Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Aeroflot Superjet 100 fire and evacuation at UUEE

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    [Blue fornt]Yes, after five predictive windshear warnings, It must have come as a total surprise. [/Blue font].
    Immaterial if the decision was made that we better friggen land the plane because we're not sure if it's safely airworthy or not.

    I'm sure the plane looks totally normal to you from 0 ft AGL and 0 knots on your computer keyboard. I keep hoping the view from 15 knots and 1 ft AGL on the bicycle will be of some value.

    Now how about the other four things I listed?

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    -Wind shear (probably unexpected)
    [Blue fornt]Yes, after five predictive windshear warnings, It must have come as a total surprise. [/Blue font].

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by TeeVee View Post
    3BS: aside from the lightning strike and "partial" electrical failure, what else was not in pilot control? seems like these two screwed just about everything to hell from 260' to where the aircraft stopped...
    -Faster than normal (BUT PRESCRIBED) approach speed.
    -Significantly reduced (BUT PRESCIBED) flap settings
    (I dunno Bobby, will that affect the handling?)
    -Wind shear (probably unexpected)
    -No automatic spoilers
    -No radio to get wind, altimeter setting, traffic

    There’s 5 and I’m just an ass hat parlor talker.

    Leave a comment:


  • TeeVee
    replied
    3BS: aside from the lightning strike and "partial" electrical failure, what else was not in pilot control? seems like these two screwed just about everything to hell from 260' to where the aircraft stopped...

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    “Gross”

    Nah, the plane wasn’t stuck by lightning and compromised...
    I say it LOOKS like gross pilot error because the approach was absolutely stable down to 1100' AGL, suggesting that the plane was sufficiently controllable (as does all of the research I've done on SSJ direct law behavior), but then after not one, not two, not three, and not four but five WINDSHEAR AHEAD, GO AROUND warnings AND dropping below glideslope AND unstable on speed while attempting to land overweight on a wet runway 24L with 30kt winds from 190° the crew failed to GO-AROUND. The windshear warning alone should be a no-bones-about-it go-around unless there is some overriding reason to continue (i.e. control issues, thrust issues in both engines, fuel emergency or fire). None of those boxes appear to be checked here.

    There's no joy in this 3WE. But the point of crash investigations is to determine what went wrong.

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan
    So, overall, it looks like gross pilot error
    “Gross”

    Nah, the plane wasn’t stuck by lightning and compromised...

    The joy of pilot admonishment on display.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    FDR results are in.

    - The control law was DIRECT after a partial electrical failure (lightning strike?).

    - The approach was a precision approach on ILS (the aircraft was adequately controllable).

    - Flaps were set as 25°, appropriate for the overweight landing. Vapp was 155kts.

    - The crew received multiple predictive WIND SHEAR alerts but did not go-around.

    - The final pitch occillations just prior to the first touchdown were commanded by the pilot.

    Originally posted by avherald
    Descending between 1100 and 900 feet the crew received 5 cycles of predictive windshear warnings "Wind Shear ahead, go around!". Descending through 260 feet AGL the aircraft began to deviate below the glide slope, a "GLIDESLOPE" warning occurred, descending between 180 to 40 feet the engine thrust was increased causing the aircraft to accelerate to 164 knots, at 16 feet AGL the speed was 170 KIAS. A Terrain Awareness Warning System aural signal "Retard" occurred, the engine thrust was reduced to idle. At that point the captain began to apply oscillating pitch inputs with increasing amplitude which changed the pitch angle up to +6 and -2 degrees.
    - After the first touchdown the ground spoilers did not deploy. In DIRECT law, they must be extended manually. The crew did not extend them during the landing sequence.

    Originally posted by avherald
    The aircraft made a "three point" touchdown 900 meters past the runway threshold at 158 KIAS and a vertical load of +2.55G and bounced up to 6 feet AGL. The spoilers did not deploy, in DIRECT MODE they are not permitted to operate automatically and need to be extended manually, however, the spoilers were not manually extended by the crew. 2 seconds after the first touch down the aircraft touched down a second time with the nose gear first at 155 KIAS and +5.85G, the aircraft bounced off again to 18 feet AGL. A third touchdown occurred at 140 KIAS in excess of +5G resulting in the destruction of the construction, a fuel spill and fire.
    The crew received a fire warning from the tail section during the 'slideout' landing but the fire suppression wasn't activated for another 40 seconds.

    So, overall, it looks like gross pilot error (failure to go-around due to windshear alert and destabilized approach on short final). With plenty of contributing factors. Still unclear is whether there was some overriding reason to continue the approach and land immediately. My guess is that there wasn't.

    Aviation Herald - News, Incidents and Accidents in Aviation

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    There's a new video on avherald that shows the very final approach and first touchdown. First, it needs be said that the video is hard to make out in detail due to the skips and low resolution (why are all airport runway cameras from 1985?) It shows that the plane was positioned to land pretty much at the runway threshold, which suggests a good degree of controllability up until then, but then it also appears that the plane is 'porpoising' even before it touches down—some noticeable pitch instability. It also either touches down very lightly or not at all before the first 'bounce' (no tire smoke). The second touchdown is hard but the plane pitches up and lifts off again. The final 'bounce' is very high. You have to wonder why they didn't go around at that point (maybe not physically possible in that pilot-aircraft coupling wild-bronco state). The main gear remains attached until the final touchdown, which looks almost akin to the 1500ft/min rate of the Heathrow 777 crash.

