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The Avianca flight that ran out of fuel. Was it ever suggested they adapt to interruptions in the flight plan by diverting somewhere between origin and destination?
Not sure what it is you are asking here? Are you specifically asking about the Avianca flight?
How can I look at that and declare that the AA 587 pilot was a total idiot for wanting to use rapid reversal pedal inputs in response to roll?...Fixed.
Evan, what data do you have to support that the pilot flying AA 587 thought, "I WANT TO USE rapid, repeated rudder reversals for roll"?
I am aware of the FDR and the CVR, but not the PTR- Pilot thinking recorder.
But I know, you really think that's what went through his mind.
Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
Evan, what data do you have to support that the pilot flying AA 587 thought, "I WANT TO USE rapid, repeated rudder reversals for roll"?
I am aware of the FDR and the CVR, but not the PTR- Pilot thinking recorder.
But I know, you really think that's what went through his mind.
Read what I posted. He was in a 23° bank at the onset. He trained in a wake turbulence simulation that had the a/c roll over to 90° (and more) by freezing the control surfaces reactions until that point (something that wouldn't happen in reality). In the same program he trained for roll recovery at high AoA (requiring rudder technique—NOT reversals). It was all balled together in an unusual attitudes recovery program. Wake turbulence recovery in the A300 is not unusual attitude recovery. It's a roll disturbance with some yaw component that is well within the capabilities of the yaw damper. But, being taught that in wake turbulence with significant roll one must treat it as a high AoA, aileron compromised situation or go inverted, where rudder is called for, he used rudder. It had the effect, due to the phase lag, of creating an escalating PIO clusterfuck, so back and forth he went as the yaw situation deteriorated. And then, you know, snap crackle POP.
Stabilized approach concepts, CRM, monitoring, and cross-checking procedures
.
Not in the list...
Pilot-flying's duties: flying the airplane, use of the Primary Flight Display, governance of vital flight parameters.
Human factors: complacency, primary-backup inversion, overreliance.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
WASHINGTON (AP) — The pilot whose Boeing 777 crashed last summer at the San Francisco airport told investigators he was "very concerned" about attempting a visual approach without the runway's instrument landing aids, which were out of service because of construction, according to an investigative report released Wednesday.
Lee Kang Kuk, a 46-year-old pilot who was landing the big jet for his first time at San Francisco, "stated it was very difficult to perform a visual approach with a heavy airplane." The jet came in too low and slow and crash-landed, killing three people and injuring more than 200, according to the National Transportation Safety Board.
A visual approach involves lining the jet up for landing by looking through the windshield and using numerous other cues, rather than relying on a radio-based system that guides aircraft to the runway.
The investigative report was released at the start of a daylong NTSB hearing that was called to answer lingering questions about the crash, not to conclude exactly what went wrong.
Though Lee was an experienced pilot with the Korea-based airline, he was a trainee captain in the 777, with less than 45 hours in the jet. He had not piloted an airliner into San Francisco since 2004, according to NTSB investigator Bill English. [It was a long final. How can it be so different from any other long final at any other airport?]
So far, the investigation has not found any mechanical problems with the 777 prior to impact, although testing is ongoing, English said.
Lee told investigators that he realized others had been safely landing at San Francisco without the glide-slope indicator, an array of antennas that transmits a signal into the cockpit to help with the descent. That system was out of service while the runway was expanded. It has since been restored.
In his interview, the trainee said that while privately he was "very concerned" about his ability to do a visual approach, [ok, tha't enough, flying planes is not for you] "everyone else had been doing (it), so he could not say he could not do the visual approach."
There were other indications that a culture of not acknowledging weakness — and of deferring to a higher-ranking colleague — contributed to the crash.
Lee told NTSB investigators that he did not immediately move to abort the landing and perform a "go around" as the plane descended because he felt that only the instructor pilot had the authority to initiate that emergency move. [Emergency move? Since when a go-around is an emergency? Not doing the go-around and letting the plane become to low and slow was the emergency]
A reluctance of junior officers to speak up had been an issue in past accidents, though industry training has tried to emphasize that safety should come first.
Lee also conceded that he was worried about his unfamiliarity with the 777's autoflight systems. He admitted he had not studied the systems well enough and thought that the plane's autothrottle was supposed to prevent the jet from flying below minimum speed as it drew near the runway. [Ok, say that it was supposed to do it, you were still supposed to monitor it in case it fails]
But two other Asiana pilots who took an instruction class with Lee said that they were told that the throttle hold did not automatically re-engage under certain autopilot modes.
"This pilot should never have taken off," [A smart word from a lawyer, wow (sorry TeeVee, just joking.. half)]said attorney Ilyas Akbari, whose firm represents 14 of the passengers. "The fact that the pilot was stressed and nervous is a testament to the inadequate training he received, and those responsible for his training and for certifying his competency bear some of the culpability for the tragedy of this crash."
Lee told investigators that as he realized his approach was off, he was worried he might "fail his flight and would be embarrassed." [.. so he said "let's try being dead instead", but failed there too]
Another Asiana pilot who recently flew with Lee told investigators that he was not sure if the trainee captain was making normal progress and that he did not perform well during a trip two days before the accident. That captain described Lee as "not well organized or prepared," according to the investigative report. [so... everybody knew it, except the airline's instructors and check pilots]
Asiana's chief pilot told investigators that the airline recommended pilots use as much automation "as possible."
At least, not being honest is not a thing for which this captain can be blamed.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
Lee also conceded that he was worried about his unfamiliarity with the 777's autoflight systems.
A captain in line training—A CAPTAIN!!—is unfamiliar with the autoflight systems that fly the plane 99% of the time?!! What is he familiar with that could get him PF duty in this cockpit?
A CAPTAIN with 45 hours on type in the left seat (??) with 291 passengers aboard?!!!
So what do they require of an F/O? A motorcycle license? 2 hours in a hang glider?
This is NOT an Asiana issue. This is a CAA issue and a CULTURAL issue. You won't find me on any Korean flagged airlines after reading this.
Not that this is accurate, but does anybody know what modes this could indicate:
As Flight 214 from Seoul neared San Francisco, it was being flown by Lee Kang Kuk. While descending near the runway, the training pilot entered a series of parameters into the flight-management and auto-throttle systems that made the plane think he wanted to accelerate and climb.
This is NOT an Asiana issue. This is a CAA issue and a CULTURAL issue. You won't find me on any Korean flagged airlines after reading this.
(I wonder if he is an ex-military pilot)
My current boss was part of the Boeing/Alteon team that was tasked with introducing the 737 to Korean Air. Some of the stories he tells about that experience are...interesting.
Not that this is accurate, but does anybody know what modes this could indicate:
I guess FLTCH. You enter the new altitude, select FLTCH and the current speed on the AP and then cimb thrust on the AT, and it will climb at constant speed adjusting the pitch as necessary.
Of course you can do the opposite and descent in FLTCH mode too.
All in all, what's written there is nonsense.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
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