BAN ALL RUDDER PEDALS!!!!!

[ATLcrew]

[In a single-pilot cockpit, you cannot have "crew resource management". Misinterpretations of the term do not apply.

A crew of one is still a crew. Said crew of one has resources available to it. Keep in mind that some of said resources may even be outside the cockpit. All those resources need to be managed, therefore you absolutely can (even should, I would even say must) have CRM in a single-pilot environment also. I dare even say that proprer CRM can (at times) be even MORE vital in a single-pilot cockpit, since one can only grow so many hands. Just something to think about.

[Evan]

That's like saying math is division, not addition.

CRM: The term "cockpit resource management" (later generalized to "crew resource management") was coined in 1979 by NASA psychologist John Lauber who had studied communication processes in cockpits for several years. While retaining a command hierarchy, the concept was intended to foster a less authoritarian cockpit culture, where co-pilots were encouraged to question captains if they observed them making mistakes.

Yes, it extends to individual actions but it is centered upon improving communication and this avoiding the errors of any individual pilot. It's also centered on clear division of tasks to allow each pilot to retain focus and situational awareness.

In a single-pilot cockpit, you cannot have "crew resource management". Misinterpretations of the term do not apply.

[ATLcrew]

No no no Gabriel. CRM is COMMUNICATION, not flying skills.

That's like saying math is division, not addition.

[Gabriel]

So, again, what failed in the first line? The blue part (the communication) happened, the red part didn't or was absolutely ineffective.

PF: "I have the controls" (focuses complete attention on the PFD to counteract roll and achieve wings-level, ball-centered 5° pitch)

So how would your version of CRM have fixed that?

(By the way, there are versions of CRM for single pilot, you can divide and prioritize task with yourself, you can talk with yourself, you can exchange opinions with yourself).
CRM is how you manage the RESOURCES, other persons around are a key resource, but not the only one.
Aviate, navigate, communicate, is an example of single-pilot CRM, or SRM.
And in any event, for a multi crew pilot, the aviate part should be even a greater focus for the PF, CRM or not.
The FP said "my plane", so it should have been clear the role that each of them were (or should have been) assuming.

Lack of CRM was a problem here. But the problem began earlier, before the CRM (or the meaning of CRM that you use) had a chance to fail or succeed.
Immediately upon the AP disengage warning, the PF did call "I have the controls", the PM replied "Ok". and the PF asks "What's going on?"
The PF pulls up, Gs reach 1.5, the stall warning sounds twice, the altitude warning also sounds, the pitch goes from zero to 10, the VSI from zero to 5K (note that one minute earlier they had discussed that they could not climb to the filled altitude because they lacked the required performance due to the unusually high temperatures), and the PF says: "There is no good speed indication." and the PM replies " SO we lost the speeds then".
9 seconds had elapsed, just 9 seconds since the AP disengaged, the communication between the pilots so far followed almost verbatim your suggested CRM, and the flight was already heading to hell (but still perfectly recoverable by a crew with any degree of situational awareness).

The fact that the PF was managing roll well and was the first one to identify that the speed was not good means that he was looking at the PFD where the pitch, altitude and vertical speed are also displayed.

In the subsequent seconds, the PM tells the PF like 10 times to lower the nose, that he was climbing, that he was still climbing, to go down, to descend... what the PF didn't fully comply with. He did lower the nose, partially, for a while, reducing the climb rate, and the plane started to gain speed (by the way, one pitot cleared in this period and they started to get one good speed indication, 35 seconds after all started) before starting to pull up again (at which moment a second pitot also clears and the avionics returns basically to normal, 50 seconds after all started).

I think that the best CRM at that point was for the PM to say "my plane, you monitor the transponder ident light". I don't think that reminding the PF to hold 5 deg of pitch would have helped, as it didn't help to tell him to lower the nose a dozen of times. Due to the shitty airmanship the PM was too busy monitoring the basic flight instrument and telling the PF what to do (to lower the nose). He had no time to reach the QRH to look for the UAS, and, anyway, in 50 seconds since all started and 40 seconds since the UAS was identified I doubt he could have gotten to the QRH's UAS section, looked up the airplane's weight and altitude, and looked up the right pitch and thrust in the table.

Yes, if they had had a proper UAS training I would have expected someone calling or enforcing 5deg pitch, but again, the PM calling it would not have helped since telling to the PM repeatedly to lower the nose was not helping either.

