Breaking news: Ethiopian Airlines flight has crashed on way to Nairobi

[3WE]

Some disturbing revelations today in the New York Times:

- Boeing didn't provide detailed MCAS information to their own test pilots.
- MCAS was originally only intended to activate at high speeds, but it then became apparent that it was needed at low speeds as well, where a greater pitch rate and angle were needed. Thus the late-inning change to the higher rates.
- The FAA didn't require their approval for this because they determined that this didn't represent a "critical phase of flight".
- Approach-to-stall recovery at low altitude isn't a critical phase of flight.

Fascinating as ever.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/b...-faa-mcas.html

Indeed, the comments are fascinating.

And troubling that the elephant in the room wasn't listed. Did anyone notice that a single sensor failure puts plane into an arguably relentless dive mode while setting off a bunch of other bells and whistles, including making a few primary instrument readings questionable, along with a nice big dose of "what's it doing now?"

[Evan]

Indeed, the comments are fascinating.

And troubling that the elephant in the room wasn't listed. Did anyone notice that a single sensor failure puts plane into an arguably relentless dive mode while setting off a bunch of other bells and whistles, including making a few primary instrument readings questionable, along with a nice big dose of "what's it doing now?"

It appears that they thought an erroneous MCAS activation would be about as risky to flight control as a erroneous toilet flush. Thus, no need for redundancy (I know... I know... but this is what they seemed to have been thinking).

[Highkeas]

It appears that the left AOA sensor vane was sheared off - possibly by a bird strike.

https://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/ethiopian-crash-data-analysis-points-vane-detachment?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_20190411_AW-05_553&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_1&utm_rid=CPEN1000000907228&utm_campaign=19193&utm_medium=email&elq2=43d7a84e292e4202bf37ae42a08ae8a1

[3WE]

***including making a few primary instrument readings questionable***

Somehow I want to claim this as THE critical flaw/final nail/kill-shot. (Maybe not the BIGGEST engineering flaw- but flaw that is just too hard to overcome).

I absolutely dislike the nose-over behavior (more than one aspect of it), lack of redundancy, and that the trim that seizes up...

But that really stands in front of broad fundamental #1. I need the good ole instruments to be able to tell the stick shaker and the trim, and whatever else blinking light to go to hell, and park my thumb on the back side of the trim switch and pull up to a nice high-performance climb...

[Evan]

It appears that the left AOA sensor vane was sheared off - possibly by a bird strike.
https://aviationweek.com/commercial-...37ae42a08ae8a1

That's what I figured. The AoA plot on the FDR shows the probe mirroring the vertical acceleration data, meaning it couldn't have been influenced by the airstream but was still free to turn. Even a bent vane would be somewhat affected by the airstream. A sheared vane wouldn't.

MIllion-dollar question now is, was it a bird, a plane, or superstupidman?

[KGEG]

The LA Times (by far not an authority on aviation I know) has posted an article detailing a document Boeing released before the Ethiopian crash that the MAX 8 (this does not include the MAX 7) may be unsuitable for use at high altitude airports (Addis Ababa is higher than Denver and even a few hundred feet higher than Mexico City). Boeing used the argument/fact that the 737-700 and MAX 7 were better suited for airports at high elevations as part of its claims that Bombardier were infringing on their market share in the niche that is the 737-700 and MAX 7. They noted they didn't believe airlines should be using the MAX 8 or 800 at high altitude airports. Indeed this hasn't been a reason pointed to as a cause of the Ethiopian crash but it brings forth yet another damning piece of evidence against the MAX 8 in this particular case. And indeed some of the airspeed data taken from this crash may be indicative of them not throttling down when they should have and would have at an airport in lower elevations, making the plane harder to recover from its stall due to its faster than recommended speed at that point in flight.

https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-boeing-max-8-airports-20190411-story.html

[LH-B744]

The MCAS is armed ONLY in MANUAL FLIGHT with FLAPS RETRACTED.
If the AP is on, the MCAS is off. If the flaps are not retracted, the MCAS is off.

