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  • BoeingBobby
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    I totally agree that we need more automation involved to stabilize system failures such as UAS. The current all-or-nothing approach to autoflight is not very well thought-out. The autopilot could continue to fly the pitch and power needed to remain safely in the envelope without airspeed or AoA data, just using inertial reference. More research and engineering needs to go into auto-upset-recovery. The goal would be to have the automation stabilize the aircraft and then prompt the pilots to take over. Of course, that isn't going to work in every failure scenario, but it would in the more common ones.

    You may also be right that the technology will become more user-friendly and less bewildering when things go wrong. As an example, look at the complexity involved in setting up a new printer on an MS-DOS computer in the early nineties and then look at how a Mac does it today. Click, clack, done.

    But both of these initiatives will require a tectonic shift in philosophy in terms of pilot authority. I think that philosophy will have to give however, because as operators are going to be chasing ever-higher efficiency, manufacturers will be delivering that through ever more complicated systems and it will probably exceed the ability of a human crew to provide that authority.

    We will still need airmanship as long as things can fail. But, as avionics become even more robust and very, very rarely require that airmanship, how to preserve flying skill is a big question. I think it can be done by dividing training between the systems admin role and the airmanship one with a good deal of sim training in high-fidelity sims. I don't think the compound knowledge and skill-set is unreasonable, but it will not be a job for just anyone. It will require an exceptional recruiting standard.

    So my greatest concern is in recruiting and training pilots for a new era, where they must be these sort of rennaissance men. In a climate that also seeks to rapidly expand while keeping down costs (a.k.a. the race to the bottom) and where the mystique of piloting is fading and bright, technically-minded young people are more interested in other, more lucrative fields, such pilots will be in short supply.

    Unless, of course, we end this race-to-the-bottom by embracing certain regulations...
    Bla bla bla.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    I think they will

    I think it won't. I think troubleshooting and failures management will be increasingly automated too.

    Airplanes are already too complex. May be not the majority, maybe not the average pilot, but a sizable fraction of pilots can't or won't do what you say they should. And I agree they should, but it ain't happening.

    And, to a point, it doesn't make sense to have the pilots routinely engaging the AT when they are just starting to roll, engage the AP at 400 ft AGL, disengage the AP at 200 ft AGL, and the AT at 20 ft AGL when the computer reminds you to retard, but then expect the pilot to manage the complexity AND the fundamentals when the computer gives up and surrenders the plane back to you at 35000 ft and M 0.8, in direct law, with half of the instruments not working, and a myriad of alarms and EICAS steps that will take 20 minutes to clear, and all that for you to go 5 deg nose up and CLB, which is something that an automation can perfectly do by itself.
    I totally agree that we need more automation involved to stabilize system failures such as UAS. The current all-or-nothing approach to autoflight is not very well thought-out. The autopilot could continue to fly the pitch and power needed to remain safely in the envelope without airspeed or AoA data, just using inertial reference. More research and engineering needs to go into auto-upset-recovery. The goal would be to have the automation stabilize the aircraft and then prompt the pilots to take over. Of course, that isn't going to work in every failure scenario, but it would in the more common ones.

    You may also be right that the technology will become more user-friendly and less bewildering when things go wrong. As an example, look at the complexity involved in setting up a new printer on an MS-DOS computer in the early nineties and then look at how a Mac does it today. Click, clack, done.

    But both of these initiatives will require a tectonic shift in philosophy in terms of pilot authority. I think that philosophy will have to give however, because as operators are going to be chasing ever-higher efficiency, manufacturers will be delivering that through ever more complicated systems and it will probably exceed the ability of a human crew to provide that authority.

    We will still need airmanship as long as things can fail. But, as avionics become even more robust and very, very rarely require that airmanship, how to preserve flying skill is a big question. I think it can be done by dividing training between the systems admin role and the airmanship one with a good deal of sim training in high-fidelity sims. I don't think the compound knowledge and skill-set is unreasonable, but it will not be a job for just anyone. It will require an exceptional recruiting standard.

    So my greatest concern is in recruiting and training pilots for a new era, where they must be these sort of rennaissance men. In a climate that also seeks to rapidly expand while keeping down costs (a.k.a. the race to the bottom) and where the mystique of piloting is fading and bright, technically-minded young people are more interested in other, more lucrative fields, such pilots will be in short supply.

    Unless, of course, we end this race-to-the-bottom by embracing certain regulations...

    Leave a comment:


  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    If anything, airliners are going to become ever more complex...
    I think they will
    ... and flying them when things go wrong is going to require an ever more complex understanding.
    I think it won't. I think troubleshooting and failures management will be increasingly automated too.

