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Breaking news: Ethiopian Airlines flight has crashed on way to Nairobi

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  • 3WE
    replied
    Yes...3WE has no appreciation of mental overload.

    (3WE appreciates ATL's genius...Evan calls for cramming this AND MUCH MUCH more into pilot's heads, with no hint of hesitation...)

    Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
    Ah yes, the glorious 5-page 27-93-01-2! The answer is no, we won't lose the left aileron. If we only lost the green pump, the PTU will take over, and the green system will remain pressurized. If we lost the fluid, the aileron will still be powered by the blue system, HOWEVER, we will be in alternate law. The answer to your second question is yes, it will go into alternate law momentarily while I'm resetting ELAC 2, but will come right out of it, if the reset is successful. Even if it doesn't, that's not any big deal, the airplane rolls beautifully on spoilers alone, even if we're down a spoiler per wing. Frankly, the rather extensive pre-flight procedure for that MEL is more of pain than not having ailerons. Probably why I've never seen that MEL used, it's easier to just replace the ELAC, takes all of 40 minutes, if that.

    Does every pilot actually NEED to know that? Maybe, maybe not. The ECAM and the SD will tell you what's working and what's not, you don't necessarily need to know why, as long as you know what to do about it.

    BTW, Evan, I'm surprised you didn't ask me if we'd lose BOTH ailerons in that Green system scenario. Now, THAT would have shown some real engineering brilliance on your part.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by Bluefalcon View Post
    In the December email, von Hoesslin reminded managers that flight crews could be overwhelmed by multiple warnings and cockpit alerts that can sound during an errant activation of MCAS.
    This is what Boeing, the FAA and 3WE seem to have overlooked. The human mind has a performance envelope.

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Maybe a bit over stated.

    What do we think about adding a single slide to the iPad PowerPoint ‘-MinLav training that says, MCAS can go haywire and push the nose over, remember to use the thumb switch liberally, and don’t doddle on killing the power to the trim.

    As the fundamentalists say, “Fly the plane, but, eventually check the checklists.”

    Leave a comment:


  • Bluefalcon
    replied
    And the bad news continues...

    https://www.seattlepi.com/news/artic...r-13903351.php

    An Ethiopian Airlines pilot told senior managers at the carrier months before one of its Boeing 737 Max jets crashed that more training and better communication to crew members were needed to avert a repeat of a similar disaster involving a Lion Air flight.

    According to emails and documents reviewed by Bloomberg News, the pilot in December urged his superiors to bolster training on a 737 Max flight-control feature so crews would be better prepared for what the Lion Air pilots encountered in October before plunging into the Java Sea, killing all aboard.

    "It will be a crash for sure," if pilots struggling with a malfunction of Boeing's flight-control system on the 737 Max also encountered, for example, a cockpit warning that they were flying too close to the ground, the pilot, Bernd Kai von Hoesslin, wrote in a Dec. 13 email...

    In the December email, von Hoesslin reminded managers that flight crews could be overwhelmed by multiple warnings and cockpit alerts that can sound during an errant activation of MCAS. Problems with the system led to the 737 Max's global grounding in March and shook confidence in Boeing and its regulator, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.

    Von Hoesslin, who identified himself in the documents as a certified 737 instructor, submitted his resignation to Ethiopian Airlines in April. The documents reviewed by Bloomberg, including the December email urging additional training, were attached to von Hoesslin's resignation letter.

    In his email to several bosses, including those responsible for flight operations and safety, von Hoesslin called attention to the airline's flight simulator program. The simulators were based on Boeing's earlier 737 "Next Generation," or NG, family of jets, and the program didn't replicate MCAS, he said.

    Although regulators and airlines around the world did not require that pilots train on a Max simulator after the Lion Air crash, Hoesslin took issue with the airline's approach.

    "The sim program does not simulate the MCAS, thus using this older NG has serious drawbacks in our training when operating the Max," von Hoesslin wrote in an email. "I suggest alternate training methods."

    In a separate email in November, von Hoesslin asked airline managers to provide more detail about MCAS to "those Max pilots who are not fully or even aware of how the Max MCAS" system functions. The request came after a flight operations manager at the airline circulated Boeing's November 6 service bulletin that described, without naming MCAS, how erroneous sensor data could cause the jet to pitch toward the ground automatically, and how pilots should respond....

    While U.S. aviation regulators and Boeing issued warnings in November that included instructions on how pilots should respond to MCAS's activation, there was no call for simulator training. Ethiopian Transport Minister Dagmawit Moges has said the pilots followed proper procedures issued after the Lion Air crash.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    Should we ask regulators to write FCOMs and other manuals?
    ATL is right. The FCOM's are anachronistically designed for the age of complex systems. We should ask regulators to require more user-friendly FCOM's with clear descriptions of systems and inter-systemic dependencies and system failure ramifications. There is an entire industry dedicated to doing just this. We should ask manufacturers to use that industry (or employ their own part of it) to create such manuals. We should ask pilots to do the diligence of constantly learning as much as they can from these manuals as well as from other sources.

