If this is your first visit, be sure to
check out the FAQ by clicking the
link above. You may have to register
before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages,
select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below.
Announcement
Collapse
No announcement yet.
Breaking news: Ethiopian Airlines flight has crashed on way to Nairobi
And, in any case, you refuse to acknowledge the essential value of procedure. So deaf ears to begin with.
This is wrong and again points to your lack of life experience.
I’ll leave it to Gabriel to state my feelings on procedures.
Admittedly, unlike your black and white world, I am MORE displeased when the specific procedure violation is also a violation of extremely fundamental procedure...
I confess that when the airplane is going to Hell in an insane, confusing manner, I think that fundamentals are a good place to go- as is reverting to your training, as is taking advantage of the overlap.
Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
BoeingBobby, do you think the Ethiopian pilots intentionally accelerated up to and beyond Vmo, and if so, why?
If you do not believe the 100kt speed increase was intentional, what do you think they should have done to keep it under control?
A number of things, the first of them being realize that the speed was increasing out of control and that that was not good.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
BoeingBobby, do you think the Ethiopian pilots intentionally accelerated up to and beyond Vmo, and if so, why?
If you do not believe the 100kt speed increase was intentional, what do you think they should have done to keep it under control?
They were diving towards the friggin ground...I don’t think they gave a flying [expeletive] whether they would hit at 375 or 475 knots...what speed does your procedure book suggest for crashing into the ground?
Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
Exactly. So why wasn't this the procedure Boeing distributed after Lion Air? Did it just not occur to them that a scenario like this would lead to tunnelled concentration on pitch, to the detriment of speed and that manual pitch trim would become increasingly difficult as speed increased?
Actually, I think that is indeed what happened, they didn't consider this, and that is what troubles me so much about this. How can so many of the world's best engineers not consider that? Were they not properly consulted? Have they missed all the accident reports of the past 30 years? Could they not put two and two together and come up with a procedure that didn't involve losing the powered pitch trim or leaving the manual pitch trim in an unmanageable state? Where was the vision?
Again:
If sudden, uncommanded pitch reduction occurs shortly after flap retraction:
- Stabilize with pitch and pitch trim
- Check speed. If above 250kts reduce thrust as necessary and modify pitch to rapidly achieve flap extension speed.
- Speed at 250kts or less, extend flaps 1.
- Land ASAP
That's what I see as the ideal memory procedure for this. Simple. Easy to memorize. Easy to execute.
It retains full, powered flight control.
It does not use elevator alone to reduce speed because pitch is the thing that is unstable.
So what am I missing? Why would Boeing not publish such a procedure?
Exactly. So why wasn't this the procedure Boeing distributed after Lion Air? Did it just not occur to them [...]
Actually, I think that is indeed what happened, they didn't consider this
I suspect the same. Otherwise they would have also said something, a reminder, about the trim wheel becoming hard when grossly mist-rimmed and high speed, and advise (more clearly) to trim with the thumb switch before using the cutout switches, to watcht he speed and avoid excessive speed, to slow down if the speed is high, and even a reminder of what it takes to move the trim wheel (roller coaster or whatever).
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
[B]If sudden, uncommanded pitch reduction occurs shortly after flap retraction
Not necessarily, and that's the problem. It happened that in Lion Air the AoA sensor was bad since the previous flight (so since the beginning of the accident flight) and in Ethiopian it was ok and failed at rotation, but there is no reason why the failure can't happen at any point after flaps retraction. Ideally the procedures need to be as universal as possible.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
Can't see the forest with all of those trees right in front of your face there can you? By the time you get into the left seat, you are supposed to be a pilot!
Can't see the forest with all of those trees right in front of your face there can you? By the time you get into the left seat, you are supposed to be a pilot!
I think I know what you are saying...and I think I agree.
Doesn't mean I can invoke an unqualified 'we', but there could be a head explode.
Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
Can't see the forest with all of those trees right in front of your face there can you? By the time you get into the left seat, you are supposed to be a pilot!
So what's the criteria for the right seat? Intern? Personal assistant?
By the time you get in a commercial cockpit, either seat, you are indeed a certified and tested pilot. You are also a human being. No matter the hours you have under your belt, you are always vulnerable to the imperfections of being human.
One of those imperfections of being human is the inability to reliably concentrate and act on multiple dimensions of information under extreme stress and emergency. The mind narrows its focus in such situations, by nature, to what is most immediately threatening, by evolutionary design. Hours mean little here.
Another of these imperfections is the mind's inability to maintain clear situational awareness and make clear, rational decisions under the same stressful and urgent circumstances. 30,000 hours will not make you immune to this. Especially when not a single hour of that experience involves this situation.
That is the forest I see, and it is a dense one. There is no green pasture where experienced captains can be relied upon to confront every situation correctly just by merit of being an experienced pilot.
Medical science knows this. The industry knows this. Boeing knows this. Procedures have been written for this reason. If those procedures are flawed, people die, planes get grounded and the costs run into the billions.
Boeing got the procedure wrong for this. They apparently did not think it through very well. Like you, they placed blind confidence in seasoned airmanship and human performance despite a maelstrom of tasks and concentration factors and all that we've learned about the effects they have on human performance.
Now tell me who wasn't seeing the forest for the trees.
We process personal data about users of our site, through the use of cookies and other technologies, to deliver our services, personalize advertising, and to analyze site activity. We may share certain information about our users with our advertising and analytics partners. For additional details, refer to our Privacy Policy.
By clicking "I AGREE" below, you agree to our Privacy Policy and our personal data processing and cookie practices as described therein. You also acknowledge that this forum may be hosted outside your country and you consent to the collection, storage, and processing of your data in the country where this forum is hosted.
Comment