    Airplanes are already too complex. May be not the majority, maybe not the average pilot, but a sizable fraction of pilots can't or won't do what you say they should. And I agree they should, but it ain't happening.

    And, to a point, it doesn't make sense to have the pilots routinely engaging the AT when they are just starting to roll, engage the AP at 400 ft AGL, disengage the AP at 200 ft AGL, and the AT at 20 ft AGL when the computer reminds you to retard, but then expect the pilot to manage the complexity AND the fundamentals when the computer gives up and surrenders the plane back to you at 35000 ft and M 0.8, in direct law, with half of the instruments not working, and a myriad of alarms and EICAS steps that will take 20 minutes to clear, and all that for you to go 5 deg nose up and CLB, which is something that an automation can perfectly do by itself.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    See that blank line..
    LAST TIME (I mean it):

    List or links please where the use of a fundamental was wrong and crashed the plane.
    I have never once said that. What I have said is that, if we want people to stop dying, when a procedure exists, and that procedure is called for, that procedure cannot be ignored or cast aside. That procedure must be executed as soon as it is safe to do so, as a part of CRM, for a multitude of reasons I have gone into over many years here and which seem to bounce off you harmlessly.

    So, I will continue to accuse you of disdain for 15 seconds of robust attitude and power.
    I have never said that. What I have said is (see above).

    Disdain for fundamentals, etc..
    You keep using this one. My insistence on procedural discipline somehow, in your mind, becomes a disdain for fundamentals, which is absurd. I've stopped trying to understand that non-sequitur. I think sometimes you're just trolling me.

    But you preach mental overload post and then preach complexity in the next.
    Where do I 'preach' complexity? I would prefer for things to be as simple as possible. 'As possible'. It is not possible to create a modern, efficient and safe airliner without a great deal of complexity. I seriously doubt (with the exception of the 737-MAX) airplane engineers add complexity that doesn't have a distinct justification for being there.

    So what ARE you getting at? You want us to go back to 1952? Good old stick and rudder airmanship? No systems to learn? No stealth factors to understand? Well, it ain't gonna happen 3WE, because we have lives to protect and an environment to protect and an industry to sustain. If anything, airliners are going to become ever more complex and flying them when things go wrong is going to require an ever more complex understanding. But don't feel too bad for the pilots. It's the same story in many other lines of work as well. In many modern professions, people face higher bars of technical learning to compete for jobs and face higher cognitive and performative expectations. It's called the future. It's called evolution.

    Next time you accuse me of having 'disdain for fundamentals', I'm ignore listing you. It's just goes nowhere.

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by 3BS twists Evan's words and sends them back View Post
    I seriously don't understand how you can continue to ignore all the lessons we have haven't learned about basic UNIVERSAL fundamentals that would easily have saved the day in many instances, by highly trained pilots, but were seemingly totally forgotten due to _______.
    See that blank line...It probably depends on the crash and you don't know and I don't know...

    But you preach mental overload post and then preach complexity in the next.

    And you refuse to acknowledge that complexity might just be one thing that goes into that blank line.

    Plus- I know I don't read as many FCOM's as you, but after 10+ years parlour talking and watching youtubes and occasionally reading official FAA documents, I really don't remember seeing much that says, "BE VERY VERY SURE YOU DON'T DON'T DO WHAT YOU WERE TAUGHT TO DO IN YOUR 152". What accident reports fault the pilots for reverting to some 152 procedure?

    Yeah, there's the obvious stuff that ILS approaches unfold a good bit slower and flying downwind 1/4 mile off the centerline and doing a 1/4 mile base can be done much more easily in a 152, and hey, let's do a deliberate spin at 3000 ft AGL, and for a well-executed post-stall-healthy-but-aggressive climb, the 152 target airspeed is indeed a bad thing on an airliner...but really...where are the Flying magazine articles that "if they had only NOT reverted to their 152 training, the passengers would have lived? Where are the accident reports?

    List or links please where the use of a fundamental was wrong and crashed the plane. (Delta 191 + the highest, ever-recorded wind shear...perhaps)

    Late edit: As confirmed by a number of real pilots, they study the hell out of procedures AND totally appreciate and remember and respect the fundamentals, and work very hard and actually provide us with an insanely safe aerospace system...

