Breaking news: Ethiopian Airlines flight has crashed on way to Nairobi

[Evan]

Should we ask regulators to write FCOMs and other manuals?

ATL is right. The FCOM's are anachronistically designed for the age of complex systems. We should ask regulators to require more user-friendly FCOM's with clear descriptions of systems and inter-systemic dependencies and system failure ramifications. There is an entire industry dedicated to doing just this. We should ask manufacturers to use that industry (or employ their own part of it) to create such manuals. We should ask pilots to do the diligence of constantly learning as much as they can from these manuals as well as from other sources.

[Bluefalcon]

And the bad news continues...

https://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Long-before-Boeing-737-Max-crash-Ethiopian-Air-13903351.php

An Ethiopian Airlines pilot told senior managers at the carrier months before one of its Boeing 737 Max jets crashed that more training and better communication to crew members were needed to avert a repeat of a similar disaster involving a Lion Air flight.

According to emails and documents reviewed by Bloomberg News, the pilot in December urged his superiors to bolster training on a 737 Max flight-control feature so crews would be better prepared for what the Lion Air pilots encountered in October before plunging into the Java Sea, killing all aboard.

"It will be a crash for sure," if pilots struggling with a malfunction of Boeing's flight-control system on the 737 Max also encountered, for example, a cockpit warning that they were flying too close to the ground, the pilot, Bernd Kai von Hoesslin, wrote in a Dec. 13 email...

In the December email, von Hoesslin reminded managers that flight crews could be overwhelmed by multiple warnings and cockpit alerts that can sound during an errant activation of MCAS. Problems with the system led to the 737 Max's global grounding in March and shook confidence in Boeing and its regulator, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.

Von Hoesslin, who identified himself in the documents as a certified 737 instructor, submitted his resignation to Ethiopian Airlines in April. The documents reviewed by Bloomberg, including the December email urging additional training, were attached to von Hoesslin's resignation letter.

In his email to several bosses, including those responsible for flight operations and safety, von Hoesslin called attention to the airline's flight simulator program. The simulators were based on Boeing's earlier 737 "Next Generation," or NG, family of jets, and the program didn't replicate MCAS, he said.

Although regulators and airlines around the world did not require that pilots train on a Max simulator after the Lion Air crash, Hoesslin took issue with the airline's approach.

"The sim program does not simulate the MCAS, thus using this older NG has serious drawbacks in our training when operating the Max," von Hoesslin wrote in an email. "I suggest alternate training methods."

In a separate email in November, von Hoesslin asked airline managers to provide more detail about MCAS to "those Max pilots who are not fully or even aware of how the Max MCAS" system functions. The request came after a flight operations manager at the airline circulated Boeing's November 6 service bulletin that described, without naming MCAS, how erroneous sensor data could cause the jet to pitch toward the ground automatically, and how pilots should respond....

While U.S. aviation regulators and Boeing issued warnings in November that included instructions on how pilots should respond to MCAS's activation, there was no call for simulator training. Ethiopian Transport Minister Dagmawit Moges has said the pilots followed proper procedures issued after the Lion Air crash.

[3WE]

And the bad news continues...

https://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Long-before-Boeing-737-Max-crash-Ethiopian-Air-13903351...

Maybe a bit over stated.

What do we think about adding a single slide to the iPad PowerPoint ‘-MinLav training that says, MCAS can go haywire and push the nose over, remember to use the thumb switch liberally, and don’t doddle on killing the power to the trim.

As the fundamentalists say, “Fly the plane, but, eventually check the checklists.”

[Evan]

In the December email, von Hoesslin reminded managers that flight crews could be overwhelmed by multiple warnings and cockpit alerts that can sound during an errant activation of MCAS.

This is what Boeing, the FAA and 3WE seem to have overlooked. The human mind has a performance envelope.

[3WE]

Yes...3WE has no appreciation of mental overload.

(3WE appreciates ATL's genius...Evan calls for cramming this AND MUCH MUCH more into pilot's heads, with no hint of hesitation...)

Ah yes, the glorious 5-page 27-93-01-2! The answer is no, we won't lose the left aileron. If we only lost the green pump, the PTU will take over, and the green system will remain pressurized. If we lost the fluid, the aileron will still be powered by the blue system, HOWEVER, we will be in alternate law. The answer to your second question is yes, it will go into alternate law momentarily while I'm resetting ELAC 2, but will come right out of it, if the reset is successful. Even if it doesn't, that's not any big deal, the airplane rolls beautifully on spoilers alone, even if we're down a spoiler per wing. Frankly, the rather extensive pre-flight procedure for that MEL is more of pain than not having ailerons. Probably why I've never seen that MEL used, it's easier to just replace the ELAC, takes all of 40 minutes, if that.

