tick tock tipms topms

[Gabriel]

Nothing to do with your crappy attitude at all. Out of respect for Larry, and so as NOT to defame another flyboy in public, (which was the caution to Gabe.) If you PM me I will be glad to enlighten you.

BB, I am not defaming or intending to defame anyone. However there are facts out there. I am sure the crew did the best they could, which doesn't mean that it could not have been done better.

[BoeingBobby]

What you said was a veiled threat to Gabriel to "Be VERY careful."

I was 21...watched it happen sort of live on TV, read about it afterwards with more discernment than the standard newspaper reader. Read the NTSB report. Wondered about my personally late liftoff and dragging over the trees and subdivision houses and how I was tunnel visioned that things were acceptable and that I didn't abort. I remember some sort of call from the tower to AF: "Cleared for an immediate takeoff, traffic short final". That's what I know- yeah maybe not much, but...

What did we miss because you still have not added one single thing to this discussion.

C'mon man, you knew the pilot, you have the hours, you were involve in the investitgation, you know so much about what happened in 1982, please educate us.

Or is it just about the power trip of I know but you don't know and I'll just brag that I know and that you don't know...

Nothing to do with your crappy attitude at all. Out of respect for Larry, and so as NOT to defame another flyboy in public, (which was the caution to Gabe.) If you PM me I will be glad to enlighten you.

[3WE]

You are in a situation where you need lots of nose up trim and then the situation changes where you need nose down trim.

Yeah, that's the point.

Why is the damn thing (or the system) not designed to prevent that.

I don't think it would kill the pilots to have to pull back some to go slow and push over some to go around.

But, no, we have to trim it all away (and I do me ALL of it)...leaving us with a plane that you can't prevent from stalling...

As elaw said..."A good DESIGN" (or not a good design).

[3WE]

Not what I said, I knew Larry well, and was involved with the NTSB investigation. But whatever, you ALL know so much about something that happened in 1982!

What you said was a veiled threat to Gabriel to "Be VERY careful."

I was 21...watched it happen sort of live on TV, read about it afterwards with more discernment than the standard newspaper reader. Read the NTSB report. Wondered about my personally late liftoff and dragging over the trees and subdivision houses and how I was tunnel visioned that things were acceptable and that I didn't abort. I remember some sort of call from the tower to AF: "Cleared for an immediate takeoff, traffic short final". That's what I know- yeah maybe not much, but...

What did we miss because you still have not added one single thing to this discussion.

C'mon man, you knew the pilot, you have the hours, you were involve in the investitgation, you know so much about what happened in 1982, please educate us.

Or is it just about the power trip of I know but you don't know and I'll just brag that I know and that you don't know...

[BoeingBobby]

Sorry man, you just contributed nothing.

Do you want to say that the captain was an extremely competent, well trained, highly-experienced, safety-conscious pilot? I don't doubt it. Airline pilots generally are.

Now, how does that contribute to the fact that they did not 'promptly' firewall the throttles? I acknowledge that it's very easy to see that at 0 kts and 0 ft AGL. But in all seriousness- they should have done that and they didn't.

I confess- I can see myself doing the exact same thing they did...well actually I did something a somewhat similar and continued a genuine short field takeoff with the carburetor heat left on. Pretty scary incident as my highly trained experience (all 30 hours of it) CORRECTLY told me that I would make it with a minimum safety buffer. I do not claim to be SMARTER than them.

Any thoughts on what could have been done differently that day to help those great humans from making human errors? (And by the way there was more than one significant contributing factor thing cited in the NTSB report?)- Or do you just want to brag about all of your hours? We respect your hours and all, but there was a good dose of hours in command of Air Florida, and here today, 35 years later, we discuss and dissect related failures in new close calls and new crashes.

Not what I said, I knew Larry well, and was involved with the NTSB investigation. But whatever, you ALL know so much about something that happened in 1982!

[Gabriel]

Actually responding to Gabriel's comment- I think I'm with elaw and have the outsider ass-hat opinion that a decently designed airplane should not be so stall-able!

I will pile on that the more in-cockpit videos I watch, guys are doing what I was taught NOT to do: Fly with trim.

Is it really that bad to have to PULL on the yoke to keep the plane in a high-performance climb.

Reduce control forces- fine. Totally eliminate them...I guess that doesn't bother me unless it makes the plane where you can't prevent a stall if you power up.

The typical scenario is a B737 in an ILS approach with the throttles at idle due to a mistake or technical fault. As the plane bleeds speed the AP adds nose-up trim to pitch up and keep the airplane in the glideslope, until the stickshaker goes off and the AP disconnects. So at this point, with the engines at idle, the plane is trimmed for stickshaker AoA (that is what I'd call grossly off). You will advance the throttles but the engines will take a few seconds to spool up from idle, so you will lose more speed. Now the engines are at TOGA adding more pitch-up moment, so what was trimmed for the stickshaker AoA now is trimmed beyond stall AoA, and at a very slow speed (below stall speed) where the elevators have little authority. In the 1 case that I know that elevator alone was not enough, the pilots realized about the low speed 1 second before the stickshaker so they started a go-around that, other than advancing the throttles to TOGA, they retracted the flaps from 30 to 15. That was the straw that broke the camel's back. The pitch up was uncontrollable, they fully stalled and started to fall, the nose went down and they gained airspeed, up they went again but this time they had enough airspeed for the elevator to have enough authority to, for the first time, reduce AoA and silence the stickshaker. ONLY THEN it occurred to them that it could be a good idea push the nose-down trim button a little bit. Had they done that early in the process they would not have been so close to die and kill as they were. Why a pilot is fighting for nose-down control (with high push force and full deflection) and doesn't think to use the trim for help is beyond me, it is what pilots do all the time to help with pitch control in non-daring situations. But it can happen in moments of intense stress, especially f the drill is not practiced (and BB, correct me if I am wrong, but scenarios where you need trim to aid in a stall recovery are not practiced often if ever, maybe once or twice in the life in an upset recovery program?)

