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  • Only somehow related (no MCAS involved, and the -500 is not an NG let alone a MAX), but interesting:

    Incident: UTAir B735 at Surgut on May 25th 2019, trim runaway

    Aviation Herald - News, Incidents and Accidents in Aviation

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Evan View Post
      I guess the answer to that question is: how much intellectual ability can we expect from pilots?

      If I had it my way, becoming an airline pilot (and thus the protector of hundreds of live every day) would require a strenuous discipline both in traditional piloting knowledge and engineering knowledge. The reason for this lies in the new reality of the job. There is no longer a flight engineer. The decision to remove the flight engineer involved the assumption that the pilots could take over those responsibilies through the digital flight deck provisions. Those provisions are meaningless if the pilots do not also have the flight engineering knowledge that has been removed with the flight engineer.


      Where do you draw the line? In terms of systems and architecture, pilots should know everything that is contained in the FCOM (MCAS should have been contained in the FCOM). Therefore, the FCOM (and FCTM's) has to be written to include everything pilots must know for both normal and abnormal operations. Knowing the FCOM from cover to cover cannot be considered "too much information". Before being given a type-rating, pilots should be extensively tested on FCOM knowledge. In addition to checkrides, pilots should be periodically quizzed on systems as described in the FCOM and the ramifications they have in abnormal situations. Moreover, pilots should feel a moral responsibility to be constantly augmenting their training with a general study of the aircraft and abnormal ops and upset recovery piloting techniques. I can't say it enough, piloting should come with a dreadful sense of responsibility.
      I actually agree to an extent. Personally, I have long advocated for more thorough systems training, particularly since it's sort of "my thing". I like systems, I've been known to read systems manuals for fun, including those of aircraft I've never flown, but that's just me. That said, there are pitfalls that come with too much information, I'll just touch on a few.

      Firstly, I don't see the benefit of knowing things I cannot address from the flight deck. E. g. it is of little use to know the exact signal pathways through SEC or ELACs since there is nothing I can do to affect those pathways. I can reset an ELAC, I can turn it off, but there's nothing I can do with it internally. Do I need to know what controls each computer affects? Absolutely. But the "engineering" of the computer itself? I suppose it's cool to know for the "gee-wiz" factor, but little else. I need to know what happens if an MMR fails. I don't need to know how it's put together or even what it looks like (and I don't).

      Secondly, too much technical knowledge can create the added risk of going down the wrong path to address a failure that may be better addressed by the relevant system just being isolated (de-powered, disconnected, whatever). In an emergency situation, we likely won't have time to do "engineer-level" troubleshooting. If something is misbehaving, put it out of business and work with what's left. With regards to specifically automation failures, my philosophy has always been to reduce the airplane to a Cessna, make it do what I need it to do, and then restore the automation (if appropriate). I don't necessarily need to know exactly how the automation failed. All I care is is it doing what I want it to or is it not?

      Thirdly (and this is particularly important, I think), too much knowledge can create even more expectation bias, that is to say, one may have seen a failure that was caused by a thingamabob with which he/she is familiar through amazing "engineering knowledge", and the next time he/she sees this failure, he/she may try to address it from the standpoint of the aforementioned thingamabob, while in fact the new failure was caused by a whatchamacallit. So, there's that.


      On a side note, I wouldn't deify F/Es too terribly much, they weren't necessarily system gods either, especially since the majority couldn't wait to get out of that seat and move forward.

      On another side note, better-written and better-designed FCOMs would be a big help. Both Bombardier and Airbus Frenglish are painful to deal with.

      Comment


      • Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
        ***my philosophy has always been to reduce the airplane to a Cessna, make it do what I need it to do and then restore the automation (if appropriate). I don't necessarily need to know exactly how the automation failed. All I care is is it doing what I want it to***
        What the phigoid does phulosophy have to do with anything?

        Follow the phugging procedures!
        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
          I actually agree to an extent. Personally, I have long advocated for more thorough systems training, particularly since it's sort of "my thing". I like systems, I've been known to read systems manuals for fun, including those of aircraft I've never flown, but that's just me. That said, there are pitfalls that come with too much information, I'll just touch on a few.