    So, I will continue to accuse you of disdain for 15 seconds of robust attitude and power, and you'll continue to offer recommendations, and the aerospace system will continue to haul me (at least occasionally) from here to there at fairly good speed, and rather mediocre customer service for one seriously reasonable price, unless I get killed on the way to the airport.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    The problem is that an event that triggers such an emotional reaction to the point that it shuts down your rational one, will likely leave you unable to use whatever you've learnt of the systems and their interaction, or even to apply the memory items. If not pulling up hard when the stall warning goes out (or when the AP suddenly disengages at 35000 ft) has not become instinctive enough to overcome that emotional reaction, neither will "UAS, call memory items please". Basic airmanship comes FIRST. You will hardly have a pilot that acts as an effective systems manager if he is not a pilot first (either because he just doesn't have what it takes or because he just lost it to emotion).
    No argument. You can't do anything until you stabilize. I don't think anyone is arguing that. Even with the UAS memory items, first you have to get it under control. But we are talking about problems that developed over a period of time, where crews did have time to think and analyze, leading to a crash, that were the result of an inadequate understanding of system behaviors in unusual failure situations.

    Leave a comment:


  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    - the mind has a performance envelope and exceeding that envelope can cause structural damage to the thought process, leading to such things as spatial disorientation, confirmation bias, bad judgment and disastrous gut reactions
    The problem is that an event that triggers such an emotional reaction to the point that it shuts down your rational one, will likely leave you unable to use whatever you've learnt of the systems and their interaction, or even to apply the memory items. If not pulling up hard when the stall warning goes out (or when the AP suddenly disengages at 35000 ft) has not become instinctive enough to overcome that emotional reaction, neither will "UAS, call memory items please". Basic airmanship comes FIRST. You will hardly have a pilot that acts as an effective systems manager if he is not a pilot first (either because he just doesn't have what it takes or because he just lost it to emotion).

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    Please reconcile how you can trash me for talking about SIMPLIFYING things by saying that things are TOO COMPLICATED...Your logic fails. A huge NEW training program JUST FOR MCAS isn't helping the thing you keep citing...the schitt hits the fan and how many red blinking lights go off? (Please continue to deny that fundamentals can help and training can focus on when the particular serial number DEVIATES.)
    First off, that wasn't meant to be a personal jab. I seriously don't understand how you can continue to ignore all the lessons we have learned about basic UNIVERSAL fundamentals not saving the day due to either a lack of discipline for procedures or a lack of literacy on systems. Weve learned that:

    - complex, modern aircraft have stealth factors involved in system failure scenarios that can lead to pilot error, necessitating adherence to procedure;

    - complex, modern aircraft have failure scenarios that can disorient and overwhelm pilots who are not familiarized with these scenarios, which leads to pilot error;

    - occasionally a complex system is poorly designed whereby a failure scenario is overwhelming even for pilots who are familiar with it (see: B737-MAX);

    - the mind has a performance envelope and exceeding that envelope can cause structural damage to the thought process, leading to such things as spatial disorientation, confirmation bias, tunnelling, bad judgment and disastrous gut reactions;

    - all of the above applies to even the most zen Cessna pilot with stainless fundamental airmanship, assuming they are mere mortals.

    I don't mean to trash talk you, I want to know why you so intransigently refuse to recognize these things. Every time a crash occurs where pilot error is involved, you go back to the same old saw about basic fundamentals: 'why didn't they just...'. At some point, don't you want to understand why that is?

    Complexity, if well-designed, is not the problem. The problem is that certain pilots refuse to embrace this new (and necessary) reality and take responsibility for the systems admin side of the job.

    Although not in the case of these -MAX crashes, where the system design was the problem - but not due to complexity; due to simplicity. Also, I agree that the -MAX erroneous-MCAS training need not be overly complex, rather simple in fact (counter-pitch, counter-trim, get some flaps out, ignore stall warning, burn off fuel and return) however, once the system has redundant AoA inputs and a disagree warning, it's unlikely to ever happen again anyway.

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    Blah blah blah...And you can't draw that line until you understand the performance envelope of the human mind. This is where Boeing failed on the 737-MAX. blah, blah, blah, personal jab.
    Dude...I hate what I read about how MCAS works...I find myself hating engineers...I also hate heavy management that seems to forget things that PEON's deal with.

    I think the MCAS crashes are not so much MCAS but lots of blinking red lights- Gabbiee's stall warning and the nose is falling like in a stall and crap, is my speed good or isn't it are bad Swiss cheese layers.

    I just threw out a random thought after reading an article calling for ALL SORTS OF ADDITIONAL TRAINING

    It might even have contained a tad of sarcasm and over-simplification.

    Please reconcile how you can trash me for talking about SIMPLIFYING things by saying that things are TOO COMPLICATED...Your logic fails. A huge NEW training program JUST FOR MCAS isn't helping the thing you keep citing...the schitt hits the fan and how many red blinking lights go off? (Please continue to deny that fundamentals can help and training can focus on when the particular serial number DEVIATES.)

