Plane ‘carrying football team from Brazil’ crashes in Colombia.

[3WE]

I know you meant 121.5 for Emergency VHF.

Hi Bobby...thanks for joining the conversation. We are well underway at designing new procedures to help you manage your fuel status...you're welcome.

[BoeingBobby]

7500 Hijack
7600 Communications failure
7700 Emergency (equivalent to mayday, any emergency, not just fuel)

But if you are in contact with ATC and they are already tracking you with a code, sometimes is better to leave the code as is. In the same way that you would not tune 125.0 (the emergency frequency).

I know you meant 121.5 for Emergency VHF.

[HalcyonDays]

A million years ago I learned the mnemonic ICE for the emergency codes : interference, communication, emergency, for 5 6 and 7 respectively.

[Gabriel]

I do not have any knowledge of aviation. But I´ve read that when pilots turn transponder to 7700, this means fuel emergency (I don´t know if this is true). Is it possible that when an aircraft reachs its fuel limits (30 minutes of flight for instance) the trasnponder automatically turns to 7700 ? And not leaving this message for crew´s discretion ?

7500 Hijack
7600 Communications failure
7700 Emergency (equivalent to mayday, any emergency, not just fuel)

But if you are in contact with ATC and they are already tracking you with a code, sometimes is better to leave the code as is. In the same way that you would not tune 125.0 (the emergency frequency).

[Observer]

I do not have any knowledge of aviation. But I´ve read that when pilots turn transponder to 7700, this means fuel emergency (I don´t know if this is true). Is it possible that when an aircraft reachs its fuel limits (30 minutes of flight for instance) the trasnponder automatically turns to 7700 ? And not leaving this message for crew´s discretion ?

[Evan]

We're on the same page.

To nitpik: in reality all companies stretch the rules as an exercise of efficiency. Complete technical legality is often unattainable and I accept that with professional integrity it can be sufficiently safe to do so, but there are some inherently dangerous and obviously deadly corners being cut by some. It can often be a fine line and I just don't trust every operator to draw their own line.

I think in reality it would work the way the 55mph speed limit worked. You don't pull them over for going 60 or even 65, but it keeps them from going 70. LAMIA was going 120. Such a system would be certain to come down on theses kinds of offences. Where you draw the line would be determined by your resources and how many violations you are getting.

[Dispatch Dog]

We're on the same page.

To nitpik: in reality all companies stretch the rules as an exercise of efficiency. Complete technical legality is often unattainable and I accept that with professional integrity it can be sufficiently safe to do so, but there are some inherently dangerous and obviously deadly corners being cut by some. It can often be a fine line and I just don't trust every operator to draw their own line.

[Evan]

A FOQuA system should be able to deal with this without being intrusive. It still depends on the airline management though.

It seems like it would be feasible given current technology to link this information to a mandatory database that could trigger red flags for a low fuel quantity and refer it to authorities for further investigation. The entire thing could be automated with fuel-remaining compared to type and perhaps TOW. It's a connect the dots exercise. It could at least work as a deterrent. Obviously, there's a problem out there we can't continue to ignore and with aviation growing, the world's aviation authorites need to take progressive action to deter these illegal operations.

[Dispatch Dog]

A FOQuA system should be able to deal with this without being intrusive. It still depends on the airline management though.

Agree regarding major and established ops, as long as they are profitable. The danger comes when budgets and accountants dictate levels of operational reg compliance. Though with low cost carrier 'skinny' ops, greed can be as influential as the threat of bankruptcy.

But we regularly see relatively new small operators like these killing people. Even when you bring in experienced op crew, the management culture of strict reg compliance can be an elusive and evaded priority.

Bend the rules, and you negate decades of devoted hard work and the lessons learnt in countless lives lost

[Gabriel]

Logging the fuel remaining does not necessarily mean that senior managers or authorities get to see this unless someone blows the whistle. I've been out of the game too long so I don't know exactly what the current regs or oversight is is but it is a feature in most QAR systems and part of most flight ops statistical analysis who constantly look at performance.

We currently rely largely on the integrity of airlines and individuals to report 'near misses'. Self regulation has worked to bring us to this level of safety and reliability but we do need a more intrusive and independent scrutiny.

A FOQuA system should be able to deal with this without being intrusive. It still depends on the airline management though.

[Dispatch Dog]

Logging the fuel remaining does not necessarily mean that senior managers or authorities get to see this unless someone blows the whistle. I've been out of the game too long so I don't know exactly what the current regs or oversight is is but it is a feature in most QAR systems and part of most flight ops statistical analysis who constantly look at performance.

We currently rely largely on the integrity of airlines and individuals to report 'near misses'. Self regulation has worked to bring us to this level of safety and reliability but we do need a more intrusive and independent scrutiny.

