Lion Air 737-Max missing, presumed down in the sea near CGK (Jakarta)

[Evan]

All except, of course the one in the entry titled: Boeing Yellowstone Project

That page only describes the Y1 from the patent application date of 2009 onward.
Clicking on the Y1 link takes you to that page, but it only lists developments from 2015 onward.

Yellowstone was announced in 2003. The 737 replacement was Y1. The 787 (the 7E7) was Y2. Only the 787 was announced publicly and was subsequently produced.


WIkipedia's 737-MAX page still tells us this:

In 2006, Boeing started considering the replacement of the 737 with a "clean-sheet" design that could follow the Boeing 787 Dreamliner.^[15]

So there's five years of foresight right there. But I'm certain they were mulling it over long before then, because the ultra-bypass requirement was clear to everyone in engineering by the late 90's.

This is a 2007 article partly reporting on the progression of Y1 (and the 737RS).

https://www.flightglobal.com/boeing-.../66022.article

This is a 2006 article about the secrecy surrounding Y1 and 737RS:

https://www.flightglobal.com/the-737.../65317.article

According to industrial sources, Boeing has accelerated the pace of the 737RS study effort and even plans to make its initial pass on prospective supplier teams by mid-2006. The RS/Y1 concept is based around an all-composite 787-like structure, fly-by-wire, more-electric system architecture, EVS-integrated avionics flightdeck, and a cabin cross-section “wider than A320”. Aerodynamic improvements include a longer span wing, single-slotted flaps, raked and blended-winglet wingtip options, blended fin root and 787-like Section 41 (nose and flightdeck).

Of course, little is known about the extent of the Y1 project before then because....

Until today Boeing has kept 737 replacement elements of its "Project 20XX" studies (which also resulted in the Sonic Cruiser and 787 initial technology studies) under wraps.

But you can bet there was plenty of study work on the project prior to then.

[flashcrash]

I think, when you factor in leveraging all the 787 R&D to a smaller airframe, it would have been less costly and ultimately more profitable than the 737M will prove to be.

No doubt. And at the risk of stating the obvious, the whole point of incurring R&D costs for a new airframe is to recover those costs from the discounted cash flow of future profits from the sale of the developed aircraft. In comparison, the $5bn set-aside is hard cost. It's non-recoverable, short of a miracle. And it'll probably go higher.

The human tragedy of these accidents can't be overstated. I don't want to deflect attention away from the seriousness of those two horrible events for a moment. But there's an economic tragedy here, for which Boeing's senior management must bear responsibility. And it's much more serious than just not having foresight. Their strategy was short term cashflow in exchange for lowered R&D spend, while their primary European competitor was doing the exact opposite. That decision affected all of us, whether or not we hold BA stock. It has a measurable impact on US GDP and on the major market indexes: https://www.ft.com/content/443d08fa-...a-30afa498db1b

Ultimately, all of us with savings, indexed investments, or 401(k)s, are paying part of the cost for this mistake.

[Gabriel]

Interestingly, all of Boeing's Wikipedia pages have recently been edited to remove all trace of the early history of Y1. Now that is REALLY interesting...

All except, of course the one in the entry titled: Boeing Yellowstone Project

[Evan]

That I bet a good bit of money that a LOT of foresight went into the re (and re re, and re re re and re re re re) birth of the 737

Oh, it did. It was called the Y1 program (or the 737RS), part of the Yellowstone project (the 787 was the Y2). Boeing engineers were probably on it in the late 90's and into the millenium. But management killed it off to preserve short-term shareholder value. I'm talking about MANAGEMENT foresight.

Interestingly, all of Boeing's Wikipedia pages have recently been edited to remove all trace of the early history of Y1. Now that is REALLY interesting...

[3WE]

What's that old saying about FORESIGHT?

That I bet a good bit of money that a LOT of foresight went into the re (and re re, and re re re and re re re re) birth of the 737, but that as Bobby didn't say exactly, when I find a crystal ball that works, to hell with deciding when to develop a new model of aeroplanie vs upgrading, Instead, I'm playing the stock market and betting on sports and buying a 707 like John Travolta AND making sure not to take the flight where I screw up and crash the thing.