          Firstly, I don't see the benefit of knowing things I cannot address from the flight deck. E. g. it is of little use to know the exact signal pathways through SEC or ELACs since there is nothing I can do to affect those pathways. I can reset an ELAC, I can turn it off, but there's nothing I can do with it internally. Do I need to know what controls each computer affects? Absolutely. But the "engineering" of the computer itself? I suppose it's cool to know for the "gee-wiz" factor, but little else. I need to know what happens if an MMR fails. I don't need to know how it's put together or even what it looks like (and I don't).
          Yeah, I'm not suggesting that pilots must have actual electrical engineering knowledge of the avionics, but rather a general engineering knowledge of how the systems come together and interact and what their specific functions are in the grand scheme of things. I'm particularly concerned that they understand the ramifications of a given failure condition and the failure 'cascade' that might result.

          So, in your example, let's say you are dispatched with a MEL'd ELAC1, and then you lose the green hydraulic system in flight. Do you lose the left aileron? Or let's say same dispatch scenario and you then have some reason to reset ELAC2 in flight. Will doing that suddenly put you in alternate law without ailerons?

          That's the level of engineering knowledge I'm talking about.

          Comment


          • Originally posted by Evan View Post
            Yeah, I'm not suggesting that pilots must have actual electrical engineering knowledge of the avionics, but rather a general engineering knowledge of how the systems come together and interact and what their specific functions are in the grand scheme of things. I'm particularly concerned that they understand the ramifications of a given failure condition and the failure 'cascade' that might result.

            So, in your example, let's say you are dispatched with a MEL'd ELAC1, and then you lose the green hydraulic system in flight. Do you lose the left aileron? Or let's say same dispatch scenario and you then have some reason to reset ELAC2 in flight. Will doing that suddenly put you in alternate law without ailerons?

            That's the level of engineering knowledge I'm talking about.
            Ah yes, the glorious 5-page 27-93-01-2! The answer is no, we won't lose the left aileron. If we only lost the green pump, the PTU will take over, and the green system will remain pressurized. If we lost the fluid, the aileron will still be powered by the blue system, HOWEVER, we will be in alternate law. The answer to your second question is yes, it will go into alternate law momentarily while I'm resetting ELAC 2, but will come right out of it, if the reset is successful. Even if it doesn't, that's not any big deal, the airplane rolls beautifully on spoilers alone, even if we're down a spoiler per wing. Frankly, the rather extensive pre-flight procedure for that MEL is more of pain than not having ailerons. Probably why I've never seen that MEL used, it's easier to just replace the ELAC, takes all of 40 minutes, if that.

            Does every pilot actually NEED to know that? Maybe, maybe not. The ECAM and the SD will tell you what's working and what's not, you don't necessarily need to know why, as long as you know what to do about it.

            BTW, Evan, I'm surprised you didn't ask me if we'd lose BOTH ailerons in that Green system scenario. Now, THAT would have shown some real engineering brilliance on your part.

            Comment


            • i think that everyone would agree that today's ac are immensely complex beasts. i imagine that very few if any ac technicians can diagnose a problem and come up with the solution in a matter of minutes. i feel pretty safe in saying that ac are far more complex than your average car/motorcycle that use minimal electronics. i know from personal experience that diagnosing and fixing problems in these relatively simple vehicles sometimes confounds dealership mechanics that have full factory support at their fingertips. i had a 2006 bmw 528 that had an electronic gremlin that not even bmw's factory rep could figure out (ending up in bmw buying the car back from me).

              what evan is proposing (and i'm not for or against it) seems to be that pilots (whose primary job is flying), have a deep understanding of systems and inter-operativity, to the point that when something goes wrong during a critical phase of flight, they barely blink to work it out. and yeah, i get the part of "one fly the other work on the issue." that appears to have failed once or more times.

              who knows...