[Evan]

So to summarize: a plane that wasn't carrying sufficient fuel crashed due to fuel exhaustion and killed a bunch of people because it was delayed so another flight which also didn't have sufficient fuel could have an expedited landing?

Wow.

The A320 had sufficient fuel. They were at FL360 enroute to San Andres Island and got a suspicious fuel indication, causing them to divert to Medellin. After landing it was established that they had sufficient fuel to reach their planned destination with the proper reserves. No foul there.

[LH-B744]

the route was almost exactly the same as the published range for the ac. i dont care what kind of winds you expect. if the pilot hadn't killed himself, i'd be advocating for his slow and painful execution.

on another note, how is it that flight plans aren't checked by independent authorities?

Evan also had an idea. But you as a passenger, I assume that you n me trust the airline. You pay the airline so that they provide an aircraft that is able to fly the route nonstop, or, if that is not the case, there is always enough fuel on board. And you're right.

It may sound harsh, but would you dare to fly Dusseldorf - Fiumicino in a Cessna 152? Even if you dared, you certainly wouldn't assume that you could fly the distance without 1 fuel stop!
DUS - FCO: clearly more than 612 nautical miles.
C152 range: not much more than 400 nautical miles.

So, I'd bet you would expect one or even two fuel stops. And why would you take the C152 if some feet above, an Airbus does it nonstop?

As Evan, I see no clear excuse for what happened last Monday.

PS: What has been transmitted to German television so far? A whole soccer team tried to fly from Guarulhos to Medellín, and - for whatever reasons -
they tried to avoid a 1 stop flight with Avianca, who, as seen from here, at least theoretically serve Guarulhos and Medellín, with 1 stop at El Dorado.

Clearly more than 2470 nmi. That's a distance for which I'd call an intercontinental airline, e.g. Avianca.

In contrast to some German sources (or who mentions something like that, in German?), I don't see a parallel to AV 052. In 1990, the B707 was technically able to fly the route nonstop.

In 2016, the Jumbolino, or Avro RJ 85 short-haul jet,

as operated by CityLine until 2012 (concerning 'Flight length', en wiki needs the word 'a former CityLine RJ 85', so, if someone has access..)

was not and will never be technically able to fly more than 1598 nautical miles (more than 2959 km), which is only my rough guess after I took out my ruler: SLVR to Medellín nonstop on a straight line, which, and that's not a secret, is not really a known IFR procedure.

It is official, that the jet had to fly circles in a waiting position. In en wiki, the Jumbolino range is described with 1570 nautical miles as the absolute maximum. But even my rough guess, without J-airways and hold, exceed that absolute maximum by 30 nautical miles.

And that's why I stay with my opinion, that's a mistake that would've been avoidable, e.g. by using a regular commercial 1 stop flight via El Dorado. The soccer team tried to fly to Colombia, so who do you ask?
If I tried to fly to Colombia, I'd ask Avianca, or an international airline that is almost as good as the domestic one at El Dorado...

It is a fatal accident that does not leave me cold. No one in the Brazilian soccer team was older than me.

[LH-B744]

It seems that we need a more inevitable deterrent than "maybe we won't make it". Why aren't ground crews required to log fuel-remaining after each flight?

Hm. I just try to imagine, I were an ATC at EDDL. Would I try to find out, if ALL aircraft that took off here this Saturday are
technically able to reach their destination?

Probably not. I'd say an ATC trusts the airline, who should be able to guarantee that
a) the aircraft can do the distance nonstop
OR, if that is not the case
b) they always have enough fuel on board.

And as far as I can think back, at DUS we've never been disappointed, although the distances are similar or even bigger. DL-B763ER? Always has enough fuel for DUS.
The ATC trusts the airline, I'd say, and I am not an ATC.

That was not a problem in international aviation, until November 28th.

[LH-B744]

More info and photos added to the avherald article.
This one particularly called my attention:

Emergency services reported the aircraft did not catch fire increasing the chances of survivors.
The head of investigation stated: "No existe evidencia de combustible en la aeronave" (there is no evidence of fuel in the aircraft).

This was a rumor last night reported by some media. Now it looks more official and likely to be a direct link with the cause of the crash.

Yes. This is what also 'arrived' here, on German Television: No evidence of fuel in the Jumbolino. Somehow it is hard for me to see that an aircraft with
four engines (!)
crashed due to --- absence of fuel?!?!

Almost every day I learn something new... An Avro RJ85 is not comparable with an Airbus A318, although both jets are approx 30 metres long (100 feet).
RJ85 range: not more than 1,570 nmi.
A318 range: 3,100 nmi.

The distance?
departure: Guarulhos. no further explanation needed.
1st fuel stop: SLVR
2nd fuel stop: cancelled!
arr: Medellín, Colombia.

distance between Guarulhos and Medellín: clearly more than 2470 nmi.

So, why did they use an aircraft that technically is not able to fly the route nonstop?!