Breaking news: Ethiopian Airlines flight has crashed on way to Nairobi

[Evan]

Should the 757 production have ended after only 23 years? That's a question which I've never discussed. That was 2004. I was not yet here in this forum back then.

But this question probably is crucial and as new as this Friday: Is the 737 max-9 able to replace the whole type 757?

I mean, here on my home airport, I have never in my life seen a 737 who crossed the Atlantic Ocean nonstop!
The 757-200 has a range of not more than 3,900 nautical miles with MTOW. That is not quite enough for JFK, in case of a German B752, but for Boston Logan.
The 737 max-9 has a range of not more than 3,500 nautical miles with MTOW. That is neither enough for JFK nor for Logan, if that were a German 737 max-9.

I don't feel good with the replacement 737 versus 757. Does that mean, United reduces the longhaul flights?
In Germany, the longhaul theoretically starts at 2,000 nautical miles. But all jet pilots on TV say, longhaul is nothing without having crossed the pond. Boston Logan, at least.
3,800 nautical miles. In a 737 max-9? Impossibile!

PS: Guess one good a/c type for Boston Logan... 747-800 passage, right.

There were transatlantic 737 flights, with a technical stopover in Halifax or something. The 737NG can fly routes from North America to Europe with ETOPS 180. The 757 can fly some nonstops however.

I think, if Boeing wasn't in the mood for a new airframe development, the 737 line should have ended instead of the 757, and new, shortened 757 variants, if engineering allowed for it, should have been introduced to replace the -700 and -800 NG's. I was saying this twenty years ago. The main reason then is the main reason now: ground clearance for the ultra fans that we knew were coming in the 1990's. A shortened 757 with new wings, engines and perhaps lowered gear height would not have needed artificial stability augmentation, would not have crashed right out of the box and would not have been grounded indefinitely, and probably would have been delivered to Lufthansa on time. Sure, a new type certification would have been required, but the process would have been minimal, the tooling and supply chains would have mostly existed and the cockpit commonality would allow for minimal changes to existing training resources. The 757, re-engined with some new avionics and a bit of FBW would be a real 21st century aircraft. The Max is a desperately dolled-up piece of antiquity.

[traveler]

There tickets have such a good price, comparing with other companies. But after this crash it makes you think what is more important - pay a bit more or fly with Ethiopian Airlines and worry about that your plane can also crush.

[LH-B744]

Should the 757 production have ended after only 23 years? That's a question which I've never discussed. That was 2004. I was not yet here in this forum back then.

But this question probably is crucial and as new as this Friday: Is the 737 max-9 able to replace the whole type 757?

I mean, here on my home airport, I have never in my life seen a 737 who crossed the Atlantic Ocean nonstop!
The 757-200 has a range of not more than 3,900 nautical miles with MTOW. That is not quite enough for JFK, in case of a German B752, but for Boston Logan.
The 737 max-9 has a range of not more than 3,500 nautical miles with MTOW. That is neither enough for JFK nor for Logan, if that were a German 737 max-9.

I don't feel good with the replacement 737 versus 757. Does that mean, United reduces the longhaul flights?
In Germany, the longhaul theoretically starts at 2,000 nautical miles. But all jet pilots on TV say, longhaul is nothing without having crossed the pond. Boston Logan, at least.
3,800 nautical miles. In a 737 max-9? Impossibile!

PS: Guess one good a/c type for Boston Logan... 747-800 passage, right.

[LH-B744]

The NTSB has weighed in with its thoughts re the FAA's certification process vs. systems like MCAS, pilot performance, etc.:
[...]

I don't read documents when Evan calls them insulting. I mean, this is ET #302 part 1099, and with it that's also type 737 max-8/737 max-9/737 max-10 problem #1099. I know what I said last time when I was here in this topic. United owns 14 jets type B737 max-9, and not one of these was in the air since more than half a year!

I have to avoid the thought what could happen if it were my favorite airline, who gave Boeing an order for another 47 jets (!) type B737 max-9,
and another order for one-hundred (100) jets type B737 max-10, and not a single jet has been delivered since more than half a year!

Sorry, but we in Germany are/my favorite airline is connected with United by the Star Alliance. I'd have to puke with such inactive orders in my mind.

PS: ..and United tries to replace a whole a/c type by the 737 max-9. Not everything in Europe is fine and brilliant, but I know an airline who pays people to be e.g. 'Lufthansa Boeing 747 Flottenkapitän' .

That's quite difficult for me to translate, but is there somebody like a 'United Boeing 757 Flottenkapitän'? Most probably 'Lufthansa B747 Fleet Captain' and 'United B757 Fleet Captain'. I only have a rough guess what you need to be appointed Fleet Captain: B747 active Flight Captain status or B757 active Flight Captain status, with the most flight hours in the 747 fleet of that airline. I somehow feel reminded of a Moustache (773) ..