And there are no MCAS switch. The report shows how the MCAS kept making trim inputs even after the trim was disconnected with the cutout switches. Only that they trim, turned off in this way, did not respond to the MCAS commands.

And there are no MCAS switches.

Hm. You should explain your point of view to German Television. I am not able to invent such things!

On serious German News Television, there was a short video which showed... what. Imho the cockpit of a Boeing 737 Max . Do you think one Aviation Enthusiast who works for serious German News Television has constructed a video

which shows two switches in a Boeing 737 Max Cockpit, which are precisely located, and you should keep in mind, I'm not able to show you the exact position in Randazzo's 737 simulator, because I only own his B744 QotS I fsx ..
so, which is precisely located, and you probably don't really know how a B744 cockpit looks like... ,

let's say you take the leftseat, then your right hand is responsible for the throttle quadrant. Then you move your right hand further backwards. In a B744 cockpit then comes a rather big round knob which is the aileron trim knob. Further backwards.

The last two switches which you are able to reach down there at the cockpit floor. Or let's compare it to a car. The ash tray which sits above the cardan shaft, for seat row #2.

There, Heinrich Großbongardt, former company spokesman for Cessna Aviation, showed two switches in a B737 Max.

I don't know if Mr Großbongardt is a jetphotos member, but this topic would be a brilliant occasion to become one.

I like to repeat that, I have not dreamed this video. It was shown either on ARD or ZDF (serious German News Television), one or two weeks ago.

[flashcrash]

And there are no MCAS switches.

Hm. You should explain your point of view to German Television. I am not able to invent such things!

I bought a German Television, plugged it in, and carefully explained to it that there are no MCAS switches. So we're all good now.

[brianw999]

I bought a German Television, plugged it in, and carefully explained to it that there are no MCAS switches. So we're all good now.

[LH-B744]

I bought a German Television, plugged it in, and carefully explained to it that there are no MCAS switches. So we're all good now.

Ok. And now you only have to explain that to Lutz Marmor (*1954), who is the CEO of the German NDR television and radio stations, and former
General for the ARD television stations (NDR, WDR, SWR, BR, ....) between 2013 and 2015.



PS: Let me add one thing. Since airliners dot de appears on top of the other airliners website, I do no longer wonder where on Earth 737 Max pilots are online.
But how do you explain the difference between the 738 and a 737 Max 8 to somebody who since 1954 thinks that he knows everything about aviation...

[KGEG]

Just like the Bay Area News station insists the Asiana pilots are Wee Too Low and Sum Ting Wong right? They sound like perfectly legit Korean or Chinese names right? Mr. Marmor might look at those and say "Looks Asian to me, must be right".

[Evan]

The LA Times (by far not an authority on aviation I know) has posted an article detailing a document Boeing released before the Ethiopian crash that the MAX 8 (this does not include the MAX 7) may be unsuitable for use at high altitude airports (Addis Ababa is higher than Denver and even a few hundred feet higher than Mexico City). Boeing used the argument/fact that the 737-700 and MAX 7 were better suited for airports at high elevations as part of its claims that Bombardier were infringing on their market share in the niche that is the 737-700 and MAX 7. They noted they didn't believe airlines should be using the MAX 8 or 800 at high altitude airports. Indeed this hasn't been a reason pointed to as a cause of the Ethiopian crash but it brings forth yet another damning piece of evidence against the MAX 8 in this particular case. And indeed some of the airspeed data taken from this crash may be indicative of them not throttling down when they should have and would have at an airport in lower elevations, making the plane harder to recover from its stall due to its faster than recommended speed at that point in flight.

https://www.latimes.com/business/la-...411-story.html

Man, someone was desperate for some column inches there. What a non-story. Addis Ababa has two runways, both exceeding 12,000ft in length. The high surface temperature thay day was 76°F. During takeoff roll, the engines were stabilized at about 94% N1. This aircraft wasn't struggling to get off.

