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Gabriel
Gabriel
Senior Member
Last Activity: Yesterday, 22:06
Joined: 2008-01-18
Location: Buenos Aires - Argentina
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  • Correction. Not just the pinger of the CVR was found, but the broken chassis and a good part of the circuitry. The memory module however is still missing and being searched.

    ...
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  • FDR was successfully downloaded with the 330 parameters recovered in good condition.

    On the CVR, the pinger was found, unfortunately detached from the CVR itself, so the search is ongoing.
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  • Might. Depending on what transpired. Anyway I am confident they will recover the CVR too, they detected both pings.
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  • FDR recovered.
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  • If you ask me, and that is just my opinion, go ahead and open a new thread for each new flight or experience for which you want to share pictures, and share as many pictures as you like.

    The FSX pictures that you are sharing here are very nice but they are kind of off topic in this thread (which is about MS launching the new version of MFS)....
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  • Yes, and again:


    When you have 2 of the 3 airspeed indicators giving the same reading, it is (at least initially) not considered an "unreliable airspeed" situation but a "speed disagree" where you discard the not-matching value and take the matching 2 values as good. There is no immediate reason to look at the ISFD when airspeed in the 2 PFD were matching. So they didn't even call a speed disagree on the ISFD.

    When they realized that the power and pitch was inconsistent with the performance indicated in the PFD they looked up at the ISFD and saw that that one was consistent with the power and pitch, so they declared the PFDs unreliable and flew the rest of the flight on the ISFD. A good reason to switch the control over to the captain is that the ISFD is on the left side of the panel....
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  • Which is understandable since both PFD ASI were agreeing (apparently).
    Strange that inconsistent altitude readings are not mentioned throughout the report....
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  • Thank you. This is the link: https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/246156

    And....



    This is exactly what I had in mind:...
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  • Any link?
    It would be interesting to have more details. It should have been something more subtle than just "no airspeed" or, one would think, they would have aborted the take-off within 6000 ft of runway rather tan 6000 ft of altitude....
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  • I have no idea either.

    BTW, I will not spend Christmas alone because I live with my wife and children, but we will be the only ones, and the same for New Year.
    With COVID at its peak in all the world in general and in the United States in particular, it is the sensible thing to do.

    BTW 2: Very nice pictures, even if they are FSX and not FS2020

    Stay safe....
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  • Less than 100% English is perfectly ok.

    Merry Christmas
    Fr÷hliche Weihnachten
    Feliz Navidad
    Feliz Natal
    Buon Natale
    Joyeux NoŰl
    С Рождеством
    圣诞节快乐
    عيد ميلاد سعيد
    חג מולד שמח
    क्रिसमस की बधाई
    メリークリスマス
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  • Regarding these flight tests where Boeing "coached" test pilots and whether or not (or how much) the corporate culture changed at Boeing (and at the FAA)...

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WQIL8CzL-yY
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  • You mean freight that doesn't self-unload?...
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  • You cannot NOT say it. It is just impossible to avoid all failure modes and combinations of failure modes that could potentially cause a confusing situation for the pilots.
    When we get to the fully autonomous plane, it will be "the pax are doomed". In the meantime, it is "the pilots will have to deal with it".
    The only question is where the line is drawn. The certification standards draw it somewhere. But that's an arbitrary limit.



    Which system gives no warning and stealthy fights the pilots commands and has supremacy over pilot commands? If you mean the MCAS, it is a gross misrepresentation.
    The trim being actuated during 10 seconds in a 737 is impossible to miss (both visually and audibly), so you have warning.
    You can FEEL the its effect in your hands too (control forces), so not stealthy either.
    And the pilot can override it just using the normal electric trim input, or using the manual wheel, and can kill...
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  • But you have the Eyeball Mark IV bio-optical altimeter as backup, although I've heard it is unreliable in IMC at night as Aeroper˙ was facing....
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  • Oh, that one. Thank you.

    Another one with poor crew performance that started when they did not abort the take-off after recognizing (at the 80 knots speed crosscheck) that there was a problem with the Captain's (PF) airspeed indication.

    This one was a problem with 1 of 3 pitot tubes / airspeed indicators. Doesn't even qualify as an unreliable speed (just a speed disagree)....
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  • One of them, I suppose, was Aeroper˙ Flight 603 where maintenance personnel put tape on all 3 static ports to wash the plane and then forgot to remove it.
    Which was the other one?

    In Aeroper˙, the crew remained relatively calm and functioning as a well coordinated crew for most of the event that lasted almost 30 minutes (the communications with ATC and the CVR recordings are available on the internet).

    This is another example where the crew (and ATC) could have saved the day but made several mistakes.

    They identified that they had airspeed and altitude disagree, and yet...
    • They didn't use the: P+P=P concept (Pitch + Power = Performance). I've heard that the current UAS procedure with memory-item power and pitch and look-up tables did not exist at that time, but you should still know that if you have the throttles fully retarded, the speedbrakes fully extended, and a more-or-less level attitude, you are not accelerating towards an overspeed.
    • This
    ...
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  • Again, I disagree. I mean, I agree with the above timeline-wise (first comes dosing and certification, then operation). But NOT as a hierarchy.


    Of course they can, they have, they are and they will be considered the last level of defense for any technical or operational issue.


    I agree, but nothing is perfect, including design and certification.

    Look, you are getting quite black and white again here. Let's start with the ideal: Planes that are designed and certified correctly as passing all the requirements and have no known issues that would made them not-certifiable.

    Safety is not an absolute. There are limitations on how safe something can be made and these limitations have different sources, can be practical, technological, economic... Things can ALWAYS be made safer.

    It is not like something that barely meets the certification standards is suddenly safe and something that almost meets it is totally unsafe....
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  • There I strongly disagree.
    Yes, A should have happened B should have happened, but then B, C and D (which would save the day if A and B didn't) are unnecessary?
    That's not how aviation safety became so good.
    Yes, it is good to cut the sequence of events that lead to a crash as soon as possible, in the first slices of swiss cheese. But having it escape the first layers and stopping it at another slice down the line is still much better than crashing.
    Take AF447 for example.
    Human factors do exist but they can and must be addressed too. That's why we have (or should have) FOQA, division of work/tasks, cross-checking, communication protocols between pilots, CRM, and training, training, training. They will never be perfect, but at the same time we cannot accept anything less than perfect, which means that we always need to work on improving them. If Ethiopian and the aviation industry at great don't take a lesson on human factors from the Ethiopian crash (and...
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  • Well, this is the first time I used the word "shame" in this thread



    So you think that they knew or that they didn't? You seem a little bit contradictory.
    We will never know what they knew. We know that Ethiopian limited their training on the subject to distributing the SB/EAS among pilots. Yes, shame on them.
    And there was more to be known. Things that you and me knew.
    A pilot worth their epaulette should have enough interest and curiosity as to research a fatal crash that just happened in the type of plane he is flying.
    Again, that doesn't remove an inch of responsibility on the airline, Boeing and the FAA for their actions.
    Responsibility (accountability), unlike liability, is one of the few things that you have any less when you share it.

    My initial post was about how there were many opportunities that could and should ave stopped the Ethiopian accident to happen.
    And the Ethiopian pilots were ONE...
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