Breaking news: Ethiopian Airlines flight has crashed on way to Nairobi

[TeeVee]

Boeing sued by more than 400 pilots in class action over 737 MAX's 'unprecedented cover-up'


https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-...7-max/11238282

i'm gonna go on the record and state that this suit will fail. i haven't read the actual complaint, but i'm guessing that no single airline has furloughed 400 pilots as a result of the max grounding.

[vaztr]

Boeing sued by more than 400 pilots in class action over 737 MAX's 'unprecedented cover-up'

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-23/over-400-pilots-join-lawsuit-against-boeing-over-737-max/11238282

[TeeVee]

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48631362

"I can tell you first hand that the startle-factor is real, and it's huge. And it absolutely and it quickly interferes with one's ability to quickly analyse the crisis and take effective action."

"Within seconds, these crews would have been fighting for their lives in the fight of their lives."

"While everyone has a duty to keep passengers and crew safe, he said, 'first, we should design aircraft for them to crew that do not have inadvertent traps set for them'".

[Evan]

If you loose the FADEC (both channels) for a given engine, you've lost control of the engine. Either the engine will self-shut down or it will keep at a constant fuel metering valve setting, constant stator vanes position, constant bleed air doors setting, etc. t that point the only control you have is cut the fuel and shut it down.

I recall the situation with Quantas Flt 32, where the data signal from the thrust levers to the FADEC was severed and the engine remained at its current thrust. I thought it was designed to go to flight idle or even shut down, but then again, that wasn't actually a FADEC failure. In any case, not ideal.

BUT, the plane can be designed to keep working with automatic thrust, automatic acceleration and deceleration schedules, etc. An engine failure can be made almost transparent for the pilot. Of course he will need to consider that his service ceiling and go-around climb gradient are lower, and that if he looses another engine he is in a glider.

Yes, but it sort of already is, since the thing has dual, redundant channels. I'm not aware of a case of dual channel FADEC failure. Perhaps a single channel is a MEL item and the second channel failed? I don't have any precedent fo that. Maybe you do...

[Gabriel]

On the A320, when you lose FADEC, you lose N1 and N2 limit protections. You lose automated control of engine thrust ratings. You lose automated acceleration and deceleration scheduling. You lose bleed valve scheduling. And then there are system interdependencies. How does an EIU fault affect FADEC? How does an LGCIU fault affect FADEC?

If you loose the FADEC (both channels) for a given engine, you've lost control of the engine. Either the engine will self-shut down or it will keep at a constant fuel metering valve setting, constant stator vanes position, constant bleed air doors setting, etc. t that point the only control you have is cut the fuel and shut it down.

BUT, the plane can be designed to keep working with automatic thrust, automatic acceleration and deceleration schedules, etc. An engine failure can be made almost transparent for the pilot. Of course he will need to consider that his service ceiling and go-around climb gradient are lower, and that if he looses another engine he is in a glider.

[Gabriel]

I don't think FADEC is a perfect metaphor for flight control systems. There are fewer interdependencies and thus fewer failure ramifications..

And that's where the added complexity of the systems and their integration and, communication and interaction (which again adds a lot of complexity) comes into play.
The FADEC has been FA and D since the 70's if I am not mistaken, So we are 40 years ahead of that with the technology. The reliability, speed, capability and memory capacity of the electronics has multiplied many-times-fold since then.

I have no doubt that the technology and engineering capacity exist TODAY (or 10 years ago) to make it happen.
I suspect that it did not happen mostly because or regulatory burden and liability issues (if the pilot f-up in a reasonable good design, we will not be liable, if the computer kills everybody on board because of a design or reliability issue we will be liable, even if that happens 1/100th of the times that everybody dies because a pilot f-ups in situations where this technology would have saved the day).
But there is a point where the steep needs to be taken, An I think that we are reaching this point.

Again, I'm not suggesting that we need to add complexity that allows pilots to start reconfiguring systems in flight beyond what is necessary. I'm just pointing out that, when the systems are designed to reconfigure, the pilots need to know (or have quick reference to) all the ramifications of those reconfigurations.

The thing is that we need to add complexity behind the scene to get a simple user interface and a better self-enclosed robust solution. The reconfiguration should have no ramifications other than the added risk because you lost some redundancy. Just like in a multiple-channel FADEC.

[ATLcrew]

On the A320, when you lose FADEC, you lose N1 and N2 limit protections. You lose automated control of engine thrust ratings. You lose automated acceleration and deceleration scheduling. You lose bleed valve scheduling. And then there are system interdependencies. How does an EIU fault affect FADEC?

