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  • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    It is suicidal to say "our irresponsible negligence killed 300+".
    I don't think so. Boeing must know by now they can't wiggle out of this one. The evidence is too damning, too widely exposed. They will be held fully responsible for their negligence. The worst thing they can do now is too try to evade taking full responsibility, especially by shifting any blame to the pilots they killed. The best thing they can do, from a public relations standpoint, is to issue an unmitigated mea culpa while containing the blame to a specific aspect and purging that aspect as a means to publicly fixing the problem. In other words, they are doing this on the technical level by identifying the problem with MCAS and redesigning it, but they still haven't publicly addressed the problem on the decision-making level. The public now sees this as a result of either poor decision-making or corrupt or negligent decision-making. Boeing has to show the public that they have identified this aspect as well and made reparations. This means an admission of rotten leadership and a purge of that rotten leadership. Distinguish the company from the problematic aspects of its leadership. Pledge to restore the integrity and vision of the company. This is how they will win back the trust of the public.

    The Challenger disaster is a prime example of public damage control. The problem was 'management culture' that subverted safety. That culture was purged. The shuttle returned to glory, at least for a while. But there is a big difference between a publicly-funded government program and a publicly-traded company. There are pressures upon a publicly-traded company that corrupt attempts to come clean and there is less regulation and accountability to overcome them.

    The commercial (non-military) airframing industry is an oligopoly, and in the U.S. it is a monopoly. Boeing thinks they can afford to take a defensive and arrogant stance. Maybe they can, but I think it will hurt them through attrition. They are already on the back foot with respect to the competition. I mean, that's what got them into this whole mess. The -Max was a shining example of a reactionary response to crutch a lack of visionary thinking.

    Comment


    • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
      And THIS is where experience comes into play. Not ALL of us sit back "fat dumb and lazy" like the nub thinks
      No Robert, Fat, Dumb and HAPPY - !

      You are obviously a super, experienced, and very very knowledgeable pilot - AFTER THE EVENT !!! - Amazing.........................................

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Evan View Post
        I don't think so. Boeing must know by now they can't wiggle out of this one. The evidence is too damning, too widely exposed. They will be held fully responsible for their negligence. The worst thing they can do now is too try to evade taking full responsibility, especially by shifting any blame to the pilots they killed. The best thing they can do, from a public relations standpoint, is to issue an unmitigated mea culpa while containing the blame to a specific aspect and purging that aspect as a means to publicly fixing the problem. In other words, they are doing this on the technical level by identifying the problem with MCAS and redesigning it, but they still haven't publicly addressed the problem on the decision-making level. The public now sees this as a result of either poor decision-making or corrupt or negligent decision-making. Boeing has to show the public that they have identified this aspect as well and made reparations. This means an admission of rotten leadership and a purge of that rotten leadership. Distinguish the company from the problematic aspects of its leadership. Pledge to restore the integrity and vision of the company. This is how they will win back the trust of the public.

        The Challenger disaster is a prime example of public damage control. The problem was 'management culture' that subverted safety. That culture was purged. The shuttle returned to glory, at least for a while. But there is a big difference between a publicly-funded government program and a publicly-traded company. There are pressures upon a publicly-traded company that corrupt attempts to come clean and there is less regulation and accountability to overcome them.

        The commercial (non-military) airframing industry is an oligopoly, and in the U.S. it is a monopoly. Boeing thinks they can afford to take a defensive and arrogant stance. Maybe they can, but I think it will hurt them through attrition. They are already on the back foot with respect to the competition. I mean, that's what got them into this whole mess. The -Max was a shining example of a reactionary response to crutch a lack of visionary thinking.
        The problem is that you are taking Boing and their executive management as separate entities. Which technically they are. Bt as long as they are in functions (i.e. they don't resign and are not removed), doing what you (and I) think should be done is digging a grave for themselves, even if it would be good for Boeing. SO who is going to take the decisions, take the actions, and state the statements, that you are proposing?

