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  • ^^^^
    ...and it takes as little as just one breath of toxic smoke to render you unconscious. Not sure how many it will take to kill you but, hey, you're not going to know about it anyway.
    If it 'ain't broken........ Don't try to mend it !

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eay6kU2lIkA

      You remain seated all you want, I happen to believe that sometimes, immediate, broad fundamental knowledge (like evacuate ASAP from Airplane fires which are fast and dangerous as hell), trumps the official, well-thought-out, sometimes-data-driven, official type-specific procedure listed in the FCOM and executed in emergency, memory checklists, and that I am outta here with even if it's a direct violation of FAR's to obey crew directions. *see footnote
      Fixed.

      No disagreement, just being sure we're clear.

      *And if things don't look too bad, Evan and I might grab our computer bags and meds.
      Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

      Comment


      • Linked below is a long winded article that says the FAA felt there was a flaw in the engine compressor, but not too much else in the way of meaningful information.

        http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...-exploded.html
        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by 3WE View Post
          Linked below is a long winded article that says the FAA felt there was a flaw in the engine compressor, but not too much else in the way of meaningful information.

          http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...-exploded.html
          An uncontained engine failure is probably the single greatest mechanical threat in modern aviation because there is no reliable redundancy provision that can provide the crew with am assured means deal with it. Therefore it must be treated with the utmost cautionary measures. The current AD indicates 6000 cycles between the 'point of part exposure' tear-downs. By deferring the inspections until a scheduled teardown, the cost is limited to only the extra labor involved in the additional inspection process. This is evidence of the typical negotiations that go on between the FAA (in the interests of public safety) and the industry (in the interests of business practicalities). It is true that to take the safest possible action (as was imposed on the Trent 900 after the Quantas A380 incident—a short-order inspection of the entire Trent 900 fleet) can be impractically disruptive and expensive, but the gravity of the issue can't be understressed. 6000 cycles is a long period of time between inspection of engines with a known precedent for a potentially catastrophic flaw. I don't like it. I would like to see an Emergency Airworthiness Directive on this one—definitely if the preliminary investigation reveals a crack in the compressor part.

          The engine that blew on BA2276 might not have had the same compressor design issue and if this is true than it was not affected by the AD in question, and if this isn't true it will come out in the final report. Even if it was included in the AD, it is very possible, given the 6000 cycle inspection interval, that it could have been in compliance. There's the problem.

          If that turns out to be the case, the FAA will have some explaining to do. The silver lining might be that this incident brings to light a dangerous willingness on the FAA's part to bend to the needs of the industry at the expense of safety. We've already heard from an FAA insider about this...

          In the interim, I think the response to this incident should resemble the response to the Quantas A380 incident. I don't see any reason for GE to be held to a lower standard than Rolls Royce, or for the FAA to be less cautious than EASA. I realize the Trent 900 issue was a relatively easy visual inspection whereas the issue here would involve a teardown inspection. But how long can we allow a fleet of 1300 B777's to continue flying with this kind of catastrophic threat onboard?

          So, exactly how impractical is it to pull these engines out of service within 100 cycles for the AD inspection?

          Comment


          • Originally posted by Evan View Post
            In the interim, I think the response to this incident should resemble the response to the Quantas A380 incident. I don't see any reason for GE to be held to a lower standard than Rolls Royce, or for the FAA to be less cautious than EASA. I realize the Trent 900 issue was a relatively easy visual inspection whereas the issue here would involve a teardown inspection.
            That's not the main difference. The main difference is that, by when the RR AD was put in place to inspect 100% of the engines, it was already known what was the defect and why that defect had happened.

            Here, we don't know what to look for yet. It is very likely that in the following days we will have a good idea and an emergency AD will be issued.

            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
              Here, we don't know what to look for yet.
              Well, the AD on these engines specifies inspections for cracks on the high pressure rotor spool in a very specific location. If these engine fragments reveal a stress failure in that area, I'd say we know what to look for.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                Well, the AD on these engines specifies inspections for cracks on the high pressure rotor spool in a very specific location. If these engine fragments reveal a stress failure in that area, I'd say we know what to look for.
                Yes, IF.

                If the spool that blew out is a different one....
                If the engine that blew out is a different one....

                If and when we know what happened, we can tell the airlines what to look for.

                In the mean time, remember this is an engine type with perhaps millions of hours, no reason to a worldwide preemptive grounding when we have no idea what happened or what to look for. The A380 and its engine was brand new when it happened. kinda like the 787 and the batteries.

                --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                  Yes, IF.
                  Yes, if.


                  The engine that blew on BA2276 might not have had the same compressor design issue and if this is true than it was not affected by the AD in question, and if this isn't true it will come out in the final report. Even if it was included in the AD, it is very possible, given the 6000 cycle inspection interval, that it could have been in compliance. There's the problem. .