Easy there, cowboy. Which engines are we talking about? Which mod status? Also, this is the first time I've ever seen the term "scheduling" used as regards bleed valves. For that matter, which bleed valves are we talking about?

[Evan]

Again, I don't think this will be the path that airliners design will take in the future. Think FADEC. FADEC sorts all issues internally, or it doesn't work.

I don't think FADEC is a perfect metaphor for flight control systems. There are fewer interdependencies and thus fewer failure ramifications. It is also very robust. On the A320, an ENG 1(2) FADEC A (B) FAULT is passive situation, since the B channel simply takes over without ramifications. But an ENG 1(2) FADEC FAULT (where both channels have failed) does have ramifications that pilots need to be aware of.

On the A320, when you lose FADEC, you lose N1 and N2 limit protections. You lose automated control of engine thrust ratings. You lose automated acceleration and deceleration scheduling. You lose bleed valve scheduling. And then there are system interdependencies. How does an EIU fault affect FADEC? How does an LGCIU fault affect FADEC?

I get your point about it being all or nothing (if both channels fail). Again, I'm not suggesting that we need to add complexity that allows pilots to start reconfiguring systems in flight beyond what is necessary. I'm just pointing out that, when the systems are designed to reconfigure, the pilots need to know (or have quick reference to) all the ramifications of those reconfigurations.

[Gabriel]

I pointed out that the knowledge required to pilot the aircraft of the present and of the future require a more complex array of traditional airmanship and systems admin expertise. There will be more complexity in understanding these systems and how they alter pilot action requirements and automation behaviors in varying degrees of degradation, when one or more components fail or malfunction. The skill set required to be a pilot will have to involve a strong aptitude for systems.

[...] a complex knowledge is still required here. For one thing, the transition requires a good understanding of what is lost, how it will affect handling and flight control and what pilot actions are now necessary (such as manual pitch trim or thrust-lock on the A320). For another, the goal of reconfiguration laws is not to remain in manual flight with degraded protections, it is to allow the crew to continue flying while working the problem and restoring systems and autoflight. This is especially true of the direct law and purely mechanical backup levels. Thirdly, in degraded states, pilot commands may still be blended with automated ones in different ways then they are used to under normal conditions and things like flight directors may still be functional but not reliable. Crews must understand and anticipate this.

I was talking about an increasingly complex understanding of the aircraft, not the physical complexity of the aircraft itself (which may become reduced by technology). I was talking about how, as ever-higher efficiency is demanded from protected aircraft, that efficiency and protection may come from systems such as augmented stability and conditional command interventions. It will come from systems that provide exacting flight surface control beyond human capability. It might even come from wing designs that can reconfigure across their surfaces in much more complex ways. As these systems are added, pilots will have to have a greater systems-side mastery to cope with failures. All of which means the standards for recruiting, vetting and training pilots will have to evolve and the job itself might require a much different mindset with different strengths and talents than those of the past.

Again, I don't think this will be the path that airliners design will take in the future. Think FADEC. FADEC sorts all issues internally, or it doesn't work. There is no way for a pilot to turn switches or pull breakers to "reconfigure" the FADEC, and there is no automatic internal reconfiguration in the FADEC that ends up with the FADEC working identically from the pilot point of view, or not working at all. Pilot's don't need to understand how the different computers, sensors and other inputs (like the thrust levers position) interact for the FADEC to produce the output it does. There is no FCOM that describes how the FADEC work and what will it do in different failure scenarios. For example, nowhere is it explained that if the FADEC senses an uncommanded reduction in fuel flow it will open the fuel metering valve beyond the normal setting for the required thrust, and that that will not be reflected in a movement of the thrust lever position (even in a Boeing). Oh, and the pilots don't complain that this is not explained, as they did complain of the MCAS, and rightfully, because the MCAS is not self-enclosed and self-troubleshooting like the FADEC. The FADEC has no equivalent to the "cutout switches" that will give you manual control. The pilots DON'T NEED TO KNOW how it works, because the FADEC work out its issues internally with no pilot intervention, doesn't change its behavior (from the pilot's point of view) when doing so, and if it does so incorrectly or what it does is not enough, there is nothing that the pilot can do anyway.

