Air France plane missing?

[SYDCBRWOD]

Maybe not: "Airbus Industries have decided to invest up to 20 million Euros (US$ 27.8 million) into the search for the black boxes of the crashed Air France Airbus, the company announced on Friday (Jul 31st). This will ensure at minimum an additional three months of search for the missing recorders. Airbus said, that they want to definitely know what happened."

(From Aviation Herald)

x 2. Wasn't it Honeywell that was boasting that they had never failed to recover one of their boxes? I'd say there's still a good chance they will be recovered - it will just take time.

[SYDCBRWOD]

Plus all the issues with the A330/A340's also have appranantly have had ADIRU failures. I'm Thinking this is the problem... Not the lame ass Pitot tubes. Don't matter if say QF72 and AF447 had differnt ADIRU's installed, Software is probably pretty damn close to the same if not the same.

Agreed. BUT, what caused the ADIRU's to have the hissy fit? In the case of the Qantas aircraft, that was in fine weather, so lightning could be ruled out as a common source. If it wasn't a serious disagreement in one of the data inputs (pitot readings) that threw them offline what could have done this?

[Evan]

Plus all the issues with the A330/A340's also have appranantly have had ADIRU failures. I'm Thinking this is the problem... Not the lame ass Pitot tubes. Don't matter if say QF72 and AF447 had differnt ADIRU's installed, Software is probably pretty damn close to the same if not the same.

The evidence doesn't support that. Qantas 72 experienced an IR fault, an erroneous AoA input, not an ADR air data fault. The fault at the onset was NAV IR1 FAULT.

AF447 doesn't report an IR fault until 2:13 (occurring during the 2:11 window), well into the sequence of failures:

.1/FLR/FR0906010211 34123406IR2 1,EFCS1X,IR1,IR3,,,,ADIRU2 (1FP2),HARD

ADIRU2 (1FP2) (2 h 11)
ATA: 341234
Source: IR2
Identifiers: *EFCS1, IR1, IR3
Class 1, HARD

This is most likely due to cascading failures. It is not an initiating factor. It comes after the pitot disagree message, which occurs in the 2:10 window:

- .1/FLR/FR0906010210 34111506EFCS2 1,EFCS1,AFS,,,,,PROBE-PITOT 1X2 / 2X3 / 1X3 (9DA),HARD

ATA: 341115
Source: EFCS2
Identifiers: EFCS1, AFS
Class 1, HARD

Neither of the Qantas flights received this message.

EASA issued the AD 2009-0012-E in January to address the fact that the faulty ADIRU could not be positively deactivated by the pushbutton, and might still be providing erroneous AoA data to other systems despite the illumination of the OFF light, and that the IR rotary switch needs to be selected to off as well. This is where the problem lurks in the Airbus system design, the thing Leightman is referring to, where the systems may be impeding the pilots ability to take the plane off-line and fly manually, that they might make things more difficult and confusing for pilots.

[Evan]

It has been said MANY times before... The reason the A320's -AA were changed out for problems during TAKE-OFF & LANDING phase of flight. NOT Cruise, which seems to be the problem of the A330/A340.

Air France NT 34-029, dated August 20, 2008 (issued in French and English):

DESCRIPTION
The purpose of this NT is to gather information in order confirm the involvement of pitot probes in case of "Nav IAS discrepancy".
At the time of creation of the NT, a case on THT and six cases on A340 AFR have been reported. Investigations conducted on Airbus family aircraft showed that most of airspeed discrepancy events were due to Pitot water ingress and to probe draining holes obstructed by external particles. Another hypothesis is in study on a possible saturation of pitots by crystallized ice in high flight level. In particular flight condition, a speed discrepancy between system 1 and 2 or total loss of airspeed indications could appear with auto pilot disengagement, auto thr off, etc.

Associated warning
-F/CTL ALTN LAW
-WINDSHEAR DETECT FAULT
-NAV IAS DISCREPANCY
-AUTO FLT AP OFF
-AUTO FLT A/THR OFF

These characteristics warning appeared simultaneously, the auto pilot disengagement occur when system 1 and 2 lose their information.

CORRECTIVE ACTION
A new standard of pitot probe is available PN: Cl6l95BA. The installation of this PN is in progress by attrition on the fleet.
The new pitot probe corrects the problems with enhanced water trap and relocated drain holes.

(Notice: it does not specifically claim to correct the problems with ice crystal saturation. This is the ambiguous area.)

[Leightman]

Great posts at 3:36 and 5:51 Evan.

"EASA issued the AD 2009-0012-E in January to address the fact that the faulty ADIRU could not be positively deactivated by the pushbutton, and might still be providing erroneous AoA data to other systems despite the illumination of the OFF light, and that the IR rotary switch needs to be selected to off as well."