Does every pilot actually NEED to know that? Maybe, maybe not. The ECAM and the SD will tell you what's working and what's not, you don't necessarily need to know why, as long as you know what to do about it.

BTW, Evan, I'm surprised you didn't ask me if we'd lose BOTH ailerons in that Green system scenario. Now, THAT would have shown some real engineering brilliance on your part.

[Evan]

Yes...3WE has no appreciation of mental overload.

(3WE appreciates ATL's genius...Evan calls for cramming this AND MUCH MUCH more into pilot's heads, with no hint of hesitation...)

Amassing knowledge over time is probably within the perfomance envelope of any commercial pilot (if not, it should be) but performing on that knowledge in an instant may not be, especially when that instant is born of confusion. That's my point.

[3WE]

Amassing knowledge over time is probably within the perfomance envelope of any commercial pilot (if not, it should be) but performing on that knowledge in an instant may not be, especially when that instant is born of confusion. That's my point.

Ok...so what's wrong with a simple reminder to not take any schitt off a 737-MAX if it starts insisting it wants to nose over...why is THAT the overload?

And if multiple warnings are going off, what's wrong with holding robust attitudes and power settings for 15 seconds to sort through them? (I'm the one who doesn't get it?)

Falcon's article (which is probably written to sell magazines) was describing intense new training requirements. Just saying simple is good because it is already complicated thanks to scientific engineering.

Never mind, you object to that situation because it closely resembles that general rule of "keep flying the plane"...Would you like it better if I said if you note the plane entering brown attitude mode, 1. TOGA, 2. Use nose up trim as appropriate to achieve blue-brown flight mode 3. When stabilized, activate the TPDS

[Evan]

Ok...so what's wrong with a simple reminder to not take any schitt off a 737-MAX if it starts insisting it wants to nose over...why is THAT the overload?

Have you really not been paying attention to all that we've learned from both of these crashes (and by we I mean us, Boeing, the FAA and everyone involved in commercial aviation)? It is the OVERLOAD and degraded situational awareness and unusual command-control responses that get in the way of simple airmanship. I guess, when Boeing and the FAA failed to ground the -MAX after the Lion Air crash, they just didn't consider this. You are thinking like they were thinking, before they started thinking clearly. Of course, now that a hard lesson has been taught, they seem to get it. What is your excuse?

The human mind has a performance envelope. When you exceed that envelope, the mind structurally fails. If an aircraft design involves things that can potentially exceed the performance envelope of the human mind, it cannot be considered airworthy.

CLEARLY the MCAS failure scenario, in its entirety, exceeded the performance envelope of the human mind. Twice.

[3WE]

Who's not paying attention?

CLEARLY the [fancy computer enhancement system] failure scenario, in its entirety, exceeded the performance envelope of the human mind. 30? times.

But nah, we can't talk about fundamentals that might span from C-150's to A-380s and add much-needed simplicity...that can't help overload at all...none, period.

[elaw]

As if this fire needed any more fuel: https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/30/polit...tor/index.html

[Evan]

But nah, we can't talk about fundamentals that might span from C-150's to A-380s and add much-needed simplicity...that can't help overload at all...none, period.

Sure, we can talk about it for ten years. You are proof of that. But where does it get us, when the problem lies elsewhere?

For example, to mount the LEAP engines on the 737, Boeing added much-needed complexity. To meet the efficiency targets of the current age also requires complexity. The job 'commercial airline pilot' now requires complex knowledge. You can't do the job with just your legendary Cessna skills. You also can't do the job if the complexity is so complex that you can't make sense of it. Drawing that line is the challenge of modern aircraft engineering. And you can't draw that line until you understand the performance envelope of the human mind. This is where Boeing failed on the 737-MAX. I thinked they've since learned that. I wish you would too.

[3WE]

Blah blah blah...And you can't draw that line until you understand the performance envelope of the human mind. This is where Boeing failed on the 737-MAX. blah, blah, blah, personal jab.

Dude...I hate what I read about how MCAS works...I find myself hating engineers...I also hate heavy management that seems to forget things that PEON's deal with.

I think the MCAS crashes are not so much MCAS but lots of blinking red lights- Gabbiee's stall warning and the nose is falling like in a stall and crap, is my speed good or isn't it are bad Swiss cheese layers.

I just threw out a random thought after reading an article calling for ALL SORTS OF ADDITIONAL TRAINING…

It might even have contained a tad of sarcasm and over-simplification.

Please reconcile how you can trash me for talking about SIMPLIFYING things by saying that things are TOO COMPLICATED...Your logic fails. A huge NEW training program JUST FOR MCAS isn't helping the thing you keep citing...the schitt hits the fan and how many red blinking lights go off? (Please continue to deny that fundamentals can help and training can focus on when the particular serial number DEVIATES.)