I think that the design philosophy of the whole airplane will be headed in the same direction. Except:
- Perhaps with 1 intermediate status between "working" and "not working", which would be a friendly Cessna like (or 747-200 like) direct law coupled with raw flight parameters and raw navigation (but you still can have a simple autoflight, like a Cessna does).
- Critical information regarding system degradation (with NO performance degradation, but with risk of performance degradation if further system degradation occurs) relayed to the pilot so he can calmly make an informed diversion decision.

[3WE]

Blah Blah Blah

Not sure I totally agree, but will only bet a single beer, recognizing the risk that I might be the one buying.

[3WE]

Answer:

Yes

Thank you. (Additional verbiage is OK too)

Not_Answer:

"All RJ's now have FBW and autothrottles" + suggestions for Nervocalm.

Sugerencia para píldoras que mejoran la comprensión & eventual red font.

[Evan]

Blah blah blah

I pointed out that the knowledge required to pilot the aircraft of the present and of the future require a more complex array of traditional airmanship and systems admin expertise. There will be more complexity in understanding these systems and how they alter pilot action requirements and automation behaviors in varying degrees of degradation, when one or more components fail or malfunction. The skill set required to be a pilot will have to involve a strong aptitude for systems.

ATL pointed out that the SOP might be to take entire systems out of the loop rather than attempt to reconfigure them. So, If I understand him correctly, if there is a problem with autoflight, you kill autoflight, or if there is a problem with envelope protection, you shut that down and fly without it. This happens automatically; the systems rule their inputs unreliable or the situation beyond the limits of their capability or detect logic errors within themselves. The crew can always reduce the systems complexity to a minimal state and fly the plane manually.

But a complex knowledge is still required here. For one thing, the transition requires a good understanding of what is lost, how it will affect handling and flight control and what pilot actions are now necessary (such as manual pitch trim or thrust-lock on the A320). For another, the goal of reconfiguration laws is not to remain in manual flight with degraded protections, it is to allow the crew to continue flying while working the problem and restoring systems and autoflight. This is especially true of the direct law and purely mechanical backup levels. Thirdly, in degraded states, pilot commands may still be blended with automated ones in different ways then they are used to under normal conditions and things like flight directors may still be functional but not reliable. Crews must understand and anticipate this.

I was talking about an increasingly complex understanding of the aircraft, not the physical complexity of the aircraft itself (which may become reduced by technology). I was talking about how, as ever-higher efficiency is demanded from protected aircraft, that efficiency and protection may come from systems such as augmented stability and conditional command interventions. It will come from systems that provide exacting flight surface control beyond human capability. It might even come from wing designs that can reconfigure across their surfaces in much more complex ways. As these systems are added, pilots will have to have a greater systems-side mastery to cope with failures. All of which means the standards for recruiting, vetting and training pilots will have to evolve and the job itself might require a much different mindset with different strengths and talents than those of the past.

[BoeingBobby]

Stay away from negative people. They have a problem for every solution.

Albert Einstein

[Gabriel]

See Red Font

What's the GREAT ADDED complexity for TOMORROW?

More complex inside. Simpler, user-friendly, user interface (which keeps simple and user-friendly, but effective, even in abnormal situations). FUTURE

My comment was just that these days of intrinsic simplicity are gone. About every new-design passenger jet out of the factory (and pretty much every new mid-size or larger bizjet) have autothrottle and fight by wire, which adds a lot of complexity to the systems architecture but not necessarily to operating the plane. FUTURE

My prediction (which can very well be wrong), unlike ATL's, is that there will be more system integration with a unified interface, in a way that differences between redundant systems and lack of consistency between different parameters (like that if we are flying horizontally, the fuselage is horizontal, and the vertical speed is zero, then the AoA is NOT 40 degrees, this is the kind of sanity check that Boeing seems to be adding to the MCAS) will be dealt with internally by the system(s) but the pilots will not need to do anything or even know abut the issue except by an EICAS message of the type "We just killed the AoA#2, you lost 1 live (i.e. level of redundancy), you have 4 lives left". The plane will keep being basically the same plane for the pilots (in the way it flies, in the way the information is presented in the panel, etc) until you reach to perhaps 2 lives left. At that point it becomes a Cessna 172. At zero lives left you are along for the ride (down), but the chances to get to 2 lives (let alone zero) will be extremely negligible. FUTURE (and again, this is a more complex design for a simpler, less complex user interface)

ATL says that the future will be isolating failing systems and working with what's left. And he is probably right in the short term, for the evolution of the current systems in the next generations of the current airplanes. FUTURE

But I think that in the longer term (but not as long as having only 1 pilot in the cockpit, let alone zero, both things that almost sure will become true eventually), the system will do that by itself and keep enough robustness that the pilot will not even realize, the plane will not lose any function, characteristic, or displayed parameter since all the parameters will be measured from different sources AND calculated based on other parameters with enough redundancy that it will almost never happen that you lose so much redundancy that the autoflight, control law, flight characteristics or information presented will be affected. FUTURE (and again, this is a more complex design for a simpler, less complex user interface)

Blah blah blah- you and Evan said things would get more complicated and that pilots would have to learn even more stuff...It's a couple pages back, but you said it

I didn't say the underlined part. I did say this in response to Evan:

If anything, airliners are going to become ever more complex...

I think they will

... and flying them when things go wrong is going to require an ever more complex understanding.

I think it won't. I think troubleshooting and failures management will be increasingly automated too.

Which again, "will" and "won't" is about FUTURE, (and additionally "won't" is about how things are NOT going to be in the future).

Yes, airplanes will have a very similar configuration to the 1968's 737-100 (one pressurized fuselage, horizontal and vertical tails, and wings with one engine under each). But they will be a more complex design, with more complex systems and more interaction between them, but with (or all that allowing for) a simpler, less complex user interface. FUTURE.

[3WE]

See Red Font

Actual deign of the airplane? The plane itself? What is the plane itself? The TIT gauge counts as the plane itself but the 3 ELAC and 2 SEC don't?

Sorry, but I don't get it. In airplanes where the control surfaces are flight-by-wire, the engines are FADEC Today , with modern digital autoflight systems Today , and where the instrument panel does not show directly any sensed parameter Today but each indication is computed from many sensed parameters, Today the computers (hardware and software) is as important and central to the design and operation as the engines, wings, tail, etc... Today

What's the GREAT ADDED complexity for TOMORROW?

Planes will keep having one pressurized fuselage No new complexity that will have attached a vertical fin with a rudder, a horizontal trimmable stabilizer with elevators, No new complexity and 2 wings with ailerons, spoilers, slats, flaps, and 1 engine each. No new complexity Just like the 737 that made the first revenue flight in February 1968, more than 50 years ago. No new complexity Just like the latest airplanes to enter revenue service like the 787, 350 and C-series. If that's your measure of complexity, then you are right, planes are not going to be more complex. Happy? Yes, you finally ADDRESSED my premise (you could have offered a counter argument- but you really were all over the place EXCEPT my point.) Except that they will because that's not THE measure of complexity and there is no such thing as the plane itself but not the systems, computers, sensors, software and instrument panel.

Blah blah blah- you and Evan said things would get more complicated and that pilots would have to learn even more stuff...It's a couple pages back, but you said it.

And about talking more about the past than the future, correct (although I would say past and present than the future). That's because I have more data, information and knowledge of the past and present that I do about the future. hat said, I gave my vision of what I think the future will look like and commented on ATLs vision of the future and sidestepped 3BS's alternative vision of the future (which Evanie actually understood). The part I did not say about the future (until just above in this post) is that planes will not have more than 2 engines. It is so obvious that I didn't even think of that, and in my opinion that's a tiny part of the complexity. Yeah, time for some comprehension pills, the resin fumes from the cheap composites are getting to you...Its not JUST about the engines, I mentioned OTHER things. I also bet new planes won't have DCAS. I bet new planes won't have tail-engine-extra-elevators. I bet new planes won't have laminar flow wings. I bet new planes won't tell the pilot the AOA...I could be wrong- we could have lithium ion batteries to cut back on the need for generators, and as I said, I'm sure there will be a few "new complexities".

But again, you and Evan said things were going to be getting worse...I said maybe not...You said a lot of stuff.

Here you have a couple of planes with 4 engines:

[ATTACH=CONFIG]25158[/ATTACH] [ATTACH=CONFIG]25159[/ATTACH]

And here you have a couple of twins:

[ATTACH=CONFIG]25160[/ATTACH] [ATTACH=CONFIG]25161[/ATTACH]

I said that I expected computer improvements? Did you not read that? Did the resin fumes kill your short term memory. Is there some reason you need to REPEATEDLY show me that computers are useful to bring simplicity? I know that and acknowledged it several times. I'll just ask if you expect planes to be more complicated and take lots more system training like you and Evan said a long time back. ALSO FOR THE RECORD...YOU ARE TALKING PAST TO TODAY...THE QUESTION IS THE FUTURE...BUT YOU NO COMPRENDE.