[Evan]

What is that old saying about hindsight?

With the loss of sales, let alone all of the litigation and settlements, it would have been cheaper.

What's that old saying about FORESIGHT?

Boeing is having just a wonderful year. The Starliner capsule botched its first visit to the ISS today. The reason being given to the press? A clock was set wrong. Ouch.

In classic form, Boeing pointed out that if the capsule had carried a live crew, they would have sorted it out. It doesn't seem like they've learned much about redundancy...

[BoeingBobby]

I think, when you factor in leveraging all the 787 R&D to a smaller airframe, it would have been less costly and ultimately more profitable than the 737M will prove to be. By comparison, the four airframes you listed were all groundbreaking designs. Boeing could now be offering a new single-aisle aircraft with cockpit commonality to the 787 and with lower operating costs than either the 737 or the A320 well into the 2050's.

What is that old saying about hindsight?

With the loss of sales, let alone all of the litigation and settlements, it would have been cheaper.

[3WE]

... Boeing could now be offering a new single-aisle aircraft with cockpit commonality to the 787 and with lower operating costs than either the 737 or the A320 well into the 2050's.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FaLyasJPyUU

[Evan]

Assuming the question wasn't rhetorical, here are the approximate development costs for recent Boeing passenger airframes. All figures are inflation-corrected to 2004 dollars to provide a common baseline for comparison:

707: 1958. $1.3 billion
747: 1970. $3.7 billion
777: 1995. $7.0 billion
787: 2012. $13.4 billion

Source: Bowen J, The Economic Geography of Air Transportation.

I think, when you factor in leveraging all the 787 R&D to a smaller airframe, it would have been less costly and ultimately more profitable than the 737M will prove to be. By comparison, the four airframes you listed were all groundbreaking designs. Boeing could now be offering a new single-aisle aircraft with cockpit commonality to the 787 and with lower operating costs than either the 737 or the A320 well into the 2050's.

[flashcrash]

What would it have cost to build a new, appropriate airframe?

Assuming the question wasn't rhetorical, here are the approximate development costs for recent Boeing passenger airframes. All figures are inflation-corrected to 2004 dollars to provide a common baseline for comparison:

707: 1958. $1.3 billion
747: 1970. $3.7 billion
777: 1995. $7.0 billion
787: 2012. $13.4 billion

Source: Bowen J, The Economic Geography of Air Transportation.

[ATLcrew]

Up to 430 unknown visitors who read every single forum entry, that's also 'a new quality'. But they'll never dare to write one single forum entry won't they. Back on topic.


Ahm. You know that I admire jetphotos members who are longer here than me. But what else than a completely new type license has been the 737 max compared to
e.g. the KLM-B737-800 fleet ?

I asked Gabriel exactly that question. He said, for the 737 max 8 you need one type license, and for the 737-800, which btw both are
exactly 39,47 meters long,
you need another type licence.

Gabe, correct me when I do not say what you said.

And. Probably it was only luck that KLM completed their 737 order before the 737 max happened. I like to confirm, KLM owns a fleet without MCAS, and LH owns a fleet without MCAS.

I'm not able to tell you how happy I am that until today not a single 747 needs MCAS! Joseph Sutter, in his function as a Boeing 747 chief engineer, was strong enough to always prefer the engineer solution.

J. Sutter invented the 747 with 'long legs', so that since 50 years all jet engine manufacturers on this planet find enough space below a 747 wing, the 747-800 passage jet included.

In my eyes, Sutter is an American National Hero, with a very rare understanding for what pilots like. 'She's ridiculously easy to fly.' That's what a 747 test pilot said in 1969.
50 years later, she hasn't lost a bit of that quality. But I admit, I'm not quite objective. I the 747.

What?