But let me go back. Please explain me what CRM (of your type, that doesn't include "fly the airplane first" for the PF) that didn't happen would have helped in the first 9 seconds, up to the point where the UAS was identified?. Up to this point, the CRM (communication) was reasonable and quite matching your expectations.

[Evan]

Why do you have 5deg pitch in the first line, before the UAS was identified?

Sorry, make that 1° pitch, the pitch that was 'known' before the event.

The reason the rest doesn't happen here is because the PF is concentrating on the task of flying and the PM, running through the ECAM and the UAS procedure, is keeping him honest. Also, they are COMMUNICATING.

Before your 4th line, I would have expected the PF just to fly the plane and keep it stable. That would have been good CRM, here in the A330 at transonic speeds and 35000ft or in a 172 at 90kts and 1000ft.

No no no Gabriel. CRM is COMMUNICATION, not flying skills. When you are flying alone, be it in a 172 or an A330, you are not communicating and nobody is helping you keep your mind on flying the plane.

[Gabriel]

Why do you have 5deg pitch in the first line, before the UAS was identified? Before your 4th line, where the PM identified the UAS, the flight was completely unstabillized, the stall warning had already sounded twice, the 1.5G peak had already happened, the pitch was already 10 deg and increasing, the VSI was already 5K and increasing...

Before your 4th line, I would have expected the PF just to fly the plane and keep it stable. That would have been good CRM, here in the A330 at transonic speeds and 35000ft or in a 172 at 90kts and 1000ft.

[Evan]

Okay, what is the non-Cessna-172 CRM that they should have followed?

I suppose something like this, but in French:

PF: "I have the controls" (focuses complete attention on the PFD to counteract roll and achieve wings-level, ball-centered 5° pitch)

PM: "Autoflight lost. FD's off."

PF: "Check" (does this) What's going on down there?

PM: "We've lost autoflight.... We've lost the speeds... Alternate law protections."

PF: "Got it, how's the engine data? (he had been concerned about ice ingestion)."

PM: "Uh, all good... Thrust is locked. Move the thrust levers"

PF: "Max climb?

PM: "Yeah, just put it back in the detent. You're pitch is coming up, keep it pegged at five for now."

PF: "Trying..."

PM: "Max speed 330"

PF: "I don't have speeds!"

PM: "Just keep it steady. We've lost uh... the rudder limiter... TCAS... ADR1...

PF: "Damn! Can you reset it?"

PM: "Dunno. QRH... Unreliable speeds..."

PF: "Just tell me what to do."

PM: "Ok, keep the thrust there. Fly at 3° pitch. Just keep it steady."

PF: "Piece o' cake."

PM: "ADR check procedure... (in the QRH)"

PM: "Looks like speeds are coming back now..."

etc....

That will never happen in a Cessna.

[Gabriel]

Okay, what is the non-Cessna-172 CRM that they should have followed? Don't name the UAS procedure because the upset was started before UAS was (or had a chance to be) identified. Again, by then, the plane had already 2 stall warnings, the load factor had reached 1.5, the pitch had gone from zero to 10 ANU, and VS had reached 5000 fpm, and the thrust levers had not been touched.

By the way, the plane still had 2 pilots, 2 fully functioning sets of controls, alternate law that provides for hands-off flight path stability, 3 perfectly working attitude indicators, heading indicators and altimeters, 2 perfectly working VSI indicators.

That was PIECE OF CAKE compared with what single-pilots of GA airplanes have to deal with in one of the most common system failures in IMC in a typical 6-pack instrument layout: Vacuum failure. You've lost the ONLY attitude indicator and the ONLY directional gyro. Now you have to revert to the turn-and-slip indicator for roll (indirectly), to the magnetic compass for heading, and to the altimeter for pitch (indirectly).

By the way, 3WE and myself managed to successfully perform, single pilot in a C-172, ILS approaches down to minimums with low clouds, fog and rain and with strong gusting winds and nasty turbulence.
Ok, that was in MSFS and 3WE did much better than myself, so it doesn't count

[Evan]

CRM of the most basic type, of the type that we low time, single engine, GA plane us: Fly the plane first, that applies to any plane with any number of required flight crew members, and what was already the duty of the PF even before the problem started.

