tick tock tipms topms

[Gabriel]

ok but now lets talk about non-Gabrielesque non-super beings. You can train pilots to a very high standard and still, with a certain fraction of them, confusion will erode everthing in an instant. If the training involves both a concentration on trim AND a concentration on moderating thrust, you can place your faith in at least one of those aspects survivng that moment of confusion. Do you follow me?

That's what the (on the other hand....) was there for. I mean... Colgan, Air France, and many others.... even the most basic failed.

The same goes for "which must be done first". Ideally you can train a pilot to do both simultaneously, but if the pilot has to think about it, you cannot have two thoughts at the same time and the first though should be to apply pitch, then power.

I still think sometimes you don't fully appreciate the human factors and how they can contradict even the most dedicated training.

Evan, if the pilot has to think about it, then we have a larger problem here. It should come naturally since it should be being regularly practiced since the pilot had about 5 hours into the PPL course.

I do appreciate the human factors. Things that the pilot is frequently exposed too, practices regularly, and on top of that deeply understands, are more likely to be performed correctly under stress. That said, a person my freak out under stress and do nothing or do everything wrong, including the single most basic action (whatever it is) and there is no absolute protection against that other than automatic protections. Again, practice and knowledge reduce the chances of that happening.

[Gabriel]

(Or perhaps that's sort of what you are saying?)

It is. Well, quite closely anyway.

[Evan]

I believe that that is a training issue. Train the pilots to use trim if needed (and make scenarios where it IS needed) and it will come as natural as lowering the nose (on the other hand.......)

In the Air Florida case, in particular, the trim was not set very nose-up (it was a normal take-off trim) and the engines were making plenty of thrust already. I don;t for a second think that the thrust increment that was left to TOGA would be enough to beat nose-down elevator without need to trim down for help.


Yes, but not-crashing is better. You don't always need to give up altitude to recover from a stall or approach to stall. It is a very popular lie but still a lie.
I explained it n times: you can increase climb rate, increse climb slope, increase deck angle, AND reduce AoA at the same time (not always, but it is not impossible). The "old" approach to stall recovery procedure of "firewall and pitch 10deg" was based on that, except that, as I said, it doesn't ALWAYS work.
Air Florida was climbing (if barely) for a good part of the sequence. Add more thrust you can tend to climb more and trade all or part of that additional climb with a reduction of the AoA.
And firewaling the throttles and reducing the AoA don't need to come in sequence. You have 2 hands, one for the yoke and one for the throttles, and they can move at the same time. So "which one must be done first" is not a sensible question. Do both!!! (in a daring condition where ground contact is imminent)

ok but now lets talk about non-Gabrielesque non-super beings. You can train pilots to a very high standard and still, with a certain fraction of them, confusion will erode everthing in an instant. If the training involves both a concentration on trim AND a concentration on moderating thrust, you can place your faith in at least one of those aspects survivng that moment of confusion. Do you follow me?

The same goes for "which must be done first". Ideally you can train a pilot to do both simultaneously, but if the pilot has to think about it, you cannot have two thoughts at the same time and the first though should be to apply pitch, then power.

I still think sometimes you don't fully appreciate the human factors and how they can contradict even the most dedicated training.

[3WE]

***The "old" approach to stall recovery procedure of "firewall and pitch 10deg" was based on that, except that, as I said, it doesn't ALWAYS work.***

Where in the hell are you going here?

1. The procedure is usually really damn effective as long as you aren't a black and white thinker like Evan, and refuse to consider 172 methodology while blindly following the type-specific procedure.

2. A long takeoff and Air Florida are two examples where full power and a healthy climb attitude and a little stall awareness (just like I practiced in a 172) would probably work wonderfully.

(Or perhaps that's sort of what you are saying?)

