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Plane with 71 on board goes missing after taking off from Moscow

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  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    And while following the procedure is the best and only acceptable way to live through UAS, it is by no means the only one.
    It is the only acceptable one.

    If I had an airline and found that one of my pilots had lost speeds, failed to execute the established procedure (where nothing prevented it) and rode it out without incident, that pilot is going to be reprimanded. The reasons for procedures go beyond what is needed to control the plane. They come from everything that has been learned from accident investigations and all that knowledge is worthless if pilots don't value it. Human factors, complex systems interdependencies, stealth factors, uneven pilot proficiency, these are the hidden dangers.

    Again, following the procedure is the best and only acceptable option, just not the only viable one.
    Here is the immediate recall procedure at my airline:

    1) Execute well-trained and memorized procedure > stabilize > CRM > whatever is viable.

    2) Where well-trained and memorized procedures are not available (or forgotten), then skip to whatever is viable.

    Keeping in mind that 'viable' is a subjective assessment subject to grievious human error.

    I have a little more sympathy for the PNF who, by the design of the Airbus control system, had no feedback on what control inputs the PF was doing
    Seriously? You don't consider the PFD feedback? I agree that the sidestick is a disadvantage here, but come on... And during the botched stall recovery the plane was responding to those inputs, but the focus needs to be on not ever getting to that point.

    My point is that I would not trust a pilot with following any specific procedure for any specific condition in any specific airplane type if they don't give me confidence that they are capable to use their general workmanship to do better than what AF did. Or Colgan. Or Pinnacle.
    But what if they did prove themselves capable, as these pilots almost certainly did to become certified and employed by AIr France? Once again Gabriel, you are discounting human factors, the reason we have to have these procedures in the first place.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    If the pilot does anything that is a hair different than that it is unacceptable and I don't care about what is reasonable or what the pilot likes or about generally safe pitch and power settings. (and, by the way, I agree with Evan)
    I don't agree with that. I'm not advocating some sort of rigidly precise execution (where did you get that idea... oh, right, 3WE). It might not even be possible in turbulence. Look, the idea—for the millionth time—behind immediate recall items is to have an immediate reaction trained into the minds of pilots that assures that the plane will remain stabilized within the envelope until they have had ample time to gather their situational awareness and made the appropriate decisions regarding all that awareness. As long as they have the memorized procedure in mind when they execute it with a small margin of error (which it accomodates), that's a win as far as I'm concerned. Saying things like "anything that is a hair different" makes it sound oppressive. And this 'procedures are oppressive' mentality is at the heart of the problem.

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  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by brianw999 View Post
    Ho Hum ! Time I think for a favourite video of mine. For the old time regulars here you can go make a coffee now because yes, it’s “Children of the Magenta” time. For the newbies, watch this all and take especial notice of the comment at 24.10.

    https://youtu.be/pN41LvuSz10
    And, more importantly, 20:05 to 20:40.

    Leave a comment:


  • BoeingBobby
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    The link is to a Ground Proximity Warning procedure. Or did you post this just as an example of an immediate recall item?

    Yes

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  • brianw999
    replied
    Ho Hum ! Time I think for a favourite video of mine. For the old time regulars here you can go make a coffee now because yes, it’s “Children of the Magenta” time. For the newbies, watch this all and take especial notice of the comment at 24.10.

    https://youtu.be/pN41LvuSz10

    Leave a comment:


  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
    I can't win for loosing with you Gabe, I think sometimes there are nuances that are lost in the translation. Here it is right out of the manual. This is an immediate recall item. No time for pulling out books. Pull out the books after you are up, away and safe.

    [ATTACH=CONFIG]13921[/ATTACH]
    I don't know what does that have to do with my previous comment.
    And I don't know what translation are you talking about, but let me clarify:

    Evan: The memory items (or immediate recall items) for UAS at high altitude in the A330 are 1) AP/AT/FD disconnect, 2) thrust: CLB, 3) pitch: 5 deg nose up. If the pilot does anything that is a hair different than that it is unacceptable and I don't care about what is reasonable or what the pilot likes or about generally safe pitch and power settings. (and, by the way, I agree with Evan)

    BoingBobby: I agree with you. In a situation such as that, wings level, pitch 5 - 10 degrees ( I like 10 in the 74) and MAX CONTINUOUS THRUST! Just a little less pitch than for wind-shear.