CRM of the most basic type for a 172 is probably what got them into this. I still think the PF believed he was flying the plane but his mental concentration was distracted and thus his motor skills and SA. But he was behaving as if he was flying a GA, single pilot aircraft. Now this situation would never occur in a GA single-pilot aircraft because the sheer complexity of the system failures involved require a second pilot. Imagine a single pilot in a Cessna that has all these systems suddenly losing autoflight and a cascade of system failures while trying to concentrate on flying and not knowing what the hell is going on! Is it going to distract him from the primary task of flying? Or course it is.

And that is why we have two pilots with clearly defined roles and task-divisions (also known as CRM) in such complex cockpit environments.

Actually, I think you nailed it though. I think what we had up there was two very confused and distracted GA pilots both piloting a single-pilot aircraft from within the same cockpit.

BUt we are aurguing at cross-purposes. You are pointing out the actions themselves and the negligence without providing a reason why (aside from 'crazy' or 'not thinking'). I'm trying to get at the reason why, and I agree with the report that the reason was a breakdown of CRM and I suspect a PF very distracted from the task of flying as a result. Thus: the importance of CRM-based procedure to keep the PF squarely focused on flying.

[Gabriel]

Evan, we are saying almost the same. The part that we disagree is that you put more focus in type-specific training and I, for this case in particular, I say that yes, that was needed, but the pilot failed at basic training first.

You already have a pilot flying (PF) and a pilot monitoring (PM). The primary function of the PF, even on AP, os to keep blue over brown and speed within stall and overspeed, or ensure that the AP/AT are doing so, in both cases by monitoring the flight parameters in the PFD (that has the words "primary" and "flight" in its name for a reason) and taking action as needed. The primary function of the PM is to back up the PF in the monitoring of the flight parameters and to handle all of the rest (engine status parameters, ECAM messages, systems status, communications...). The PF doesn't need to say "I have the plane" in any given situation, because he was having the plane all the time and still have it. He is the pilot flying. When one pilot overtakes the PF function, then he needs to announce "I have the plane" (or similar, "I have the controls", "my plane", etc...) and the other one has to acknowledge "you have the plane" (or similar).

When something unexpected happens, the pilot flying needs to focus more than ever in his primary duty: to fly the plane. When the problem is related with flight itself (windshear, upset, ground or traffic avoidance) it is the job of the PF to manage the situation at great, and the PM monitoring assist by calling out flight parameters (altitude, speed, attitude). When the problem is related to systems (engine problems, hydraulic problems, or pitot-static problems), the job of the PF is basically reduced to "fly the plane" and wait for the initial troubleshooting of the PM. In either case, as said, there is no need for the PF to say "I have the plane, you have the ECAM". It had been like that all the time and nothing changed. Later, as the PM makes progress in the troubleshooting, the PF must also participate by following specific procedures that may include confirming the position of switches, or following specific flight parameters appropriate for the specific issue (like 5deg and CLB, you will not do that before UAS is identified). That last sentence in bold is type-specific. The first part is quite universal and applies to any airplane in any flight regime at any altitude or speed.

Let's go to Air France.

The AP disconnect warning sounded. The PF immediately says "I have the plane" (even when it was not required to say so) and starts to do manual inputs. A few seconds later (that can be counted with the fingers of one hand) the PM says "we lost the speeds". Up to here, I would say that that was a quite reasonable CRM, right? The problem is that, by when the PM identified and verbalized the speed issue, in these very few seconds the PF had done excessive control inputs that resulted in 1.5G, the stall warning sounding twice, the pitch increased from about zero to 10 ANU (and still increasing), and the vertical speed had reached 5000 FPM (and increasing). An interesting point is that, despite the roll inputs being much larger and exaggerated than the already large and exaggerated pitch inputs, the PF managed to keep good control in roll, what means that probably he was actually looking at the PFD.

So whatever was his intention, if he had one to begin with, the PF either had a crazy intention or was failing miserably at it. Lack of training? Sure.

Now let me make a distinction.

I think that we will agree "airmanship" is the set of skills and attitudes needed to fly well and safe. It includes stick-and-rudder skills, good flight planning, good judgement, conservative decision making, adherence to procedures, and CRM (and perhaps more things that I am missing).

Now, in all and each of these categories, there are things that are BASIC and UNIVERSAL, and others that are TYPE SPECIFIC and AIRLINE SPECIFIC.
Both things are important, but some, the basics, come before and are prerequisite to others, the specifics.

