BREAKING: Boeing 767 cargo jet operated by Atlas Air has crashed in Texas

[Gabriel]

I get it, the time sequence does not support my idea that he thought he was stalling.

Or does it...He might have THOUGHT he was stalling several some blah blah seconds EARLIER and was just now (AFTER some seconds) TELLING the captain.

I dunno- I may stick with my theory until we croak and can ask him what he was thinking.

It is possible. Nobody will know for certain what he was thinking when. I think the sequence of events is more consistent with that he first tried to compensate for what he perceived as an excessive pitch up and seconds later he though of the stall. But I can't prove it. Let's see what is NTSB's analysis on this when the final report comes out in the next few days (and yet, they will not be able to prove either what the FO thought when).

I can also see him dozing off, and dreaming something and making control inputs consistent with his dream (another question for the hereafter).

I missed the part of the report where he was fatigued, though.

Because there is no such part, we don't have the complete final report but so far nobody is talking of fatigue, except in this NTSB finding (which is rather a non-finding):

2. There was insufficient information to determine whether the flight crewmembers were fatigued at the time of the accident, and no available evidence suggested impairment due to any medical condition, alcohol, or other impairing drugs.

[BoeingBobby]

You can mount the G/A alarm right next to the TOPOMS, or whatever that thingamajigy you want to install is called.

[Evan]

You can mount the G/A alarm right next to the TOPOMS, or whatever that thingamajigy you want to install is called.

Sure, I guess wherever you would 'mount' a few lines of software code because that is what this amounts to.

Something I think that's getting lost here: this would be merely for awareness, to let the crew know the mode has been activated, mostly as a confirmation of their intention but also as an alert in rare situations when the mode is accidentally activated (It happens).

[3WE]

It is possible. Let's see what is NTSB's analysis on this when the final report comes out

The horse is fairly dead and the more I think about it it is not THOUGHT of stalling VERSUS a FEELING of nose up- they COMBINE TOGETHER...

[Evan]

The horse is fairly dead and the more I think about it it is not THOUGHT of stalling VERSUS a FEELING of nose up- they COMBINE TOGETHER...

This is a dead horse about lost situational awareness. A pilot, with not a lot of grace under pressure, became bewildered by an unexpected event (see AF447). When this happens the mind grasps for clues to recontruct situational awareness. Naturally, the senses take priority over the rational mind. Then, the rational mind might be subject to confirmation bias, giving weight to the senses. Competent upset recovery involves overcoming these things, including the discipline to prioritize the instruments despite what the senses are screaming at you. This F/O didn't have that discipline.

If the F/O had a situational awareness cue that he had accidentally activated the go-around mode, he wouldn't have had to form his own version of the situation.

As Gabriel pointed out, the difference between this go-around and any other go-around was that the crew didn't initiate it or expect it. Apparently, when the mind is commanding and expecting longitudinal forces, they do not create somatogravic illusions.

[3WE]

This is a dead horse about lost situational awareness.

Or is it a lack of fundamental skills?

This one is uuuuuuuuber simple: Don't screw with a big, stable airplane: Aviate.

Aviate: Like maybe peek at attitude and airspeed (vertical speed) and determine if it is FDNH.

Sure, I'll jump on the poor dead pilot, something was wrong with his actions...But FWIW, he passed a LOT of checklist tests, screening and oversight (Bobby's concerns noted).

[BoeingBobby]

Or is it a lack of fundamental skills?

Sure, I'll jump on the poor dead pilot, something was wrong with his actions...But FWIW, he passed a LOT of checklist tests, screening and oversight (Bobby's concerns noted).

The problem is, he was passed! He had multiple problems at multiple companies. Yet not only did Atlas hire him, they pushed him through training. I blame the training department for not only allowing this, but to continue to do it. You want to blame someone? Blame Jeff Carlson!

[3WE]

The problem is, he was passed! He had multiple problems at multiple companies. Yet not only did Atlas hire him, they pushed him through training. I blame the training department for not only allowing this, but to continue to do it. You want to blame someone? Blame Jeff Carlson!

I appreciate your comments- I know nothing of transport piloting, but even in my own line of work, MBA's and the HR department are all about checking the boxes on stuff. "If you measure it, you can improve it" they say". However there is stuff that is intangible. So what if you make 20 sales calls. You can make 20 worthless sales calls, you can make one really quick sales call and be successful and a really hard one and be successful...the success may have everything to do with your skill and nothing to do with "the number of calls".