And what does such a 757 fleet captain say concerning this topic here, or concerning that his fleet will soon be discontiued?
757 discontinued, after only 23 years in production. No 45 years or more.

I just don't know why I mention more than 45 years in the 747 club ... Must've happened unconsciously.

[Evan]

The NTSB has weighed in with its thoughts re the FAA's certification process vs. systems like MCAS, pilot performance, etc.: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...ts/ASR1901.pdf

This is almost insulting. At least as insulting as when Boeing distributed memos to pilots 'reminding' them of the runaway trim procedure. The NTSB shouldn't have to 'remind' Boeing and the FAA about human factors. Yet nowhere in Boeing's 'assumptions' used to certify the MCAS system is the assumption that pilots will become confused by an unfamiliar emergency situation in which cockpit warnings are not consistent with the aircraft state and therefore a recognition of the problem will be degraded or errononeous. That would have been an easy assumption to make, but an inconvenient one.

Essentially, Boeing presented assumptions that would support certification while ignoring those that would impair it. Basically the FAA did as well.

Let's call this: Certification Bias

[elaw]

The NTSB has weighed in with its thoughts re the FAA's certification process vs. systems like MCAS, pilot performance, etc.: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...ts/ASR1901.pdf

[ATLcrew]

A very brilliant question. I just wonder what CEOs who operate a 'Star Alliance' airline can do, or better will do, until the case ET # 302 is fully solved. My favorite airline is not affected by the 737-max.
But what could somebody like CEO Munoz of United Airlines do, who operates a fleet of fourteen 737-max9 and not a single one in the air today or tomorrow. The UA order contains another fourtyseven (47) 737-max9, which are not delivered since six or seven months.

I don't know how long it normally takes between the order of a brandnew jet and the inauguration flight. An answer which is probably too easy could be, try another 5 or 10 airbuses. But UA still has an airbus order where 4 A320s have to be delivered.

And a few minutes ago, I learned that Airbuses might get more expensive for US carriers, without that somebody in Europe had risen the prices (!) ... Is that really helpful for United Airlines (rhetorical question) ?

PS: Imho, the problem is not that Airbuses are too cheap for US carriers. The real problem is time. I just try to remember what happened when Lufthansa ordered the 747-800 passage jet. That was back in 2006. In 2011, a few LH 747 pilots visited Boeing for the first test flight in a LH-B748 . 5 years, between the order and the first test flight in LH colors.

But I think that's worth it. Patience is always worth it. Since 2011, 'my bigger sister' really works like a charm!

What?

[LH-B744]

Before Boeing built MCAS wrong for the 737-MAX, it built MCAS right for the KC-46. Don't these people talk to each other?

[...]

A very brilliant question. I just wonder what CEOs who operate a 'Star Alliance' airline can do, or better will do, until the case ET # 302 is fully solved. My favorite airline is not affected by the 737-max.
But what could somebody like CEO Munoz of United Airlines do, who operates a fleet of fourteen 737-max9 and not a single one in the air today or tomorrow. The UA order contains another fourtyseven (47) 737-max9, which are not delivered since six or seven months.

I don't know how long it normally takes between the order of a brandnew jet and the inauguration flight. An answer which is probably too easy could be, try another 5 or 10 airbuses. But UA still has an airbus order where 4 A320s have to be delivered.

And a few minutes ago, I learned that Airbuses might get more expensive for US carriers, without that somebody in Europe had risen the prices (!) ... Is that really helpful for United Airlines (rhetorical question) ?

PS: Imho, the problem is not that Airbuses are too cheap for US carriers. The real problem is time. I just try to remember what happened when Lufthansa ordered the 747-800 passage jet. That was back in 2006. In 2011, a few LH 747 pilots visited Boeing for the first test flight in a LH-B748 . 5 years, between the order and the first test flight in LH colors.

But I think that's worth it. Patience is always worth it. Since 2011, 'my bigger sister' really works like a charm!

[Evan]

Very lengthy article on the ‘MAX situation.

Indeed, let us legislate morals and eliminate Wall Street.

This, the thoughtless hyperbolic response to a very obvious need to strengthen and enforce societal protections and to end the chaos-casino that Wall Street has become. We don't need to "legislate morals", we need to create moral legislation. We don't need to "eliminate Wall Street", we need to make it beneficial to society.

One thing is blatantly obvious about many of these despicable scandals that have become SOP for big business: they do make rich people richer. In that respect they work as intended. But at what cost? The currency of a nation's respect and reputation? Common decency? Human lives? Don't you think those things should be protected by some sort of legislation, since clearly they are not going to be protected any other way?

