Breaking news: Ethiopian Airlines flight has crashed on way to Nairobi

[Black Ram]

Do you understand the difference between negligence and malice? Irrespective of body count, intentional harm is far more pernicious than harm through ineptitude or procedural violation. The investigation of these two 737 crashes will hopefully determine if any intentional risk to human life was directed by management in order to get the product to market, but I doubt that will be the case. VW (and others, as it turns out) intentionally violated regulatory laws and thus poisoned the air that we breath. People will live shorter lives because of this and will suffer from chronic health issues. Not 346 people. Potentially millions of people.

And, yes, defeat devices WERE illegal in Europe. These cars were tested and found to have emissions over three times the EURO 5 limit (and over seven times the EURO 6 limit).

No one at Boeing wanted to see passengers die. However, they did design MCAS in a way that posed a risk. They did not provide adequate training. They didn't even mention the system existed. This is definitely not how you do things in the aviation industry.

As for diesels, like you said, there are other manufacturers. Actually, for quite a few years now, it has been mostly about several other manufacturers. But you won't hear about Renault cheating, or Fiat cheating, or Opel cheating. Unless you dig into it.
If you don't believe me defeat devices were not illegal in Europe, read this:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/bertels...ces-in-the-eu/

https://www.forbes.com/sites/bertels.../#7990b4355ae8

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/...EN.html#title6


Everyone knows there are a few manufacturers that keep selling really dirty cars. There are EURO 6 cars that are as dirty as EURO 4 cars. But everyone keeps talking about VW, which has been way cleaner for years now. Anyone knowledgeable of the diesel industry will tell you that this is not a VW problem, but an industry problem. VW was doing what everyone else was doing, except for one tiny little detail: they sold those cars in the US. European governments and regulators are totally part of this - from their inaction against the dirtiest manufacturers today, to setting this whole thing up a few decades ago when they decided that reducing CO2 emissions will be a priority, and that diesel cars will be the way (diesels have lower CO2 and higher NoX emissions). And of course, the defeat device loophole.

If they knew diesels didn't meet the standards for NoX emissions - and likely they did - they should have instead concentrated on research on how to make diesels cleaner. A lot of manufacturers have done work on that - some is still experimental, others is now industry standard (AdBlue). All manufacturers have also developed their small displacement turbo engines, which now practically match small diesels in all parameters, and are cheaper to get them to meet emissions standards. What the regulators did instead was turn a blind eye and establish the industry-wide practice of meeting emissions standards only when testing. But like I have said before, VAG could done well even without diesels. Not sure about a few other manufacturers.

[Black Ram]

And... what really makes me mad, over 40 times the emissions that the cars had with the emissions control device that was installed in the car anyway and could have been used, except it was inhibited when not under test. It is not only a matter of meeting the regulations or not. It is ALSO a matter of being responsible with the huma helath nd lie that you are (and show that you are with fake test) when you know you aren't.

That's probably because the car's performance will not be the same when the engine goes into "emissions testing mode". Fuel burn will be higher. Torque and acceleration will not be the same - remember that people have certain expectations and the low-end torque of diesel cars is one thing that makes them so popular for city driving. Can you get all that and meet emissions standards? Definitely not without AdBlue. And smaller cars with smaller diesel engines are less likely to have AdBlue (and make it work economics-wise).

Another thing - you can probably do what those diesel manufacturers did by getting a custom chip tuning. Will they ever catch you?

[lapzdplt]

Just saw this: https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-...es-11557087129. What I don't get is how Boeing could allow the MCAS to activate in the presence of sensor disagreement. To me, this is worse than the alert issue.

[Evan]

Just saw this: https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-...es-11557087129. What I don't get is how Boeing could allow the MCAS to activate in the presence of sensor disagreement. To me, this is worse than the alert issue.

The alert issue is a non-issue.

[Gabriel]

Just saw this: https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-...es-11557087129. What I don't get is how Boeing could allow the MCAS to activate in the presence of sensor disagreement. To me, this is worse than the alert issue.

If the question is HOW, that's easy, The MCAS was taking input from only one sensor and blind to the other sensor. So for the MCAS, there was no disagreement.
If the question is WHY, however, well, that another full can of worms.

By the way, I am not subscribed to the WSJ so I can't read the article. Can you please summarize what it says?

[Evan]

By the way, I am not subscribed to the WSJ so I can't read the article. Can you please summarize what it says?

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/business/boeing-737-max-warning-light.html?action=click&module=Latest&pgtype=Homepage

According to the NY Times, Boeing management didn't even know it wasn't a standard feature. But it's a non-issue here. The only way it could have saved anyone is if it worked on the ground and alerted them before take-off that a problem existed. But, of course, it can't, for obvious reasons.

[Gabriel]

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/b...gtype=Homepage

According to the NY Times, Boeing management didn't even know it wasn't a standard feature. But it's a non-issue here. The only way it could have saved anyone is if it worked on the ground and alerted them before take-off that a problem existed. But, of course, it can't, for obvious reasons.

Thank you. Did you see this?

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=130431

[Evan]

Thank you. Did you see this?

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-re...ts?item=130431

I suppose the disagree indicator would make it easier to detect a false stickshaker activation. I can't think of any other reason pilots would need it. If the automation gets spooky, switch it off (assuming it's in the FCOM and has a switch).

[Evan]

The more they air this thing out, the more it stinks. NY Times reporting that, after the Lion Air crash, in a closed door meeting with Boeing, American Airlines pilots wanted Boeing to "push authorities to take an emergency measure that would likely result in the grounding of the Max."