This PF failed to apply specific CRM, specific UAS procedures, specific high-altitude flight skills and specific stall avoidance and recovery techniques, but BEFORE that he failed to the most basic of all the same things that are not specific to this type of airplane, to this airplane, or to this flight condition. So here is the key question. Why?

I don't buy the lack of specific training by Air France in UAS, high-altitude stalls, high-altitude UAS, and high-altitude manual flight, because what all what the pilot did, starting IMMEDIATELY after the AP disconnected and before the UAS was identified, was contrary to the BASIC AIRMANSHIP that comes BEFORE all that and that should have been applied in the A330 at 35 to 38000ft and transonic speeds or to a Cessna 172 doing 90kts at 1000ft.

CRM of the most basic type, of the type that we low time, single engine, GA plane us: Fly the plane first, that applies to any plane with any number of required flight crew members, and what was already the duty of the PF even before the problem started. Actively stalling the plane first by pulling up like crazy, and failing to lower the nose in a fully developed stall where the stall warning, the combination of pitch and sink rate, and the behavior of the plane were all indicating a stall. So why?

You keep talking about:
- UAS training
- high-altitude manual flight training
- high-altitude upset recovery
- transport-category-specific CRM.

I keep talking about:
- fly the plane first
- don't pull up relentlessly
- don't make unsustainable climbs
- stall warning x (10deg ANU + -10000 fpm) x airplane buffet x roll instability x the plane will not pitch up anymore despite pulling full back = stall^5
- to recover from a stall or proximity to stall, reduce AoA
all of which apply to an A330 at cruise and to a C-172 around the pattern.

Again, it is not that what I say is more important than what you say, it is that it comes BEFORE and is a PREREQUISITE.
You have to learn to walk before you learn to run.

Sure, AF should ha trained these pilots better (even in those basic tasks), but also should the flight instructor during the PPL course.

Either that, or the pilot's brain forze, which, even when training and exposure reduces the chances for that to happen, it is impossible to predict how a person will react when facing, for real, a daring life-or-death situation (or that he considers so, because this was not such a situation at all). If that was the case, that is where the ultimate reason to have two persons in the cockpit should have kicked in. Someone should have said "I have the plane", and it was not the PF.

[Evan]

Again, you...reveal your strong disdain for fundamentals... blah blah blah...

There's no point in discussing this with you 3WE. You want to put me in an either/or argument and it's never been that. Airmanship and CRM are one in the same. I do not "have a disdain" for basic skills. I have a disdain for the arrogance that leads some pilots to think—naively—that they don't need to learn and follow procedures. A good airman is constantly aware of the limits of situational awareness, proficiency under extreme and sudden pressure and the vulnerability of human judgment.

I do have a disdain for technical ignorance. The computers did not 'go crazy' on AF447. The crew crashed a perfectly good airplane. Everything worked as designed and the computers gave correct instructions to the PM. The interface could be improved to provide clearer instructions but a properly trained crew should need only the cues it provided. The plane shouldn't have to teach pilots on the fly.

WIthout having any technical knowledge about the event, how is anyone supposed to take your opinions seriously?

[Evan]

I do see it, and by all means, do follow the procedure. I am not proposing to use airmanship and stick-and-rudder in lieu of the procedure. Not at all. Better use it to follow the procedure with grace and precision.

What I am saying is that this was much worse than a simple "not following the procedure".

Ok, you said that the pilot had an intention, right? I am not convinced but let's assume that. Whatever was his intention (that obviously was not to follow the UAS procedure), he failed miserably. Unless his intention was to pull up strong enough that he triggered the stall warning a second after the AP disconnected, establish a 1.5G, 15 deg nose-up, 7000 fpm climb and when the plane finally stalled, pull up hard again and keep "pulling up all the time" all the way down from 38000 ft to sea level. Not following the UAS procedure and lack of CRM cannot explain this (except in the trivial and useless way that, yes, they didn't follow the procedure or the CRM). The pilot was out of the game since t=0. (wait, was all that a copy paste from a previous post?).

