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Gabriel
Gabriel
Senior Member
Last Activity: Yesterday, 23:24
Joined: 2008-01-18
Location: Buenos Aires - Argentina
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  • Our definitions are not aligned....
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  • It's a completely different kind of MCAS ...
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  • I tend to believe him. Maybe not that he lost control, what I heard him say was the the pilot told him that he lost all instruments for a few seconds and then all came back. I can see how critical sensor information going "blank" for a few seconds can disable the instruments and the flight controls at the same time (in a fully FBW plane), since these sensor info are critical inputs for both the digital instruments and the flight control computers / FBW laws.

    Not much evidence, but:
    - The pax said he was surprised himself that the pilot told him that.
    - Rumors that all 3 flight control computers self-rebooted at the same time.
    - Rumors regarding existing procedures and AD's related to this, that include actions to reboot different systems every X hours, days or cycles, to prevent overflow errors.

    Crazy stuff....
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  • It is a factor in discarding Boeing as the source of the problem....
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  • On an airframe that is 20+ years old, has dozen of thousands of flight hours, and had the wheels inspected hundreds of times, and most likely replaces a few times too....
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  • In a desk drawer in the Renton shop floor....
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  • You don't know what damage may be there, so probably you don't want to risk an ETOPS flight with it.
    Also you don't know what additional damage my happen during landing. If something semi-major were to happen, you probably want the plane in LAX and not in Japan....
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  • Yep. And almost certainly since the spoke the last words over the radio and the transponder went off and the plane started the turn almost immediately after that....
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  • Just finding the wreckage would be a huge closure for the families, and a huge shut the F up for all the other crazy theories.
    Also, you may be able to determine for example if the captain was in the cockpit and the FO was outside, or was inside with a bullet through his head.
    If if both the captain and FO had bullets in their heads and someone else was in the cockpit.
    Physical evidence of the wreckage can help confirm no pre-impact breakup or fire.
    And it is very possible that you may be able to obtain data from the black boxes.
    The black boxes from AF447 were 2 years under the sea. 2 years is not 100, but If the containers of the memory modules remain watertight, there is hope....
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  • Not true!
    Plug doors are retreating too. And bolts. And nuts. And quality control....
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  • 2 thoughts:

    1- This seems to be written by lawyers for shareholeder (liability limitation), not by engineers and test pilots for pilots.

    2- Appreciate that the crew of this accident didn't have a predictive widshear warning, a reactive windshear warning, or a windshear advisory from ATC. In this context, once again, I totally see the pilots in a go-around mindset and noting that the plane is flying like in a normal go around except that look, we have 15 degrees pitch, we are climbing like a rocket, but speed is a tad too low and decaying especially since we have just retracted the flaps to 15, why don't you go ahead and push down a bit. And suddenly bahm, lost 30 knots of airspeed and entered a 2500 fpm downdraft (both of which probably caused most of the nose-down motion). By the time they recognized and reacted to that it was too late to avoid the crash, but at least it saved some lives....
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  • Select quotes:



    I was describing what happened, and asking questions about how things are supposed to happen. I am not pontificating for pilots to execute a maximum performance windshear escape maneuver at the first hint of a windshear (unless that's what the SOP calls for in which case let's follow the SOP or change the SOP to the one that we want to follow).

    A go around is not essentially full power and nose up for a really good climb. Most go arounds are reduced-thrust go around where the target climb rate is 1000 to 2000 fpm only. And in a go around you immediately call for flaps retraction (to a takoffish position) after adding power (actually the call is "go around, flaps 15", as an example) and for gear up after positive climb. And you target for an initial 15 deg pitch and then fine tune for a specific target airspeed.

    Because of that, it is undertandable that, since they were climbing VERY well but the speed was low...
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  • You are talking windshear, right? Becuase go aound I always see (in the YouTube videos) "positive climb, gear up"....
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  • 0:57 - I think that one is reactive (boo-deet winshear, windshear, windshear) and flown as a go around
    2:11 - This one I think is predictive (go around, windshear ahead), not sure if it was flown as go around or widshear escape
    2:40 - again boo-deet winshear, windshear, windshear. I think reactive. Flown as a go around crossing all the t's and dotting all the i's (Go around, toga set, flaps 15, positive climb, gear up)
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  • But this guys are calling go around (not windshear), flaps 15, positive climb, gear up.......
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  • In this video there are several windshear-related go-arounds.

    It called my attention that the pilots always call "go around" and follow go around procedures not only for the predictive windshear warning but also for the actual reactive windshear warning (or at least I think that some of them are reactive).

    So what is the trigger to execute a windshear escape maneuver?

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3RTE5pS0akY...
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  • There was no call for sustained airplane-nose-down pitch and no sustained airplane-nose-down pitch was applied. There was some nose down pitch and not enough pull up pitch for a windshear escape maneuver.


    Negative AoAs, or negative effect on AoA as it is reduced by a downdraft, do not bring on the stall warning. The stall warning is brought on ONLY* by an excessive positive angle of attack, like when they pulled up at the end and by doing so they exceeded the stickshaker AoA which is the real thing that brought on the stall warning.

    Because of the 2 points above is that I, sarcastically, asked what you report are you reading. I omitted the blue font memory item.

    * except spurious warnings due to a vane damage or system malfunction....
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  • What accident report are you looking at, Evan?

    I do agree with Evan a couple of things:

    - Despite some similarities, a go around and a windshear escape maneuver are fundamentally different maneuvers. The windshear escape is more similar to a CTIF escape than to a go around.
    - The main goal in a windshear escape maneuver is "don't sink", and the best way to achieve it is "don't think".Just execute it. Don't change config, firewall the throttles, pitch up to either 20 degrees or to the stickshaker onset (whatever is reached first). In airplanes equipped with PLI just pitch to PLI. Don't watch the airspeed. Don't watch the altitude. Don't watch the vertical speed. Let the PM monitor all that until out of the mess.

    There were several problems here:
    - ATC knew about low level windshear but transmitted that info to the pilots in a frequency different than the one being used by...
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  • Despite the "push it down" instruction from the PIC, the push down inputs by the FO (PF) were brief in duration and small in deflection.
    It looks to me that most of the pitch down motion was not commanded, but the result of a wind that went from 30+ head to 20+ tail with the subsequent loss of 30 kts of airspeed (despite the plane having positive longitudinal acceleration), and of encountering a ~2000 fpm downdraft.​...
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  • A little perspective...

    ...
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