If you say so.
Announcement
Collapse
No announcement yet.
Breaking news: Ethiopian Airlines flight has crashed on way to Nairobi
Collapse
X
-
Originally posted by TeeVee View Postthe blame i lay at the feet of the engineers is their silence. and insofar as they likely could have prevented these two tragedies, are equally to blame.
When the space shuttle Challenger exploded, a number of well-qualified engineering types were NOT silent... they said the launch should be postponed, but they were overruled by management.Be alert! America needs more lerts.
Eric Law
Comment
-
Originally posted by elaw View PostWhen the space shuttle Challenger exploded, a number of well-qualified engineering types were NOT silent... they said the launch should be postponed, but they were overruled by management.
This may or may not be an apples to apples comparison. Adding a system to prevent stalls versus launching at a temperature where we KNOW the O-rings were NOT SPECIFICALLY designed for. It's wow- who would have thought two crews would forget to use the thumb switch if MCAS accidentally kicked in...vs. Rubber gets hard when it's cold AND WE ALREADY KNOW THESE 0-RINGS HAVE LEAKED ON OCCASION...but lets not really tell upper management about that...
If a significant group of Boeing engineers said, "hey, there's a set of circumstances where this might be a death trap*see footnote" AND THEY WERE SILENCED, then maybe you've got something. Right now, I'm not so sure that it wasn't a big bunch of well-meaning folks who really never envisioned the swiss cheese of this...
To steal (and paraphrase) a comment from someone: "We are still not sure if this is "a much-needed, enhanced stick-pusher" OR a "make it feel the same pseudo-FBW system". (Don't interpret this as an absolute statement)
*Footnote: "Set of circumstances" to include Boeing Bobby NOT in the cockpit to turn off the trim switches.Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
Comment
-
Timeline:
1960 - The first low-bypass turbofans appear on commercial airliners.
I
I
1966 - Boeing introduces the JT8D-powered B737 with a bypass ratio of 1:1.
I
I
1969 - Boeing delivers the JT9D high-bypass turbofan-powered B747 with a bypass ratio of 5:1. From this point on, all new (clean-sheet) large-capacity airframes would feature high-bypass turbofans.
I
I
1984 - Boeing delivers the first high-bypass-powered B737, the Classic series, with an airframe-limited fan diameter of 60" and a bypass-ration of around 6:1.
I
I
Early 1990's - Engine manufacturers, in collaboration with Nasa and other research facilities, begin development on Ultrahigh-Bypass Turbofans with bypass ratios of 10:1 or greater.
I
I
1997 - Boeing delivers the first B737-NG, with an airframe-limited fan diameter of 61" and a max bypass ratio of 5:1. The CFM56-7 achieves greater efficiency through materials and aerodynamic technology advancements such as wide-chord fan blades. The CFM-56 efficiency is essentially maxed out at this point.
I
James McNerney becomes CEO of GE Aircraft Engines division. He is therefore well-aware of the future trend toward Ultrahigh-Bypass Turbofans.
I
I
2005 - James McNerney becomes CEO of Boeing. His emphasis is on cost reductions and stock performance.
I
I
2006 - Rolls Royce first runs the new Trent 1000 ultrahigh-bypass turbofan, destined to power the B787.
I
I
2007 - Boeing rolls out the first production B787. It incorporates a great deal of new technology and serves as an in-service testbed for the Y1. It also represents an enormous R&D investment, running billions over budget, that will delay B787 profitability for a decade or more. This weighs heavily on Boeing's current stock price performance.
I
I
2008 - Pratt & Whitney begin test-flights for the ultrahigh-bypass PW1000G. CFM announces the LEAP-X. It is now clear that these engines will be a customer requirement for new aircraft designs.
I
I
2009 - Boeing submits patent for the Y1, a design to replace the B737 with an airframe capable of mounting the new ultrahigh-bypass turbofans.
I
I
2010 - Airbus announces the A320 NEO. NEO stands for 'New Engine Option' and is centered on the ultrahigh bypass engines coming to market.
I
I
2011 - American Airlines announces an order for 460 narrowbody jets including 130 A320NEO's and 130 A320NEO's, and intended to order 100 re-engined 737 with CFM LEAPs, pending Boeing confirmation. The order broke Boeing's monopoly with the airline and forced Boeing into the re-engined 737 MAX.
I
Boeing announces the fast-tracked B737-MAX, officially postponing the Y1 replacement. Boeing engineers are tasked with fitting the CFM LEAP turbofan under an airframe that is too small to carry it. They are therefore forced to rely on artificial stability augmentation software to obtain certification.
I
I
2014 - CEO James McNerney announces "no more moonshots" in new airframe development, effectively backing the company away from technological innovation. He states that “All of us have gotten religion,” while speaking to Wall Street analysts at the annual investor conference in the Fairmont Olympic Hotel in Seattle.
I
I
2015 - James McNerney steps down as Boeing CEO. Of his more than $100M in compensation, over $25M is in the form of stock options. Thus, his potential wealth is tied to the company stock performance over the coming years.
I
I
2017 - Boeing begins delivery of its highly-profitable 737 MAX. Boeing stock price begins to soar sharply above $150/share.
I
I
October 29th, 2018 - Lion Air flight 610 crashes with the loss of 189 lives. The cause is determined to have involved malfunctioning artificial stability augmentation designed without any provision for sensor-input redundancy.
I
I
2019 - Boeing refuses to ground the B737-MAX pending an initial investigation despite calls from pilot's unions to do so. The FAA also refuses to mandate such a grounding.