              Comment


              • Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
                Ah yes, the glorious 5-page 27-93-01-2! The answer is no, we won't lose the left aileron. If we only lost the green pump, the PTU will take over, and the green system will remain pressurized. If we lost the fluid, the aileron will still be powered by the blue system, HOWEVER, we will be in alternate law. The answer to your second question is yes, it will go into alternate law momentarily while I'm resetting ELAC 2, but will come right out of it, if the reset is successful. Even if it doesn't, that's not any big deal, the airplane rolls beautifully on spoilers alone, even if we're down a spoiler per wing. Frankly, the rather extensive pre-flight procedure for that MEL is more of pain than not having ailerons. Probably why I've never seen that MEL used, it's easier to just replace the ELAC, takes all of 40 minutes, if that.
                Yes! This level of system knowledge is what I'm talking about. I'm fairly convinced that there is a significant percentage of A320 pilots out there who could not have written that paragraph. Were you given this knowledge in type-training or is it the result of your personal curiosity for systems? I wish all pilots had that curiosity but I would also like it to be a requirement to learn the airplane on this level before ever getting a front seat. I know this raises the bar considerably and might cause a shortage of qualified pilots, but it seems to be what is lacking in so many incidents and accidents (just forget about the AirBlue captain who didn't understand the difference between pushing and pulling knobs on the FCU while flying into a mountainside.)

                Does every pilot actually NEED to know that? Maybe, maybe not. The ECAM and the SD will tell you what's working and what's not, you don't necessarily need to know why, as long as you know what to do about it.
                I'm talking about stealth factors which arise in unusual circumstances when that knowledge is missing. I think ECAM is pretty good at providing awareness and instructing pilot actions after a thing has happened, but sometimes it's about not doing a thing in the first place, because of the stealthy consequences.

                BTW, Evan, I'm surprised you didn't ask me if we'd lose BOTH ailerons in that Green system scenario. Now, THAT would have shown some real engineering brilliance on your part.
                Are you sure? I thought ELAC 2 uses the Blue system on the right aileron.

                There was also this snippit from Airbus Safety FIrst Magazine that I had in my files:

                To illustrate the method, let us consider an A320 under the following conditions:

                -- A dispatch with the ELAC 1 inoperative under MEL, and
                -- An HYD G SYS LO PR ECAM caution in flight

                These two failures lead to the loss of the left aileron:
                Click image for larger version

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                Comment


                • Originally posted by Evan View Post

                  Are you sure? I thought ELAC 2 uses the Blue system on the right aileron.

                  There was also this snippit from Airbus Safety FIrst Magazine that I had in my files:



                  [ATTACH=CONFIG]24970[/ATTACH]
                  I meant you could have showed off your knowledge that the green system actually powers both ailerons (as does the blue system).

                  Not sure what serial numbers/mod numbers that snippet applies to. On our birds the aileron should still be good.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
                    I meant you could have showed off your knowledge that the green system actually powers both ailerons (as does the blue system).

                    Not sure what serial numbers/mod numbers that snippet applies to. On our birds the aileron should still be good.
                    Ah yes, then there are avionics mods and updates to consider... (this came from a 2012 issue of Safety First)

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by TeeVee View Post
                      i think that everyone would agree that today's ac are immensely complex beasts. i imagine that very few if any ac technicians can diagnose a problem and come up with the solution in a matter of minutes. i feel pretty safe in saying that ac are far more complex than your average car/motorcycle that use minimal electronics. i know from personal experience that diagnosing and fixing problems in these relatively simple vehicles sometimes confounds dealership mechanics that have full factory support at their fingertips. i had a 2006 bmw 528 that had an electronic gremlin that not even bmw's factory rep could figure out (ending up in bmw buying the car back from me).

                      what evan is proposing (and i'm not for or against it) seems to be that pilots (whose primary job is flying), have a deep understanding of systems and inter-operativity, to the point that when something goes wrong during a critical phase of flight, they barely blink to work it out. and yeah, i get the part of "one fly the other work on the issue." that appears to have failed once or more times.

                      who knows...
                      Indeed.

                      And, as much as I'm enjoying the Evan-ATL technicalacronymcolorcode fest, when is the training that relentless pull ups often cause stalls (and which serial numbers vary)?
                      Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                        And, as much as I'm enjoying the Evan-ATL technicalacronymcolorcode fest...
                        I am, and a lot. Seriously.