Nothing in this article surprised me. It's as plainly obvious as it is plainly stated here:

Here, a generation after Boeing’s initial lurch into financialization, was the entirely predictable outcome of the byzantine process by which investment capital becomes completely abstracted from basic protocols of production and oversight: a flight-correction system that was essentially jerry-built to crash a plane. “If you’re looking for an example of late stage capitalism or whatever you want to call it,” said longtime aerospace consultant Richard Aboulafia, “it’s a pretty good one.”


Call it a sign, a wake-up call, a call-to-action or whatever else fits, but to ignore it, to fail to take action to address it, through governance, would be an unthinkable act of neglect for society. If this "late stage capitalism" scourge isn't routed through laws, it won't be routed through individual moral courage or compunction, the reward-based culture is too deeply instilled now among the morally weak, and it will—it will—be the moronic end of modern democractic civilization.

[3WE]

Very lengthy article on the ‘MAX situation.

Indeed, let us legislate morals and eliminate Wall Street.

Fortunately, governments do much better at being a "large organization" that is moral, correct and efficient...[/Blue Font]

https://newrepublic.com/article/154944/boeing-737-max-investigation-indonesia-lion-air-ethiopian-airlines-managerial-revolution?utm_source=social&utm_medium=facebook&utm_campaign=sharebtn

I mostly like the discussions of how engineers are kept from management in favor of non engineers. And analogous stories about jet engines, space shuttle and RR locomotives... I dunno, you'd think some subject matter knowledge might be a good thing?



PS: I'm still not 100% on board that this is some sort of premeditated crime, as much as an unfortunate "storm" of human behavior.

[Evan]

Before Boeing built MCAS wrong for the 737-MAX, it built MCAS right for the KC-46. Don't these people talk to each other?

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/30/politics/boeing-737-max/index.html

[BoeingBobby]

No. Age and experience is a double-edged sword. You have EXCELLENT youngster pilots and TERRIBLE highly experienced ones.

I will agree with that! Just remember, that a 25 year old can turn two switches off just as well as a 65 year old!

[3WE]

Depending on what you mean with that, that doesn't work. Having someone doing only easy tasks while the automation takes most of the workload and suddenly expect that person to take over and do what he never does when the automation says "that's it, good bye" is naive.

What’s interesting is that is kind of what we have- autopilot on at 400 feet, and then off at 400 feet with lots of FMS adjustments and acronym utterance the rest of the time.

Captain ATL razzed for hand flying too much.

Evan is too black and white on the subject- but there may be validity that the anti error engineering of air bus and flying in general makes a mediocre environment for awesome airpersonship and a trend to focus elsewhere.

Should we deprioritize airmanship for systems?

All that being said, Air France shows the other side of this- that some Uber basic skills can sometimes be important, even in the biggest, bestest planes.

Finally, let’s not forget that lots of smart people INCLUDING WORKING PILOTS GENERALLY contribute to the design of aeroplanies, systems and training. But it would be interesting to know how pilots were involved in the design of MCAS. Were they not, or was it insidious group think?

[Evan]

compare and contrast:

"Airbus decided to take on Boeing by creating a robotic new airplane that would address the accelerating decline in airmanship and require minimal piloting skills largely by using digital flight controls to reduce pilot workload, iron out undesirable handling characteristics and build in pilot-proof protections against errors like aerodynamic stalls, excessive banks and spiral dives. The idea was that it would no longer be necessary to protect the public from airplanes if Airbus could get airplanes to protect themselves from pilots....
You might think that the 737 would have grown increasingly disadvantaged given the New World qualities of the A320, but in my estimation pilots have managed to crash the 320 at about the same rate, largely because of confusion over automation." (William Langeweische, NYT Magazine 9/18/19).

The A320 wasn't designed or intended for idiots either. There is still a steep professional learning curve involved. AirAisa was a wonderful example of what can happen when you put the A320 in the wrong hands. But current technology can make managing and troubleshooting such systems more user-friendly, even when they malfunction. If these flying taxis every enter service (let's hope this day is a good way off), you can bet the pilot-facing automation won't be much more complex than your basic Tesla. The rest will be done in the background.

[TeeVee]

compare and contrast:

"Airbus decided to take on Boeing by creating a robotic new airplane that would address the accelerating decline in airmanship and require minimal piloting skills largely by using digital flight controls to reduce pilot workload, iron out undesirable handling characteristics and build in pilot-proof protections against errors like aerodynamic stalls, excessive banks and spiral dives. The idea was that it would no longer be necessary to protect the public from airplanes if Airbus could get airplanes to protect themselves from pilots....
You might think that the 737 would have grown increasingly disadvantaged given the New World qualities of the A320, but in my estimation pilots have managed to crash the 320 at about the same rate, largely because of confusion over automation." (William Langeweische, NYT Magazine 9/18/19).