Departing from hot and high airfields does not routinely involve acceleration past Vmo. The thrust was left in TO setting due to an abnormal workload distracting the crew from monitoring power and airspeed.

Even respected journals are beginning to pick at the bones of this thing for a another story. Because enquiring minds want to know...

[LH-B744]

Just like the Bay Area News station insists the Asiana pilots are Wee Too Low and Sum Ting Wong right? They sound like perfectly legit Korean or Chinese names right? Mr. Marmor might look at those and say "Looks Asian to me, must be right".

Oh. Now you don't know that in 99,85% of all cases I appreciate what Mr Marmor does. He's not the chief editor, responsible for what appears in the TV news, but he is the chief of the chief editor. So, probably, we should not accuse him for a video which only tried to explain what happened on flight #ET 302.

No such switches in a 737 Max. Ok. I always trust jetphotos members, especially if you are longer here than me.

Btw, there is another man where I wonder if he's not a jetphotos member. Before he appeared on German Television, he indeed passed everything which you need to be a
German Air Traffic controller. Again NDR.

But who will know most about the 737 Max. Not Brian, not me. Certainly a 737 Max pilot. As I mentioned it, old as a cow, but I'm still learning. LH doesn't yet own a 737 again.

[LH-B744]

The MCAS is armed ONLY in MANUAL FLIGHT with FLAPS RETRACTED.
If the AP is on, the MCAS is off. If the flaps are not retracted, the MCAS is off.

And there are no MCAS switch. The report shows how the MCAS kept making trim inputs even after the trim was disconnected with the cutout switches. Only that they trim, turned off in this way, did not respond to the MCAS commands.

Now I understand why the Flight Captain of flight #ET 302 on board his 737 Max 8 tried to engage the a/p. He tried to switch off MCAS!

And his 737 didn't allow him to engage a/p.

this resulted in two autopilot warnings.

What the hell. Again, I know nothing about the 737 Max. But what would I do in a B744 simulator by Randazzo
if the B744 a/p does not react,
regardless if with or without warning.

I'd think, what the hell, let me throw this stupid computer out of the cockpit window. Half a second later, I'd try to return to the airport where I took off only minutes ago.

And I'm sure. This is exactly what the Ethiopian Flight Captain tried to do. But MCAS did not allow him to do so.

The rest are known facts.

[LH-B744]

And now I understand why LH CEO Spohr almost insists to have a real 737 Max in his hands.

Like me, he does not understand where the difference is between flight #ET 302 and,
if KGEG is older than me he probably remembers it quite well,
one of the first flights of an Airbus A320. June 26th, 1988.

Back then the investigators stated 4 pilot errors. That's the difference to ET 302.
1. In 1988, the Flight Captain took a brandnew A320 from Basel to Habsheim, a tiny tiny tiny strip where he never was never in his whole life before. And which he was not able to find at once, not even with the help of his F/O!
2. Again a very doubtful decision by the A320 Flight Captain was to try (and not more than to try...) an

alpha max maneuver, with 130 passengers on board!
3. He tried to use an A320 with 130 passengers on board for low-level flight, which in Germany is defined as 'below 1970 ft AGL'. So, the 'too low' error.
4. By god, not enough airspeed!

Alpha protection. I knew a CEO of a rather unimportant European airline, who could tell us more about that..

I'd assume that since 1988 (or since 1985 when this rather unimportant airline ordered their first A320) the alpha protection on board an A320 is described
where it has to be described.

In the A320 manual.

Now compare that to the 737 max MCAS.

PS: Ethiopian Airlines until today is one of the very rare airlines on this planet who still are
'Boeing only'.
Almost. Since a few months they fly the A359.
How disappointed they must be. Boeing only (almost), since 1945 (!). And what is the result.

Boeing only (almost), in contrast to American Airlines! Thus, Ethiopian until today was not able to have a CEO
who is an active Airbus A320 Flight Captain, and who knows quite alot about Alpha Protection..

Avoidable, if Ethiopian previously ordered at least 1 A320? Who knows.

But how disappointed they must be.