    Do you see the contrast?

    Leave a comment:


  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    You can't have a policy that says "just improvise and do your best" when this is the reality. You can't have any tolerance for that. And you can't have a policy that says "only the good pilots can improvise" because the bad ones
    And that's why I don't endorse any of that.

    If we want everyone to live through UAS, we need everyone to agree to follow procedure no matter how ridiculous they might find it. That is the reality.
    I don't think that anybody said that the procedure is ridiculous. And while following the procedure is the best and only acceptable way to live through UAS, it is by no means the only one.

    Great, quick... what were they? Go dig up the pilots of AF447 and ask them what the pitch/power settings were prior to the event. I'll give you $20 if they get it right. Pitch, maybe (I doubt it). Power, forget about it.
    Pitch would be just a little bit nose-up (no matter exactly how much just a little bit is)
    Power will be whatever they have. Yes, they had a somehow reduced power since they were slowing down to turbulent air penetration speed. Doesn't matter, the only difference is that they will establish themselves in a descent.

    Again, I am not advocating this. By all means , do follow the procedures.
    But the only thing they needed to do to survive was anything-not-what-they-did. Including nothing at all whatsoever but refraining themselves from touching anything.
    Between following the procedures and not following the procedures and crashing, there was an enormous range of not following the procedures and not crashing that I don't advocate but was not only available to them but should have also been more natural to do for any pilot (compared with what they did, not with following the procedures).

    So what are we arguing about? Isn't it better to do what is better? Isn't it safer to do what is safer for everyone?
    Yes, it is, and I never said anything contrary to that.

    Again, the bottom line: if everyone adhered to memory procedure we wouldn't have ever heard of AF447.
    Yes, and also if they had not adhered to the memory procedure in other 20 better, more reasonable, more natural ways not to adhere to the memory procedure othern than what they did. Again, following the procedure is the best and only acceptable option, just not the only viable one.

    We will never be able to definitively explain why the pilot of AF447 did what he did, but I have a number of theories, all of them based on distraction, disorientation, misunderstanding the ECAM or following the flight director.
    All of which can have created a situation where the pilots don't follow the correct procedure even if in the sim they nail it 10 out of 10 times. Sure, the chances that they get it right are much better if the procedure is trained in the sim first, which was not the case with the AF pilots. But startle and mis-diagnosis can happen always (again, training, training and more training reduce the chances).

    But this much I know: he didn't execute the proper procedures, nor did the PNF, and both of them threw CRM out the window. So I think we should work with what we know went wrong.
    Here is my problem: That is NOT all that we know went wrong.
    And UAS was NOT they only procedure that they didn't follow.

    We may never know why, but the general airmanship of this pilot was terrible. I have a little more sympathy for the PNF who, by the design of the Airbus control system, had no feedback on what control inputs the PF was doing, I can only imagine his face (and his palm in the face) when he heard "But I have been pulling up all the time" a couple of seconds before dying.

    My point is that I would not trust a pilot with following any specific procedure for any specific condition in any specific airplane type if they don't give me confidence that they are capable to use their general workmanship to do better than what AF did. Or Colgan. Or Pinnacle.

    Did they follow the procedure? Of course not. The procedure is not to pull relentlessly up and when the plane stalls and the stall warning activate respond with more pull up and then crash and die.

    But like as I said before, I would not teach the correct overturn procedure to a driver who reacts to an overturn by setting full parking brake, engaging reverse, turning the steering-wheel all the way to the stop into the turn, and turning on the wipers. Not until something else at a more fundamental level is fixed FIRST. Nor I would simplify it saying that such thing happened because the driver didn't follow the overturn procedure.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
    I can't win for loosing with you Gabe, I think sometimes there are nuances that are lost in the translation. Here it is right out of the manual. This is an immediate recall item. No time for pulling out books. Pull out the books after you are up, away and safe.

    [ATTACH=CONFIG]13921[/ATTACH]
    The link is to a Ground Proximity Warning procedure. Or did you post this just as an example of an immediate recall item?