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    And I fault regulators for not requiring all of this. Nothing you describe above is unrealistic of unachievable, but it will never happen until the industry finds fault in the system.
    Should we ask regulators to write FCOMs and other manuals?

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
    The problem is that learning the airplane to my (admittedly awesome and amazing, if not downright flabbergasting and mindboggling) level is nearly impossible to do through the FCOMs. They're written so poorly that one is lucky to have an idea on how to pour coffee after he/she is done with reading one. I've also maintained that FCOMs should be written more like user guides/learning guides rather than cumbersome, confusing, multihundred-page fact sheets, like they are now. E.g. there should be things like "here's system A, it's composed of components B, C, D, and E. If you see a failure of E, expect to see failure of J in system P or a failure of component M in system S etc etc." In other words, provide real-world operational stuff rather than just dry, rote info. Such guides do exist, but are usually based on tribal knowledge (or even the knowledge of a particular individual), are neither peer- nor manufacturer-reviewed and are not always terribly reliable.

    In other words, it's not entirely fair to fault pilots for not having information that's not terribly accessible.
    I only fault them for not seeking it out, for not making the effort or even having the interest to do so. You seem to do this. I don't think it is unreasonable to expect this from passenger airline pilots.

    But I also fault the manufacturers for not making the FCOM's more as you describe (and operators for not updating them if equipment is updated or modified).

    And I fault regulators for not requiring all of this. Nothing you describe above is unrealistic or unachievable, but it will never happen until the industry finds fault in the system.

    Leave a comment:


  • ATLcrew
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    Yes! This level of system knowledge is what I'm talking about. I'm fairly convinced that there is a significant percentage of A320 pilots out there who could not have written that paragraph. Were you given this knowledge in type-training or is it the result of your personal curiosity for systems? I wish all pilots had that curiosity but I would also like it to be a requirement to learn the airplane on this level before ever getting a front seat.
    The problem is that learning the airplane to my (admittedly awesome and amazing, if not downright flabbergasting and mindboggling) level is nearly impossible to do through the FCOMs. They're written so poorly that one is lucky to have an idea on how to pour coffee after he/she is done with reading one. I've also maintained that FCOMs should be written more like user guides/learning guides rather than cumbersome, confusing, multihundred-page fact sheets, like they are now. E.g. there should be things like "here's system A, it's composed of components B, C, D, and E. If you see a failure of E, expect to see failure of J in system P or a failure of component M in system S etc etc." In other words, provide real-world operational stuff rather than just dry, rote info. Such guides do exist, but are usually based on tribal knowledge (or even the knowledge of a particular individual), are neither peer- nor manufacturer-reviewed and are not always terribly reliable.

    In other words, it's not entirely fair to fault pilots for not having information that's not terribly accessible.

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    Just that, as I said many times before, I don't trust a pilot to apply established procedures and systems knowledge if they don't have the Cessna 152 basic airmanship in place first.
    Evan has occasionally said some strange things...I'm not 100% sure what...possibly that KNOWLEDGE of fundamentals is OK...but no way in hell should you ever ever ever briefly pause and hold robust attitudes and power settings and briefly pause to consider exactly which acronym-laden memory checklist applies...THAT is wrong (insert little dot: . )

    Leave a comment:


  • Gabriel
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    And, as much as I'm enjoying the Evan-ATL technicalacronymcolorcode fest...
    I am, and a lot. Seriously.

    when is the training that relentless pull ups often cause stalls (and which serial numbers vary)?
    Well, that's the thing I wanted to call out. As much as I agree with Evan, sometimes quite basic airmanship could have saved the day too. Not remembering the memory items for UAS is no excuse to pull a 1.5G, 7000 fpm, 2500 ft climb, and then stall the plane, and then keep pulling up the whole time. If that was an irrational reaction out of sheer terror, I doubt that the pilot could have rationally identified the correct situation and recalled and applied the correct memory items.

    And no, Evan, I am not saying use airmanship in lieu of established procedures and systems knowledge. Just that, as I said many times before, I don't trust a pilot to apply established procedures and systems knowledge if they don't have the Cessna 152 basic airmanship in place first.