I
I
March 10th, 2019 - Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crashes with the loss of 157 lives. The cause is again determined to involve a malfunction of the artificial stability augmentation system.
I
I
May 10th, 2019 - Boeing stock price is currently around $355/share, meaning James McNerney's approximately $25M in stock compensation has since increased in value by approximately $45M in just four years.
Summary:
Boeing management knew by the late 1990's that the ultrahigh-bypass market requirement was coming. They knew a single-aisle airframe suitable to these engines would be a necessity by 2015. They did nothing to begin production on a solution until a pending defection by American Airlines to Airbus forced their hand in 2011. The makeshift solution they devised required adding artificial stability augmentation to an outdated airframe. It was rushed through development and the design and certification process involved negligence that compromised safety. Priority was placed on minimal pilot transition time and new-type certification avoidance.
During the tenure of James McNerney as CEO, development on the ultrahigh-bypass Y1 B737 replacement was curtailed and emphasis was placed on cost reduction and stock price performance.
Boeing was left with an obsolete airframe modified to carry an engine it was never designed to carry, and was forced to rely on artificial stability to earn certification and remain competitive. In marketing the aircraft, Boeing relied on fleet-commonality with the B737NG and minimal pilot transition training. This resulted in safety compromises.
As the result of negligence on the part of Boeing and the FAA, 346 people lost their lives.
James McNerney earned an enormous profit from this strategy, as did every major shareholder of the company. This is clearly the motive behind the chain of decisions that postponed the Y1 and fast-tracked the development and marketing strategy of the inherently unsafe 737-MAX.
Comment
-
Originally posted by Evan View PostTimeline:
* * * * *
Including one of them that just almost lost a wing...
What were those engineers thinking, and were they silent?Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
Comment
-
Originally posted by BoeingBobby View PostBird strike! Must be Boeing's fault.
Stall warning
Unreliable airspeed
Moderately relentless nose over (that can result in an old-fashioned mechanical lock like the top link on a tractor)
You put all of that in combination (the combination is what's critical)
What the hell is going on, the plane has gone bezerk and I sure as hell shouldn't pull up, it will make the stall worse, and I have no idea if I have good airspeed...
Admittedly, it is much easier to pass judgement after the fact, but it seems to be a crappy design.
Should someone have noticed during the design phase? I don't know.
Edit:
In other news, my Subaru is being recalled because the brake light switch is glitchy...
But not only is that important from the standpoint that I don't get rear ended, apparently this also cues important safety features like anti-lock braking...Important crap like that jury rigged off of a lame brake light system...Oh the evil, profiteers and lying engineers!Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
Comment
-
Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
Sometimes, they whack an AOA vane.
AOA vanes crap out sometimes for other reasons.
I think it's probably better if single AOA failures (including bird-caused ones) don't enable an insistent dive system + effing up your airspeed indications (and other things Gabriel is going to list because he remembers all this stuff).Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
Comment
-
Originally posted by 3WE View PostNot sure where you are going...Bird strikes happen a LOT...
Sometimes, they whack an AOA vane.
AOA vanes crap out sometimes for other reasons.
I think it's probably better if single AOA failures (including bird-caused ones) don't enable an insistent dive system + effing up your airspeed indications (and other things Gabriel is going to list because he remembers all this stuff).
Comment
-
Two comments:
Boeing engineers are tasked with fitting the CFM LEAP turbofan under an airframe that is too small to carry it. They are therefore forced to rely on artificial stability augmentation software to obtain certification.
All the planes with under slung engines have a thrust-pitch coupling. While the engines in the MAX are further ahead than in the NG, they are not as low as in the NEO.
Second comment. Keep in mind: We are not talking about an obscure undetected bug burred in millions of lines of code or an unusual dynamic structural response that was not foreseen or a complex aerodynamic feedback that requires advanced modeling and wind tunneling to observe.
The took the trim system put an automation on it that has full authority to move the stabilizer to the stops based on a single source of information coming from an external sensor that other that its own failure modes is exposed to damage and took the input from said sensor at face value without comparing with a second source or making a data sanity/integrity check.
That is a big NO-NO in basic Aeroengineering 101 for dummies, equivalent to single pilot, single engine, or single hydraulic system or single electrical system. That is NOT acceptable by neither Boeing own standards or the FAA. It is NOT certifiable. And it is OBVIOUS.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
Comment
-
Originally posted by BoeingBobby View PostNo, I was just wondering if Evan thinks the bird worked for Boeing?
In any case, that should have zero fatal consequences.
Comment
-
Originally posted by Gabriel View PostAre you sure of that? Are you sure that the plane was not certifiable without the MACAS? Or was it more an attempt to keep the handling characteristics similar to the NG?
Second comment. Keep in mind: We are not talking about an obscure undetected bug burred in millions of lines of code or an unusual dynamic structural response that was not foreseen or a complex aerodynamic feedback that requires advanced modeling and wind tunneling to observe.
The took the trim system put an automation on it that has full authority to move the stabilizer to the stops based on a single source of information coming from an external sensor that other that its own failure modes is exposed to damage and took the input from said sensor at face value without comparing with a second source or making a data sanity/integrity check.
That is a big NO-NO in basic Aeroengineering 101 for dummies, equivalent to single pilot, single engine, or single hydraulic system or single electrical system. That is NOT acceptable by neither Boeing own standards or the FAA. It is NOT certifiable. And it is OBVIOUS.
Comment
-
Originally posted by Evan View PostNot really sure of anything until the report comes out, but I've read that it was needed to pacify the FAA into granting certification, since without it, the plane could, under certain conditions pitch itself into a stall. Autostall. Not the most helpful kind of automation.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
Comment
Comment