        I posted this almost 1 month ago:

        Boeing CEO's statements (paraphrasing):

        - We are sorry
        - MCAS action due to erroneous AoA values was a necessary part in the chain of events of both crashes.
        - This has to be fixed. We own it. We know how to do it. And we will do it so accidents like this never happen again

        Boeing CEO's non-statements

        - Not only we got the MCAS wrong. We got the product design, development, testing and certification wrong.
        - These kind of systemic process and policy gaps may have created and may create in the future more mistakes, which may include safety-critical issues.
        - Because of that we are reviewing the whole 737 MAX design, development, testing and certification process and the decisions that were taken.
        - We are also reviewing our design, development, testing and certification process and policies so flaws like this never happen again or, at minimum, they are not the result of active decisions taken.
        - We are at minimum partially responsible for the loss of the lives in these two crash. We recognize that and we are taking full accountability.
        - We are being sued by the families of the victims. But I can assure you that there will be no lawsuit.
        - That's because we recognize that their claim is fair, and we are going to honor them.
        - We are meeting individually and collectively with each and every next of kin and family of the victims of these 2 accidents, we are addressing their immediate needs and working out an economic compensation to their satisfaction.
        - Nothing will ever replace the lives lost, but the best we can do is take care of these families in a fair way, assume our responsibility, and make sure that we learn the lessons and identify, address, and fix the issues so as not only as there is never an MCAS accident again, but there is never another accident caused by bad product design, development, certification and testing. Then the loss of lives would not have been vain.
        - Boeing is suffering and will continue to suffer a lot from the mistakes we ourselves created, but we are learning from them and we will emerge from the crisis as a stronger company.
        - As the head ob Boeing, I am responsible for a leadership structure and style the led to these events. And I take full accountability.
        - Here is my undclinable resignation, and I will not accept any golden parachute.

        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

        Comment


        • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
          Can't see the forest with all of those trees right in front of your face there can you? By the time you get into the left seat, you are supposed to be a pilot!
          So Robert ? - what happened in your case ? ... A Redwood ?

          Comment


          • Originally posted by SmoothAir View Post
            So Robert ? - what happened in your case ? ... A Redwood ?
            Two switches!

            Comment


            • Evan, go ride a bike.

              While I go on a WN 737-800 ride (I didn't did died) you are writing Gabriel rants arguing with Gabriel regarding a Boeing statement that is (IMO) totally accurate.

              Yes, management exerts pressure. I'm sure 10 more years to develop the '-MinLav would be nice.

              With the Challenger disaster, there were memos that this was a bad idea and information that things were outside of design parameters.

              Does the same exist at Boeing. I bet a beer you can find something- but that's all I'm betting and I really doubt there's the toxic, broken culture you so hope for...

              More likely it's a more insidious human error, something you could learn about on a bike ride.
              Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                The problem is that you are taking Boing and their executive management as separate entities. Which technically they are. Bt as long as they are in functions (i.e. they don't resign and are not removed), doing what you (and I) think should be done is digging a grave for themselves, even if it would be good for Boeing. SO who is going to take the decisions, take the actions, and state the statements, that you are proposing?

                I posted this almost 1 month ago:

                - As the head ob Boeing, I am responsible for a leadership structure and style the led to these events. And I take full accountability.
                - Here is my undclinable resignation, and I will not accept any golden parachute.
                The problem is, this isn't Japan or America in the 1970's when top executives still had an inkling of shame and took responsibility. This is the era of entitlement class vs oblivion, where you cling to the cliff-face of power with shameless tenacity. So I'm not holding my breath for a voluntary resignation.

                Personally, I will not have my faith restored until Boeing routs upper management, makes a full accounting of the errors that led to the existence of the 737-MAX and the dysfunction and/orcorruption that got it certified and pledges to restore uncompromising safety and quality as core principals from the drawing board to the roll-out. Achieving this will require an independent investigation.

                See: The Rogers Commission and The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)

                What do the MAX disasters and the shuttle disasters have in common: Each should never have happened twice. Each was the result of a persistent cancer of upper management and a rotten organizational structure.

                Originally posted by CIAB report (paraphrased)
                The causes of the institutional [management culture] failures responsible for Challenger have not been fixed...the same flawed decision making process that had resulted in the Challenger accident was responsible for Columbia's destruction seventeen years later.
                Originally posted by CIAB report
                Leaders create culture. It is their responsibility to change it. Top administrators must take responsibility for risk, failure, and safety by remaining alert to the effects their decisions have on the system. Leaders are responsible for establishing the conditions that lead to their subordinatesʼ successes or failures. The past decisions of national leaders – the White House, Congress, and NASA Headquarters – set the Columbia accident in motion by creating resource and schedule strains that compromised the principles of a high-risk technology organization. The measure of NASAʼs success became how much costs were reduced and how efficiently the schedule was met.
                Originally posted by CIAB report
                The Shuttle Programʼs structure is a source of problems, not just because of the way it impedes the flow of information, but because it has had effects on the culture that contradict safety goals. NASAʼs blind spot is it believes it has a strong safety culture. Program history shows that the loss of a truly independent, robust capability to protect the systemʼs fundamental requirements and specifications inevitably compromised those requirements, and therefore increased risk. The Shuttle Programʼs structure created power distributions that need new structuring, rules, and management training to restore deference to technical experts, empower engineers to get resources they need, and allow safety concerns to be freely aired.
                Originally posted by CIAB report
                NASA structure changed as roles and responsibilities were transferred to contractors, which increased the dependence on the private sector for safety functions and risk assessment while simultaneously reducing the in-house capability to spot safety issues.
                Sound familiar? Essentially, what is needed is a CIAB-style report, an acknowledgement from Boeing and a pledge to internally purge and restructure.