If his intention was to keep the plane straight and level, or even to climb to the filled cruise altitude of 37000ft, or anything imaginable, and that resulted in this, then his airmanship was terrible, and it is not because of lack of high altitude manual flight training, since there was nothing special about high altitude skills for keeping the plane straight and level or climb to 37000 (for which he didn't even advance the throttles). So I am skeptical that he could have kept the plane 5deg up and CLB, even if he knew the UAS procedure by hart. Yes, if this was the result of moving the sidestick without looking at the PFD, then yes, CRM was a critical skill that was lacking. But again, it is CRM of the most basic type. You look at the horizon (artificial or natural) when maneuvering. Nothing special about an A330 at high altitude with UAS. Fly the plane first. Aviate, navigate, communicate. There is no reason one cannot use the Cessna 172 skill for it. If I all pilots had had the fish and I was alone in the left seat of that plane, I, a PPL with 180 hours in the Piper tomahawk, would not have crashed that plane like that. I may have crashed in a different way (like succumbing to spacial disorientation), but not in that way. If all the pilots had had the fish and there was nobody conscious in the cockpit, the plane would not have crashed like that either.

I've said this many times: This pilot lacked skills and training, but not only UAS and high-altitude manual flight: Also (and first), the most basic type of airmanship. Unless...

If, instead, the startle/panic effect left him instantly so emotionally perturbed to the point that he did what he did by a gut, irrational reaction and was unable to think critically (or at all), then knowing the procedures would have not helped, except that perhaps having enough exposure in training may have reduced the chanced that he lost his mind.

You keep reciting what he did wrong, which I completely agree was atrocious airmanship, and I keep reciting what I believe is the reason why. I entirely reject the notion that an Air France pilot with his training and experience thought it was acceptible to establish a 1.5G, 15 deg nose-up, 7000 fpm climb, and so does the report. Now, you may be right that "the startle/panic effect left him instantly so emotionally perturbed to the point that he did what he did by a gut, irrational reaction and was unable to think critically (or at all)". The report also suggests that possibliity:

A saturation of the mental resources needed to make sense of the situation, to the detriment of aeroplane handling;

But of course this what CRM is all about. There are two pilots and the procedures are designed to overcome human factors such as this. WIthout CRM, both pilots are working in isolation. You basically have a single-pilot cockpit at that point.

So I am skeptical that he could have kept the plane 5deg up and CLB, even if he knew the UAS procedure by heart.

Well, as you said, you could do it. I could do it. Of course he could do it. If he had only known what was happening, what to do about it and had focused on doing it. Run the scenario with CRM intact, even if the PF has "stopped thinking". The PF does what he did, for whatever reason. The PNF calls out 'alternate law, protections lost' (he did not) and memory item pitch and power (he did not) and cross-checks or gets to the QRH and reads out the standard pitch and power settings for the altitude and weight, then cross-checks this against his instruments. He then clearly sees what the PF is doing (sidestick control is a detriment to SA for the PNF, and this is why instrument cross-checks are so important here) and calls the PF out—get it to this pitch and move the damn throttles into CLB!!—or better yet, takes command.

The PF may not have touched the throttles due to his assumption that the AT was still active. This was all on the top of ECAM list and not called out until the PNF eventually told him to move the thrust levers. It's fair to say that, during the time of the initial, abrupt climb, the PF did not know that the AT was off and locked, did not know the law was 'alternate'' in pitch and 'direct' in roll, did not know stall protections were lost, did not know the airspeeds were in disagree and therefore did not know the aircraft was not descending and did not know the FD was unreliable and did not know the stall warnings were to be respected. All of this he would have known if CRM had prevailed.

CRM is to prevent a single pilot from succumbing to his own human factor weaknesses, by providing the resources of the other pilot and vice versa. ECAM is a step by step guide (red items are master caution, blue items are actions, priotized items remain at the top of the list until they are cleared). The key is healthy communication between both pilots, a distinct division of tasks and a simple list of actionable items. Without that, things can get crazy. WIth them, it would be almost impossible to get into this situation.

Instead, you had two pilots improvising here mostly in isolation, and stress isolated them even more. One of them was stricken by unthinkable airmanship and, because he was isolated, nothing could defend him from his own mental confusion and errors. It's like losing an engine on a single-engine plane. You need that second engine, that redundancy. Without CRM, you have a single-pilot plane. If one goes, it crashes.

I do see it, and by all means, do follow the procedure. I am not proposing to use airmanship and stick-and-rudder in lieu of the procedure. Not at all. Better use it to follow the procedure with grace and precision.

I know you see it, but it's not there for 'grace and precision'. It's there for human factors. It is there to preserve airmanship.

[3WE]

I've said this many times: 1) This pilot lacked skills and training, but not only UAS and high-altitude manual flight: 2)Also (and first), the most basic type of airmanship.

