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Lion Air 737-Max missing, presumed down in the sea near CGK (Jakarta)

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  • A REAL handful of thrust levers! Click image for larger version

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    • Is that what they use to help B-52 pilots transition to civil aircraft?
      Be alert! America needs more lerts.

      Eric Law

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      • Saber rattling?

        https://www.reuters.com/article/us-i...-idUSKBN1O21UD

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        • Originally posted by Evan View Post
          Yes.

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          • Lion Air has ended their search for the CVR. The Indonesian NTSC will now "likely" conduct their own search "as soon as feasible".

            I get the impression they don't want it found. Boeing should do everything to recover it, including funding their own search if necessary. If we can recover the CVR for AF-447 and the Air Asia 'debarcle', we can recover this one as well.

            https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...-recor-454757/

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            • Originally posted by Evan View Post
              Lion Air has ended their search for the CVR. The Indonesian NTSC will now "likely" conduct their own search "as soon as feasible".

              I get the impression they don't want it found. Boeing should do everything to recover it, including funding their own search if necessary. If we can recover the CVR for AF-447 and the Air Asia 'debarcle', we can recover this one as well.

              https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...-recor-454757/
              I'm sure "we" can do all sorts of things, Evan.

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              • Reportedly the CVR has been found.
                https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...cid=spartanntp

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                • https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/w...sh-pilots.html

                  evan will not like this. but i do. surprise.

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                  • Originally posted by TeeVee View Post
                    https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/w...sh-pilots.html

                    evan will not like this. but i do. surprise.
                    Nothing we didn't already know.

                    Boeing is entirely correct in that the procedure for runaway trim was adequate to handle this. That isn't my issue.

                    My issue is that Boeing crutched the 737Max through certification using a system that overrides pilot commands with NO COMPARATOR REDUNDANCY. One bad sensor, one BIG problem.

                    Apparently the system is entirely software, so giving it comparator redundancy should be as easy as altering code. Maybe this is what will be in the update. If not, they're crazy.

                    The problem with relying on the trim runaway procedure alone is that the behavior of the system when malfunctioning can cause the crew to become disoriented, scramble their situational awareness and lead to those 'what's it doing now' scenarios where crews forget CRM and just wing it.

                    "I don't know, just pull back a bit. That always works..."

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                    • i did not know that brazil had required pilot instruction. and the absolutely lame-ass line from the faa about every country having different blah blah blah...WTF????????????? really? you mean humans die in somehow different ways in brazilian air crashes? sorry folks, that guy needs to be removed from the gene pool.

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                      • Originally posted by TeeVee View Post
                        i did not know that brazil had required pilot instruction. and the absolutely lame-ass line from the faa about every country having different blah blah blah...WTF????????????? really? you mean humans die in somehow different ways in brazilian air crashes? sorry folks, that guy needs to be removed from the gene pool.
                        The issue isn't really about training; it's about awareness. The new system doesn't alter the way pilots need to fly the plane. Now, yes, I firmly believe Boeing needed to put the system description in the FCOM, but who reads it? From my observation of post-accident and post-accident reports, there are quite a few pilots out there who are quite uninspired to read the manual until something goes sideways and lack a deeper understanding of the systems they are working with. If Boeing had included this system in the FCOM, I doubt it would have changed the outcome here.

                        But more importantly, this crash is not about how the new system works or behaves, it's about how it behaves when it isn't working right. Nobody seems to have given that much thought:

                        Originally posted by NYTimes
                        In designing the 737 Max, Boeing decided to feed M.C.A.S. with data from only one of the two angle of attack sensors at a time, depending on which of two, redundant flight control computers — one on the captain’s side, one on the first officer’s side — happened to be active on that flight.

                        That decision kept the system simpler, but also left it vulnerable to a single malfunctioning sensor, or data improperly transferred from it — as appeared to occur on the day of the crash.

                        There is no evidence that Boeing did flight-testing of M.C.A.S. with erroneous sensor data, and it is not clear whether the F.A.A. did so. European regulators flight-tested the new version of the plane with normal sensor data feeding into M.C.A.S. but not with bad data, the pilot familiar with the European certification process said.
                        So, culpability? The airline, absolutely, but also Boeing and the certifying authorities for being so incredibly blind to the consequences of a single sensor failure.

                        I think what we are seeing here is the manifestation of a bad decision on Boeing's part to forgo the 737 replacement project and a too-cozy relationship with the FAA in re-certifying that obsolete airframe as a 21st-century contender.

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                        • Originally posted by Evan
                          ...who reads it? From my observation of post-accident and post-accident reports, there are quite a few pilots out there who are quite uninspired to read the Manual...

                          Indeed.
                          Reckless cowboy improvisation permeates the pilot community!
                          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                          • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                            The issue isn't really about training; it's about awareness.
                            i didn't say training. though the article refers to instructing the pilots on the system. semantics?

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                            • I know that "RTFM" is usually considered good advice, but is it part of the runaway pitch trim emergency procedure? https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/c...ng-737-n985296
                              Be alert! America needs more lerts.

                              Eric Law

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by elaw View Post
                                https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/cockpit-voice-recorder-reveals-moments-leading-lion-air-boeing-737-n985296[/URL]
                                I think this is the essential thing for the FAA and Boeing to understand:

                                "They didn't seem to know the trim was moving down," the third source said. "They thought only about airspeed and altitude. That was the only thing they talked about."
                                I can see, in the confusion, with the stickshaker masking the trim wheel noise, how they could fail to see this as a trim runaway, but rather mistake it for a "flight control problem" a.k.a. "what's it doing now"

                                Also the handover to the FO seems to provide an explanation as to why the trim switch inputs stopped. Apparently, trim was never mentioned between them, so the FO might have not recognized that aspect.

                                Very sad that the pilot died looking for answers in a manual that never held any.

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