                I urge you to read this section of the CIAB report. It is startlingly appropriate to the situation at Boeing:

                CAIB_lowres_chapter8.pdf

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                  The problem is, this isn't Japan or America in the 1970's when top executives still had an inkling of shame and took responsibility. This is the era of entitlement class vs oblivion, where you cling to the cliff-face of power with shameless tenacity. So I'm not holding my breath for a voluntary resignation.

                  Personally, I will not have my faith restored until Boeing routs upper management, makes a full accounting of the errors that led to the existence of the 737-MAX and the dysfunction and/orcorruption that got it certified and pledges to restore uncompromising safety and quality as core principals from the drawing board to the roll-out. Achieving this will require an independent investigation.

                  See: The Rogers Commission and The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)

                  What do the MAX disasters and the shuttle disasters have in common: Each should never have happened twice. Each was the result of a persistent cancer of upper management and a rotten organizational structure.

                  Sound familiar? Essentially, what is needed is a CIAB-style report, an acknowledgement from Boeing and a pledge to internally purge and restructure.

                  I urge you to read this section of the CIAB report. It is startlingly appropriate to the situation at Boeing:

                  [ATTACH=CONFIG]23966[/ATTACH]
                  Boeing will do that (or something similar) internally, not open to the public. It will take an external investigation (Congress commission, NTSB, lawsuits, I doubt that the FAA is up to the task) to make the systemic issues visible to the public and to punish the ones responsible for them (punishment can go from losing their jobs to liability to penal).

                  Or did NASA investigate themselves?

                  --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                  --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                    Evan, go ride a bike.

                    While I go on a WN 737-800 ride (I didnÂ’t did died) you are writing Gabriel rants arguing with Gabriel regarding a Boeing statement that is (IMO) totally accurate.

                    Yes, management exerts pressure. I’m sure 10 more years to develop the ‘-MinLav would be nice.

                    With the Challenger disaster, there were memos that this was a bad idea and information that things were outside of design parameters.

                    Does the same exist at Boeing. I bet a beer you can find something- but thatÂ’s all IÂ’m betting and I really doubt thereÂ’s the toxic, broken culture you so hope for...

                    More likely itÂ’s a a more insidious human error, something you could learn about on a bike ride.
                    I am not so sure. They designed a system with a single point of failure that would simultaneously trigger IAS disagree, ALT disagree, FD disagree, AoA disagree, stickshaker on the affected side, and repeated large automatic nose-down trim commands that could go all the way to full nose-down trim, and the instruction was to kill the electric trim and leave you with a manual trim wheel that they knew could become extremely to impossible hard to turn unless you start doing other things to reduce its load before you can turn it. And the single point of failure was something like an AoA sensor than, other than normal technical faults, manufacturing quality issues, and installation and maintenance errors, is exposed to FOD. It was an incredibly clear unacceptable design. Yes, I am cherry-picking the bad things and yes, I do think tht the pilots of both planes could and should have saved the day, if nothing else just by using the thumb switch as designed and as they are used to use it. But still. Maybe they didn't realize the category 5 perfect storm hurricane they were creating, but even a category 2 or 3 would have been unacceptable. I feel sure that someone knew that this was not a good design. And, if I stated by Boeing, the system followed internal Boeing safety guidelines as well as certification requirements (which I very much doubt), well, it should have not. There you have a couple of places to start look for root cause and corrective action.

                    14 CFR § 25.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations.
                    (a) The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is required by this subchapter, must be designed to ensure that they perform their intended functions under any foreseeable operating condition.

                    (b) The airplane systems and associated components, considered separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that -

                    (1) The occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane is extremely improbable, and

                    (2) The occurrence of any other failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions is improbable.

                    (c) Warning information must be provided to alert the crew to unsafe system operating conditions, and to enable them to take appropriate corrective action. Systems, controls, and associated monitoring and warning means must be designed to minimize crew errors which could create additional hazards.