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    I highly doubt the bounce was caused by direct law alone, but in combination with other failures (or in combination with pilot error),
    Reading comprehension exercise 1: Recheck thread, looking for references to landing at a high speed and crew performance as factors in the bounces.

    that's a different story....the most important question in my estimation: is the SSJ inadequately protected against lightning strikes
    No, it's not "a different story" it's the same plane in the same crash...There's video of a plane flying along beautifully...engines, wings, all functioning...the pilots seemingly in control. Then it goes boom. It's a different aspect, but it's the same story.

    Concur that lightning tolerance is an important question, but the jury is still out on the order of importance. It could very well be that the pilots messed up and crashed a plane that most people would not have crashed...or it could be a nasty stinking fried airliner that isn't reporting key data and is a little more tricky in the flare and hold off phases...or further a combination...

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    electrically compromised aircraft...
    How compromised is the question we need answered. The SSJ-100 has zero mechanical control provisions. If ALL of the FCC's were actually 'fried', I don't see how it would have ever made the runway (Not having any actual architectural reference, I assume you need at least one FCC operating in direct law to maintain control). I also assume, based on the information I've already posted, that it is not difficult to control with a single FCC working in direct law. But what else failed, what cascade of failures was involved? Does the SSJ have the equivalent of an ELAC? Did those both fail? Etcetera.

    I highly doubt the bounce was caused by direct law alone, but in combination with other failures (or in combination with pilot error), that's a different story.

    Which gets me back to the most important question in my estimation: is the SSJ inadequately protected against lightning strikes (or was this one improperly maintained)?

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    Not the black and white answer you seem to be asking for, but enough to counter speculation that SSJ direct law was the primary cause of the bounced landing.
    Regarding reading comprehension, where did I say "primary"?

    I also know that my 172-minustwobodies had 'close to normal handling qualities' as did the Narita MD-11...

    You land it a thousand times and one little bounce...gusty winds, electrically compromised aircraft...

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
    Flankers, Fullbacks, Fulcrums and the like. Russian manufacturers have a rather long history of not being too terribly interested in supporting large fleets of airliners abroad. Even going back to the Yak-40, which at the time of its introduction had NO western competitors and was, at least in some ways, such a forward-looking aircraft that Boeing (!) was interested in a joint venture, the attitude has generally been that it's a game not worth playing. The same has regrettably been the case with engineering support. Consider, for another example, the Tu-154, for which technical support was so poor that non-Soviet users turned to MALEV of Hungary, who at the time had a very advanced tech ops department, for expertise and materials rather than to the manufacturer. When Russian carriers started transitioning to western types, it was almost like the industry was relieved to be able to concentrate on military work.
    Don't you think that's changing? The Chinese are all up in it now. Reviving the commercial airliner industry was a Putin initiative. The Irkut MS-21 is in flight testing using the PW 1400G. There is a lot of consultation and cooperation with western airframers and component suppliers. The days of isolation seem to be over. I agree that they will face an uphill battle in winning over the trust of operators and the public, but they seem to be making some pretty competitive aircraft over there, and if I had to choose between a 737-Max and two MS-21's...

    Leave a comment:


  • ATLcrew
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    ...aaaaaaaaaand what might those be?
    Flankers, Fullbacks, Fulcrums and the like. Russian manufacturers have a rather long history of not being too terribly interested in supporting large fleets of airliners abroad. Even going back to the Yak-40, which at the time of its introduction had NO western competitors and was, at least in some ways, such a forward-looking aircraft that Boeing (!) was interested in a joint venture, the attitude has generally been that it's a game not worth playing. The same has regrettably been the case with engineering support. Consider, for another example, the Tu-154, for which technical support was so poor that non-Soviet users turned to MALEV of Hungary, who at the time had a very advanced tech ops department, for expertise and materials rather than to the manufacturer. When Russian carriers started transitioning to western types, it was almost like the industry was relieved to be able to concentrate on military work.

    Leave a comment:


  • Evan
    replied
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    Ok...so please show me where you established that the 100's fly by wire system does not add stability, and that the loss of that stabilizing system is definitely not a potential factor here.
    I just posted that, under the bold words 'read carefully'.

    [Direct law] is close to Airbus's "direct law", but with improved manual handling qualities as the damping is still available in roll, yaw and pitch channels. "There is no envelope protection, but handling qualities are close to normal," says Dolotovsky.
    Not the black and white answer you seem to be asking for, but enough to counter speculation that SSJ direct law was the primary cause of the bounced landing.

    Leave a comment:


  • 3WE
    replied
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    My emphasis lies with cutting through the BS.
    Ok...so please show me where you established that the 100's fly by wire system does not add stability, and that the loss of that stabilizing system is definitely not a potential factor here.

    Leave a comment:

Working...
X