[3WE]

***I'd think any decently-designed plane would have enough elevator authority to overcome that even with the trim grossly off***

Actually responding to Gabriel's comment- I think I'm with elaw and have the outsider ass-hat opinion that a decently designed airplane should not be so stall-able!

I will pile on that the more in-cockpit videos I watch, guys are doing what I was taught NOT to do: Fly with trim.

Is it really that bad to have to PULL on the yoke to keep the plane in a high-performance climb.

Reduce control forces- fine. Totally eliminate them...I guess that doesn't bother me unless it makes the plane where you can't prevent a stall if you power up.

[3WE]

They did... eventually.

Adjusted my wording for factual accuracy.

[Gabriel]

I guess the one exception would be if the pilot believes that too much power would cause the plane to pitch up and stall. I'd think any decently-designed plane would have enough elevator authority to overcome that even with the trim grossly off, but maybe not?

No, there have been cases where the trim grossly off + changing from idle to TOGA made elevator by itself not enough to keep the AoA below stall. Of course that a bit of nose-down trim (or better, a little less of nose-up trim) would have fixed it. THIS WAS NOT THE SCENARIO IN PALM 90 WHERE THE TRIM WAS UNDER NO WAY GROSSLY OFF OR MODERATELY OFF.

[Gabriel]

Now, how does that contribute to the fact that they never firewalled the throttles?

They did... eventually.

[Gabriel]

And you were how old when Palm 90 happened?

10. What does that have to do with anything is beyond me.

I knew and used to fly DC-3's with the Captain of that flight, and had just come back from a trip to South America in the 707 the same day. Be VERY careful here Gabe!

And does you knowing the captain change the Physics, or the sequence of the events that transpired that day, or something? I don't get what I need to be VERY careful about. In particular (the part you quoted)... Wasn't the trim set for take off? Weren't the engines producing plenty of thrust already? I don't understand what part you find even questionable.

[3WE]

And you were how old when Palm 90 happened? I knew and used to fly DC-3's with the Captain of that flight, and had just come back from a trip to South America in the 707 the same day. Be VERY careful here Gabe!

Sorry man, you just contributed nothing.

Do you want to say that the captain was an extremely competent, well trained, highly-experienced, safety-conscious pilot? I don't doubt it. Airline pilots generally are.

Now, how does that contribute to the fact that they did not 'promptly' firewall the throttles? I acknowledge that it's very easy to see that at 0 kts and 0 ft AGL. But in all seriousness- they should have done that and they didn't.

I confess- I can see myself doing the exact same thing they did...well actually I did something a somewhat similar and continued a genuine short field takeoff with the carburetor heat left on. Pretty scary incident as my highly trained experience (all 30 hours of it) CORRECTLY told me that I would make it with a minimum safety buffer. I do not claim to be SMARTER than them.

Any thoughts on what could have been done differently that day to help those great humans from making human errors? (And by the way there was more than one significant contributing factor thing cited in the NTSB report?)- Or do you just want to brag about all of your hours? We respect your hours and all, but there was a good dose of hours in command of Air Florida, and here today, 35 years later, we discuss and dissect related failures in new close calls and new crashes.

[elaw]

Me 3BS.

(etc)

I agree!

As I think you guys know I'm a proud rider of the human-factors bandwagon. But this particular issue is hella basic. What makes an airplane fly? Power. What do you need when your airplane won't fly? More power.

I completely get that people panic, get flustered/distracted/confused/etc but the relationship between power and the plane getting/staying airborne is so basic, so simple, and so immutable it's hard to understand why pilots don't add power as soon as they realize the airplane isn't flying as much as they want it to. Of course that only works if the pilot *recognizes* the plane isn't flying!

I guess the one exception would be if the pilot believes that too much power would cause the plane to pitch up and stall. I'd think any decently-designed plane would have enough elevator authority to overcome that even with the trim grossly off, but maybe not?

[BoeingBobby]

In the Air Florida case, in particular, the trim was not set very nose-up (it was a normal take-off trim) and the engines were making plenty of thrust already. I don;t for a second think that the thrust increment that was left to TOGA would be enough to beat nose-down elevator without need to trim down for help.

And you were how old when Palm 90 happened? I knew and used to fly DC-3's with the Captain of that flight, and had just come back from a trip to South America in the 707 the same day. Be VERY careful here Gabe!

[3WE]

***Ideally you can train a pilot to do both simultaneously, but if the pilot has to think about it, you cannot have two thoughts at the same time.***

Me 3BS.

Me 100 hour private pilot.

Me pretty stupid (Just ask Gabriel and ATL Crew).

Me know how advance power and control attitude at same time. Left hand hold yoke, right hand hold power control...unless tricky situation and sit in right seat...then left hand work power, right hand work yoke...

Require some split brain muscle training, but easier than play piano.

Me also know second part of procedure...if beeping sound happen and plane fall, maybe not pull up so much. Maybe even push over a little in extreme situation.

Sometimes, me make stupid mistake, but me not need fancy Evan training. Me learn concept at about 10 hours into training (Gabriel smart, he learn in 5 hours).

Maybe me freeze and be stupid if bad thing happen, but pretty sure further delay while remember what do first, not good idea.