Brian,
I tried to locate the old thread about this accident, but I have had no luck with the search function since the change in the forum engine.
If you have luck, please join the threads.
And please report this failure to the admin. Or am I the only one having exactly zero success rate with any search attempted?
Anyway, back to the accident, we can summarize the MAK findings in:
- The plane was being flown by a blacksmith, not a pilot.
- The flight was being operated by a toilet cleaning company, not an airline.
- Pilots are really dangerous when faced to any slightly non-routine situation, like a go-around (ok, in the AvHerald report in is not stated where the MAK took the sample of pilots from).
A small sample of the report:
The captain's not having had primary flight training
Violation of the principle "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate"
The MAK performed simulator tests with a number of pilots having them go through a scenario similiar to the accident flight, in particular forcing a go around at low height with the autopilot disconnecting at the initiation of the go-around by pressing the TOGA button. The MAK reported that the vast majority of crews coped well with the scenario but found it difficult to master reporting highly increased stress levels, especially when the pilot monitoring did not provide full assistance. A number of pilots, although the autopilot disconnect aural and visual alerts are very distinct and have high attraction potential, did not catch the fact, that the autopilot had disconnected, several silencing the alerts by pressing the AP disconnect button, a number (about 42% of the pilots tested) not recognizing the alert at all and therefore responding with a substantial delay or not reacting at all. None of the pilots participating in the test was able to answer all questions to the procedures correctly, the MAK reported that 28% even believed the go around was automatic on autopilot despite the AP disconnect alert indicating lack of knowledge and a substantial gap between theoretic knowledge and practical skills.
Of all pilots participating in the test only one third mastered the go around successfully. Only 28% attempted to achieve a suitable pitch angle after initiating the go around aiming for +15 degrees of nose up, others began to react only between +20 and +37 degrees of nose up attitude and airspeeds as low as 90 KIAS with stick shaker activation. None of the pilots was able to level off at the assigned altitude.
In a second part of the experiment a test pilot produced a pitch up upset similiar to the accident flight and then let the participating pilot recover the aircraft. None of the pilots took the right decisions and none was able to recover the aircraft. The MAK reported, that after demonstration of the correct upset recovery technics almost all pilots were able to apply the technics and recover the aircraft, suggesting that the result of the experiment was mainly the result of lack of pilot training
Un-f***ing-believable.
I tried to locate the old thread about this accident, but I have had no luck with the search function since the change in the forum engine.
If you have luck, please join the threads.
And please report this failure to the admin. Or am I the only one having exactly zero success rate with any search attempted?
Anyway, back to the accident, we can summarize the MAK findings in:
- The plane was being flown by a blacksmith, not a pilot.
- The flight was being operated by a toilet cleaning company, not an airline.
- Pilots are really dangerous when faced to any slightly non-routine situation, like a go-around (ok, in the AvHerald report in is not stated where the MAK took the sample of pilots from).
A small sample of the report:
The captain's not having had primary flight training
Violation of the principle "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate"
The MAK performed simulator tests with a number of pilots having them go through a scenario similiar to the accident flight, in particular forcing a go around at low height with the autopilot disconnecting at the initiation of the go-around by pressing the TOGA button. The MAK reported that the vast majority of crews coped well with the scenario but found it difficult to master reporting highly increased stress levels, especially when the pilot monitoring did not provide full assistance. A number of pilots, although the autopilot disconnect aural and visual alerts are very distinct and have high attraction potential, did not catch the fact, that the autopilot had disconnected, several silencing the alerts by pressing the AP disconnect button, a number (about 42% of the pilots tested) not recognizing the alert at all and therefore responding with a substantial delay or not reacting at all. None of the pilots participating in the test was able to answer all questions to the procedures correctly, the MAK reported that 28% even believed the go around was automatic on autopilot despite the AP disconnect alert indicating lack of knowledge and a substantial gap between theoretic knowledge and practical skills.
Of all pilots participating in the test only one third mastered the go around successfully. Only 28% attempted to achieve a suitable pitch angle after initiating the go around aiming for +15 degrees of nose up, others began to react only between +20 and +37 degrees of nose up attitude and airspeeds as low as 90 KIAS with stick shaker activation. None of the pilots was able to level off at the assigned altitude.
In a second part of the experiment a test pilot produced a pitch up upset similiar to the accident flight and then let the participating pilot recover the aircraft. None of the pilots took the right decisions and none was able to recover the aircraft. The MAK reported, that after demonstration of the correct upset recovery technics almost all pilots were able to apply the technics and recover the aircraft, suggesting that the result of the experiment was mainly the result of lack of pilot training
Un-f***ing-believable.
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