also be some comments about the demise of basic airmanship here.

    Aviation Herald - News, Incidents and Accidents in Aviation

  • #2
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    The FD’s were in ALT mode due to the MCP altitude being at 0000.

    There may also be some comments about the demise of basic airmanship here.
    The Commander stated that during cockpit preparation, she noticed that the altitude selector was set to 0000 feet and she selected it to 4,000 feet, which was also verified by the flight data recorder.

    ​Comment: A 'classic' Evan. Blaming the pilots due to lack of comprehension.

    They were lucky to get airborne without tire failure(s) since they are usually certified for a maximum of 195kts. ​
    bernt stolle aviation photos on JetPhotos
    Bernt Stolle - Art for Sale | Fine Art America​​

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    • #3
      Originally posted by bstolle View Post
      The Commander stated that during cockpit preparation, she noticed that the altitude selector was set to 0000 feet and she selected it to 4,000 feet, which was also verified by the flight data recorder.

      ​Comment: A 'classic' Evan. Blaming the pilots due to lack of comprehension.

      They were lucky to get airborne without tire failure(s) since they are usually certified for a maximum of 195kts. ​
      I think it might be you with the comprehension problem. Apparently, she did not follow this by recycling the FD's, as instructed in the FCOM.
      ​:

      On Dec 27th 2021 Emirates Airlines released a crew alert to their pilots following the occurrence suggesting the crew had not picked up the previous flight crew had left the altitude setting at the Master Control Panel at airport elevation/00000 feet causing the flight director to not indicate takeoff rotation and climb out but instead indicate to maintain that altitude (ALT mode).

      On Feb 17th 2022 the United Arab Emirates GCAA released their preliminary report. The Commander stated that during cockpit preparation, she noticed that the altitude selector was set to 0000 feet and she selected it to 4,000 feet, which was also verified by the flight data recorder. The selection of 4,000 feet on the altitude selector was in accordance with the planned standard instrument departure (SID) of SENPA 2F1.

      The GCAA released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

      ​​a) As designed, the AFDS did not include any provisions to prevent a takeoff with incorrect AFDS pitch mode. The ALT pitch mode activates on the ground once either side flight directors is switched ‘on’ and the selected altitude is within 20 feet of the displayed barometric altitude.

      (b) The Commander did not identify the incorrect AFDS pitch mode and inappropriate altitude entry that could have been caused by the pressure to achieve on-time performance and distractions during preflight phase.

      (d) The FCOM did not contain explicit instructions on how to reset the flight directors in order to enable the crew to select the correct pitch mode. The FCOM only mentioned selecting an MCP altitude more than 20 feet from the displayed baro altitude and recycling the flight director switches in the Controls and Indicators description (Volume 2 − Systems Information), not the procedures (Volume 1 − Operational Limitations, Normal and Supplementary Procedures, and Dispatch Performance Data).
      Now, correct me if I wrong, but my comprehension is that the AFDS selected ALT mode automatically because the altitude was left at 0000 by the previous crew and this was not reset before switching on the FD's. The pilot reset this after switching on the FD's, did not recycle the FD's and this left the AFDS in ALT mode.

      Am I mistaken?

      And would you not call rolling out to the end of the runway at 200+ kts without rotation and adequate climb-out pitch to be pilot error? ​

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by Evan View Post
        Apparently, she did not follow this by recycling the FD's, as instructed in the FCOM.


        And would you not call rolling out to the end of the runway at 200+ kts without rotation and adequate climb-out pitch to be pilot error? ​
        Aaah. Now your reply differs quite a bit from your previous accusation. If you are blaming the pilots, you should be much more precise.

        200+ kts without rotation? Where did you get this 'information' from?

        Btw. it took the Commander only 20sec after gear up selection to notice the problem and to find a suitable solution. Not bad IMO.
        bernt stolle aviation photos on JetPhotos
        Bernt Stolle - Art for Sale | Fine Art America​​

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        • #5
          Originally posted by Evan View Post
          There may also be some comments about the demise of basic airmanship here.
          Yeah.

          Like check instruments.

          Point nose appropriately.

          Check instruments.

          Adjust. (See footnote)

          I prefer this over match the attitude indicator to the FD bars with obliviousness to stuff, including speed.

          Footnote: At this point in BROAD, NOT_TYPE-SPECIFIC PROCEDURE, use the flight director for said fine adjustments to the attitude…

          But do not_flip the guarded switch on FDNH/oblivious mode.
          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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          • #6
            Originally posted by bstolle View Post
            Comment: A 'classic' Evan. Blaming the pilots due to lack of comprehension.
            Shocking.
            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by bstolle View Post
              Aaah. Now your reply differs quite a bit from your previous accusation.
              I'm not 'making accusations'. I'm summarizing the findings of the final report.

              If you are blaming the pilots, you should be much more precise.
              Let me be precise: the investigation findings 'blame' the pilots for incorrect AFDS procedure and neglecting to monitor and apply basic airmanship and CRM. This was pilot error and a stealth factor in the guidance logic. Only they don't use words like 'blame' and 'accusation'. Only you and 3WE use these words and you need to stop doing that.

              200+ kts without rotation? Where did you get this 'information' from?
              The report tells us the pilot was not applying rotational pitch because the FD pitch remained neutral. This was not an airplane performance issue. What happens when you rotate a perfectly good 777 at 199kts?

              Btw. it took the Commander only 20sec after gear up selection to notice the problem and to find a suitable solution. Not bad IMO.
              Seriously? All's well that ends well? This was very nearly a disaster.

