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BREAKING: Boeing 767 cargo jet operated by Atlas Air has crashed in Texas

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  • #91
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    STILL THE SUPER CRAZY UBER BASIC FUNDAMENTALS OF INSTRUMENT FLIGHT ARE TO LOOK AT THE DIETY-CONDEMING ATTITUDE INDICATOR, TRUST IT, DOUBLE CHECK IT(IF YOU NEED TO) AND ADDRESS IT!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

    (Or do I need more exclamation points?)

    Again- I am a bit forgiving of go-around somtatographic deals- high workload and less-experienced pilots botching it...

    But this is sooooooooooooooooooooooo basic that an ATP-AT LEAST- should not botch it (level off's and when flying 20+ miles away from the airport and a mile away from the ground....)
    And since the captain apparently what was happening, how many times do you instruct the junior FO to stop pushing down and help pull up before punching him in the face? (since FO's don't have a cutout switch).

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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    • #92
      Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
      One thing that I am having problems to buy with this initial rumor sort of confirmed (still as a rumor) by BB is that of the captain pulling up so hard that he broke the pins holding the control column. It is my understanding (but I am not sure or even confident of it) that each control column controls its side of the elevator and both control columns are connected via a torque tube that has a spring-loaded connection which, if enough opposite force is applied on the control column, will separate and each control column will control it's side of the elevator independently (a split elevator).
      Yes, that part is highly dubious. The 767 has a breakout override mechanism as you describe. I've seen various figures between 30lbs and 50lbs of force differential required (it is intended to overcome a jammed column, not a column war). The rumor might have misunderstood a report of broken shear rivets on the elevator bellcrank or a sheared spring pin on the PCA linkage in the empennage, which might result from a column war (who knows). The idea that Boeing would attach the column to the torque tube in a way that could be broken by human force seems a bit... crackerbox...

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      • #93
        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
        And since the captain apparently what was happening, how many times do you instruct the junior FO to stop pushing down and help pull up before punching him in the face? (since FO's don't have a cutout switch).
        Concur.

        However, on the discussion front- One of my most valuable learnings was messing around in MSFS in "mundane IMC (3000 ft ceiling)", drinking a beer...HAND FLYING an airliner as any good Bobby-wanna-be would do...

        I let my SA slip, and developed a good crisp sink...

        Looked away...looked back...Oh hey, just broke out of the clouds- dang the ground is coming up really f[SPLAT].

        The brief version: Concur, but it doesn't take too awful long to develop an unrecoverable dive from 6000 feet...Plenty of time for an early recovery...not much-if not zero- for a late recovery.

        Still, I cannot reconcile an extreme dive- Ground bad...altitude good...that's just almost ALWAYS the way it is...

        Nevertheless, this is all still rumor and yes, I remember the suicide deal where somehow or other the 767 went into "split elevator" mode...
        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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        • #94
          Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
          And since the captain apparently what was happening, how many times do you instruct the junior FO to stop pushing down and help pull up before punching him in the face? (since FO's don't have a cutout switch).
          They tend to frown heavily in CRM training when you"punch" another crewmember. However, there is a time and a place.

          Comment


          • #95
            Originally posted by 3WE View Post
            Nevertheless, this is all still rumor and yes, I remember the suicide deal where somehow or other the 767 went into "split elevator" mode...
            The left column controls the left elevator. The right controls the right elevator. They run separate cables through entirely different parts of the fuselage. The columns are linked via a torque tube under the cockpit, and the two sides of the torque tube are connected via a spring mechanism that is designed to breakout if a large differential force is applied. This is all done to prevent a single column/elevator control circuit jam from prohibiting pitch control. But if both columns are forcefully moved in opposite directions, you can get into a split elevator situation. AFAIK this basic set-up is common to all the non-fbw Boeings, including the older 737's via a retrofit.

            I don't see any scenario in which the right column could be broken by pilot force against the left. It makes no sense.

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            • #96
              The NTSB has downloaded the CVR and issued preliminary information.
              https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-rele...r20190305.aspx

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              • #97
                Originally posted by Highkeas View Post
                The NTSB has downloaded the CVR and issued preliminary information.
                https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-rele...r20190305.aspx
                That's more than 2 months old.

                --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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                • #98
                  Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                  That's more than 2 months old.
                  THAT it's 2 months old is a bit newsworthy.
                  Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                  • #99
                    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                    THAT it's 2 months old is a bit newsworthy.
                    It is and it was. We already discussed it here.

