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Lion Air 737-Max missing, presumed down in the sea near CGK (Jakarta)

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  • TeeVee
    replied
    if this turns out to be true, forget about lawsuits. people should be charged criminally. fat chance of that happening though.

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  • Black Ram
    replied
    There has been a lot of talk about this. Some have suggested Boeing needed the new system on the MAX to make it behave the same way as the NG, despite the heavier engines and altered center of gravity. This was needed for certification. But now they are saying Boeing did not clearly describe the changed behavior from the new system - possibly to keep commonality with the NG and avoid any additional training that would have been required? It is speculation, but that's one reason forums exist.

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  • vaztr
    replied
    From PPRUNE.ORG

    From the extremely brief description of the MCAS, we can possibly conclude:

    JT 610 retracted flaps to the clean configuration (MCAS becomes active)

    Low mach number, therefore maximum rate of horizontal stabilizer of 0.27 degrees per second, and a forward deflection to the limit with a spurious AoA input.


    And LOTS of talk of none of this being in the 'manual'

    This is looking like a whole lotta lawsuit for Boeing

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  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    I don't believe that. The pilot can always overpower the trim wheel.
    I think the WSJ is just misinformed. I hope it is.

    However, now the NY times is reporting on this...

    Originally posted by NY Times
    “We’ve just been informed that there’s an entire new system on the Max,” said Capt. Dennis Tajer, spokesman for the Allied Pilots Association, the union for pilots at American Airlines, and a 737 pilot.

    He said he was referring to what is known on the new version of the plane as the M.C.A.S., or maneuver characteristics augmentation system. The previous system, and the one in the standard manual, goes by a different shorthand, E.F.S., for elevator feel shift.
    Originally posted by NY Times
    The pilots’ union for American Airlines, which also flies the Max 8, said Tuesday that the emergency system in question had not been included by Boeing in the standard operating manual. In addition, the flight checklist — which contains information for manually overriding the emergency system — was incorrect, the union said.
    If this is a stall-protection system that introduces automated flight control inputs based on a single source of AoA data... this is looking very very bad for Boeing....

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  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    The WSJ has published a claim that the 737MAX has new stall protection features that may make it impossible for pilots to overcome an erroneous pitch down command.
    I don't believe that. The pilot can always overpower the trim wheel.

    Leave a comment:


  • xspeedy
    replied
    Every cockpit needs one of these to disable HAL.

    Click image for larger version

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  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
    Remind me how long the Nightmareliner sat on the ground over a battery.
    About four months, at which point they had around 900 orders to delay. As opposed to 4,500. Perhaps Boeing could simply modify the 737 system to integrate AoA redundancy (and disengage if redundancy is lost) and get it re-certified in a similar timeframe. Or perhaps they could use their political muscle to keep the fleet flying in the meantime and only issue a recommendation for the upgrade, as they did with that treacherous autothrust unit. I think, if this turns out that the crew really had no reasonable chance of restoring flight control, the FAA would ground it until it could be re-certified as safe. That would do some real injury to a brand that absolutely depends on public trust.

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  • ATLcrew
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    So, a significant delay of over 4,500 deliveries (and the potential cancellations of those orders) and the thusly expanded time to profitability and loss of public confidence on that airframe wouldn't cause a fatal shareholder panic in the age of shareholder panic. That's reassuring.
    Remind me how long the Nightmareliner sat on the ground over a battery.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
    Oh...Evan, it would take a lot more than that to cause "curtains" for Boeing, trust me.
    So, a significant delay of over 4,500 deliveries (and the potential cancellations of those orders) and the thusly expanded time to profitability and loss of public confidence on that airframe wouldn't cause a fatal shareholder panic in the age of shareholder panic. That's reassuring.

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
    Oh...Evan, it would take a lot more than that to cause "curtains" for Boeing, trust me.
    However, I AM sure it would generate much parlour talk.

    Leave a comment:


  • ATLcrew
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    If it does turn out that Boeing developed an "airplane-has-ultimate-authority" stall protection system without air data redundancy, the entire 737MAX fleet will have to be immediately grounded and the system redesigned and recertified. That outcome could be curtains for Boeing.
    Oh...Evan, it would take a lot more than that to cause "curtains" for Boeing, trust me.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    The WSJ has published a claim that the 737MAX has new stall protection features that may make it impossible for pilots to overcome an erroneous pitch down command.

    Originally posted by CNN
    Citing "safety experts involved in the investigation, as well as midlevel FAA officials and airline pilots," the Journal reported Monday that the automated stall-prevention system on Boeing 737 MAX 8 and MAX 9 models -- intended to help cockpit crews avoid mistakenly raising a plane's nose dangerously high -- "under unusual conditions can push it down unexpectedly and so strongly that flight crews can't pull it back up."
    STS has been a feature since the debut of the NG's. It can be overriden (with considerable effort) by the pilots. So what are they talking about here?
    The very idea goes against Boeing's "pilot-has-ultimate-authority" philosophy. If it does turn out that Boeing developed an "airplane-has-ultimate-authority" stall protection system without air data redundancy, the entire 737MAX fleet will have to be immediately grounded and the system redesigned and recertified. That outcome could be curtains for Boeing.
    However, I find it impossible to believe the FAA would certify such a system in the first place, let alone that Boeing would be so foolish as to design one.
    So I'm highly inclined to file this report under "poor fact checking".

    On the other hand, Boeing DID design an autopilot for the NG that would occassionally--due to an undetected weakness in the logic--continue to operate without redundancy when one RA was faulty and this led to the fatal crash of Turkish 1951. That system was quietly replaced in 2003 with a reliable alternative and the press never got wind of it.

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  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
    Not only that, but I have it on good authority that the malfunction in question is even a memory item on at least one type. Remember, though, "standard basics" are not welcome 'round these parts, only strict, highly type-specific procedures are.
    Right, because runaway pitch trim 'standard basics' are so universal... grab the damn pitch trim wheel... on the 737, the 757... oh wait, WHERE'S THE DAMN PITCH TRIM WHEEL?!... or the A320... which... doesn't have a runaway pitch trim problem in the first place... but whatever, we'll just grab the trim wheel and, uh... WHERE ARE THE DAMN CUTTOFF SWITCHES?!

    Better to pay attention in type-specific class, I'm guessing, and practice what you've learned. Cuz when the ground starts coming up and you've got 5...4...3...2...1...

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  • BoeingBobby
    replied

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  • ATLcrew
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    Isn't runaway trim part of the very basic standard curriculum of what is done in the sim as part of any type rating?
    Not only that, but I have it on good authority that the malfunction in question is even a memory item on at least one type. Remember, though, "standard basics" are not welcome 'round these parts, only strict, highly type-specific procedures are.

    Leave a comment:

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