                        when is the training that relentless pull ups often cause stalls (and which serial numbers vary)?
                        Well, that's the thing I wanted to call out. As much as I agree with Evan, sometimes quite basic airmanship could have saved the day too. Not remembering the memory items for UAS is no excuse to pull a 1.5G, 7000 fpm, 2500 ft climb, and then stall the plane, and then keep pulling up the whole time. If that was an irrational reaction out of sheer terror, I doubt that the pilot could have rationally identified the correct situation and recalled and applied the correct memory items.

                        And no, Evan, I am not saying use airmanship in lieu of established procedures and systems knowledge. Just that, as I said many times before, I don't trust a pilot to apply established procedures and systems knowledge if they don't have the Cessna 152 basic airmanship in place first.

                        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                          Just that, as I said many times before, I don't trust a pilot to apply established procedures and systems knowledge if they don't have the Cessna 152 basic airmanship in place first.
                          Evan has occasionally said some strange things...I'm not 100% sure what...possibly that KNOWLEDGE of fundamentals is OK...but no way in hell should you ever ever ever briefly pause and hold robust attitudes and power settings and briefly pause to consider exactly which acronym-laden memory checklist applies...THAT is wrong (insert little dot: . )
                          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                            Yes! This level of system knowledge is what I'm talking about. I'm fairly convinced that there is a significant percentage of A320 pilots out there who could not have written that paragraph. Were you given this knowledge in type-training or is it the result of your personal curiosity for systems? I wish all pilots had that curiosity but I would also like it to be a requirement to learn the airplane on this level before ever getting a front seat.
                            The problem is that learning the airplane to my (admittedly awesome and amazing, if not downright flabbergasting and mindboggling) level is nearly impossible to do through the FCOMs. They're written so poorly that one is lucky to have an idea on how to pour coffee after he/she is done with reading one. I've also maintained that FCOMs should be written more like user guides/learning guides rather than cumbersome, confusing, multihundred-page fact sheets, like they are now. E.g. there should be things like "here's system A, it's composed of components B, C, D, and E. If you see a failure of E, expect to see failure of J in system P or a failure of component M in system S etc etc." In other words, provide real-world operational stuff rather than just dry, rote info. Such guides do exist, but are usually based on tribal knowledge (or even the knowledge of a particular individual), are neither peer- nor manufacturer-reviewed and are not always terribly reliable.

                            In other words, it's not entirely fair to fault pilots for not having information that's not terribly accessible.

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
                              The problem is that learning the airplane to my (admittedly awesome and amazing, if not downright flabbergasting and mindboggling) level is nearly impossible to do through the FCOMs. They're written so poorly that one is lucky to have an idea on how to pour coffee after he/she is done with reading one. I've also maintained that FCOMs should be written more like user guides/learning guides rather than cumbersome, confusing, multihundred-page fact sheets, like they are now. E.g. there should be things like "here's system A, it's composed of components B, C, D, and E. If you see a failure of E, expect to see failure of J in system P or a failure of component M in system S etc etc." In other words, provide real-world operational stuff rather than just dry, rote info. Such guides do exist, but are usually based on tribal knowledge (or even the knowledge of a particular individual), are neither peer- nor manufacturer-reviewed and are not always terribly reliable.

                              In other words, it's not entirely fair to fault pilots for not having information that's not terribly accessible.
                              I only fault them for not seeking it out, for not making the effort or even having the interest to do so. You seem to do this. I don't think it is unreasonable to expect this from passenger airline pilots.

                              But I also fault the manufacturers for not making the FCOM's more as you describe (and operators for not updating them if equipment is updated or modified).

                              And I fault regulators for not requiring all of this. Nothing you describe above is unrealistic or unachievable, but it will never happen until the industry finds fault in the system.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                                And I fault regulators for not requiring all of this. Nothing you describe above is unrealistic of unachievable, but it will never happen until the industry finds fault in the system.
                                Should we ask regulators to write FCOMs and other manuals?
                                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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