Not even being able to easily turn the thing off doesn't exactly fill me with confidence.

[Evan]

Great posts at 3:36 and 5:51 Evan.

"EASA issued the AD 2009-0012-E in January to address the fact that the faulty ADIRU could not be positively deactivated by the pushbutton, and might still be providing erroneous AoA data to other systems despite the illumination of the OFF light, and that the IR rotary switch needs to be selected to off as well."

Not even being able to easily turn the thing off doesn't exactly fill me with confidence.

Basically, you just have to keep pulling breakers until it can't sing the daisy song anymore.

[MCM]

Come on Evan,

That was two very good posts in a row... no need for the sensationalist stuff.

You do not have to touch the breakers. Selecting two swtiches in accordance with a new checklist is not excessively difficult.

I'd also be a little careful assuming the order and timing of the messages received in the AF case.

[Leightman]

New evidence has ceased to appear. Unless more wreckage is found--and I think there's not an unreasonable chance of that--we may be stuck until another report is issued. Even if they find wreckage, it will be easier to keep a cork on what gets out. Do investigation plans include any other interim reports prior to a final report? Do we look forward to a very long period of no information and then a final report?

[EconomyClass]

The delay in recovering the data recorder is time during which other crashes could well occur due to the lack of knowledge of the cause of this plane's failure. I've heard of black boxes found years later. But will people just have to avoid this plane model till whenever that is?

[YULchick]

RE: Pitot tubes & angle of attack sensors

Above are both items that have been possibly (allegedly?) linked to recent crashes/incidents, including AF447.

I know some people at one of the main manufacturers of the above, so, I'm not telling you which one, but suffice it to say, there has been a great deal of swapping of parts at another aircraft manufacturer recently (other than Airbus). And there aren't enough spare parts available to do the swapping out.

They parts are costly per piece, not to mention the cost/time involved in moving them around the world quickly, and they aren't being manufactured quickly enough for the demand right now, in either case.

[Evan]

RE: Pitot tubes & angle of attack sensors

I know some people at one of the main manufacturers of the above, so, I'm not telling you which one

Why aren't you telling us which one? Haven't we had enough secrecy on this issue?

[Gabriel]

The delay in recovering the data recorder is time during which other crashes could well occur due to the lack of knowledge of the cause of this plane's failure. I've heard of black boxes found years later. But will people just have to avoid this plane model till whenever that is?

Stop it, would you?

This airplane type has more than 15 years of history, more than 1,000,000 flights, and more than 10,000,000 flight hours, and it had had no fatal accident in service until the AF crash.

I know statistics don't help those aboard the AF that crashed, but when you have to make a decision that involves risk management (and every decision does) you have to base it on probabiliies.

Any airplane type can crash just tomorrow. If you are too afraid of that, then don't even take the elvator in the morning (nor the stairs, they have killed people too).

[EconomyClass]

Any airplane type can crash just tomorrow. If you are too afraid of that, then don't even take the elvator in the morning (nor the stairs, they have killed people too).

As for elevators in general, I understand how the brakes work and have a high degree of confidence in them. They do not depend on things like language, operators, or weather.

And the people in charge of making flying safe are concerned, very much so, so I think my concern is as legitimate as theirs. It has been shown over and over that people in all corners affecting the service of flying are more vulnerable to breakdown than the planes. They are there as a "backstop", but that backstop has holes in it big enough for hundreds of unassuming laypeople to pass through on the way to their graves. It seems to bother fans and professionals on this board to see words displayed that don't phrase things in euphemisms. But more and more, the people who are charged to protect outsiders from the mental hangups of the insiders are being blunt about this (for example, the NTSB chairman who says "we can't afford the number of near misses we're having, we're looking at a disaster waiting to happen"). If they can be that blunt, I feel totally justified in being that blunt.

You know, the very FACT that commercial aviation has become like a vascular system for the world economy makes it IMPERATIVE to fix the glaring flaws. People here seem to see flying as mostly a leisure time activity that people can just stop doing. But if flying became a lot rarer, I'm telling you the world economy will simply grind to a halt.

[YULchick]

Why aren't you telling us which one? Haven't we had enough secrecy on this issue?

Evan, there's 2 of them, take your pick, I'm not jeopardizing the source of my information, which is very solid thankyouverymuch.

[Evan]

Evan, there's 2 of them, take your pick, I'm not jeopardizing the source of my information, which is very solid thankyouverymuch.

Well, I'll have to file that as an unsubstantiated rumor then.

Thales or Goodrich... hmmm... well, Thales had the initial demand and was rumored to have been unable to meet supply back then... but now they are out of vogue because EASA wants Goodrich parts on all those planes... so you must be referring to Goodrich then!

But I didn't hear it from you.