                    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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                    • AVHerald comments on the new Public Docket released for this flight. Lots of data, not a lot of answers:
                      https://avherald.com/h?article=4c497c3c/0000&opt=0

                      Comment


                      • AVH's report on the NTSB's public hearing:
                        http://avherald.com/h?article=4c497c3c/0001&opt=0

                        NTSB's annimation:
                        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GsSNr5DR840

                        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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                        • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                          AVH's report on the NTSB's public hearing:
                          http://avherald.com/h?article=4c497c3c/0001&opt=0

                          NTSB's annimation:
                          https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GsSNr5DR840
                          That happened much more quickly that I imagined. I don't understand where the strong somatogravic illusion would come from. The go-around change in g-force doesn't seem to be unusual and the F/O reacts at least a few seconds after that.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                            That happened much more quickly that I imagined.
                            True, just about 26 seconds from the point where the FO first touched the yoke to the ground.

                            I don't understand where the strong somatogravic illusion would come from. The go-around change in g-force doesn't seem to be unusual and the F/O reacts at least a few seconds after that.
                            Engines go from idle to TOGA, spool up and a rush of thrust kicks in with a lot of longitudinal acceleration involved, which pushes you back against the seat back, just as if you were tilted nose-up. That is the most basic and common somatogravuic illusion (confusing longitudinal acceleration with pitch) and is the cause, for example, of the well documented series of accidents where the pilots take off into total darkness (like onto a large body of water in a moonless night or into very low IMC), push down and crash.

                            The slight pitch up made by the AP when transitioning into the go-around possibly gave a rotational cue to the inner ear that they were pitching up, which was exaggerated by the brain when combined with the somatogravic illusion explained.

                            At this point the FO thought that they were aiming way too high and when he pushed forward on the column the plane entered a very low G state which feels like falling from the sky. The FO's brain then possibly combined his exaggerated nose-up perception with the falling sensation to fabricate the "stall" mental picture.

                            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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                            • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                              True, just about 26 seconds from the point where the FO first touched the yoke to the ground.


                              Engines go from idle to TOGA, spool up and a rush of thrust kicks in with a lot of longitudinal acceleration involved, which pushes you back against the seat back, just as if you were tilted nose-up.
                              Well, yes but how is that different from any other go-around?

                              I think the real issue here was either extreme fatigue or mental instability. Plus somatogravic illusion.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Evan View Post

                                Well, yes but how is that different from any other go-around?
                                In that this one was unexpected and uncommanded (or better, accidentally and unnoticedly commanded)

                                From the NTSB findings:

                                The activation of the airplane’s go-around mode was unintended and unexpected by the pilots.

                                From the NTSB's public hearing:

                                The chair inquired whether it was correct the first officer perceived something like an 80 degrees pitch up as result of the unintended go around activation and how the somatogravic illusion could be overcome. The expert stated: "Well I think it is helpful that pilots know when to be on their guard like during an intentional go around and if they have practice with instrument flying. In this case I think the thing that was tricky they would not have expected a rapid acceleration at this time and they were unaware of the mode change and at a bit of disadvantage."

                                I think the real issue here was either extreme fatigue or mental instability. Plus somatogravic illusion.
                                I think that the NTSB kinda answered that too.

                                Quote from the public hearing:

                                Check airmen at Air Wisconsin, Mesa and Atlas reported that when the first officer was presented with an unexpected scenario, he would get flustered and could not respond to the system, he would become extremely anxious and push buttons without thinking about what he was doing just to be doing things.

                                The first officer's training record was "terrible".

                                If the FAA had done their job this pilot would not have been employed by Atlas Airlines and therefore this crash would not have happened.


                                And from the contributing factors:

                                - systemic deficiencies in the aviation select and performance measurement practices which failed to address the first officer's aptitude related deficiencies in maladaptive stress response
                                - the federal aviation administrations dragging failure to administer the pilot database in a sufficient robust timely manner.


                                And from the NTSB's findings

                                Although compelling sensory illusions, stress, and startle response can adversely affect the performance of any pilot, the first officer had fundamental weaknesses in his flying aptitude and stress response that further degraded his ability to accurately assess the airplane’s state and respond with appropriate procedures after the inadvertent activation of the go-around mode.

                                Had the Federal Aviation Administration met the deadline and complied with the requirements for implementing the pilot records database (PRD) as stated in Section 203 of the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, the PRD would have provided hiring employers relevant information about the first officer’s employment history and training performance deficiencies.

                                The first officer’s long history of training performance difficulties and his tendency to respond impulsively and inappropriately when faced with an unexpected event during training scenarios at multiple employers suggest an inability to remain calm during stressful situations—a tendency that may have exacerbated his aptituderelated performance difficulties.




                                --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                                --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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