[Evan]

And yet, they lengthened it 9 inches. Sort of.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4IGl4OizM4

Just what the 737 needs: more mechanical complexity. I admire the ingenuity but this is a perfect example of how far Boeing engineers have had to go to make up for the failures of Boeing management. Again, it was clear to everybody by the mid-90's that ultra-high bypass fan diameters were going to drive efficiency and future sales. And it was clear to five-year-olds that the 737 didn't have the ground clearance to carry those fans. So you either put ingenuity into a new airframe for a new era well ahead of time or you put it into getting yourself out of a fix after it's too late. Boeing has already written off 5 billion dollars to compensate operators for the 737M grounding. Industry insiders predict the final cost, including lost or cancelled orders, will be around 15 billion! What would it have cost to build a new, appropriate airframe?

[LH-B744]

The production line was suspended due to backlog. It's temporary. Once they get the MAX re-certified and begin deliveries it should start up again. Boeing claims there will not be layoffs, so you can bet they will be working to get things running again asap.

Modifying the gear height was never an option. Doing so would have triggered a new type certification. The entire Boeing strategy was to avoid that outcome, because the clock had run out, because they had dragged their feet on an ultrafan airframe until the last minute, when Airbus rolled out their A320NEO, and then Boeing crutched one together in a mad scramble to save their long-term customers. Classic case of purblind management negligence. I hope those people who actually build the airplanes don't have to pay the price.

Up to 430 unknown visitors who read every single forum entry, that's also 'a new quality'. But they'll never dare to write one single forum entry won't they. Back on topic.

Doing so would have triggered a new type certification.

Ahm. You know that I admire jetphotos members who are longer here than me. But what else than a completely new type license has been the 737 max compared to
e.g. the KLM-B737-800 fleet ?

I asked Gabriel exactly that question. He said, for the 737 max 8 you need one type license, and for the 737-800, which btw both are
exactly 39,47 meters long,
you need another type licence.

Gabe, correct me when I do not say what you said.

And. Probably it was only luck that KLM completed their 737 order before the 737 max happened. I like to confirm, KLM owns a fleet without MCAS, and LH owns a fleet without MCAS.

I'm not able to tell you how happy I am that until today not a single 747 needs MCAS! Joseph Sutter, in his function as a Boeing 747 chief engineer, was strong enough to always prefer the engineer solution.

J. Sutter invented the 747 with 'long legs', so that since 50 years all jet engine manufacturers on this planet find enough space below a 747 wing, the 747-800 passage jet included.

In my eyes, Sutter is an American National Hero, with a very rare understanding for what pilots like. 'She's ridiculously easy to fly.' That's what a 747 test pilot said in 1969.
50 years later, she hasn't lost a bit of that quality. But I admit, I'm not quite objective. I the 747.

[Gabriel]

Modifying the gear height was never an option.

And yet, they lengthened it 9 inches. Sort of.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4IGl4OizM4

[Evan]

,

auf Deutsch ist das die Einstellung der 737 Max Produktion.

In German, the word suspension imho still sounds too harmless for what has happened here.

Suspendierung in German is something which on a certain day in the same year will be revoked, mostly in the days around Christmas. That's true for one chief inspector in the Duisburg-Ruhrort Tatort episodes.

For the 737 max I have a different question. Is December 31st 2019 the end for all a/c of this a/c type?
That's what it sounded like on German TV. Not suspension, but the end.

PS: Who again was the man who preferred MCAS instead of a prolonged 737 main gear? I'd always prefer the engineer solution instead of software failure. And there is one aircraft which is the symbol for that philosophy. 50 years. In the 747 club.

The production line was suspended due to backlog. It's temporary. Once they get the MAX re-certified and begin deliveries it should start up again. Boeing claims there will not be layoffs, so you can bet they will be working to get things running again asap.

Modifying the gear height was never an option. Doing so would have triggered a new type certification. The entire Boeing strategy was to avoid that outcome, because the clock had run out, because they had dragged their feet on an ultrafan airframe until the last minute, when Airbus rolled out their A320NEO, and then Boeing crutched one together in a mad scramble to save their long-term customers. Classic case of purblind management negligence. I hope those people who actually build the airplanes don't have to pay the price.