Originally posted by Evan
View Post
Announcement
Collapse
No announcement yet.
Breaking news: Ethiopian Airlines flight has crashed on way to Nairobi
Collapse
X
-
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
-
Very thoroughly damning article on Bloomberg from May 9th about how a company once focused on quality and safety above all else was taken over by a toxic executive culture prioritizing cost-cutting and shareholder value. The problem started long before Dennis Muilenburg, although it appears that Mullenberg has agreed to toe that line, which seems like a Faustian betrayal since he is a former engineer.
Originally posted by BloombergWhen Boeing, by then run by Stonecipher, embarked the following year on the 787 Dreamliner, it handed much of the work to outside suppliers in an attempt to keep down costs. The plane instead entered service three years late and billions of dollars over budget.
The next CEO, James McNerney, a former General Electric Co. executive, vowed no more “moonshots” in aircraft development.
Comment
-
Originally posted by Gabriel View PostWell, you quoted me saying that the AoA INDICATOR was just a graphical representation of an existing parameter on an existing display, and them you attached the picture of the AoA DISAGREE WARNING (which is another message on an existing display). So for completeness, here is the AoA indicator.
[ATTACH=CONFIG]24530[/ATTACH]
I think the disagree warning is more necessary than the indicator. Commercial pilots don't fly by AoA.
Comment
-
Originally posted by Evan View PostVery thoroughly damning article on Bloomberg from May 9th about how a company once focused on quality and safety above all else was taken over by a toxic executive culture prioritizing cost-cutting and shareholder value. The problem started long before Dennis Muilenburg, although it appears that Mullenberg has agreed to toe that line, which seems like a Faustian betrayal since he is a former engineer.
So, that was the foolish (one might even say 'blind') decision that killed the Y1 (B797), set the events leading to the fast-tracked 737-Max in motion and sealed the fate of 346 passengers and crew.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/featu...rificed-safety
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
Comment
-
Originally posted by Evan View PostAha. I thought we were talking about the fact that the disagree "light" being mentioned in the press is also a mere software fix as opposed to an optional bit of hardware.
especially since eliminating the disagree warning doesn't save an ounce of weight or a cent of money (it is just a message displayed in the PFD).
However, the disagree warning was accidentally left tied to the AoA indicator. So if the AoA indicator option was not selected, the disagree warning was inactive de facto. (by the way the AoA indicator is just another weightless and costless electronic indication on an existing screen of an existing parameter, costless for Boeing, I think that Boeing charges the airlines for this option).
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
Comment
-
Originally posted by Gabriel View PostWell, you quoted me saying that the AoA INDICATOR was just a graphical representation of an existing parameter on an existing display, and them you attached the picture of the AoA DISAGREE WARNING (which is another message on an existing display). So for completeness, here is the AoA indicator.
[ATTACH=CONFIG]24530[/ATTACH]Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
Comment
-
"Starting from the point where the Ethiopian pilots hit the cut-off switches and stopped MCAS from operating, the U.S. MAX crew tried in the simulator to recover. Even though the U.S. crew performed the simulator experiment at a normal speed of 250 knots instead of the more than 350 knots of the Ethiopian jet, the forces on the jet’s tail still prevented them from moving the manual wheel in the cockpit that would have corrected the nose-down attitude.
"To get out of it, the pilots used an old aviator technique called the “roller coaster” method — letting the yoke go to relieve the forces on the tail, then cranking the wheel, and repeating this many times. This technique has not been in U.S. pilot manuals for decades, and pilots today are not typically trained on it. Using it in the simulator, the U.S. MAX crew managed to save the aircraft but lost 8,000 feet of altitude in the process. The Ethiopian MAX never rose higher than 8,000 feet, indicating that from that point in the flight, the crew couldn’t have saved it."
Comment
-
Originally posted by Gabriel View PostStrange syllogism which, of course, is flawed. The fact that the 787 development went overboard may have influenced the decision to extend the life of the 737 with a new spin of modernization. But that's NOT what killed 346. Sure, if Boeing had developed the 797 instead of pushing on the 737 these accidents would not have happened. But neither would they have happened if Boeing didn't do anything at all (stay with the NG), or payed more attention when engineering the MCAS. The fact (because I consider it a fact) that, now, they will get it right, shows that it is something that could have been done since the beginning and it didn't need to be so flawed as it was.
So the question in my mind is, when James McNerney made that fateful decision back in 2007/2008, knowing that the new, game-changing engines were coming to market and would be a must have, what was he thinking?
Comment
-
Originally posted by Evan View PostBoeing could not have just stayed with the NG. That's the whole point. When Airbus announced the NEO, with its LEAP-1B engines, and American Airlines took an interest, Boeing had no choice but to offer a LEAP-1B version of their own, and they weren't going to fit on the NG. The industry was going to demand the new generation of larger, more efficient turbofans. That was a no-brainer. So Boeing scrambled to find a solution. The solution was rushed, it was complex and it added risk. Boeing knew that. Boeing just insisted that pilots could handle that risk. The rest is a sort of foregone conclusion because, as we all know (and knew then), that is not always true.
So the question in my mind is, when James McNerney made that fateful decision back in 2007/2008, knowing that the new, game-changing engines were coming to market and would be a must have, what was he thinking?
Comment
-
Originally posted by Evan View PostBoeing could not have just stayed with the NG. That's the whole point. When Airbus announced the NEO, with its LEAP-1B engines, and American Airlines took an interest, Boeing had no choice but to offer a LEAP-1B version of their own, and they weren't going to fit on the NG. The industry was going to demand the new generation of larger, more efficient turbofans. That was a no-brainer. So Boeing scrambled to find a solution. The solution was rushed, it was complex and it added risk. Boeing knew that. Boeing just insisted that pilots could handle that risk. The rest is a sort of foregone conclusion because, as we all know (and knew then), that is not always true.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
Comment
-
Originally posted by Gabriel View PostEven given all that, Boeing could have still designed the MCAS properly.
I'm reasoning that the die was cast when Boeing painted themselves into the box they found themselves back in 2010. I still can't imagine what they were thinking.
Boeing invested dearly in R&D for the 787. Why did they not then leverage that investment to produce the 797? The tech was already proven, all they needed to do was scale it down.
Instead, they shouldered all that investment into one airframe (the B787) which will probably not turn a profit for over a decade. Possibly never.
Even if they were adamant about not developing the 797, why didn't they end the 737 line and mod the 757 instead? A couple shortened versions would have carried the LEAP without a hitch. Throw in some FBW spoilers, a new flight deck and some composites and you have a fairly modern contender against the A320 NEO. Probably without needing a minlav...
Comment
-
Originally posted by Evan View PostThey didn't because they wouldn't have. Boeing has a history of undervaluing redundancy, unless you consider the pilot the redundancy.
I'm reasoning that the die was cast when Boeing painted themselves into the box they found themselves back in 2010. I still can't imagine what they were thinking.
Boeing invested dearly in R&D for the 787. Why did they not then leverage that investment to produce the 797? The tech was already proven, all they needed to do was scale it down.
Instead, they shouldered all that investment into one airframe which will probably not turn a profit for over a decade. Possibly never.
Even if they were adamant about not developing the 797, why didn't they end the 737 line and mod the 757 instead? A couple shortened versions would have carried the LEAP without a hitch. Throw in some FBW spoilers, a new flight deck and some composites and you have a fairly modern contender against the A320 NEO. Probably without needing a minlav...
Comment
Comment