I can see where you sit there and program the autopilot like a whiz, but to hand fly...much different skill set...

I feel most sorry for the guy who jumpseated...

[BoeingBobby]

I feel most sorry for the guy who jumpseated...

The kid had a class date coming up at United. I believe he was an RJ Captain for one of the commuters. With the layoffs that are about to happen, he probably would be furloughed soon anyway. I believe he was married and had a young child. Atlas and probably Amazon will surely be paying out on that. But those last couple of minutes for him, I can only imagine.

[ATLcrew]

Why on earth not? Piloting is certainly a job that needs full disclosure of weaknesses.

I don't believe Ken is entirely correct. I'm not aware of an FAA regulation of policy prohibiting airlines from issuing recommendation letters, it's more that it's not normal practice, perhaps for liability reasons.

[Gabriel]

I don't believe Ken is entirely correct. I'm not aware of an FAA regulation of policy prohibiting airlines from issuing recommendation letters, it's more that it's not normal practice, perhaps for liability reasons.

What liability could be involved here?

[3WE]

What liability could be involved here?

Gabby:

It’s not_uncommon for companies to not_make recommendations.

One could give inaccurate recommendations and cause harm.

A company could screw over a good employee with an incorrect bad recommendation...a company could screw over a competitor with an incorrect good recommendation.

Folks can hire lawyers and play “the big bad company” vs “the poor working stiff”.

Or, if the pilot here had a good recommendation from the Mayberry FBO where he gave Andy Taylor flying lessons...Is there liability?

There is often guidance from HR: “John Doe worked here from 10/2015 to 3/2018.” And then say nothing more.

We do that in the fertilizer industry some, so why not aviation?

[KGEG]

Gabby:

It’s not_uncommon for companies to not_make recommendations.

One could give inaccurate recommendations and cause harm.

A company could screw over a good employee with an incorrect bad recommendation...a company could screw over a competitor with an incorrect good recommendation.

Folks can hire lawyers and play “the big bad company” vs “the poor working stiff”.

Or, if the pilot here had a good recommendation from the Mayberry FBO where he gave Andy Taylor flying lessons...Is there liability?

There is often guidance from HR: “John Doe worked here from 10/2015 to 3/2018.” And then say nothing more.

We do that in the fertilizer industry some, so why not aviation?

But I think its completely different to with-hold something that has been witnessed by multiple co-workers and bosses in an unbiased way than one boss saying 'I am going to give this guy a bad rap and make some stuff up that never happened because I think he and my wife were having an affair". But I guess thats the problem, having solid proof and presenting it to the new company. But in the end they have to figure out the new employees weaknesses for themselves.

So its any classic tale of risk versus reward. Do we have the next Sully on our hands or do we have Mr. Magoo who somehow faked his way through an eye exam? If he saves the lives of a hundred people by landing in the river as smooth as possible or if he mistakes his co-pilots nose for the flap lever.

Sometimes you don't figure out someones weaknesses until its too late and they are now gone and have taken other out with them, as is the case here. But thats why it seems so preventable with there being warning signs. We see this in cases like school shootings where it was clear the kid or student was having a mental breakdown but nothing was done in time to stop a tragedy despite the signs.

It really is a case of there being a fine line between doing too little to stop them from hurting others and doing too much to impede a persons right to work and do as they wish with life.

And its funny you mention the fertilizer industry because thats what my dads last line of truck driving was, hauling fertilizer from a plant in British Columbia to farm towns here in the northwest, and is one reason he quit because the mountain road to Trail, BC was so poorly maintained in the winter for a 100,000 pound plus truck. To the point of having to be towed up it several times.

But even in that industry you have laws to limit things such as making sure you are not selling certain fertilizer to a dude who wants to make a bomb.

[kent olsen]

Well the NTSB report is out! Wow! As i said earlier, there was a time with that performance info would be available to the new employer and then the FAA changed it. Some people would be better off driving a bus than an airplane. Quote from a fellow I met in Las Vegas. "I'm no different than you, I drive a bus with 30-40 passengers and you drive an airplane with 100".

[flashcrash]

Well the NTSB report is out! Wow! .

Link to the public docket incorporating the July 27 2020 updates (with Feb 7 2020 statement from Atlas) is below: