Qantas pilots forget to lower landing gear

[Spectator]

Looks like November is going to be the month of forgetful pilots... forgetting to land, forgetting landing gear, what next?

Two Qantas pilots were suspended on Wednesday after forgetting to lower landing gear as they came in to land at busy Sydney airport.

...

The airline today issued a statement saying the events around Monday's flight from Melbourne constituted a "serious incident" and would be subject to a full investigation by Qantas and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

There's also a small titbit about an airspeed issue similar to what is suggested may have affected AF447.

http://www.news24.com/Content/World/News/1073/179fb58951da47ffb6ecade92b46b20e/04-11-2009-09-58/Pilots_forget_to_lower_wheels

[Gabriel]

I just thought I'd mention that they noticed the gear-up condition and initiated a go-around when they were still at 700ft, so it's not that they were at seconds from landing (well, yes, like 60 seconds).

The "seriousness" of the incident is that they got to that point without realizing that the gear was not down.

The ground proximity warning system GPWS saved them with a "too low / gear" warning, and they initiated the go-around. The GPWS is exactly intended for these cases. Intended, yes. But not expected because the pilots are expected to lower the landing gear AND to perform the landing checklist effectively (which includes checking gear down and locked) AND to check that the plane meets the stabilized approach criteria (typically by 1000ft) which again includes that the plane is configured for landing, and are NOT expected to rely on the GPWS.

So the GPWS is the backup in case the pilots failed on all that. The pilots did fail on all that, and hence it's a serious incident that requires investigation.

But the news make it look like it was almost a total air disaster, and that's not right. A go around at 700 ft is not even considered a low altitude go around. A plane in an instrument approach that reaches the minimums without seeing the runway and goes around does it at some 200ft, something that happens everyday and it's not considered a close call.

[MCM]

Just some additional points to consider -

The pilots had already commenced the go around before the too low gear warning went off. (This is contained in the ATSB information). This means the GPWS did not "save" them.

From the official information we do not know if the go around was because they were not configured (which is certainly possible), or they selected the gear up too early in a go around for other reasons and that triggered the warning.

The operators requirement is to be stable (in VMC) by 500ft, although it is expected the gear will be down well before that.

[Gabriel]

The pilots had already commenced the go around before the too low gear warning went off. (This is contained in the ATSB information).

Have a link?

[TeeVee]

just a quick query: is it possible that there was a gear malfunction and the pilots decided to continue the approach while trying to set gear down? or is there a minimum alt where gear must/should be confirmed down, and they had passed that min alt?

[AJ]

Have a link?

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2009/aair/ao-2009-066.aspx

[EconomyClass]

Do pilots do risky things via a checklist? I've read about enough incidents where checklists were being followed that I wonder if SOP is to do a list, but often they perform from the MEMORY of what is on the list.

[Gabriel]

AJ, Thanks!

EC, check lists are written list and the crew is supposed to follow the written list while perfotming it.

Each airline has its own policies, but the current tendency is not to use the checklist as a to-do list. The procedures should be completed before, and the check list is just to check that you have actually done it right. In this way the probability that you both forget to press a button and then you mistakenly skip the line of that button in the list is minimized.

[Evan]

Each airline has its own policies

I think I see the problem here.

[MCM]

The idea is that you accomplish the items as per your normal operations, without reference, and then you do the checklist at certain stages of flight, confirming that all of the required actions have been completed.

Airlines do have varying policies, but I can't think of one "recognized" airline carrier that does it differently... why? Because it is the accepted best practice for aviation, and is used by Boeing and Airbus in their checklist philosophies.

I can't see a problem with having minor variations in policy given that crews tend to remain with one carrier for a protracted time. They are only very minor differences anyway.

[Evan]

If an airline requires a checklist procedure for approach, I don't see how it is possible to overlook deployment of landing gear. One pilot reads out the item, the other confirms it. Therefore it gets done. Failsafe. What is so difficult about enforcing that? Why no universal checklist requirement? The checklist is there to protect us. It should be a universal requirement. Why isn't it? I'd really like to know.

[Leftseat86]

Come on AJ you can fess up

[Simpleboy]

I don't think you understood MCM's answer. The checklist is used universally, and these pilots should have used it properly. Is it failsafe? Not when you have human beings who have to lower the landing gear, and human beings who then have to check to ensure they lowered it. With a zillion flights, sooner or later someone's going to mess up on both counts. Luckily, there's yet another safeguard, the ground proximity alarm, when this occurs.

I hope I haven't misstated the situation.

Thats my take on it as well, and as we know, they had already commenced a go around, perhaps they were using the checklist when it happened? A little late, but still, we just dont know. The ATSB info reads very differently to that of the newspaper article.

[EconomyClass]

Time for a clarification. If they did normal SOP for landing, then they had aborted the landing before the spot where they would expect to lower the wheels and were in the middle of go-around which doesn't required the wheels to be down and locked? Is this what we are now expecting? Whatever log there is would show a go-around decision had interrupted the landing checklist?

[Evan]

I don't think you understood MCM's answer. The checklist is used universally, and these pilots should have used it properly. Is it failsafe? Not when you have human beings who have to lower the landing gear, and human beings who then have to check to ensure they lowered it. With a zillion flights, sooner or later someone's going to mess up on both counts. Luckily, there's yet another safeguard, the ground proximity alarm, when this occurs.

I hope I haven't misstated the situation.

Actually, I was responding to Gabriel's answer, but in any case, I don't see how you can overlook gear extension if you are using a checklist as a to-do list. You call it out, you move the lever, you check it off. Done. So I'm asking why this isn't a universal requirement.

And, once again, this technological complacency issue keeps coming up at the heart of things. Disasters are often the result of multiple failures of equipment and pilot procedure. Will the GWPS always have your back? What happens if the GWPS fails to alert you for some unforeseen reason—faulty RA input or something? I don't think GWPS alone is a failsafe, but along with a strict checklist requirement it certainly is.

Why doesn't the GWPS drop the gear automatically at the alert level (provided there is a guarded override switch)? Or would this breed further complacency?