I promise you, that the industry is NOT going to adapt what you want...What I'd like to see, what you'd like to see, what Gabieee would like to see. Boeing and the FAA are making good progress on MCAS adjustments. Edit: I initially missed Eric's post...how do you like that...no need for a simulator...just remember that if the dang thing starts nosing over on you, (and you are in a -'MinLav) don't take any crap off of it...mash the nose up button on the yoke until it feels good and then go looking for those Boeing Bobby switches...) (That's Boing and the FAA, not 3BS- just so you are clear).

As you say, keep ranting...10 years for you too...

AS ATL once said, this forum ain't impacting anything.

After the bicycle ride and flying lessons, apply at the FAA for a regulatory position. Your application will benefit if you are a veteran of the armed services.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ebo0aLLPYwA (Note: As corny and hyperbolic and exaggerated as the YouTube is, the issue is very real.) (But a disclaimer, I am sure that tons of human performance psychological scientific engineer type folks think very very very very very hard on how to design systems...Heck, we might be surprised at how cool the designed things...yeah, today MCAS looks bad, but it's not as simple as you or I like to think it is to design these things).

[Evan]

Please reconcile how you can trash me for talking about SIMPLIFYING things by saying that things are TOO COMPLICATED...Your logic fails. A huge NEW training program JUST FOR MCAS isn't helping the thing you keep citing...the schitt hits the fan and how many red blinking lights go off? (Please continue to deny that fundamentals can help and training can focus on when the particular serial number DEVIATES.)

First off, that wasn't meant to be a personal jab. I seriously don't understand how you can continue to ignore all the lessons we have learned about basic UNIVERSAL fundamentals not saving the day due to either a lack of discipline for procedures or a lack of literacy on systems. Weve learned that:

- complex, modern aircraft have stealth factors involved in system failure scenarios that can lead to pilot error, necessitating adherence to procedure;

- complex, modern aircraft have failure scenarios that can disorient and overwhelm pilots who are not familiarized with these scenarios, which leads to pilot error;

- occasionally a complex system is poorly designed whereby a failure scenario is overwhelming even for pilots who are familiar with it (see: B737-MAX);

- the mind has a performance envelope and exceeding that envelope can cause structural damage to the thought process, leading to such things as spatial disorientation, confirmation bias, tunnelling, bad judgment and disastrous gut reactions;

- all of the above applies to even the most zen Cessna pilot with stainless fundamental airmanship, assuming they are mere mortals.

I don't mean to trash talk you, I want to know why you so intransigently refuse to recognize these things. Every time a crash occurs where pilot error is involved, you go back to the same old saw about basic fundamentals: 'why didn't they just...'. At some point, don't you want to understand why that is?

Complexity, if well-designed, is not the problem. The problem is that certain pilots refuse to embrace this new (and necessary) reality and take responsibility for the systems admin side of the job.

Although not in the case of these -MAX crashes, where the system design was the problem - but not due to complexity; due to simplicity. Also, I agree that the -MAX erroneous-MCAS training need not be overly complex, rather simple in fact (counter-pitch, counter-trim, get some flaps out, ignore stall warning, burn off fuel and return) however, once the system has redundant AoA inputs and a disagree warning, it's unlikely to ever happen again anyway.

[Gabriel]

- the mind has a performance envelope and exceeding that envelope can cause structural damage to the thought process, leading to such things as spatial disorientation, confirmation bias, bad judgment and disastrous gut reactions

The problem is that an event that triggers such an emotional reaction to the point that it shuts down your rational one, will likely leave you unable to use whatever you've learnt of the systems and their interaction, or even to apply the memory items. If not pulling up hard when the stall warning goes out (or when the AP suddenly disengages at 35000 ft) has not become instinctive enough to overcome that emotional reaction, neither will "UAS, call memory items please". Basic airmanship comes FIRST. You will hardly have a pilot that acts as an effective systems manager if he is not a pilot first (either because he just doesn't have what it takes or because he just lost it to emotion).

[Evan]

The problem is that an event that triggers such an emotional reaction to the point that it shuts down your rational one, will likely leave you unable to use whatever you've learnt of the systems and their interaction, or even to apply the memory items. If not pulling up hard when the stall warning goes out (or when the AP suddenly disengages at 35000 ft) has not become instinctive enough to overcome that emotional reaction, neither will "UAS, call memory items please". Basic airmanship comes FIRST. You will hardly have a pilot that acts as an effective systems manager if he is not a pilot first (either because he just doesn't have what it takes or because he just lost it to emotion).

No argument. You can't do anything until you stabilize. I don't think anyone is arguing that. Even with the UAS memory items, first you have to get it under control. But we are talking about problems that developed over a period of time, where crews did have time to think and analyze, leading to a crash, that were the result of an inadequate understanding of system behaviors in unusual failure situations.