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by Evan View Post
                The report tells us the pilot was not applying rotational pitch because the FD pitch remained neutral.
                What? Where does the report state that? Do you really belief that a 777 becomes airborne at 0° pitch at ~200kts???
                bernt stolle aviation photos on JetPhotos
                Bernt Stolle - Art for Sale | Fine Art America​​

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                • #9
                  Originally posted by bstolle View Post
                  What? Where does the report state that? Do you really belief that a 777 becomes airborne at 0° pitch at ~200kts???
                  Bstolle, we are having a real comprehension problem here...

                  the aircraft rotated for takeoff past the end of the runway and became airborne just at the end of the runway end safety area
                  The aircraft did not autorotate. The pilot added pitch at that point to rotate, seeing as the runway was coming to an abrupt end.

                  Why not sooner, at the proper Vr? The report gives no indication that there was any takeoff performance issue. Instead, it cites pilot error:

                  The Commander followed flight director commands reflected in the flight mode annunciator (FMA) that were not appropriate for the takeoff flight phase.
                  The flight director was in ALT mode, maintaining altitude, not in any mood to pitch up into a climb, let alone a takeoff.

                  Originally posted by bstolle
                  200+ kts without rotation? Where did you get this 'information' from?
                  Because if the pilot adequately rotated at any time past the calculated Vr, the plane would have lifted off the runway.

                  According to Mode-S data transmitted by the aircraft's transponder the aircraft remained on the ground until accelerating through at least 216 knots over ground
                  Let that sink in. At least 216kts!

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Forget about the gross mistake about setting up the autopilot and not understanding how it works.
                    Following the flight flight director blindly into a near-CFIT is a big no-no.

                    V1, rotate, positive climb gear up, aim for 15 degrees and adjust from there to keep V2+10 / +20 without exceeding flaps speeds. If the flight director says "pitch down", DON'T.
                    ESPECIALLY WHEN YO ARE AWARE THAT THE FD IS BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE PHASE OF FLIGHT.

                    Yes, flame me and roast me if you want. But I absolutely and black-and-white-ly blame the flight crew, and whomever hires, trains and evaluates pilots in that airline.

                    Going back to the automation... I didn't fully understand the explanation (subtle way to say that I didn't read the explanation carefully) but, in a nutshell, for the pitch mode you don't just tell the AP/FD where you want to go but also how. This is very typical for all big-plane autopilots and many modern small-plane autopilots too. If you are flying at ALT HLD at 10000ft with 10000ft selected in the altitude window and dial in 15000 ft, nothing will happen. You have to either select VRT SPD mode or the FLCH mode. In this case it seems that they recognized the 0000 value in the altitude window and corrected it to 4000, but they left the pitch ode in ALT HLD. That's why when the PIC finally selected TOGA (with the plane already in the air and barely climbing while speeding up through the flap speed restriction) the FD finally started to indicate the correct pitch. But this is a big no-no and speaks volumes about how bad this pilot is to actually fly the plane, a plane, any plane (beyond trying to follow specific type procedures and magenta lines) and, possibly, about the type of pilot that this airline creates.


                    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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                    • #11
                      Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                      V1, rotate, positive climb gear up, aim for 15 degrees and adjust from there to keep V2+10 / +20 without exceeding flaps speeds.
                      Any chance you’d acknowledge that I already said this, albeit in outsider, Aggie language?
                      Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        Yes, flame me and roast me if you want. But I absolutely and black-and-white-ly blame the flight crew, and whomever hires, trains and evaluates pilots in that airline
                        Evidently, four crew 'may have been dismissed' as a result of this (why four?). I'm guessing they weren't the cabin crew. In any case, they needed to be re-evaluated as pilot material.

                        In this case it seems that they recognized the 0000 value in the altitude window and corrected it to 4000, but they left the pitch ode in ALT HLD.
                        The FCOM states that the FD's must be recycled after changing this value. I would hope all 777 pilots know this instinctively. Or that Boeing would tweak that logic to self-recycle...

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by 3WE View Post

                          Any chance you’d acknowledge that I already said this, albeit in outsider, Aggie language?
                          Acknowledged. You said it first.

                          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Evan View Post
                            The FCOM states that the FD's must be recycled after changing this value.
                            I don't understand that logic. It looks to me that the problem (the lesser problem, the automation management problem, because the big problem was the basic airmanship how-to-fly-a-plane problem) was that, for TAKE OFF, they didn't select TAKE OFF / GO AROUND (which you do by pressing the TOGA buttons in the throttles and is standard practice both to let the autothrottle hold TOGA thrust if enabled as it should, and enable the take-off mode in the autopilot)

                            I would hope all 777 pilots know this instinctively. Or that Boeing would tweak that logic to self-recycle...
                            No, that's a bad idea. Again, you tell the autopilot* what you want to do, and THEN tell it HOW/WHEN you want it to do it.

                            Select the new altitude and THEN select FLCH or VS for the new altitude to be executed.

                            Or, during the approach while in APP mode, select the go-around altitude AND THEN select TOGA to execute it (or don t select TOGA and land).

                            Or in an arrival procedure, you are holding the minimum altitude for your segment and want to descend to the next minimum altitude for the next segment after crossing the fix. Select the floor of the next segment and desired sink rate and then, when crossing the fix, select VS.

                            *Note: I am using "autopilot" loosely here to refer to the flight guidance system, the flight director, and the autopilot altogether although the autopilot component itself was not a factor here since it was all manual flight.

                            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Evan View Post

                              The FCOM states that the FD's must be recycled after changing this value. I would hope all 777 pilots know this instinctively. Or that Boeing would tweak that logic to self-recycle...
                              …are you trying to troll or trap us?

                              Sometimes pilots and bicycle riders do screw up.

                              I’m an asshat outsider, but won’t award style points for screaming past Vr because the FD likes your nose attitude.

                              Then again, when you get in the habit of watching the FD you might miss the drain grate and go over the handle bars.

                              Gabriel gets weird when I suggest AI oversight.
                              Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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