On Feb 3rd 2015 the NTSB opened the docket into the investigation with all factual information available so far. The operational factual report stated, that the captain and first officer of the flight did not have prior experience in transporting armoured vehicles, 2 of which weighed 13 tons each and 3 18 tons each. It has been the first itime for National Air Cargo to transport 18 ton vehicles when those were taken aboard in Camp Bastion. The flight was originally planned to depart Camp Bastion directly for Dubai, the flight however did not receive overflight permission over Pakistan out of Camp Bastion. Hence the flight was planned to Bagram for a refuelling stop and then depart to Dubai. No additional cargo was loaded in Bagram, just 48 tons of fuel were added.
The NTSB reported that while on the ground in Bagram the captain was informed by one of the crew members that one of the straps had broken. The crew engaged in a discussion about a possible load shift while landing in Bagram, there was also discussion of re-securing the load prior to departure. The aircraft departed an hour later. (Editorial note: in the entire docket The Aviation Herald was unable to find any answer to the question, whether the cockpit discussion about the broken strap and possible load shift on landing resulted in action or whether nothing was done about)
The takeoff roll on runway 03 was normal, the aircraft rotated at the usual point. 9 seconds after the "rotate" call by the crew the cockpit voice recorder stopped recording just after the "gear up" call, 3 seconds later the flight data recorder at 171 KIAS, 13 degrees nose up, 4 degrees right bank and 33 feet AGL with no warnings or unusual recordings until and at that point. According to witnesses on the ground including tower controller and several other observers on the ground the aircraft continued to pitch up until it appeared to be stalling, turned to the right and impacted ground just right of the runway and beyond the departure end of the runway.
According to interviews 26 straps were used for tie down of the 18 ton Cougars, 24 straps for the 13 ton vehices. Each strap was capable of a load of 5000 lbs (2.27 tons). A number of witnesses interviewed were quoted stating that "only" two straps were added to the heavier Cougar in comparism to the 13 ton vehicle.
The NTSB reported that while on the ground in Bagram the captain was informed by one of the crew members that one of the straps had broken. The crew engaged in a discussion about a possible load shift while landing in Bagram, there was also discussion of re-securing the load prior to departure. The aircraft departed an hour later. (Editorial note: in the entire docket The Aviation Herald was unable to find any answer to the question, whether the cockpit discussion about the broken strap and possible load shift on landing resulted in action or whether nothing was done about)
The takeoff roll on runway 03 was normal, the aircraft rotated at the usual point. 9 seconds after the "rotate" call by the crew the cockpit voice recorder stopped recording just after the "gear up" call, 3 seconds later the flight data recorder at 171 KIAS, 13 degrees nose up, 4 degrees right bank and 33 feet AGL with no warnings or unusual recordings until and at that point. According to witnesses on the ground including tower controller and several other observers on the ground the aircraft continued to pitch up until it appeared to be stalling, turned to the right and impacted ground just right of the runway and beyond the departure end of the runway.
According to interviews 26 straps were used for tie down of the 18 ton Cougars, 24 straps for the 13 ton vehices. Each strap was capable of a load of 5000 lbs (2.27 tons). A number of witnesses interviewed were quoted stating that "only" two straps were added to the heavier Cougar in comparism to the 13 ton vehicle.
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