Crash 737 Islamabad

[Evan]

It's not that I think pilots always need to use one or the other; I'm just looking for consistency in how we approach the problem. If the reason you don't want pilots to use basic airmanship knowledge as their first recourse at a UAS event is because they are lacking in the skills and competence to consistently make that happen, it seems inconsistent to turn around and expect them to use that very same level of airmanship in a different situation. It makes more sense (to me at least) to say that pilots ought always exercise their skill and judgement - that's always ok as a first recourse - but there are also fallback procedures they can turn to when reason and judgement are out the window.

Again, I think knowing when to follow procedures is exercising skill and judgement. Let me repost what I posted in the B&W thinking thread (which somehow migrated over here). Here, read this again:

I know how I want pilots to think: I want them to view rules and procedures, not as oppressive and idiotic rote exercises (as you seem to perceive them), but rather as valuable assets, safeguards against human factor errors—which have been well documented over the years. I want pilots to think: "under stress, I might not have the right instinct, but by following the learned procedures I will avoid the possibility of making the wrong decision. I want pilots to be humble enough to realize that enormous amounts of science, research and engineering have been enlisted in developing these procedures". To acknowledge this is not black and white thinking. It is rationale. It does not preclude the pilot's ability to abstract when facing a situation that is unique, where no procedure exists, where the pilot must extrapolate from a solid education in aerodynamics and systems. In short, where a black and white procedure is called for, I want that procedure adhered to. Where no such procedure exists, I want the pilot to be able to create the best strategy based upon a deep knowledge of all the factors involved. The key to all of this is knowing when to adhere and when to improvise. So, as I see it, pilots must be black, white and grey thinkers, but must also have the sound judgement to know when to think rigidly vs creatively.

I see UAS at cruise as a place to adhere to procedures because those procedures have been engineered for a highly predictable situation, whereas a stall in ground proximity is definitely a dynamic situation consisting of factors that cannot be predicted when writing a procedure, where judgement based upon solid airmanship is vital to the outcome.

[3WE]

Some airplanes / airlines had a procedure to go for TOGA and some fixed pitch attitude (say 12° nose-up).

Ok, that's wack.

BINGO!

...and let's practice that in the simulator every other recurrent training!

[Evan]

Of course, then there is something we might call Gabriel's Paradox, which states that if a pilot has the solid judgement and airmanship skills to react properly to a stall, he probably would not have got into a stall in the first place.

So... stall recovery for dummies? My head is beginning to hurt.

[3WE]

Evan, you don't get it!

Of course, then there is something we might call Gabriel's Paradox...

...etc...

...My head is beginning to hurt.

Evan, you DO get it!

[Gabriel]

Final report out. What is clear is that the authorities of Pakistan's CAA today are not only different from those in 2012, but they are in opposite political sides, and they don't go along well with each other:

Pakistan's CAA have released their final report concluding the probable causes of the crash were: [...] The inability of CAA Pakistan to [...]

http://avherald.com/h?article=44e48c2a/0000&opt=0

http://caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/SIBReports/SIB-350.pdf

And what happened? The windshear of Delta's L-1011 combined with the pilots of Turkish 737 at Amsterdam.

The collection of warning themes that the crew enjoyed "Windshear" "Woop-woop, Pull-Up", AP disconnect horn, and "clacklacklacklack". Meanwhile, the pilots just kept sitting there and watched the AP unsuccessfully fight the situation while trying to follow the ILS, and when the autopilot finally gave up and disconnected itself, they just keep sitting there watching Newton unsuccessfully fly the plane. When they finally reacted, they stalled. And when they stalled, they overreacted the correction.

The plane crashed at 215kts and a very small AoA with a pitch of about zero degrees. I can hear the AA instructor in these videos saying, about the Delta windshear accident (that impacted in a very similar state): "Did they have an energy problem or a lift problem?"