                  Comment


                  • From today's AIAA newsletter:

                    FAA Warned In 2011 About GE90-85B Engines.
                    The AP (9/14, Ritter) reports that crash investigators probing the British Airways aircraft that aborted a takeoff last week in Las Vegas “plan to remove and disassemble a General Electric engine that caught fire.” An FAA airworthiness directive “went into effect in August 2011 after cracks were detected in weld joints of compressor fan spools in similar GE90 engines,” the article reports, adding that the engine in the British Airways plane “had different parts and a different compressor spool configuration than those cited in the directive.”

                    Under the headline, “Exclusive: Boeing and GE Warned About Airplane Engine That Exploded,” the Daily Beast (9/14, Irving) reports on the FAA directive and on the reaction of Boeing and General Electric in 2011. Asked whether the NTSB would take the Airworthiness Directive into account, Board spokesman Eric Weiss said, “The investigation will be comprehensive.”

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                      Fixed (For those who need the specific verb to make out my meaning despite the obvious causal relationship between 'squib' and 'release the agent' that extinguishes).
                      Obviously, you missed my point entirely. A squib sits between the halon bottle and the lines that deliver the agent to the engine compartment and to certain accessories. In essence it is an electrically actuated valve. So it was not "fixed" as so stated. So if you "blew" the squib(s) and the bottles had thermally discharged and there was no agent in them, they ain't gonna do squat!

                      Comment


                      • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R9ETlTZoF1E



                        Blew a squib or blew a seal?

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                          Obviously, you missed my point entirely. A squib sits between the halon bottle and the lines that deliver the agent to the engine compartment and to certain accessories. In essence it is an electrically actuated valve. So it was not "fixed" as so stated. So if you "blew" the squib(s) and the bottles had thermally discharged and there was no agent in them, they ain't gonna do squat!
                          So squib is the term you use to look cool on the aviation forum while solenoid is generic, but makes you look like a layman?
                          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                            Obviously, you missed my point entirely. A squib sits between the halon bottle and the lines that deliver the agent to the engine compartment and to certain accessories. In essence it is an electrically actuated valve. So it was not "fixed" as so stated. So if you "blew" the squib(s) and the bottles had thermally discharged and there was no agent in them, they ain't gonna do squat!
                            BB, I'm not sure what your point was other than to lash out at people who don't sit in the pointy end for using pointy-end vernacular. I don't agree with that. If you haven't noticed, it is also the lingua franca of aviation forums.

                            You seemed to miss my point (observation/speculation) that a pilot might not be aware of an uncontained engine failure (and subsequent fire) from the cockpit and that one possible clue would would be that after firing both squibs, the ENG FIRE indication was still present.

                            Now, why did I say 'firing the squibs'? Well, because that is essentially what you are doing when you move the fire handle. It sends an electrical signal to an electrically operated explosive device known as a squib. The signal causes the squib to 'fire' a slug into a frangible disk, thus destroying the disk and releasing the agent. A squib is not simply an electrical solenoid. It is an electrically operated explosive device (in this case).

                            However, if you insist on perfect technical description...

                            Originally posted by Evan
                            I'm sure they were looking at a fire indication but have no way to know it was uncontained (other than pulling the associated fire handle, rotating it for 1 second and then, after half a minute, rotating in the other direction for 1 sec not extinguishing the ENG FIRE indication).
                            Fix-ed.

                            That might cause a pilot to send someone back for a look out the window, no?

                            Comment


                            • I think what BB is trying to say in his cryptic way is there are two ways a fire extinguishing agent bottle can be "discharged".

                              The first is the way you describe, and results in agent being discharged through nozzles near the engine, hopefully putting out a fire if one is present.

                              The second is if the agent bottle is subjected to excessive heat (and thus its internal pressure increases above a safe level), there is a thermally-actuated valve that will vent the contents of the bottle to atmosphere via a separate outlet - not the nozzles near the engine.

                              So if you were to perform the engine-fire routine and attempt to discharge the extinguishing agent into the engine area, if the bottle were empty because it had already vented due to excessive heat, there would be no agent delivered to the engine area. And therefore no extinguishing effect.
                              Be alert! America needs more lerts.

                              Eric Law

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by elaw View Post
                                I think what BB is trying to say in his cryptic way is there are two ways a fire extinguishing agent bottle can be "discharged".

                                The first is the way you describe, and results in agent being discharged through nozzles near the engine, hopefully putting out a fire if one is present.

                                The second is if the agent bottle is subjected to excessive heat (and thus its internal pressure increases above a safe level), there is a thermally-actuated valve that will vent the contents of the bottle to atmosphere via a separate outlet - not the nozzles near the engine.

                                So if you were to perform the engine-fire routine and attempt to discharge the extinguishing agent into the engine area, if the bottle were empty because it had already vented due to excessive heat, there would be no agent delivered to the engine area. And therefore no extinguishing effect.
                                The bottles are housed in the fuselage, not near the engines (and opposite the #1 side) so thermal venting due to a fire would not occur until the heat from the fire reached that area. In that case you would get DISCH 1 and 2 lights and the same EICAS indications. If you hadn't already fired them manually, you would know they vented.

                                Comment

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