To which Evan has dismissingly replied many many times that the basic stuff (2) is "Cowboy stick and rudder airmanship".

[Gabriel]

The EASA know this is true. The NTSB knows this is true. Why can't you see it?

I do see it, and by all means, do follow the procedure. I am not proposing to use airmanship and stick-and-rudder in lieu of the procedure. Not at all. Better use it to follow the procedure with grace and precision.

What I am saying is that this was much worse than a simple "not following the procedure".

Ok, you said that the pilot had an intention, right? I am not convinced but let's assume that. Whatever was his intention (that obviously was not to follow the UAS procedure), he failed miserably. Unless his intention was to pull up strong enough that he triggered the stall warning a second after the AP disconnected, establish a 1.5G, 15 deg nose-up, 7000 fpm climb and when the plane finally stalled, pull up hard again and keep "pulling up all the time" all the way down from 38000 ft to sea level. Not following the UAS procedure and lack of CRM cannot explain this (except in the trivial and useless way that, yes, they didn't follow the procedure or the CRM). The pilot was out of the game since t=0. (wait, was all that a copy paste from a previous post?).

If his intention was to keep the plane straight and level, or even to climb to the filled cruise altitude of 37000ft, or anything imaginable, and that resulted in this, then his airmanship was terrible, and it is not because of lack of high altitude manual flight training, since there was nothing special about high altitude skills for keeping the plane straight and level or climb to 37000 (for which he didn't even advance the throttles). So I am skeptical that he could have kept the plane 5deg up and CLB, even if he knew the UAS procedure by hart. Yes, if this was the result of moving the sidestick without looking at the PFD, then yes, CRM was a critical skill that was lacking. But again, it is CRM of the most basic type. You look at the horizon (artificial or natural) when maneuvering. Nothing special about an A330 at high altitude with UAS. Fly the plane first. Aviate, navigate, communicate. There is no reason one cannot use the Cessna 172 skill for it. If I all pilots had had the fish and I was alone in the left seat of that plane, I, a PPL with 180 hours in the Piper tomahawk, would not have crashed that plane like that. I may have crashed in a different way (like succumbing to spacial disorientation), but not in that way. If all the pilots had had the fish and there was nobody conscious in the cockpit, the plane would not have crashed like that either.

I've said this many times: This pilot lacked skills and training, but not only UAS and high-altitude manual flight: Also (and first), the most basic type of airmanship. Unless...

If, instead, the startle/panic effect left him instantly so emotionally perturbed to the point that he did what he did by a gut, irrational reaction and was unable to think critically (or at all), then knowing the procedures would have not helped, except that perhaps having enough exposure in training may have reduced the chanced that he lost his mind.

[3WE]

...if pilots are still thinking like 3WE, it is bound to happen again...

Again, you step in a huge pile of dog (not_cow) shit and reveal your strong disdain for fundamentals.

If the pilots had thought like 3WE the plane would not have crashed that night. Gabriel concurs.

But your hatred of fundamentals blinds you from seeing that.

As Gabriel and I and others have said, ad-infinitum, yeah, the pilots defied procedure, but they also defied THE MOST BASIC FUNDAMENTALS OF AIRMANSHIP!

Listen carefully- when the shock factor kicks in, people forget procedures. You call for more practice. I say WTF- they PRACTICE FLYING AT FAT DUMB AND HAPPY ATTITUDES AND POWER SETTINGS FOR 80% OF THE EXPELITIVE TIME THEY ARE FLYING.

PRETTY FORNICATING SIMPLE!!!

And it would have worked. You don't have to believe me, but Gabriel said so.

Repeating- you keep calling for more training when 80% of the time, they practice cruising fat dumb and happy at a known power and attitude.

Sure, following procedure was ideal, but again, the Evan disdain for someone thinking BASIC aerodynamics and airmanship when the computer, IN FACT HAD GONE CRAZY VERSUS NORMAL AND COULD INDEED CONFUSE A LARGE NUMBER OF HIGHLY-TRAINED PEOPLE...

Can I say, "Dios forbid they might remember basic 172 fundamentals when the situation goes to hell and revert to them for a whole friggen 15 seconds while they remember the memory checklist and get the proper CRM going?"

Nope you have closed minded black and white thinking and I'm glad you JUST sit here and pass judgement.

(And, please, get a job, or drive your own damn car instead of your driver. You still have no clue whatsoever how human factors work.)