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by TeeVee View Post
    i think that everyone would agree that today's ac are immensely complex beasts. i imagine that very few if any ac technicians can diagnose a problem and come up with the solution in a matter of minutes. i feel pretty safe in saying that ac are far more complex than your average car/motorcycle that use minimal electronics. i know from personal experience that diagnosing and fixing problems in these relatively simple vehicles sometimes confounds dealership mechanics that have full factory support at their fingertips. i had a 2006 bmw 528 that had an electronic gremlin that not even bmw's factory rep could figure out (ending up in bmw buying the car back from me).

    what evan is proposing (and i'm not for or against it) seems to be that pilots (whose primary job is flying), have a deep understanding of systems and inter-operativity, to the point that when something goes wrong during a critical phase of flight, they barely blink to work it out. and yeah, i get the part of "one fly the other work on the issue." that appears to have failed once or more times.

    who knows...
    Indeed.

    And, as much as I'm enjoying the Evan-ATL technicalacronymcolorcode fest, when is the training that relentless pull ups often cause stalls (and which serial numbers vary)?

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
    I meant you could have showed off your knowledge that the green system actually powers both ailerons (as does the blue system).

    Not sure what serial numbers/mod numbers that snippet applies to. On our birds the aileron should still be good.
    Ah yes, then there are avionics mods and updates to consider... (this came from a 2012 issue of Safety First)

    Leave a comment:


  • ATLcrew
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post

    Are you sure? I thought ELAC 2 uses the Blue system on the right aileron.

    There was also this snippit from Airbus Safety FIrst Magazine that I had in my files:



    [ATTACH=CONFIG]24970[/ATTACH]
    I meant you could have showed off your knowledge that the green system actually powers both ailerons (as does the blue system).

    Not sure what serial numbers/mod numbers that snippet applies to. On our birds the aileron should still be good.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
    Ah yes, the glorious 5-page 27-93-01-2! The answer is no, we won't lose the left aileron. If we only lost the green pump, the PTU will take over, and the green system will remain pressurized. If we lost the fluid, the aileron will still be powered by the blue system, HOWEVER, we will be in alternate law. The answer to your second question is yes, it will go into alternate law momentarily while I'm resetting ELAC 2, but will come right out of it, if the reset is successful. Even if it doesn't, that's not any big deal, the airplane rolls beautifully on spoilers alone, even if we're down a spoiler per wing. Frankly, the rather extensive pre-flight procedure for that MEL is more of pain than not having ailerons. Probably why I've never seen that MEL used, it's easier to just replace the ELAC, takes all of 40 minutes, if that.
    Yes! This level of system knowledge is what I'm talking about. I'm fairly convinced that there is a significant percentage of A320 pilots out there who could not have written that paragraph. Were you given this knowledge in type-training or is it the result of your personal curiosity for systems? I wish all pilots had that curiosity but I would also like it to be a requirement to learn the airplane on this level before ever getting a front seat. I know this raises the bar considerably and might cause a shortage of qualified pilots, but it seems to be what is lacking in so many incidents and accidents (just forget about the AirBlue captain who didn't understand the difference between pushing and pulling knobs on the FCU while flying into a mountainside.)

    Does every pilot actually NEED to know that? Maybe, maybe not. The ECAM and the SD will tell you what's working and what's not, you don't necessarily need to know why, as long as you know what to do about it.
    I'm talking about stealth factors which arise in unusual circumstances when that knowledge is missing. I think ECAM is pretty good at providing awareness and instructing pilot actions after a thing has happened, but sometimes it's about not doing a thing in the first place, because of the stealthy consequences.

    BTW, Evan, I'm surprised you didn't ask me if we'd lose BOTH ailerons in that Green system scenario. Now, THAT would have shown some real engineering brilliance on your part.
    Are you sure? I thought ELAC 2 uses the Blue system on the right aileron.

    There was also this snippit from Airbus Safety FIrst Magazine that I had in my files:

    To illustrate the method, let us consider an A320 under the following conditions:

    -- A dispatch with the ELAC 1 inoperative under MEL, and
    -- An HYD G SYS LO PR ECAM caution in flight

    These two failures lead to the loss of the left aileron:
    Click image for larger version

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    Leave a comment:


  • TeeVee
    replied
    i think that everyone would agree that today's ac are immensely complex beasts. i imagine that very few if any ac technicians can diagnose a problem and come up with the solution in a matter of minutes. i feel pretty safe in saying that ac are far more complex than your average car/motorcycle that use minimal electronics. i know from personal experience that diagnosing and fixing problems in these relatively simple vehicles sometimes confounds dealership mechanics that have full factory support at their fingertips. i had a 2006 bmw 528 that had an electronic gremlin that not even bmw's factory rep could figure out (ending up in bmw buying the car back from me).

    what evan is proposing (and i'm not for or against it) seems to be that pilots (whose primary job is flying), have a deep understanding of systems and inter-operativity, to the point that when something goes wrong during a critical phase of flight, they barely blink to work it out. and yeah, i get the part of "one fly the other work on the issue." that appears to have failed once or more times.

    who knows...

    Leave a comment:

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