    Leave a comment:


  • BoeingBobby
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    "I agree with you" and your later explanation are incompatible one with the other.

    If you agreed with Evan, ambiguous ranges like 5 - 10 deg, what you like, and whether it is little more or less than for wind-shear is all irrelevant and out of place.
    You should have recited the immediate recall items verbatim and follow them as a robot as if they were an automatic code programmed in the FMS/autoflight/FBW logic (which, by the way, I agree with Evan that's what needs to be done).

    I can't win for loosing with you Gabe, I think sometimes there are nuances that are lost in the translation. Here it is right out of the manual. This is an immediate recall item. No time for pulling out books. Pull out the books after you are up, away and safe.

    No.pdf

    Leave a comment:


  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
    I agree with you on this one. In a situation such as that, wings level, pitch 5 - 10 degrees ( I like 10 in the 74) and MAX CONTINUOUS THRUST! Just a little less pitch than for wind-shear.
    "I agree with you" and your later explanation are incompatible one with the other.

    If you agreed with Evan, ambiguous ranges like 5 - 10 deg, what you like, and whether it is little more or less than for wind-shear is all irrelevant and out of place.
    You should have recited the immediate recall items verbatim and follow them as a robot as if they were an automatic code programmed in the FMS/autoflight/FBW logic (which, by the way, I agree with Evan that's what needs to be done).

    Leave a comment:


  • ATLcrew
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    However that intransigent pilot confidence problem still remains and is still resistent to these 'ridiculous' procedures. That is what has to change.
    I hate intransigent, resistent things...

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    Again, by all means follow procedures. But just not following procedures is not enough to explain these accidents.
    Gabriel, that's a different matter. We will never be able to definitively explain why the pilot of AF447 did what he did, but I have a number of theories, all of them based on distraction, disorientation, misunderstanding the ECAM or following the flight director.

    But this much I know: he didn't execute the proper procedures, nor did the PNF, and both of them threw CRM out the window. So I think we should work with what we know went wrong.

    As far as we know, training remedies have been put in place. However that intransigent pilot confidence problem still remains and is still resistent to these 'ridiculous' procedures. That is what has to change.

    And we are just starting to understand how the human mind works (or doesn't work). So humility is part of the solution.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by TeeVee View Post
    if we all REALLY, REALLY, REALLY wanna live through UAS (and stalls for that matter), then the idiots that program these wonderful flying computers need to either (1) make an idiot/save my ass button or (2) teach the damn thing to ignore UAS, set an acceptable pitch and power setting THAT IS SURVIVABLE, and allow the fallible humans to sit back and figure WTF is going on.

    if for UAS it's as simple as: ok, i'm not sure how fast i'm going for whatever reason, but if i pitch up 5 degrees and set power at x% i absolutely will survive, then it is (at least to me) unimaginable that these machines have not already bee programmed to deal with this. Rather, they disconnect and expect the humans to take over and figure it all out, sometimes with only seconds to spare. giving up and shutting down is not a proper failsafe
    I suggested this waaaaaay back somewhere. It makes sense to me. But I'm sure there are ramifications we mortals haven't though of...

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
    Evan, you need to catch up with the times. They are now called immediate recall items. But seriously, I agree with you on this one. In a situation such as that, wings level, pitch 5 - 10 degrees ( I like 10 in the 74) and MAX CONTINUOUS THRUST! Just a little less pitch than for wind-shear.
    Maybe they should be called 'total recall items".

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    I don't know that Evan agrees with your rather arbitrary choice of 5-10 degrees (nor even your declaration of a single figure of 10 degrees & full power).

    You see, it depends on weight and altitude and temperature...
    I agree with whatever values the pointy heads who designed the plane and tested it in flight wrote into the procedure.

    But here's where you keep missing it: These... ahem... "immediate recall items"... are to s t a b i l i z e things in a situation that has gone suddenly awry. From there, now stabilized safely in the envelope, you get out the FCOM and fine tune things based on weight and altitude. Because now you have t i m e to think. As opposed to an improvised reaction, which in certain pilots is to establish a safe pitch and power setting while in others it is to pull back and climb without touching the thrust levers...

    Leave a comment:

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