[Gabriel]

I think it's warranted because the combination of thrust-pitch coupling and a nose high trim condition CAN make it impossible to recover with pitch alone, and the trim condition is always a stealth factor, especially when the stall occurs following an autopilot disconnect. By impressing upon pilots the need to apply thrust cautiously, they will probably be able to recover even when they fail to address the trim. It's a good line of defense against a human error that is often a factor in stall-related incidents.

I believe that that is a training issue. Train the pilots to use trim if needed (and make scenarios where it IS needed) and it will come as natural as lowering the nose (on the other hand.......)

In the Air Florida case, in particular, the trim was not set very nose-up (it was a normal take-off trim) and the engines were making plenty of thrust already. I don;t for a second think that the thrust increment that was left to TOGA would be enough to beat nose-down elevator without need to trim down for help.

Yes, "about as" but it is still of secondary importance to pitch, no? If you have no altitiude to give, what's the difference between stalling and crashing and not stalling and crashing? Better to crash wings-level?

Yes, but not-crashing is better. You don't always need to give up altitude to recover from a stall or approach to stall. It is a very popular lie but still a lie.
I explained it n times: you can increase climb rate, increse climb slope, increase deck angle, AND reduce AoA at the same time (not always, but it is not impossible). The "old" approach to stall recovery procedure of "firewall and pitch 10deg" was based on that, except that, as I said, it doesn't ALWAYS work.
Air Florida was climbing (if barely) for a good part of the sequence. Add more thrust you can tend to climb more and trade all or part of that additional climb with a reduction of the AoA.
And firewaling the throttles and reducing the AoA don't need to come in sequence. You have 2 hands, one for the yoke and one for the throttles, and they can move at the same time. So "which one must be done first" is not a sensible question. Do both!!! (in a daring condition where ground contact is imminent)

[Evan]

The SOP today makes a big warning against adding thrust for airplanes with engines under the wing. I think it is totally unwarranted.

I think it's warranted because the combination of thrust-pitch coupling and a nose high trim condition CAN make it impossible to recover with pitch alone, and the trim condition is always a stealth factor, especially when the stall occurs following an autopilot disconnect. By impressing upon pilots the need to apply thrust cautiously, they will probably be able to recover even when they fail to address the trim. It's a good line of defense against a human error that is often a factor in stall-related incidents.

In a very low altitude stall or approach to stall you need to lower AoA as in any stall or approach to stall but, unlike what happens at higher altitudes (and a few hundred feet may well qualify as higher altitude), you are eager for energy and you don't have any to give away. Adding thrust NOW becomes about as important as managing AoA, else you may end up not stalling but still crashing.

Yes, "about as" but it is still of secondary importance to pitch, no? If you have no altitiude to give, what's the difference between stalling and crashing and not stalling and crashing? Better to crash wings-level?

[Gabriel]

Wait, I thought we we're still talking about the topic of this thread. (I should know better than that by now). Yeah, once in the air, I think it should be plainly obvious, but remember, we don't want to just "firewall" the thrust levers if that prevents us from managing pitch. I think the SOP of today is "apply thrust smoothly". And as you've told us a thousand times, the first, most effective action is to reduce pitch.

The SOP today makes a big warning against adding thrust before recovering from the high AoA for airplanes with engines under the wing. I think it is totally unwarranted. I don't know of a single case where pitch inputs (including a bit of trim is necessary) would have not been enough to recover against the pith-up moment of the thrust. In a very low altitude stall or approach to stall you need to lower AoA as in any stall or approach to stall but, unlike what happens at higher altitudes (and a few hundred feet may well qualify as higher altitude), you are eager for energy and you don't have any to give away. Adding thrust NOW becomes about as important as managing AoA, else you may end up not stalling but still crashing.

[3WE]

***it's an issue of awareness when there is still time to avoid bending anything***

I'm not going to give you that 100% free and clear.

As much as I appreciate brain fog/'done it a million times':

There's still some pretty fair visual cues you are running long.