                    (d) Compliance with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section must be shown by analysis, and where necessary, by appropriate ground, flight, or simulator tests. The analysis must consider -

                    (1) Possible modes of failure, including malfunctions and damage from external sources.

                    (2) The probability of multiple failures and undetected failures.

                    (3) The resulting effects on the airplane and occupants, considering the stage of flight and operating conditions, and

                    (4) The crew warning cues, corrective action required, and the capability of detecting faults.

                    (e) In showing compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section with regard to the electrical system and equipment design and installation, critical environmental conditions must be considered. For electrical generation, distribution, and utilization equipment required by or used in complying with this chapter, except equipment covered by Technical Standard Orders containing environmental test procedures, the ability to provide continuous, safe service under foreseeable environmental conditions may be shown by environmental tests, design analysis, or reference to previous comparable service experience on other aircraft.




                    There are fuzzy terms there, and there is an official interpretation, FAA's Advisory Circular 25-1309-1 which among other things state:



                    (3) CRITICAL--Functions whose failure would contribute to or cause a
                    failure condition which would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of
                    the airplane. Failure conditions which result from improper accomplishment or
                    loss of critical functions must be extremely improbable.

                    a. CONTINUED SAFE FLIGHT AND LANDING--This phrase is used in the regulation
                    to require that an airplane be capable of continued controlled flight and
                    landing, possibly using emergency procedures and without exceptional pilot skill
                    or strength, after any failure condition which has not been shown to be
                    extremely improbable. There may be failure conditions which are not extremely
                    improbable for which it is necessary to assure that continued safe flight and
                    landing is possible by appropriate analysis and/or tests.

                    (3) EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE--Extremely improbable events are so unlikely
                    that they need not be considered to ever occur, unless engineering judgment
                    would require their consideration. A probability on the order of 1 x 10-9
                    or less.


                    But on the other hand (and I am guessing this is the criteria that Boeing used....)


                    (2) ESSENTIAL--Functions whose failures would contribute to or cause a
                    failure condition which would significantly impact the safety of the airplane or
                    the ability of the flight crew to cope with adverse operating conditions.
                    [Note, however, that if it requires exceptional pilot skill or strength, it is CRITICAL]
                    Failure conditions which result from improper accomplishment or loss of
                    essential functions must be improbable.

                    (2) IMPROBABLE--Improbable events are not expected to occur during the
                    total operational life of a random single airplane of a particular type, but may
                    occur during the total operational life of all airplanes of a particular type.
                    A probability on the order of 1 x 10-5 or less.

                    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by SmoothAir View Post
                      No Robert, Fat, Dumb and HAPPY - !

                      You are obviously a super, experienced, and very very knowledgeable pilot - AFTER THE EVENT !!! - Amazing.........................................
                      I guarantee you that had I been on the crew in either A/C it would not have ended the way it did.

                      Comment


                      • Okay, but safety cannot depend on having a 20K hours pilot, and a really good one at it, in each cockpit.

                        Airplanes have to be designed for below-average pilots, because about half of the pilots are below average (by definition of average).

                        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                          Note, however, that if it requires exceptional pilot skill or strength, it is CRITICAL
                          We need to revise that to read 'exceptional pilot skill, strength, judgment or performance. Again, a great deal of the danger here lies in its potential for disorientation and task saturation.

                          There is no way a single failed AoA sensor qualifies as improbable.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                            Boeing will do that (or something similar) internally, not open to the public. It will take an external investigation (Congress commission, NTSB, lawsuits, I doubt that the FAA is up to the task) to make the systemic issues visible to the public and to punish the ones responsible for them (punishment can go from losing their jobs to liability to penal).
                            Absolutely. As I said:
                            Originally posted by Evan
                            Achieving this will require an independent investigation.

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                              Does your J3 even have an electrical system?
                              How can it be fun to fly an aircraft without electricity? So many cool acronyms come from Avionics...(starting with Avionics). NAV-COM, ADF, VOR, DME, LORAN, GPS, LOC, GS, RNP, ILS, TACAN, PAR, UNICOM...

                              It's ALL ABOUT THE ACRONYMS......
                              Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                                How can it be fun to fly an aircraft without electricity? So many cool acronyms come from Avionics...(starting with Avionics). NAV-COM, ADF, VOR, DME, LORAN, GPS, LOC, GS, RNP, ILS, TACAN, PAR, UNICOM...

                                It's ALL ABOUT THE ACRONYMS......
                                I have my cell phone in my pocket, does that count?

                                Comment

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