Boeing refused.

Mike Sinnett, a vice president at Boeing, acknowledged that the manufacturer was assessing potential design flaws with the plane, including new anti-stall software. But he balked at taking a more aggressive approach, saying it was not yet clear that the new system was to blame for the Lion Air crash, which killed 189 people.

“No one has yet to conclude that the sole cause of this was this function on the airplane,” Mr. Sinnett said, according to a recording of the Nov. 27 meeting reviewed by The New York Times.

So whatever happened to erring on the side of caution? Shouldn't a reasonable suspicion of system malfunction exceeding pilot actions, combined with a lack of conclusive evidence to establish that the airplane is otherwise safe, result in a grounding?

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/business/boeing-737-max-ethiopian-plane-crash.html

[Bluefalcon]

The more they air this thing out, the more it stinks. NY Times reporting that, after the Lion Air crash, in a closed door meeting with Boeing, American Airlines pilots wanted Boeing to "push authorities to take an emergency measure that would likely result in the grounding of the Max."

Boeing refused.



So whatever happened to erring on the side of caution? Shouldn't a reasonable suspicion of system malfunction exceeding pilot actions, combined with a lack of conclusive evidence to establish that the airplane is otherwise safe, result in a grounding?

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/b...ane-crash.html

This stinks to high heaven. It's becoming clear that the profit motive was placed before safety, which seems to have been taken for granted. If it's true that a key piece of safety equipment was made 'optional' without fully disclosing that its absence could prove fatal to the aircraft, just in order to save some money, then there should be criminal charges for those involved at Boeing.

And to think we only know about this because some intrepid pilot(s) chose to illicitly record their conversation with Boeing.

[Gabriel]

This stinks to high heaven. It's becoming clear that the profit motive was placed before safety, which seems to have been taken for granted. If it's true that a key piece of safety equipment was made 'optional' without fully disclosing that its absence could prove fatal to the aircraft, just in order to save some money, then there should be criminal charges for those involved at Boeing.

And to think we only know about this because some intrepid pilot(s) chose to illicitly record their conversation with Boeing.

What safety equipment whose absence could prove fatal for the aircraft was made optional?

[3WE]

What safety equipment whose absence could prove fatal for the aircraft was made optional?

I believe he is referring to disagreement indicators...which I think we agree at least SEEM LIKE a "nice to have option"- and which has been touted as a notable difference between the crash aircraft and typical US aircraft.

Conversely, I think your point (and what Blubie should understand) is "what difference would it make" to have a disagree light?

A disagree light might be a little more insightful- and MAYBE it would have cued the crew, but I'm still wondering if the big spinning clacking non-airbus trim wheel was supposed to be the "backup indicator" in case DCAS was doing it's thing when it shouldn't.

And as Bobby reminds us- he'd turn off the switches (+ I ASSUME he would not let the plane get way out of trim first).

[Evan]

A disagree light might be a little more insightful- and MAYBE it would have cued the crew...

It definitely would have 'cued' the crew, but to what? IF they were well up—and I mean WELL up— on the Lion Air crash, it would have been a warning not to retract the flaps and to return asap. Even if they weren't, it would have been a warning that the stickshaker was erroneous (but they seemed to divine that one on their own).

I think, after the Lion Air crash Boeing should have, at the very least:

- issued a warning and procedural guidance for an erroneous MCAS activation (which they did, though not the best procedure IMHO).
- included in that procedure a clear instruction to a) not retract flaps and b) return as soon as possible (after burning down fuel if desired) in the event of an AoA disagree warning light.
- immediately grounded all 737Max aircraft not having an AoA warning light until they could be fitted with one.

This probably would have prevented any further crashes until the fleet could be upgraded with new MCAS software.

So, in this context, the AoA disagree light could have saved the day.

[Gabriel]

I believe he is referring to disagreement indicators...which I think we agree at least SEEM LIKE a "nice to have option"- and which has been touted as a notable difference between the crash aircraft and typical US aircraft.

It was not a decision to make the AoA disagree warning optional. It was an inadvertent mistake.
This AoA disagree warning is standard in the NG, where the AoA indicator itself is optional.
The intention was to leave this unchanged in the MAX. And I really believe that. You know the effort that Boing was putting to minimize the differences from a pilot point of view, it makes no sense to introduce this modification, especially since eliminating the disagree warning doesn't save an ounce of weight or a cent of money (it is just a message displayed in the PFD).
However, the disagree warning was accidentally left tied to the AoA indicator. So if the AoA indicator option was not selected, the disagree warning was inactive de facto. (by the way the AoA indicator is just another weightless and costless electronic indication on an existing screen of an existing parameter, costless for Boeing, I think that Boeing charges the airlines for this option).

Before the Ethiopian crash (and I believe before the Lion Air crash) Boeing realized of this mistake, but they judged the missing disagree warning not significant so they scheduled the correction of this mistake for the next scheduled software update. The accident(s) rushed this decision and the AD that will mandate the changes that the airlines will need to make to the MAX before further flight will include the update of this software to re-enable this feature (the AoA disagree warning, not the AoA indicator that remains optional), together with the changes in the logic of the MCAS, changes in the manual, and changes in the training, which all for the "return to flight" package.

[Evan]

(by the way the AoA indicator is just another weightless and costless electronic indication on an existing screen of an existing parameter, costless for Boeing, I think that Boeing charges the airlines for this option)

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