    I promise you, that the industry is NOT going to adapt what you want...What I'd like to see, what you'd like to see, what Gabieee would like to see. Boeing and the FAA are making good progress on MCAS adjustments. Edit: I initially missed Eric's post...how do you like that...no need for a simulator...just remember that if the dang thing starts nosing over on you, (and you are in a -'MinLav) don't take any crap off of it...mash the nose up button on the yoke until it feels good and then go looking for those Boeing Bobby switches...) (That's Boing and the FAA, not 3BS- just so you are clear).

    As you say, keep ranting...10 years for you too...

    AS ATL once said, this forum ain't impacting anything.

    After the bicycle ride and flying lessons, apply at the FAA for a regulatory position. Your application will benefit if you are a veteran of the armed services.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ebo0aLLPYwA (Note: As corny and hyperbolic and exaggerated as the YouTube is, the issue is very real.) (But a disclaimer, I am sure that tons of human performance psychological scientific engineer type folks think very very very very very hard on how to design systems...Heck, we might be surprised at how cool the designed things...yeah, today MCAS looks bad, but it's not as simple as you or I like to think it is to design these things).

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    But nah, we can't talk about fundamentals that might span from C-150's to A-380s and add much-needed simplicity...that can't help overload at all...none, period.
    Sure, we can talk about it for ten years. You are proof of that. But where does it get us, when the problem lies elsewhere?

    For example, to mount the LEAP engines on the 737, Boeing added much-needed complexity. To meet the efficiency targets of the current age also requires complexity. The job 'commercial airline pilot' now requires complex knowledge. You can't do the job with just your legendary Cessna skills. You also can't do the job if the complexity is so complex that you can't make sense of it. Drawing that line is the challenge of modern aircraft engineering. And you can't draw that line until you understand the performance envelope of the human mind. This is where Boeing failed on the 737-MAX. I thinked they've since learned that. I wish you would too.

    Leave a comment:


  • elaw
    replied
    As if this fire needed any more fuel: https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/30/polit...tor/index.html

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Who's not paying attention?

    Originally posted by What Evan doesn't see
    CLEARLY the [fancy computer enhancement system] failure scenario, in its entirety, exceeded the performance envelope of the human mind. 30? times.
    But nah, we can't talk about fundamentals that might span from C-150's to A-380s and add much-needed simplicity...that can't help overload at all...none, period.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    Ok...so what's wrong with a simple reminder to not take any schitt off a 737-MAX if it starts insisting it wants to nose over...why is THAT the overload?
    Have you really not been paying attention to all that we've learned from both of these crashes (and by we I mean us, Boeing, the FAA and everyone involved in commercial aviation)? It is the OVERLOAD and degraded situational awareness and unusual command-control responses that get in the way of simple airmanship. I guess, when Boeing and the FAA failed to ground the -MAX after the Lion Air crash, they just didn't consider this. You are thinking like they were thinking, before they started thinking clearly. Of course, now that a hard lesson has been taught, they seem to get it. What is your excuse?

    The human mind has a performance envelope. When you exceed that envelope, the mind structurally fails. If an aircraft design involves things that can potentially exceed the performance envelope of the human mind, it cannot be considered airworthy.

    CLEARLY the MCAS failure scenario, in its entirety, exceeded the performance envelope of the human mind. Twice.

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    Amassing knowledge over time is probably within the perfomance envelope of any commercial pilot (if not, it should be) but performing on that knowledge in an instant may not be, especially when that instant is born of confusion. That's my point.
    Ok...so what's wrong with a simple reminder to not take any schitt off a 737-MAX if it starts insisting it wants to nose over...why is THAT the overload?

    And if multiple warnings are going off, what's wrong with holding robust attitudes and power settings for 15 seconds to sort through them? (I'm the one who doesn't get it?)

    Falcon's article (which is probably written to sell magazines) was describing intense new training requirements. Just saying simple is good because it is already complicated thanks to scientific engineering.

    Never mind, you object to that situation because it closely resembles that general rule of "keep flying the plane"...Would you like it better if I said if you note the plane entering brown attitude mode, 1. TOGA, 2. Use nose up trim as appropriate to achieve blue-brown flight mode 3. When stabilized, activate the TPDS

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    Yes...3WE has no appreciation of mental overload.

    (3WE appreciates ATL's genius...Evan calls for cramming this AND MUCH MUCH more into pilot's heads, with no hint of hesitation...)
    Amassing knowledge over time is probably within the perfomance envelope of any commercial pilot (if not, it should be) but performing on that knowledge in an instant may not be, especially when that instant is born of confusion. That's my point.

    Leave a comment:

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