AND

If your pre-takeoff calculations show things as tight then there are less good excuses for being relaxed and trusting on takeoff and not scrutinizing the acceleration/takeoff roll.

This may not solve all cases, but I still argue it would solve many of them.

As to our 727 cargo guys who did some off-roading and roofing activities...maybe they had less of a chance- based on a long history of tight, familiar takeoffs where they didn't come up a few hundred feet short.

And...I'm still pretty intrigued by the BB/ATL no-acronym-nor-autmoation acceleration-check procedure. The more I think about it, it sounds pretty robust, and a shame that we only want to add type-specific automation to our checklists and procedures and not add a mandatory, quick, manual speed/distance check.

[Evan]

The stick shaker should be a big eye-opener, though. I am convinced (in the technical meaning of the word, not as a creed) that had they TOGAed it as soon as the stickshaker went off and managed the AoA to keep it as high as needed but not beyond the onset of the stickshaker, the flight would have been saved.

Wait, I thought we we're still talking about the topic of this thread. (I should know better than that by now). Yeah, once in the air, I think it should be plainly obvious, but remember, we don't want to just "firewall" the thrust levers if that prevents us from managing pitch. I think the SOP of today is "apply thrust smoothly". And as you've told us a thousand times, the first, most effective action is to reduce pitch.

[Gabriel]

Again, it's not an issue of ACCESS to full available power, it's an issue of awareness when there is still time to avoid bending anything yet the situation is not yet obvious to the human pilot. You might notice that thrust levers have not yet been removed from the cockpit and they are designed with the hand in mind. The only thing preventing the pilot from using them is a lack of awareness.

The stick shaker should be a big eye-opener, though. I am convinced (in the technical meaning of the word, not as a creed) that had they TOGAed it as soon as the stickshaker went off and managed the AoA to keep it as high as needed but not beyond the onset of the stickshaker, the flight would have been saved.

[Evan]

Meh...I get the automatic power setting deal, but I'm hoping you scientific engineers did not remove an override-I-need-full-power(see footnote)-in-30-seconds-Scotty-or-we're-all-dead. An extra notch beyond "HAL-Chosen-takeoff-power".

Footnote: "Full power is intended to mean full available power without damaging something. I know you guys locked pilots out from doing that some time ago.

Again, it's not an issue of ACCESS to full available power, it's an issue of awareness when there is still time to avoid bending anything yet the situation is not yet obvious to the human pilot. You might notice that thrust levers have not yet been removed from the cockpit and they are designed with the hand in mind. The only thing preventing the pilot from using them is a lack of awareness.

[3WE]

But then autothrust derate wouldn't be a concern on the 737-200... unless we're talking about the 737-200(adv)...

Meh...I get the automatic power setting deal, but I'm hoping you scientific engineers did not remove an override-I-need-full-power(see footnote)-in-30-seconds-Scotty-or-we're-all-dead. An extra notch beyond "HAL-Chosen-takeoff-power".

Footnote: "Full power is intended to mean full available power without damaging something. I know you guys locked pilots out from doing that some time ago.

[Evan]

(But I guess it would only work for a 737-200)

But then autothrust derate wouldn't be a concern on the 737-200... unless we're talking about the 737-200(adv)...

[3WE]

Here, Here!!! [and Brian's comment].

Of course we have to remember tunnel vision and confirmation bias that we are probably just as guilty of as humans...but still, I thought that the Air Florida crash might have cemented a broadly-applicable, fundamental procedure to physically move the power levels ALL THE WAY UP if things start looking tight for almost all future operations. (But I guess it would only work for a 737-200)

[brianw999]

Here, here!!! This is the same that I've always thought and said. And it is documented in the epic "stall" thread (because this was also a stall accident that could have been avoided or recovered with timely application of sound stall recovery procedure).

This plane was able to fly. Proof? It did fly. They "just" had to firewall the throttles as soon as the sticksahker started, and manage the AoA.

The frightening bit is, I'm not a pilot, but even I know that !